India’s ties with the Arabian Peninsula date back several millennia. These have included a vibrant exchange of peoples, goods, technologies, and diverse interactions on secular and spiritual topics that have enriched their shared civilizational ethos and given their people a high sense of mutual cultural comfort.

India’s present-day ties with the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states reflect this rich history and continuity. In 2023-24, India-GCC bilateral trade amounted to $162 billion, accounting for 15.8% of India’s global trade, compared to just 11.6% with the European Union. This has made the GCC India’s largest trade partner. GCC states are also important investors in the Indian economy: Saudi Arabia and the UAE have pledged to invest $100 billion and $70 billion in India’s infrastructure development.[1]

The GCC states also host a nine-million-strong resident Indian community that is employed as professionals, technicians and blue-collar workers and remits home about $40 billion annually. It also includes entrepreneurs who head both small and medium enterprises and multi-billion enterprises that have contributed significantly to the national development of the GCC states.

Under Prime Minister Narendra Modi, India-GCC ties have scaled new heights—acquiring greater diversity and substance. India has strategic partnership agreements with all GCC states that embrace engagements in political, security and defense areas, as well as frontier areas such as Artificial Intelligence, information technology, biotechnology, cybersecurity and space, supported by appropriate institutional platforms and supervised closely by the leaders of the countries concerned.[2]

In September 2024, India-GCC relations took a new step forward with the convening of the Joint Ministerial Meeting for Strategic Dialogue in Riyadh that brought together the Indian External Affairs Minister, Dr. S Jaishankar, in dialogue with his counterparts from all six GCC states, the first Indian engagement with the full GCC grouping. The Indian minister emphasized the need to “invest in each other’s future and support each other’s continued prosperity.”[3] The four-year Action Plan (2024-28) that emerged from this conclave envisages joint ventures in sectors such as energy, trade, security, agriculture, food security, and health.

India-GCC energy ties

Though bilateral ties today are multifaceted, energy remains at the heart of the India-GCC relationship. Traditionally, the GCC states have provided over 60% of India’s oil imports and 30% of its imported natural gas. (India’s oil imports from the GCC dropped to 55% in 2022-23 as India increased its imports of discounted Russian oil, but this is likely to be a short-term arrangement.)

In 2023, India became the world’s second-largest importer of oil after China, having increased its imports by 36% over the previous decade. By 2030, India is expected to become the largest global oil importer.[4] India has also announced that its share of oil demand globally will rise from 5% to 11%, signaling a steady commitment to fossil fuels over the medium to long term. Affirming this trend, India has concluded a 20-year agreement to import gas from Qatar in a deal valued at $78 billion. India’s energy ties with the GCC have also gone well beyond the mere purchase of the region’s hydrocarbon resources: GCC states are investing in India’s strategic petroleum reserves and in downstream oil and gas projects.

A new factor has now entered the global energy scenario that has significant implications for India’s traditional energy ties with the GCC—the commitment to a green transition by India and the GCC states. This marks a shift away from fossil fuels to green energy sources such as solar, wind, nuclear and biofuels, and increased adoption of technologies that restrict carbon emissions. India and almost all the GCC states have committed themselves to reach net-zero carbon emissions by specific target dates: Saudi Arabia, 2060; the UAE, 2050; Oman, 2050; Kuwait, 2060; and Bahrain, 2060. India’s target date is 2070. Only Qatar has not set a target date, though it is pursuing policies to restrict carbon emissions.

The green transition poses a particular challenge to the GCC states as they are the principal global repository and producers of hydrocarbon resources, with their economies having a high dependence on revenues from hydrocarbon exports: Saudi Arabia, 60%; Bahrain, 63%; Oman, 74%; and between 80% and 84% for the UAE, Qatar, and Kuwait.[5] As Aisha Al-Sarhi has pointed out, “The transition away from fossil fuels therefore poses an existential threat for Gulf nations—potentially eroding their primary sources of income and diminishing their capacity to cope with escalating climate challenges.”[6]

The green transition also poses serious challenges to India as it requires huge investments in new technologies and processes, even as the country is committed to utilizing all its energy resources (largely conventional) to achieve the high growth rates annually that will make it a developed nation by 2047, while it simultaneously strives to meet its net-zero carbon emissions target by 2070.

This insight will point out that the GCC states will follow a two-pronged approach, i.e., while pursuing ambitious initiatives to reduce carbon emissions, they will continue to defend the demand for their hydrocarbon resources and even expand markets where possible. At the same time, India will remain a major consumer of conventional energy resources from the GCC over several decades while exploring opportunities for cooperation with the GCC states to pursue the shift to renewables and jointly fund, develop, and adopt technologies and systems to reduce emissions.

GCC’s green transition policies and projects

The green transition envisages obtaining net-zero greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions by states by certain specific deadlines. These targets are to be achieved through the dual approach of steadily reducing the use of fossil fuels (coal, oil and gas) and their replacement by renewable energy sources (solar, wind, nuclear, biofuels, etc.) while, simultaneously, reducing carbon and other GHG emissions through improved energy efficiency, carbon capture and storage projects, batteries to store power from renewable sources, etc.

As a result of the growth of national populations and the GDP, carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions in the GCC states went from 540.79 Metric Tons of CO2 equivalent (MtCO2) in 2003 to 1090.93 MtCO2 in 2020. This has encouraged the GCC states to set targets to reduce carbon emissions and finally obtain net-zero emissions by specific dates (see Table 1).

Table 1: Renewable energy targets to 2030

Source: Sanfilippo et al, p. 4

The GCC states have also announced significant investments over the upcoming years to reach these targets. In 2021, Saudi Arabia said it would invest $186 billion in green transition to reach its net-zero emissions target in 2060, and the UAE has announced investments of $163 billion to reach its target.[7] In 2023, the UAE gained global attention for its commitment to green transition by organizing the COP28 conference, affirming its goal of becoming a world leader in climate-related matters and placing itself “at the forefront of the global energy transition.”[8]

Besides the GCC’s ambitious targets relating to the increased use of renewable energy resources in the national energy mix, each state has also set emissions reduction targets as part of its national climate strategies, which are being pursued through high-powered governance entities (see Table 2).

Table 2: Climate-related strategy, governance, and emissions reduction targets

Source: Aisha Al-Sarihi, “GCC-China Energy Relations in the Post-Paris Agreement Era,” Middle East Institute, July 2023, p. 82

The GCC’s green energy projects

The GCC’s shift in favor of renewables has been facilitated by the fact that solar energy has become the cheapest form of energy in the GCC, while wind energy is also becoming competitive: the electricity unit prices from solar and wind are below 2 cents per kWh, while electricity generation costs from fossil fuels are about 5.5 cents per kWh.[9]

Again, the generation of electricity through renewables requires far less water than electricity produced by fossil fuels or nuclear energy. A nuclear power reactor consumes between 1500 and 2700 liters of water per MWh, while a gas/oil combined cycle with cooling towers uses about 680 liters of water per MWh. Compared to this, renewable fuels utilizing different technologies use between 115 and 125 liters of water per MWh. According to one estimate, if the GCC states were to achieve the announced renewable energy targets (see Table 1, above), they would reduce 12% in their water consumption.[10]

Given the abundant availability of sunshine through most of the year, the GCC states have focused on increasing the use of solar energy in their green transition programs, principally solar photovoltaic (PV), which has emerged as the cheapest form of energy in the region. It provides 98% of installed renewable capacity in the GCC, a trend that is likely to continue due to its economic advantages.[11]

Saudi Arabia has taken the lead here with the Sudair solar park (1.5 GW) and the planned solar park at Al Shuaibah, which will have the largest single-site solar power plant in the Middle East with a generation capacity of 2060 MW. The UAE has three major solar power plants: the Noor Solar Plant at Abu Dhabi (1.2 GW), the Al Maktoum Solar Park in Dubai (5000 MW), and the Masdar solar plant (17,500 MW).[12]

Oman, Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia are also generating wind energy through onshore plants. Saudi Arabia is planning to achieve 27% of its renewable target of 58.7 GW by 2030 through wind energy, while Oman has an operational plant at Dhofar. Both Kuwait and Bahrain are looking at wind projects of 10 MW and 3.5 MW, respectively.[13] In 2023, the UAE also initiated its wind energy program with four wind farms with a total capacity of 103.5 MW.[14]

Nuclear energy is also an attractive option for GCC states; it fits in with their focus on decreasing emissions and energy consumption and securing viable prices for electricity. Nuclear energy is relatively clean (emissions of 12-110 grams of CO2 equivalent per kWh, depending on plant design). As Sanfilippo and others have noted, compared to other energy sources, “nuclear energy typically has lower lifecycle CO2 emissions than fossil fuels such as coal and natural gas, but higher emissions than renewable energy sources such as wind and solar.”[15]

While GCC states have asserted their right “to own expertise in the field of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes”, the UAE is the only country to generate domestic electricity from its Barakah nuclear plant, which has a rated capacity of 5.6 GWe. It provides 20% of the UAE’s electricity while preventing the release of 22.4 million tons of carbon emissions.[16] Saudi Arabia has also signed agreements to acquire 17 GWe nuclear capacity by 2040.[17]

Apart from the shift toward renewables, the GCC states are pursuing carbon management strategies to reduce emissions through three technologies: (i) energy storage, (ii) carbon capture, utilization and storage, and (iii) hydrogen generation and storage.

Energy storage

Energy storage refers to the adoption of technologies to store renewable energy such as solar and wind energy, whose supply varies according to seasons and weather conditions, leading to grid instability. The most widely used technology is energy storage in batteries, which have capacities of up to a hundred MWh. Several GCC states use battery storage to ensure a continuous power supply from renewable sources. Qatar is a pioneer in this area with pilot projects at selected solar energy plants. Saudi Arabia has also set up storage facilities of 1.3 GWh at a tourist facility on the Red Sea, while another project of a 600 MWh battery system is planned for the smart city, NEOM. The UAE is pursuing a major storage project of 1500 MWh and two smaller ones totaling 16.1 MWh.

Carbon capture, utilization and storage (CCUS)

Carbon capture, utilization and storage is the process by which carbon dioxide emissions produced while using fossil fuels can be captured and either used in industry or permanently stored, thus reducing emissions. (The storage of captured carbon dioxide is usually done underground in depleted gas fields or saline aquifers.)

This technology is important for GCC states as they are major consumers of hydrocarbons for power generation for residential and industrial use, and for water desalination. The captured carbon dioxide can also be utilized in chemicals, plastics and building materials sectors and as fuel. However, the problems associated with CCUS are high capital costs and storage difficulties, including geological issues.[18]

Though CCUS is an attractive proposition in the GCC, its application is still at a nascent stage. Research and development and pilot projects are being undertaken in Saudi Arabia, Qatar and the UAE that together account for 10% (3.7 million tons per annum) of carbon dioxide captured globally, though there are plans to increase carbon capture to 56 mta by 2030.

Hydrogen

The third technological approach being pursued to reduce carbon emissions is the use of hydrogen in national long-term energy strategies, primarily as a fuel cell to generate energy. Hydrogen fuel cells convert hydrogen into electricity through a chemical reaction with oxygen while producing only water and heat as byproducts; thus, hydrogen is a clean energy source.

Hydrogen can be used in transportation, power generation and backup power systems. In vehicles, hydrogen fuel cells make them more energy-efficient and reduce emissions. They can also be used to heat residences. Hydrogen fuel cells produced from solar Photovoltaics also provide huge storage of excess energy produced by intermittent renewable energy sources such as wind and solar power stations, releasing this energy during times of low power production.[19] Hydrogen can be transported in gaseous form through pipelines and in liquid form in specially designed and refrigerated steel cylinders or tube trailers.

Hydrogen, the most abundant element on Earth, can be produced from water, fossil fuels, renewables (sun and wind), and through CCUS technologies. Most of the world’s hydrogen comes from natural gas (47%), with the balance from coal (27%), oil (22%), and water electrolysis (4%). Hydrogen has been color-coded on the basis of the mode of production and the process utilized. Green hydrogen is produced through the electrolysis of water by using electricity from renewable sources; there is thus no carbon dioxide emission in the production process. Blue hydrogen is produced from fossil fuels, but it can become carbon-neutral if the carbon dioxide is captured and stored through the CCUS process.[20]

The technologies to be utilized for the production and diverse uses of hydrogen fuel cells are still at an early development stage. However, capital costs of electrolyzers are declining so that production costs of hydrogen could reach $2/kg by 2030; this is the average cost of fossil fuels. Further declines to $1/kg are expected by 2050.[21] In the GCC, the UAE, Oman and Saudi Arabia are avid promoters of hydrogen production and use. The UAE led the way with the production of clean hydrogen using solar energy. Later, in 2020, Oman initiated its first green hydrogen project using solar and wind energy.

India’s green transition

In 2023, India was the fourth-largest economy in the world. It was also the third-highest energy-consuming country globally, behind the U.S. and China. Most of the energy consumed in the country is from fossil fuels, as affirmed by its energy mix in 2023:

• Coal: 59%
• Oil and products: 29%
• Natural gas: 6%
• Renewables: 6% (of which nuclear: 2%)[22]

At COP26 in Glasgow in December 2021, India announced that it would reach net-zero emissions by 2070. In August 2022, India declared that by 2030 it would obtain 50% of its electricity from non-fossil fuel sources. It also announced that it would reduce the emissions intensity of its GDP by 45% by 2030. India has emphasized the importance of external finance for the green transition on several occasions. In September 2024, Prime Minister Modi called on international investors to support the country’s green transition. The response has been positive: by 2024, India had secured pledges of $386 billion to finance renewable energy projects.[23]

India is the world’s third-largest consumer of electricity and is also the third-largest renewable energy producer, with 46.3% renewable capacity (including nuclear and hydro) installed as of October 2024. Wind power now has a strong manufacturing base with several producers of different types of wind turbines of international quality.

Again, at present, India has eight nuclear power plants with 25 nuclear reactors with an installed capacity of 8800 MW. Another eleven reactors are under construction, which will provide 8700 MW. India also has 27 hydroelectric power projects under construction that will be operational by 2032 and will add 17.5 GW to installed capacity.[24]

India set up its National Green Hydrogen Mission in January 2023 and has targeted achieving 5 million metric tons of green hydrogen capacity by 2030. The government has provided $200 billion for hydrogen-related projects, including $4 billion for research. The country plans to use hydrogen to replace fossil fuels as feedstock in petroleum refining, fertilizer manufacture, and steel production. In the transport sector, it plans to use hydrogen in long-haul vehicles, ships, and railways. As Lakshmi Priya has noted, “By 2030, India aims to become a global hub for production, usage and export of green hydrogen and its derivatives, while becoming a leader in technology and manufacture of electrolyzers and other enabling technologies.”[25]

Given that the GCC and India are dependent on hydrocarbon resources, in pursuit of the green transition, they will need to shape their energy policies within a dual energy framework in which conventional fuels remain an important part of the energy scenario, though complemented by policies that promote clean energy, while separately adopting technologies that promote the steady reduction of carbon emissions to attain net-zero emissions by the targeted dates.

Before discussing this challenge, it would be useful to examine the global energy outlook projected by different sources.

Global energy outlook

While projections relating to energy demand and mix vary considerably among different sources, there is consensus among them that the global energy outlook is most uncertain. Thus, OPEC’s World Oil Outlook 2025 points out:

Combined with the ambiguous and changing investment priorities of companies, including major oil and gas companies, as well as the ever-shifting public sentiment and sensitivity to climate actions, the energy landscape has become more complex, polarized, and lacks clear policy signals for the future. (Emphasis added)[26]

Similarly, the International Energy Agency (IEA) has noted that “[H]eightened geopolitical risks, unresolved trade tensions, and policy shifts have added myriad uncertainties to the oil market outlook and that the “risk of further disruptions is now very high.”[27]

Given the uncertainties set out above, it is not surprising that there is no consensus among energy analysts about the medium- and long-term global energy outlook. The IEA projections give a prominent place to renewables, noting that the “clean energy momentum remains strong enough to bring a peak in demand for each of the fossil fuels by 2030.”[28] However, projections from ExxonMobil, the Gas Exporting Countries Forum, and OPEC are quite different. The ExxonMobil Global Outlook to 2050 rejects the idea of peak oil and asserts that oil demand will see a “plateau” from 2030 of over 100 million barrels/day, which will continue to 2050.[29]

The Global Gas Outlook 2050 of the Gas Exporting Countries Forum (GECF) projects, in the sustainable energy scenario, a global primary energy demand increase of 23% from 2022 to 2050, finally reaching 18,478 Mtoe by 2050. Gas, at 29%, will surpass both oil and coal in the global energy mix.[30]

The OPEC report, while accepting that oil demand in the OECD countries may peak in 2030, points out that “non-OECD oil demand is not expected to peak any time soon”; it notes that oil demand in non-OECD countries will increase every year to 2050 and that almost all groups in this segment will have annual increases in demand.[31] It also questions the IEA’s view relating to the increase in demand for renewables by pointing out:

• significant dilution in the U.S.’ commitments and concerns on climate issues under the Trump administration;
• increasing European focus on improving defense capabilities and economic competitiveness, with a likely reduction of interest in decarbonization; and,
• increasing concerns globally about problems relating to disruptions caused by “intermittent renewables”, particularly due to seasonal imbalances, which have led to higher costs due to deployment of backup capacities (usually gas-fired thermal plants) and storage (batteries and hydro storage).[32]

Thus, while accepting the need to prioritize emission reduction, the OPEC report insists that “all energy sources and all technologies will be needed to fuel demographic and economic growth in the long term.”[33]

The detailed forecasts in the OPEC report are examined below.

Table 3: World primary energy by fuel, 2024-2050

Source: World Oil Outlook 2025, OPEC, p. 61

The following points are noteworthy:

• Over the next 25 years, while demand for coal will be significantly reduced, there will be hardly any change in the demand for oil and gas.
• The increased demand for renewables (mainly solar and wind) largely replaces the decline in coal demand.

Another important table in the OPEC report relates to oil demand by region over the medium term (2024-30) and long term (2024-50) [see Table 4].

Table 4: Medium- and long-term oil demand by region (mb/d)

Source: World Oil Outlook 2025, pp. 111 & 113

Over the next 25 years, India’s oil demand shows sustained growth over the medium term (1.8% over 2024-30) and the long term (8.2% over 2024-50). This trend is confirmed by Indian projections as well (see Table 5).

Table 5: Indian energy demand and import dependence, 2022-2047 (Mtoe)

Source: Indian Energy Security Scenarios 2047, NITI Aayog, 2023, IESS_v3_one_pagers.pdf.

It is interesting to note that the medium-term projections relating to India’s energy demand by NITI Aayog, the Indian government’s premier economic advisory body, indicate a three-fold increase in energy demand from 857 Mtoe to 2895 Mtoe, but the energy mix forecast does not show any significant changes from 2022 to 2047. Thus, India’s demand for fossil fuels remains above 80%, even as import dependence for oil goes from 88% to 92%. India’s gas demand increases by 31%, while import dependence goes from 55% to 66%, affirming that India’s increased requirements will have to be met through imports.

But another challenge looms before India—achieving net-zero emissions by 2070, just 23 years from 2047. In March 2025, a senior NITI Aayog official dealing with energy said that India’s energy demand in 2070 would increase 11 times from today in order to support increases in industrial production (steel, cement, aluminum, and ethylene) and to meet the needs of the transport sector, as well as the demand for cooling and agricultural mechanization.[34] Though NITI Aayog has not given a precise figure to attain net-zero emissions by 2070, an earlier joint report prepared by the Federation of Indian Chambers of Commerce and Industry (FICCI) and Deloitte in September 2023 had provided an estimate of $15 trillion, making net-zero emissions an extraordinarily expensive proposition that would need very substantial external funding.[35]

Having reviewed the energy demand scenario as set out by diverse sources, which has affirmed the central place of hydrocarbons in the global energy mix to 2050, a look at the supply scenario will complete our understanding of the energy outlook (see Table 6).

Table 6: Global crude and condensate exports by origin, 2024-2050 (mbd)

Source: World Oil Outlook 2025, OPEC, pp 236-37

The following conclusions relating to the long-term energy scenario are drawn from the above discussion:

• While the forecasts vary considerably, they agree that hydrocarbons are likely to be a significant part of the global energy mix up to 2050.
• The Middle East will be the major exporter of oil, its share rising from 47% (2024) to 60% in 2050. The bulk of these exports will go to the Asia-Pacific.
• Revenues from hydrocarbon sales will retain their central importance in the GCC economies.
• India will continue to power its economy through fossil fuels and will largely source its oil and gas requirements from the GCC states, as at present.
• At the same time, India and the GCC states will continue to work toward reducing carbon emissions, but, at least till 2050, there will be no reduction in oil and gas production in the GCC states or in India’s imports of hydrocarbon resources, mainly from the GCC states.

India-GCC cooperation in green transition

While seeking to reconcile the GCC states’ crucial dependence on hydrocarbons with their commitments to green transition, Antoine Halff and Robin Mills have noted:

For Gulf producers, dealing with the energy transition can mean fighting for oil’s continued relevance as much as preparing for the post-oil economy. [This means] riding the decarbonization wave as smoothly as possible and looking for oil to support and benefit from the decarbonization agenda.[36]

Toward this end, they have suggested that the revenues accruing to the GCC states from hydrocarbon exports could be used to fund the green transition; they described this as “the oil sector needing to plan its own succession.”[37]

This could be done through the development and increased use of products and processes that would reduce the carbon footprint, e.g., CCUS; hydrogen; advanced plastics produced at petrochemical plants for use in packaging, electronics, transport, construction, etc.;  and non-metallic materials such as carbon fiber that is five times stronger than steel and half the weight and usable in aerospace, drone manufacture, sports equipment, upmarket cars and boats, etc.

Given the India-GCC synergy fostered by long-standing and mutually beneficial ties in conventional energy, it is natural for the two sides to support each other’s green transition interests as well, particularly through technological cooperation.

Hydrogen offers the best area for collaboration. As noted above, both Saudi Arabia and the UAE are pioneers in this sector. Saudi Arabia produces blue ammonia and had exported 40 tons to Japan and South Korea some years ago. The UAE also has a blue ammonia production facility and has made shipments to Germany and Japan.

India’s Green Hydrogen Mission neatly complements the plans of the GCC states that prioritize the production of green hydrogen through renewable energy. Thus, the two GCC states and India can share technology and experience, with the former, with their developed infrastructure, financial resources, and export experience, facilitating the development and global export of India’s green hydrogen.

Separately, Qatar and Oman can be India’s joint venture partners in their blue ammonia projects, which are at early stages. India can also offer its expertise in the blending of green hydrogen with piped natural gas, given that several GCC states have natural gas facilities.[38]

Another hydrogen-related area for collaboration is the Fuel Cell Electric Vehicle (FCEV). Saudi Arabia is encouraging the use of FCEVs for cars, buses and trains, as well as in jet fuel production, while the UAE is pursuing hydrogen-powered car fuel stations. Oman and Kuwait are also looking at hydrogen-powered vehicles. Another area for cooperation is the manufacture of electrolyzers and other support technologies, such as port infrastructure, in the hydrogen sector.[39]

Given that several technologies pertaining to green transition are at a nascent stage, India and GCC states can cooperate in joint research and development projects in battery storage, CCUS, and energy efficiency. As Paul Sullivan has noted, “collaborations are possible in a range of areas from green finance to green inventions and innovation to circular carbon economies.”[40]

An interesting area to explore India-GCC collaboration is civilian nuclear energy. In September 2024, India’s Nuclear Power Corporation and the UAE’s Emirates Nuclear Energy Company signed an MoU for Indian engineers and technicians to handle operations and maintenance of the Barakah nuclear power plant, a recognition of India’s expertise in handling several reactors at home over several decades. The agreement envisages “expertise sharing, supplier sourcing, human resource development and consulting services in future nuclear projects.”[41]

Conclusion

India’s ties with the GCC states have expanded and diversified over the last two decades to acquire a “strategic” character that embraces shared interests in security, defense, and collaborations in the development of frontier technologies. However, the substantial cooperation in energy-related ventures between India and each member state of the GCC has provided the solid foundation for these ties. For nearly four decades, the GCC states have met the bulk of India’s energy requirements and have provided the energy resources to enable the growth trajectory that has placed India at the vanguard of global economic success stories.

The interests that India and the GCC share in energy security have deepened security cooperation between them as their maritime ties ensure the safety of sealanes and chokepoints in the Indian Ocean. Again, India obviously has a strong stake in regional stability, which has promoted regular engagements in the defense area and has facilitated a comprehensive regional approach through the joint ministerial conclave between the Indian and the six foreign ministers of the GCC that has provided a four-year action plan to address shared interests and concerns.

India and the GCC states are also partners in research and development in areas of frontier science and technology—a partnership that will benefit their peoples in future decades as they jointly seek to shape and master the complex nuances of new developments that could reshape national economies and frame new systems, values and approaches across cultures and personal identities and encourage explorations of the deep sea and outer space.

It is interesting to note that the commitment to green transition, shared by India and the GCC states, will not in any way dilute the importance and resilience of India-GCC relations. This is mainly because, despite the avowed objective of moving away from conventional fuels toward renewables as the alternative “clean” energy, the factual position is that over the four decades at least, if not longer, the GCC states will remain a major source of the hydrocarbons that large parts of the world will continue to require to fuel their economic activity. India will lead this group of nations as the principal global user and importer of conventional fuels. Thus, India and the GCC states will remain bonded by their shared interest in the flow of energy resources from the Gulf.

But there is more to the relationship: India and the GCC will also be partners in the use of “clean” energy sources and, more importantly, in the development of technologies that will reduce carbon emissions and ensure that their net-zero targets are attained. Thus, collaboration in the green transition will constitute the latest area of bilateral engagement that has shaped India’s ties with the Arabian Peninsula for several millennia.

[1] Sabena Siddiqui, “India’s growing bid for influence in the Gulf,” The New Arab, 28 April 2025, https://www.newarab.com/analysis/indias-growing-bid-influence-gulf#:~:text=Sabena%20Siddiqui%20is%20a%20foreign%20affairs%20journalist%2C%20lawyer%2C,relatively%20new%2C%20New%20Delhi%20is%20rapidly%20gaining%20importance.

[2] Jonathan Fulton, “India-Gulf relations are muted – but mobilizing,” N7Initiative, June 3, 2025, https://n7initiative.org/research/india-gulf-relations-are-muted-but-mobilizing/.

[3] Srishtistuti Roy, “A Milestone in Insia’s West Asia Diplomacy: The India-GCC Strategic Dialogue, September 2024,” IMPRI, September 19, 2024, https://www.impriindia.com/insights/india-gcc-strategic-dialogue-2024/.

[4] Alexandre Kateb, “The GCC’s Multipolar Pivot: From Shifting Trade patterns to New Financial and Diplomatic Alliances,” Carnegie, May 28, 2024,  https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2024/05/the-gccs-multipolar-pivot-from-shifting-trade-patterns-to-new-financial-and-diplomatic-alliances?lang=en.

[5] Antinio Sanfilippo, Marc Vermeersch and Veronica Bermudez Benito, “Energy Transition strategies in the Gulf Cooperation Council countries,” Energy Strategy Reviews 55 (September 2024): p. 3, https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S2211467X24002219.

[6] Aisha Al-Sarhi, “Energy Transition in the Gulf: Best Practices and Limitations,” Carnegie, April 17, 2025, https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2025/04/energy-transition-in-the-gulf-best-practices-and-limitations?lang=en.

[7] Kudakwashe Muzoriwa, “How the GCC is fuelling the transition to clean energy,” Gulf Business, June 18, 2024, https://gulfbusiness.com/how-the-gcc-region-is-powering-into-the-future/.

[8] Mate Szalai, Raafat Shamieh and Matteo Colombo, “Cutting through the green hype – the political economy of renewable energy in the UAE and Oman”, Clingendael, Netherlands Institute of International Relations, Policy Brief, April 2025, p. 1, https://www.clingendael.org/sites/default/files/2025-04/Political_economy_renewable_energy_UAE_and_Oman.pdf.

[9] Sanfilippo et al.

[10] Sanfilippo et al.

[11] Ibid., pp. 6-7.

[12] Muzoriwa

[13] Sanfilippo et al., p. 8.

[14] Muzoriwa

[15] Sanfilippo et al., p. 13.

[16] Muzoriwa

[17] Sanfilippo et al., p. 14.

[18] Ibid., p. 10.

[19] Sanfilippo et al., p. 11.

[20] Lakshmi Priya, “Rebooting India-GCC Energy Partnerships: Hydrogen as a fuel for the future,” Strategic Analysis 47, no. 3, August 29, 2023, pp 237-38, https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/09700161.2023.2247768.

[21] Sanfilippo et al., p. 11.

[22] “Country Analysis Brief: India,” US Energy Information Administration, February 6, 2025, https://www.eia.gov/international/content/analysis/countries_long/India/pdf/India.pdf.

[23] Felicity Bradstock, “India’s Green Transition Gains Momentum with $386 Billion in Funding Pledges,” Oilprice.com, September 22, 2024, https://oilprice.com/Energy/Energy-General/Indias-Green-Transition-Gains-Momentum-with-386-Billion-in-Funding-Pledges.html.

[24] “Country Analysis Brief: India,” p. 16.

[25] Lakshmi Priya, p. 240.

[26] “World Oil Outlook 2025,” OPEC, p. 108, https://www.opec.org/assets/assetdb/woo-2025.pdf.

[27] “World Energy Outlook 2025,” International Energy Agency, November 2025, p. 1, https://www.iea.org/events/world-energy-outlook-2025.

[28] Ibid, p. 17.

[29] ExxonMobil Global Outlook to 2050, p. 3, https://corporate.exxonmobil.com/sustainability-and-reports/global-outlook.

[30] Global Gas Outlook 2050, Gas Exporting Countries Forum, 8^th Edition, March 2024, p. 5 and 2, gecf-global-gas-outlook-20231.pdf.

[31] “World Oil Outlook 2025,” pp. 113-114.

[32] Ibid., pp. 60 and 108.

[33] Ibid., p. 60.

[34] “India’s energy demand to grow 11-fold by 2070; infrastructure, investment, supply chains to see massive surge: NITI Aayog official,” ET Energyworld, March 25, 2025, https://energy.economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/power/indias-energy-demand-to-grow-11-fold-by-2070-infrastructure-investment-supply-chains-to-see-massive-surge-niti-aayog-official/119472991.

[35] “FICCI-Deloitte report reveals India’s $15 trillion net-zero emissions plan by 2070,” CNBC-TV18, September 25, 2025, https://www.cnbctv18.com/environment/ficci-deloitte-report-reveals-india-net-zero-emissions-plan-by-2070-17873921.htm.

[36] Antoine Halff and Robin Mills, “Having it both ways: GCC oil faces peak demand”, Center on Global Energy Policy, Columbia/ SIPA, December 2021, p. 21, https://www.energypolicy.columbia.edu/publications/having-it-both-ways-gcc-oil-faces-peak-demand/.

[37] Ibid., p. 11.

[38] Lakshmi Priya, p. 246.

[39] Ibid., pp. 246-247.

[40] Paul Sullivan, “How India and the GCC can help each other in their energy transitions,” The National,

March 17, 2022, https://www.thenationalnews.com/opinion/comment/2022/03/17/how-india-and-the-gcc-can-help-each-other-in-their-energy-transitions/.

[41] Rakshith Shetty, “The India-UAE Partnership in next-generation energy sectors,” Observer Research Foundation, May 12, 2025, https://orfme.org/research/india-uae-partnership-in-next-generation-energy-sectors/.