The recent presidential election in the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) stands as a pivotal development in both Cypriot politics and the broader Eastern Mediterranean geopolitical context. Amid enduring divisions, evolving regional alliances, and ongoing disputes over energy resources, the election’s outcome resonates well beyond the island. Türkiye’s historical role as a guarantor power and its strategic interests in Cyprus are essential for understanding the implications of the new administration led by President Tufan Erhürman.[1] This analysis provides an in-depth look at the election’s outcomes, examines the subsequent shifts in TRNC politics, outlines Türkiye’s re-positioning, and assesses the prospects for reunification on the island and regional recalibration.

Election outcomes in Northern Cyprus

On 19 October 2025, Turkish Cypriots participated in a significant presidential election that would determine the future path of the TRNC and influence broader issues surrounding Cyprus.[2] Tufan Erhürman, the leader of the center-left-leaning Republican Turkish Party (CTP), achieved a decisive victory over Ersin Tatar, the right-wing incumbent candidate from the National Unity Party (UBP). Erhürman won almost 63% of the vote, while Tatar, despite apparent strong support from Ankara and overt backing from Türkiye’s political leadership, received only 36%. Just under 65% of the registered electorate partook in elections in a highly divisive political landscape.

The campaign highlighted a stark ideological divide. Tatar, perceived as Türkiye’s preferred candidate, championed a two-state solution and called for international recognition of the TRNC as an independent state.[3] This approach aligned with Türkiye’s long-standing policy since 2020, especially as Turkish-Greek tensions escalated and competition over Eastern Mediterranean energy resources intensified. Türkiye’s Vice President, Cevdet Yılmaz,[4] along with other notable figures from Turkish political and social life, such as musician Yavuz Bingöl and the retired Army General Hulusi Akar, visited Nicosia shortly before the election, signaling Ankara’s support for Tatar’s continuity. Just days before the elections, Tatar’s party, the UBP, pushed through a parliamentary resolution in the TRNC endorsing a two-state solution, thereby increasing pressure on the opposition led by Erhürman.[5]

Conversely, Erhürman campaigned on reviving negotiations aimed at creating a federal, bi-communal Cyprus based on the United Nations (UN) parameters.[6]  His message resonated beyond his traditional supporters, attracting voters from a broader cross-section of society, including some from Tatar’s electoral base, by emphasizing political normalization in the north and a departure from divisive politics along ethnic and religious lines. Many interpreted the results as a mandate for change, reflecting the electorate’s readiness to challenge prevailing stances of the incumbent party and re-engage with the international community under a more solution-oriented approach to solve the decades-long political impasse on the island.

In the immediate aftermath, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan formally congratulated Erhürman, who reciprocated by pledging to consult with Türkiye on key policy decisions, most importantly on foreign policy. This exchange highlighted the enduring, though sometimes complex, relationship between Ankara and Nicosia. Türkiye’s formal position for the past five years has been to support Turkish Cypriot independence, and Ankara is historically non-belligerent in the TRNC’s internal political divides. Yet, the politicization of the Cypriot issue broadly[7] and ties to Ankara specifically have generated fault lines in the TRNC. There have been calls amongst the Turkish Cypriot electorate, particularly amongst younger and more pro-EU voices, to limit ties with Türkiye. Some in the Turkish Cypriot electorate link the nation’s difficulties to over-reliance on Türkiye’s proximity, economic dominance, and influence over Nicosia. While these sentiments may indeed have supporters, there are also stark realities, with Türkiye’s role as a guarantor and an investor essential for the perpetuity of the Turkish Cypriot nationhood across all sectors of public and economic life.

As the new administration takes shape, Erhürman quickly set a new tone in TRNC politics, focusing on inclusivity and reconciliation. The leadership shift was not simply a rejection of Tatar’s two-state vision but an embrace of pragmatic engagement and renewed efforts toward reunification while preserving the equal political status and sovereign rights of the Turkish Cypriot community. The government faces the challenge of uniting a diverse and sometimes polarized electorate while balancing the need to maintain constructive ties with Ankara.

Erhürman’s early statements stressed transparency, dialogue, and a commitment to economic and social reform, resonating with a population fatigued by political deadlock, external pressures, and internal anxieties about the country’s direction. Regional and international actors watched closely, aware that the TRNC’s evolving approach under Erhürman could significantly impact both the peace process and the broader dynamics of the Eastern Mediterranean. In this context, the administration prepares to confront entrenched divisions and dependencies, recognizing that rebuilding trust and pursuing creative diplomacy would be essential for tangible progress in the coming months.

Shifts in the TRNC political landscape

After the collapse of UN-led reunification talks at the Swiss town of Crans-Montana in 2017, both Turkish and Turkish Cypriot leaders embraced the view that federalism with Greek Cypriots was no longer a viable path. Declassified meeting notes from the Crans-Montana round show that “Türkiye went out of its way to reach a compromise on a bi-zonal, bi-communal federation by even agreeing to abolish the Treaty of Guarantee and reduce its troop number to a symbolic 650.”[8]  The 1960 Treaty of Guarantee authorized Türkiye, Greece, and the United Kingdom (UK) to act—unilaterally if required—to prevent Cyprus from uniting with another state and to restore its constitutional order. Abolishing the treaty would deprive Türkiye of the legal basis for any future intervention akin to its 1974 operation. However, the Greek side abruptly rejected the offer, marking Ankara’s second major disappointment since the failure of the Annan Plan referendum in 2004.

Consequently, for nearly a decade, the TRNC’s stance on the Cyprus issue had increasingly favored a two-state solution rather than a unified government with Greek Cypriots,[9] a position reinforced by Ankara since 2020 amid deteriorating relations with the European Union (EU) and rising regional tensions. This stance was shaped by several factors: Turkish Cypriots felt sidelined in the EU decision-making bodies, perceived the Greek Cypriot side as making maximalist claims, and developed a growing sense of vulnerability amid intensifying maritime disputes and competition to exploit offshore energy resources. Tatar’s advocacy for partition and international recognition was seen as consistent with both the local sentiment and Türkiye’s assertive regional posture. Simply amidst the ensuing regional disorder, lack of clear leadership from both the EU and the United States, and the collapse of the diplomatic route, both Ankara and Nicosia opted for a more assertive policy, and the cohesive channeling of Turkish and Turkish Cypriot interests.

Moreover, following Ersin Tatar’s ascendancy to the Presidency of the TRNC in 2020, their policies became further aligned. The two leaders, Tatar and Erdoğan, showcased a similar brand of politics, and Tatar became increasingly supportive of Türkiye’s foreign policy assertiveness, seeking to align the TRNC’s policy accordingly and refusing to resume bilateral talks with the Greek side unless it recognized the Turkish Cypriot state’s equal sovereignty. To that effect, the TRNC did indeed orchestrate a strong diplomatic push in the Tatar years, even earning some level of semi-official recognition from the Organization of Turkic States—a key intergovernmental organization for the integration of the Turkic world and a diplomatic tool for Türkiye to influence its influence in Central Asia.

Erhürman’s victory, from this perspective, has now challenged these assumptions and signified more than a routine change in leadership; it marks a substantial recalibration of the political landscape in North Cyprus.[10] His pledge to consider a federal solution as an option and resume reunification talks with the Greek Cypriot administration marks a return to a diplomatic path reminiscent of former President Mustafa Akıncı. Akıncı was also a divisive figure in Ankara and was often portrayed as being at odds with President Erdoğan. Erhürman’s support base is more diverse; while some voters favored his pro-unification agenda, others sought political stability, economic growth, social justice, and a departure from polarizing rhetoric. The broader coalition that brought Erhürman to power highlights the complexity of the TRNC’s internal dynamics and suggests that his mandate does not grant unrestricted freedom to dismiss the past decade’s policies. Simply, Erhürman has not achieved a carte blanche in dealing with reunification talks but a mandate to at least explore the possibility of returning to diplomacy, with Türkiye’s reservations also being considered.

By signaling his intent to consult closely with Ankara, Erhürman acknowledges the necessity of balancing domestic ambitions with Turkish Cypriot security needs and the realities of Turkish influence. His proposed energy policy seeks equal power sharing and joint development of hydrocarbon resources with the Greek side,[11] aiming to address core grievances and set the stage for renewed negotiations with a forward-looking agenda. These topics are of utmost significance in Türkiye too—and remain closely intertwined with Türkiye’s own defense and security policy, exemplified by its growing naval presence in the Eastern Mediterranean.

In the period ahead, the resilience of Erhürman’s inclusive mandate and the adaptability of the TRNC’s political institutions will be tested. The administration must reconcile varied aspirations within its electorate and respond to external pressures from Ankara, Brussels, London, and the broader region. Economic uncertainty, exacerbated by sanctions, limited investment, and currency volatility, remains a persistent challenge, fueling social tensions and eroding public trust. Added to these are illicit activities involving organized crime networks that exploit the North’s isolation and its de facto safe-haven status. Erhürman’s team has prioritized economic reform, aiming to attract investment by modernizing regulations and leveraging the island’s strategic position for logistics and trade, though these efforts are complicated by the TRNC’s unresolved status and reliance on Turkish financial support.

Diplomatically, renewed negotiations with the Greek Cypriot administration are likely to hinge on incremental confidence-building measures, such as reopening border crossings, settling ownerships in the ghost town of Varosha (Maraş), forming joint technical committees on environmental and public health issues, and pursuing mutually beneficial cooperation in areas like disaster response and water management. While these steps could help create a less adversarial climate, deep-seated mistrust and conflicting views on sovereignty will likely continue to hinder major breakthroughs.

As the TRNC embarks on a new chapter, the dynamic between local agency and external influence will continue to shape its trajectory. Progress toward reconciliation and prosperity will depend on the readiness of regional and international actors to support pragmatic, confidence-building initiatives. In this evolving context, flexibility, perseverance, and openness to creative solutions will be vital for all parties seeking a more stable and cooperative Eastern Mediterranean.

Türkiye’s strategic calculus and domestic dynamics

Türkiye’s response to the election has combined pragmatism with internal debate. Shortly after the results, President Erdoğan and senior officials congratulated Erhürman, maintaining the tradition of formal non-interference in TRNC elections. However, dissent surfaced within Türkiye’s political establishment. Devlet Bahçeli,[12] leader of the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) and Erdoğan’s ally, called for the annulment of the results and suggested integrating the TRNC as Türkiye’s “82nd province”, symbolically referencing it with a car plate number. Although these remarks lack official endorsement, they underscore Cyprus’s enduring salience in Turkish politics and reveal divergent perspectives among influential actors. Bahçeli remains a formidable figure with loyal factions and allies within the bureaucracy whose views cannot be easily dismissed. His call for outright annexation is less a literal policy proposal than a strategic signal—intended to remind both Turkish and Greek Cypriots that, should negotiations collapse, Türkiye retains the option of formal incorporation as a last resort.

At the strategic level, Ankara faces a complex set of considerations. While the popularity of a two-state solution remains strong in some quarters,[13] evolving regional and international dynamics open opportunities for policy re-adjustment. Türkiye’s relationship with the EU has recently improved, partly due to shared security interests and the EU’s push for rearmament amid the perceived threat of Russian animosity and U.S. intransigence to Euro-Atlantic security. Ankara’s effort to join the SAFE defense program—a €150 billion initiative—reflects this shift, though Greek and Greek Cypriot opposition remains an obstacle. Erhürman’s willingness to resume talks offers Türkiye potential leverage and a face-saving way to soften its stance toward reunification on the island: As possibly hinted during German Chancellor Friedrich Mertz’s visit to Erdoğan on 30 October, backing negotiations could be exchanged for EU concessions, such as lifting vetoes on Turkish participation in security initiatives.

Türkiye is also aware of the risks of international isolation and the emergence of adverse regional alliances such as the East Med Gas Forum (2019) and IMEC (2023). The broad-based partnership among Greece, the Greek Cypriot administration, and Israel under the “3+1” format—backed by the United States—has reinforced Türkiye’s perception of exclusion and strategic encirclement, highlighting the need for sustained diplomatic engagement to prevent further marginalization. Political dialogue under TRNC President Erhürman could align with Türkiye’s broader goals and attract potential partners in the region, such as Syria and Libya, providing a counterweight to rival blocs and reinforcing its role as a guarantor on the island.

Despite these diplomatic overtures, Türkiye’s military presence in North Cyprus remains firm. Ankara regards its military force as a non-negotiable security guarantee for Turkish Cypriots and a tangible expression of its long-term commitment to the island’s future. It also serves Türkiye’s broader strategic interest in safeguarding its southern flank amid heightened tensions with Israel following the Gaza war and the growing assertiveness of the U.S.-backed “3+1” partnership. This dual approach—combining diplomatic flexibility with steadfast security priorities—will likely define Türkiye’s engagement moving forward.

As Türkiye balances strategic necessity with diplomatic opportunity, both Ankara and northern Nicosia are poised for cautious engagement and incremental adjustments rather than abrupt changes. The interplay between energy geopolitics, security needs, and the broader regional landscape makes flexibility and creative problem-solving essential, especially as the TRNC under Erhürman seeks to rebuild trust and revive negotiations with the Greek Cypriot administration.  Türkiye’s readiness to use its influence to support dialogue, while maintaining its robust military presence, reflects a pragmatic understanding of shifting realities in the Eastern Mediterranean. Though internal debates and competing agendas persist, this approach offers a possible route for Türkiye to reconcile its longstanding commitments with new opportunities for cooperation and integration, shaping the future of the Cyprus issue as it enters a new phase of diplomatic engagement.

Energy geopolitics and regional tensions

The discovery of natural gas reserves in the Eastern Mediterranean has introduced a new dimension to the Cyprus issue, offering both prospects for economic development and risks of intensified competition. Control over maritime boundaries and access to energy resources therein have become central to regional strategies, drawing in multiple actors and increasing the stakes of the dispute. Türkiye and the TRNC argue that the Greek-administered “Republic of Cyprus (RoC)”, which Ankara does not recognize, cannot unilaterally exercise rights over surrounding territorial waters. Instead, they insist that Turkish Cypriots must be included in any arrangement regarding exploration, extraction, and revenue sharing. The EU and its member states support the RoC’s claims and have sanctioned Turkish activities considered infringements on Cypriot and Greek waters.

These tensions have led to confrontations at sea, diplomatic protests, and the formation of alternative energy partnerships, most notably the once highly touted East Med pipeline project involving Greece, Cyprus, and Israel.[14] For Türkiye, these developments underscore the necessity of maintaining a strong military and diplomatic presence in the region. The energy question is thus deeply intertwined with the broader competition for influence, sovereignty, and security in the Eastern Mediterranean. Erhürman’s proposals emphasize equitable sharing and joint development, offering a possible path toward de-escalation and cooperation. However, turning these ideas into reality requires overcoming deep-rooted mistrust and securing agreement from all stakeholders, including the Greek Cypriot administration, the EU, and other regional actors.

Precedent of past failures, however, does not provide much encouragement in that regard: In 2019, the TRNC, under the previous pro-unification president Mustafa Akıncı, proposed to the RoC treating the island’s natural gas resources as a shared heritage, suggesting the establishment of a joint development zone that would partly accommodate the EEZ claims of all parties—Türkiye, the TRNC, and the RoC. The proposal included placing revenues into an escrow account to support economic development on both sides of the island. However, the Greek Cypriot administration rejected the offer, countering with a proposal that only 30% of gas revenues would be allocated to Turkish Cypriots, contingent upon Türkiye’s recognition of the RoC’s EEZ as representative of the entire island. Since then, both sides have continued unilateral exploration activities, without coordination or mutual consent. The RoC, enjoying full access to known reserves and benefiting from international legitimacy and EU support, faces no tangible pressure or incentive to compromise or share these resources with the Turkish Cypriots.

As the region navigates these complex dynamics, the intersection of energy geopolitics and diplomacy will likely become even more significant soon. Erhürman’s challenge is to turn proposals for equitable cooperation into actionable policies that can withstand Greek Cypriot intransigence and external pressures from third parties while building trust incrementally. With international actors closely watching and regional alliances shifting, managing hydrocarbon resources in a just and equitable way is both a test and an opportunity for confidence-building. Whether through joint ventures, third-party mediation, or innovative resource-sharing frameworks, current decisions will influence not only the potential for de-escalation but also the larger trajectory of peace efforts and regional integration in the Eastern Mediterranean.

The capacity of all parties to transform competition over energy into opportunities for constructive engagement and mutual benefit will shape the next phase of the Cyprus issue. Addressing the technical aspects of resource management must go hand in hand with a renewed commitment to inclusive dialogue and creative diplomacy. Moving beyond zero-sum approaches and leveraging shared economic interests could catalyze broader reconciliation. As prospects for reunification and renewed diplomacy gain momentum, the link between energy geopolitics and peacebuilding will remain central to achieving a durable and equitable future for Cyprus and the wider region. The test here will be to reach a solution agreeable to all sides—simultaneously quelling Turkish security concerns and allotting Turkish Cypriots an equal status at the table.

Prospects for reunification and renewed diplomacy

Erhürman’s election has brought a measure of cautious optimism to discussions about the future of the Cyprus issue. In its aftermath, both the new TRNC President Erhürman and his Greek Cypriot counterpart, Nikos Christodoulides, expressed willingness to meet and explore ways to revive stalled peace talks. The EU, which has long supported a federal solution and deeper engagement with the Turkish Cypriot community, views Erhürman as a promising interlocutor for renewed negotiations.

Nonetheless, significant challenges persist. Decades of failed negotiations, conflicting national narratives, and external pressures have entrenched positions on both sides. The Greek Cypriot administration, while open to dialogue, insists on the withdrawal of Turkish forces as a prerequisite for any settlement. Conversely, Türkiye’s security concerns and commitments to Turkish Cypriots limit the scope for unilateral concessions. Within the TRNC, the diversity of motives among Erhürman’s supporters complicates policymaking. While many back his pro-unification stance, others remain skeptical of the Greek Cypriot side’s willingness to accommodate Turkish Cypriot interests. What most Turkish Cypriots share in common is the desire for Türkiye’s security guarantees—and some form of continued military presence on the island—to remain in place under all circumstances. Maintaining political cohesion and avoiding alienation of key constituencies among such key matters will shape the administration’s approach to negotiations.

Aside from these legitimate concerns and conditions, direct contact between the communities and engagement by international actors provide opportunities for incremental progress. Confidence-building measures, such as joint energy initiatives, cultural exchanges, and cross-border cooperation, could establish the foundation for a more comprehensive settlement in the future.

Conclusion

The 2025 Turkish Cypriot presidential election marked a watershed in the island’s political evolution, opening new possibilities for addressing the longstanding Cyprus problem. Tufan Erhürman’s victory reflects a desire among Turkish Cypriots for renewed engagement, political normalization, and a more inclusive approach to governance and diplomacy. Simultaneously, the outcome complements Ankara’s re-adjusted strategy, balancing security imperatives with the potential benefits of diplomatic flexibility and regional cooperation.

Domestic political dynamics, regional energy competition, and the evolving relationship between Türkiye and the EU will shape the next phase in the Cyprus saga. While major obstacles remain, the current moment offers a chance for creative diplomacy and pragmatic problem-solving. The international community, especially the EU and UN, has a vital role in supporting constructive engagement and facilitating a lasting solution.

Looking ahead, the prospects for durable peace depend on all stakeholders’ ability to reconcile competing interests, address longstanding grievances, and build trust across communal divides. Whether the outcome is a federal settlement, a formalized partition, or a hybrid arrangement like a confederation, the decisions made in the coming months and years will have far-reaching consequences for Cyprus, regional stability, and the security architecture of the Eastern Mediterranean.

As diplomatic channels cautiously reopen and new leadership seeks to bridge entrenched divisions, the period ahead will be shaped by the persistence of old challenges alongside new opportunities. Meaningful progress will require ongoing dialogue, mutual concessions, and the willingness of all parties—local, regional, and international—to reconsider established positions in favor of pragmatic compromise. President Erhürman’s ability to balance Turkish Cypriot aspirations, Ankara’s strategic interests, and international expectations will be crucial. Ultimately, Cyprus’s future depends on achieving inclusive governance, equitable resource sharing, and building trust—elements that, if realized, could transform the island from a point of division into a model of cooperation and stability in the Eastern Mediterranean.

[1] “New momentum to unification as Turkish Cypriots reject Erdogan-backed leader as president,” The Arab Weekly, October 20, 2025, https://thearabweekly.com/new-momentum-unification-turkish-cypriots-reject-erdogan-backed-leader-president.

[2] “Landslide win for pro-EU Turkish Cypriot candidate raises hopes for peace,” The Guardian, October 19, 2025, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2025/oct/19/turkish-cypriots-vote-in-pivotal-presidential-election-that-could-revive-peace-talks.

[3] Mehmet Kemal Firik, “Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus president reiterates demand for 2-state solution for island,” Anadolu Agency, August 5, 2025, https://www.aa.com.tr/en/world/turkish-republic-of-northern-cyprus-president-reiterates-demand-for-2-state-solution-for-island/3651356.

[4] “Northern Cyprus heads to elections, Ankara mobilises for Tatar,” Bir Gün, October 16, 2025, https://www.birgun.net/haber/northern-cyprus-heads-to-elections-ankara-mobilises-for-tatar-661387.

[5] Mehmet Kemal Firik, “KKTC Cumhuriyet Meclisi, iki devletli çözüm önerisini kabul etti,” AA, October 14, 2025, https://www.aa.com.tr/tr/dunya/kktc-cumhuriyet-meclisi-iki-devletli-cozum-onerisini-kabul-etti/3717230.

[6] “Erhürman’s landslide victory marks policy shift, new era in Turkish Cyprus,” Hürriyet Daily News, October 20, 2025, https://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/main-opposition-leader-erhurman-wins-turkish-cyprus-election-according-to-unofficial-results-214822.

[7] Cenk Kaan Adasoy, “TRNC votes: Choice between reality vs. delusion,” Daily Sabah, October 8, 2025, https://www.dailysabah.com/opinion/op-ed/trnc-votes-choice-betweenreality-vs-delusion.

[8] Sabahattin İsmail, “Crans Montana’da tutulan gizli BM tutanakları garantörlük konusunda verilen tavizi kanıtladı * Rum basını kaç gündür Temmuz 2017’de Crans Montana’da BM diplomatlarınca tutulan garantörlük görüşmelerinin gizli tutanaklarını yayınlıyor. DİB’nı Çavuşoğlu’nun ortaya koyduğu önerileri+ https://t.co/vQRADEczUl,” Tweet, @sabahatinismail, November 22, 2021, https://twitter.com/sabahatinismail/status/1462910642676015121.

[9] Islam Dogru and Serdar Dincel, “It is time for new approach to resolve Cyprus issue: TRNC president,” Anadolu Agency, September 27, 2025, https://www.aa.com.tr/en/turkiye/it-is-time-for-new-approach-to-resolve-cyprus-issue-trnc-president/3700515.

[10] Nektaria Stamouli, “A new player in an old game on Cyprus,” Kathimerini, October 29, 2025, https://www.ekathimerini.com/in-depth/analysis/1285080/a-new-player-in-an-old-game-on-cyprus/.

[11] “Turkish Cyprus president declares political equality a ‘red line’,” Hürriyet Daily News, October 25, 2025, https://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/turkish-cyprus-president-declares-political-equality-a-red-line-215019.

[12] “MHP leader calls on Turkish Cyprus to join Türkiye,” Hürriyet Daily News, October 21, 2025, https://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/mhp-leader-calls-on-turkish-cyprus-to-join-turkiye-214884.

[13] “Türkiye’s Erdogan insists on Cyprus two-state solution,” Arab News, July 20, 2025, https://www.arabnews.com/node/2608798/middle-east.

[14] Vassilis Nedos, “Greece revives Eastern Med forum plan,” Kathimerini, October 17, 2025, https://www.ekathimerini.com/politics/foreign-policy/1284022/greece-revives-eastern-med-forum-plan/.