Historically, landlocked countries have struggled with structural disadvantages that complicate trade, raise transportation costs, and limit access to international markets. Without direct access to seaports, these states must rely on the infrastructure, regulations, and political goodwill of their neighbors to move goods beyond their borders. Among such countries, Uzbekistan occupies a particularly unique and challenging position.
It is one of only two double landlocked nations in the world—meaning that to reach a seaport, goods must cross the territory of at least two other countries. This geographic reality has long shaped Uzbekistan’s economic prospects, placing significant constraints on its ability to engage in global trade. The legacy of these challenges was starkly reflected in 2007, when Uzbekistan ranked 123rd out of 150 countries in the World Bank’s Logistics Performance Index, underscoring its logistical and infrastructural weaknesses.[1]
Yet geography, while fixed, does not determine destiny. Since 2016, when President Shavkat Mirziyoyev assumed power, Uzbekistan has pursued a proactive foreign and domestic policy agenda aimed at reframing its landlocked status not as a liability but as an opportunity. Through a strategy of economic liberalization, regional integration, and diplomatic outreach, Tashkent has sought to position the country as a strategic crossroads at the heart of Eurasia.
Rather than being seen as a logistical bottleneck, Uzbekistan now presents itself as a central hub connecting major markets across Asia, the Middle East, and Europe. This reframing has enabled the country to attract international partners and investors who view it as a pivotal component of emerging transcontinental trade networks.
At the core of this shift is Uzbekistan’s adoption of a balanced, multi-vector transport strategy designed to hedge against overreliance on any single corridor, neighbor, or partner. By investing in multiple international transport routes and prioritizing a “good neighbor” foreign policy, the government aims to construct a resilient and diversified network of trade corridors.
This approach not only reduces exposure to geopolitical risks but also enhances the country’s long-term economic security by ensuring stable, redundant access to global markets. In doing so, Uzbekistan is gradually transforming its inherited geographic constraints into a source of strategic strength, redefining both its national identity and its role within the broader Eurasian landscape.
Economic Dynamics of the Transport Sector
Since 2016, the Government of Uzbekistan has actively engaged with a wide range of international partners to attract investment and modernize its transport sector. Through cooperation with international financial institutions such as the World Bank, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, the Asian Development Bank (ADB), and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), Uzbekistan has gained access to much-needed financing, technical expertise, and policy advice.
These partnerships have become a cornerstone of the country’s strategy to upgrade infrastructure, improve logistics, and integrate more effectively into regional and global markets. Several flagship projects illustrate this engagement. For example, the ADB has financed the refurbishment of a 77 km stretch of the Karshi–Shakhrisabz–Kitab highway as well as an 87 km section of the A-380 Guzar–Bukhara–Nukus–Beineu road, both aimed at enhancing capacity, connectivity, and climate resilience.[2]
Similarly, the AIIB has co-financed the Bukhara Road Network Improvement Project and the Bukhara-Miskin-Urgench-Khiva Railway Electrification Project, which are designed to improve transport services, increase efficiency, and build more resilient infrastructure. Together, these projects not only improve physical connectivity but also support Uzbekistan’s ambition to become a regional transit hub.[3]
Beyond IFIs, Uzbekistan has deepened investment links with key partners, including China, Russia, Qatar, and Türkiye. These relationships have provided access not only to capital but also to advanced technologies and managerial expertise in logistics and infrastructure development.
Between 2017 and 2024, Uzbekistan attracted over US$113 billion in total foreign investment, more than 80% of which comprised foreign direct investment and concessional loans.[4] The transport and road construction sectors have been a priority focus within this inflow, with public-private partnership projects alone expected to mobilize an additional US$14 billion in investments in the coming years. The modernization of the transport sector has already begun to generate significant economic value for Uzbekistan.[5]
The sector contributes between 8-9% of national GDP and provides employment to nearly 1 million workers. In addition, the expansion of international transport operations has created more than 50,000 new jobs in the past five years, primarily through the purchase and deployment of modern truck fleets. These gains have been matched by notable improvements in Uzbekistan’s global competitiveness: over the past decade, the country has climbed from 129th to 88th place in the World Bank’s Logistics Performance Index.[6]
Taken together, these dynamics highlight how targeted investment, strategic partnerships, and proactive reforms are transforming Uzbekistan’s transport sector into a driver of economic growth, employment, and regional integration. By leveraging both international finance and domestic policy innovation, the country is steadily reducing the constraints imposed by its geography and positioning itself as a key link in transcontinental trade.
The Multi-Vector Approach to Transit
Uzbekistan’s strategy for developing its transport sector is not limited to attracting foreign investment and financing; it is equally about embedding the country into the wider network of Eurasian transport corridors.
Historically, around 80% of Uzbekistan’s exports and imports have transited through Russia, making the country highly vulnerable to geopolitical shocks, sanctions regimes, and supply chain disruptions. Such overdependence has posed not only economic risks but also potential social risks, as disruptions in trade routes can directly impact prices, employment, and public welfare.[7]
To address these vulnerabilities, Uzbekistan has adopted a multi-vector corridor strategy designed to diversify trade routes and reduce reliance on any single transit country. This approach aims to balance dependence on the Russian corridor while simultaneously positioning Uzbekistan as a “land-linked” rather than a landlocked country. By developing new connections, Tashkent seeks to transform itself into a competitive alternative transit hub to Kazakhstan within Central Asia.
Two corridors are particularly critical in this strategy: the Middle Corridor, which connects China and Central Asia to Europe via the South Caucasus and Türkiye, and the Southern Transport Corridor, which links Central Asia to Iran, Afghanistan, and South Asia. Together, these routes are central to Uzbekistan’s multi-vector foreign policy, enabling the country to build resilient and diversified access to global markets while enhancing its role as a regional connector.
The Trans-Caspian Pivot
Since 2022, Uzbekistan has placed growing emphasis on the Middle Corridor—also known as the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route (TITR)—as a vital alternative to the northern transit path through Russia. The conflict in Ukraine and growing geopolitical risks have underscored the importance of diversifying trade routes. By investing in the Middle Corridor, Uzbekistan is bolstering resilience and access to European markets via the South Caucasus and Türkiye.
Tashkent’s strategic plan includes a five-year infrastructure upgrade program, along with a US$18 million investment in a logistics terminal at Georgia’s Poti Free Industrial Zone—steps designed to streamline trade and reinforce Uzbekistan’s role as a transit hub.[8]
Another critical element is the China-Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan (CKU) railway, which enables cargo to bypass Kazakhstan. A joint holding company will lead the project, with 51% ownership by a Chinese firm and 24% each by Kyrgyz and Uzbek entities. China has pledged a US$2.35 billion low-interest loan (approximately half the total cost), leaving Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan responsible for about US$700 million each. Once completed, the CKU railway is estimated to cut transit distance by roughly 900 km and reduce shipping time by around eight days—a potential game-changer for the region.[9]
The Middle Corridor’s appeal is not only economic but also geopolitical. Unlike the northern route, which is increasingly unpredictable due to political risks around Russia, or the southern routes through Iran—vulnerable to regional instability—the Central Asia-South Caucasus axis remains comparatively stable. Developments like the Kyrgyz-Tajik border agreement and normalization efforts between Armenia and Azerbaijan further enhance regional security. For Uzbekistan, the Middle Corridor offers a sanction-free, politically steady, and long-term-friendly route.
A new development known as the Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity (TRIPP) further elevates the corridor’s strategic importance. As part of a U.S.-mediated peace agreement between Armenia and Azerbaijan signed on 8 August 2025, Armenia granted the U.S. a 99-year lease to develop the road, linking Azerbaijan to its Nakhchivan exclave across southern Armenian territory.[10]
Under the agreement, a U.S.-backed consortium will build rail, road, energy, and communication infrastructure, all while Armenia retains sovereignty over the land. The corridor is expected to accelerate connectivity between Türkiye, the Caspian, and Central Asia—solidifying Uzbekistan’s economic integration into Europe and beyond.
This new route offers Uzbekistan additional strategic flexibility. By further diversifying access through both Georgian and Armenian pathways, Tashkent reduces dependency on any single transit country and enhances resilience against geopolitical disruptions.
In summary, the Middle Corridor—including the CKU railway and the newly established TRIPP corridor—embodies Uzbekistan’s strategy of turning geographic constraints into diplomatic and economic strengths. By expanding transport options, the country is positioning itself as a central, adaptable hub in Eurasia’s emerging trade architecture.
Strategic Detour: The Southern Corridor Option
While Uzbekistan has prioritized East-West connectivity through the Middle Corridor, it is simultaneously developing southern transport routes to secure direct access to the Indian Ocean and the fast-growing markets of South Asia, a region home to more than two billion people. This southward orientation is a key pillar of Uzbekistan’s ambition to transition from landlocked to land-linked, unlocking new opportunities for trade diversification and economic growth.
The centerpiece of this strategy is the ambitious Trans-Afghan Railway, which envisions a line connecting Mazar-i-Sharif to Kabul and onward to Peshawar, where it would link with Pakistan’s rail network and seaports at Karachi and Gwadar. If completed, this railway would provide the shortest route to seaports for Uzbekistan and its Central Asian neighbors. Estimates suggest it could reduce transit times from Pakistan to Uzbekistan from 35 days to just 3-5 days, while slashing transportation costs by nearly threefold.[11]
Such a shift would radically enhance Uzbekistan’s trade competitiveness, enabling it not only to save on imports but also to expand exports of textiles, processed metals, chemicals, and fresh agricultural products into South Asian and global markets. Beyond trade, the railway would generate transit revenues, spur the development of logistics services, and create value-added export zones near key nodes such as Termez, turning border regions into dynamic economic hubs.
However, the success of the Trans-Afghan route is inseparable from long-term security in Afghanistan. Without credible assurances of stability, private companies and international financial institutions are unlikely to commit the large-scale funding necessary to make the project viable. The lack of security also undermines investor confidence in the railway’s long-term sustainability, making it one of the most politically sensitive infrastructure projects in the region.
Recognizing these risks, Uzbekistan has also sought to revive alternative southern routes that bypass Afghanistan. One such option is the Uzbekistan-Turkmenistan-Iran corridor, which connects Central Asia to Iran’s ports. While progress on this route has been constrained by international sanctions on Iran, recent increases in Turkmen transit efficiency have improved the cost and speed of shipping Uzbek goods westward, prompting Tashkent to reconsider its potential.[12]
If sanctions were eased and regional stability improved, this route could provide a valuable complement to the Trans-Afghan corridor, offering an additional southern gateway to global markets. Nevertheless, both southern routes face persistent uncertainties. Ongoing sanctions on Iran, coupled with heightened Iran-Israel tensions, continue to cloud the prospects of the Turkmenistan-Iran corridor.
Meanwhile, instability in Afghanistan remains the defining obstacle to the Trans-Afghan railway. Despite their immense potential to connect Uzbekistan to South Asia and the Indian Ocean, these corridors will only materialize as transformative trade arteries if underpinned by security, political stability, and sustained international investment. Until then, they remain strategic aspirations rather than guaranteed outcomes.
Navigating the Future of Connectivity
Uzbekistan’s evolving transport strategy reflects a remarkable transformation in how the country approaches its geographic condition. Once defined primarily by the limitations of being double-landlocked, Uzbekistan is now steadily reframing its position as a strategic crossroads at the heart of Eurasia. Through ambitious domestic reforms, proactive diplomacy, and extensive engagement with international financial institutions and partners, Tashkent has laid the foundation for modernizing its transport infrastructure and expanding its connectivity.
The country’s multi-vector approach—anchored in both the Middle Corridor and the Southern Corridors—demonstrates a deliberate effort to mitigate overdependence on any single transit route, particularly the historically dominant northern corridor through Russia. By investing in alternative pathways, Uzbekistan is not only reducing its vulnerability to geopolitical shocks but also unlocking new avenues of trade with Europe, the Middle East, and South Asia.
Projects such as the China-Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan railway and the Trans-Afghan Railway highlight the dual economic and geopolitical stakes of this strategy. If successful, they promise to shorten transit times, reduce costs, attract foreign investment, and generate new employment opportunities—while also embedding Uzbekistan more firmly within global supply chains. At the same time, challenges remain.
Persistent instability in Afghanistan, sanctions on Iran, and the fluid nature of regional geopolitics mean that not all corridors carry equal prospects in the near term. Nevertheless, by combining infrastructure modernization, foreign investment, and multi-vector diplomacy, the country is positioning itself not as a passive landlocked state but as an active transport hub shaping the flows of Eurasian trade.
[1] “Uzbekistan: Trade Facilitation and Logistics Development Strategy Report,” Asia Development Bank, 2009, https://www.carecprogram.org/uploads/Transport-and-Trade-Logistics-Uzbekistan.pdf.
[2] “Overview of the transport and logistics sector investment market in Uzbekistan,” Tenet Consulting, 2024, https://tenetcons.com/publications/transport-logistics-sector-investment-market-in-uzbekistan/.
[3] Ibid.
[4] “Over the Past Eight Years, New Uzbekistan Has Absorbed Over $113 Billion in Foreign Investments,” The Times of Central Asia, August 15, 2024, https://timesca.com/opinion-over-the-past-eight-years-new-uzbekistan-has-absorbed-over-113-billion-in-foreign-investments.
[5] “Transport,” Ministry of Investment and Trade of The Republic of Uzbekistan, 2025, https://gov.uz/en/miit/pages/transport.
[6] “Transport in Review: Uzbekistan,” Asian Transport Observatory, August 2025, https://asiantransportobservatory.org/documents/368/Uzbekistan_20250814.pdf.
[7] “Uzbekistan: An Aspiring Transport Hub for Central Asia,” The Jamestown Foundation, October 26, 2022, https://jamestown.org/program/uzbekistan-an-aspiring-transport-hub-for-central-asia/.
[8] “Uzbekistan’s Logistics Ambitions: Integrating into Trans-Eurasian Corridors,” Kursiv, July 25, 2025, https://uz.kursiv.media/en/2025-07-25/uzbekistans-logistics-ambitions-integrating-into-trans-eurasian-corridors/.
[9] “Beijing Revives China–Kyrgyzstan–Uzbekistan Railway,” The Jamestown Foundation, July 17, 2024, https://jamestown.org/program/beijing-revives-china-kyrgyzstan-uzbekistan-railway/.
[10] “President Aliyev: The Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity will lift the walls,” Azernews, August 9, 2025, https://www.azernews.az/nation/245784.html.
[11] “Uzbekistan’s Modern Policy on Developing International Transport Corridors to the South,” ConnectiveThink Research Center, December 11, 2024, https://connectivethink.org/uzbekistans-modern-policy-on-developing-international-transport-corridors-to-the-south.
[12] Ibid.
