In early December 2025, the White House released its latest National Security Strategy (NSS), which marks a major paradigm shift in American global leadership. Some experts argue that the NSS represents a pursuit of implementing an illiberal, rules-based order. Others contend that it signals a shift from sustaining American influence as a global power toward a more regional posture characterized by increased isolationism. Overall, the NSS reflects a move away from the United States’ traditional role as the leading global defender of the international rules-based order toward greater emphasis on transactional behavior and the prioritization of economic interests.
The style of the National Security Strategy is distinctive. Notably, this appears to be the first strategy to open with an explicit explanation of the ends-ways-means framework. The NSS outlines a series of “ways,” including, but not limited to, ending mass migration, securing the border, protecting core rights and civil liberties, shifting defense burdens to capable allies, using peace deals to realign regions, rebalancing trade, securing supply chains, and strengthening defense production.[1]
Additionally, the NSS presents a list of “means,” which include a nimble political system; a large, innovative economy; leading financial and capital markets; a world-class technology sector; the most powerful military; an extensive alliance network; favorable geography and natural resources; unmatched soft power; national willpower and patriotism; the restoration of a culture of competence; strategic energy dominance; reindustrialization; tax deregulation; and sustained investment in technology and science.[2]
The “peace through strength” doctrine reflects a mixed record of approaches that at times conflict with one another. Several stated priorities appear to be in tension with other priorities, and there is a broader lack of alignment between stated objectives and desired outcomes. Moreover, in light of significant developments that occurred after the NSS was released, some subsequent decision-making does not appear to align with its stated priorities. For example, the stated commitment of the United States to non-intervention in other countries’ internal affairs is inconsistent with the Nigerian Christmas strikes. The administration condemned attacks on Christians at the United Nations and targeted alleged ISIS strongholds that were attacking Christians in northeastern Nigeria.[3] Conversely, certain priorities do align with subsequent policy decisions, with the emphasis on the Western Hemisphere serving as one of the most evident examples.
Strategic themes and shifts included in the NSS
The NSS presents several traditional national security approaches. American primacy and offshore balancing represent its core strategic foundations. At the same time, the strategy signals notable shifts, including heightened prioritization of the Western Hemisphere, a looser commitment to sustained strategic competition, and an increased emphasis on economic interests in the Middle East and Africa.
American Primacy: Maintaining American primacy in the international system remains a central U.S. strategic objective. The NSS emphasizes sustaining dominance across military, economic, and technological domains. To achieve this, the United States seeks to prevent near-peer competitors from emerging as dominant global actors. However, the strategy gives limited attention to reinforcing and expanding the post-Cold War alliance system, despite alliances historically being a critical component of sustaining primacy. An overreliance on coercive diplomacy could risk destabilizing the balance of power. While the NSS claims to embrace a form of “flexible realism”—favoring pragmatism and common sense over cynical power politics—it supports a restrained approach to global policing only when such engagement clearly serves U.S. national interests.[4]
Offshore Balancing vs. Liberal Internationalism: Offshore balancing appears repeatedly throughout the NSS, particularly in its call to work with allies and partners to prevent adversaries from achieving regional dominance. Allies and partners are expected to assume greater responsibility for collective defense, and the strategy strongly emphasizes increased burden-sharing. In contrast, liberal internationalism is sharply criticized, most notably through the denigration of international organizations (IOs).[5] The NSS argues that U.S. participation in IOs yields diminishing returns, claiming that these institutions encourage unnecessary American involvement in global conflicts, restrict freedom of speech, and at times promote anti-American sentiment. Nevertheless, the strategy reflects a limited element of liberal internationalism by portraying the United States as a global peacemaker. In this context, the NSS highlights the executive branch’s role in securing an estimated nine peace agreements.
Intermestic Policy: The Trump 2.0 National Security Strategy exhibits both continuity and change relative to the 2018 strategy. A key point of continuity is its emphasis on intermestic policy challenges—international issues that directly affect domestic affairs. Addressing these challenges is identified as a top priority and includes trade imbalances, migration, border security, international and regional criminal networks, and cross-border narcotics trafficking. This intermestic focus significantly shapes the strategy’s attention to the Western Hemisphere. Secretary of State Marco Rubio has argued that long-standing neglect of the region contributed to these challenges by enabling near-peer competitors and other non-hemispheric actors to expand their influence across both hard and soft security domains.[6]
Western Hemisphere: Prioritizing the Western Hemisphere—also referred to as the “Donroe Doctrine 2.0”—is not surprising given developments over the past year, but it does represent a significant policy shift from Trump’s first NSS. This prioritization is justified through a threat-based narrative emphasizing the flow of illicit drugs, the presence of transnational gang organizations, and migration pressures as key national defense concerns. The White House established specific preconditions to support this regional focus. One salient indicator was the issuance of an executive order addressing Cuban aggression and recommending a robust, interagency approach aimed at ensuring that Cuba becomes “a stable, prosperous, and free country.”[7]
Strategic Competition: Another major departure from Trump’s earlier strategy concerns strategic competition. While the Trump administration is historically associated with introducing the concept of strategic competition, the “Peace Through Strength” doctrine reflects a more moderate and loosely defined commitment to it. Competition with China remains a stated priority; however, the NSS preserves strategic ambiguity regarding U.S. commitments to Taiwan’s security. Additionally, Trump signaled a qualified commitment to remaining competitive in the technological race with China, exemplified by the sale of advanced semiconductor chips to the Chinese Communist Party. In contrast, the NSS devotes minimal attention to Russia, offering little discussion of competition or adversarial behavior—marking a notable shift from Trump’s first NSS and National Defense Strategy (NDS). Some experts argue that this reduced emphasis on strategic competition could significantly alter the international system’s power distribution. Others interpret it as evidence of an implicit effort to shape a tripolar order in which the United States, China, and Russia function as regional hegemons focused primarily on dominance within their respective spheres.
Europe: The European section of the NSS has drawn significant criticism, particularly for its portrayal of political instability. The strategy sharply criticizes Europe’s open-border policies and demographic changes, asserting that subregional organizations such as the European Union and NATO pose challenges rather than solutions. Russian behavior receives comparatively limited attention. Notably, the NSS proposes an unprecedented opportunity to pursue strategic stability with Russia while also emphasizing the need to “restore Europe’s civilizational self-confidence and Western identity.”[8]
Middle East: The NSS approaches the Middle East without positioning the region as a central pillar of U.S. foreign policy. Instead, the Trump administration emphasizes economic engagement and a partial commitment to peace and security, including soft-security interests that extend beyond the energy sector. Despite this relative deprioritization, the administration’s actions suggest continued engagement. During President Trump’s first foreign trip, the Middle East featured prominently, with multiple agreements secured in technology, renewable energy, and artificial intelligence.[9] President Trump also met twice with the Syrian president during his first year in office and agreed to ease tensions with Syria—an approach reflected in the FY2026 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA). According to the latest NDAA, the legislation includes “the repeal of sanctions on Syria to support economic and political stability following the end of the Assad regime.”[10]
The NSS further emphasizes the continued U.S. commitment to peace and security initiatives. It highlights the administration’s role in addressing the Gaza crisis, portraying these efforts as advancing a peace agreement and pledging continued focus on sustainable peace and reconstruction. With respect to Iran, the NSS underscores an offshore balancing approach and praises airstrikes targeting Iran’s nuclear facilities.
Functional Areas: The NSS underscores several top priorities across key functional areas. The document emphasizes the importance of securing supply chains—including energy, food, semiconductors, and critical minerals. Many of these issues are increasingly becoming central components of negotiations in peace agreements. Furthermore, the NSS argues that the United States should invest in soft-security issues that “truly serve America’s best interests.” The recommendation that the nation embrace cultural and spiritual health represents a significant departure from Trump’s first National Security Strategy. The NSS goes further by asserting that the country must promote stronger traditional families and healthier children—a position that closely reflects the views commonly associated with Vice President J.D. Vance.[11]
Major national security topics that were not addressed
The NSS is notably deliberate in omitting certain topics. Several emerging themes are not addressed. President Trump has repeatedly stated that he prefers not to disclose all aspects of his intentions and strategy, and it is possible that he intentionally avoided discussion of counterterrorism and expansionist policies. Since the release of the NSS, Trump has authorized airstrikes in Nigeria,[12] taken actions against Nicolás Maduro’s regime, expressed interest in seizing oil fields in Venezuela,[13] and appointed a special envoy to negotiate with Denmark over Greenland—actions that were not explicitly anticipated in the strategy.[14]
American Imperialism: The “Peace Through Strength” doctrine does not explicitly address imperialistic ambitions or the use of military force to expand U.S. influence. Trump’s earlier policy documents, including his first NSS and presidential directives, did reflect expansionist interests—particularly in Greenland and the Panama Canal region. At its core, imperialistic behavior tends to be driven by the pursuit of natural resources, access to oil, and competition with China. Greenland, Nigeria, and Venezuela have all become focal points for verbal or physical actions by the current administration that can be interpreted as expressions of imperialistic interest.
Combating the National Affordability Crisis: Some foreign policy experts may be surprised that the NSS acknowledges the national affordability crisis. This crisis—a product of deep economic insecurity—is likely to be a long-term issue in the United States. It also contributes to a growing inward focus among Americans and a rising skepticism toward overseas involvement. Regardless of political affiliation, combating the affordability crisis is a legitimate national concern and could be reasonably incorporated into a comprehensive NSS.
Domestic Security: The NSS does not address several major domestic security challenges. Threats such as the spread of hate crimes and the ongoing epidemic of gun violence—which have worsened since the COVID‑19 pandemic—are absent from the strategy.[15] These issues directly affect Americans’ sense of safety and are contributing factors in the public’s decreased interest in foreign policy. To strengthen national security broadly, President Trump should consider advocating for enhanced mental health programs and support for sensible anti‑gun violence initiatives.
Nuclear Non‑Proliferation: The NSS shows limited engagement with international nuclear non‑proliferation efforts. The strategy does not articulate a role for the United States in supporting treaties such as the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) or in strengthening the United Nations’ nuclear non‑proliferation regime. The only relevant reference in the strategy involves remarks made in President Trump’s speech to the United Nations General Assembly on biological weapons, not nuclear dangers.[16] While the administration expressed a desire to lead international enforcement of the Biological Weapons Convention, the NSS lacks substantive nuclear non‑proliferation commitments. Many analysts note that the strategy largely ignores nuclear risks, even though nuclear capabilities and strategic stability are discussed elsewhere in policy debates and arms control dialogues. Given growing global nuclear tensions and the impending expiration of key arms control treaties, it remains vital for both the executive branch and Congress to recommit to nuclear risk‑reduction measures and to avoid unilateral reductions in U.S. intercontinental ballistic missile capabilities.
Education Security and Public Service: The NSS does not fully address education. Unlike the NSS 2017, the 2025 strategy mentions education only twice, primarily in reference to merit-based initiatives and cultural exchanges in Europe.[17] Trump’s first National Security Strategy (2017), by contrast, expressed a strong commitment to investing in STEM programs and promoting global competitiveness among American students.[18] The limited attention in the NSS 2025 is unsurprising, given the administration’s actions dismantling aspects of the Department of Education and reducing funding for critical programs at top U.S. universities and colleges. The strategy could have better emphasized investments in global education and civic awareness programs, particularly encouraging Americans to study abroad and pursue public service work. At a minimum, the NSS could have addressed the implications of declining recruitment levels in the U.S. Armed Forces.
U.S. Engagement in Southeast Asia: The NSS asserts that the United States does not need to be involved in every part of the world, which some experts argue should not apply to South Asia. While the strategy mentions India and Pakistan, it narrowly focuses on fostering a peace agreement between the two countries. A more comprehensive approach would include regional security and economic interests and emphasize alliances that advance U.S. strategic objectives. For India, maintaining a robust partnership is critical to supporting U.S. strategic competition in the Indo-Pacific. For Pakistan, the NSS overlooks the country’s ongoing role in U.S. counterterrorism efforts, which was highlighted during the administration’s first 100 days.[19] Additionally, Bangladesh has volunteered to assist with establishing an international interim security force as part of the Gaza peace process, but this contribution receives no acknowledgment in the strategy.[20]
The Arctic Region: The NSS omits strategic consideration of the Arctic, despite its importance. While Greenland receives attention, the Arctic region as a whole is neglected, missing opportunities to address competition for dominance, security, trade routes, and climate-related challenges. However, the administration has shown interest in the region elsewhere; President Trump issued an executive order on 8 October 2025, recognizing growing threats and recommending the construction of Arctic Security Cutters.[21]
Environmental Policy: The strategy does not outline how the United States will confront future environmental challenges. The NSS rejects climate change as a policy concern, stating, “We reject the disastrous climate change and Net Zero ideologies that have so greatly harmed Europe, threaten the United States, and subsidize our adversaries.”[22] The strategy also fails to address practical concerns such as the increasing severity of the annual hurricane season.
Health Security: The NSS provides no guidance on health security issues, including pandemic prevention. Chronic illnesses remain one of the leading causes of death in the United States, yet the strategy does not mention investments in research or treatment for diseases like cancer. Cancer is a growing concern, particularly for Americans under fifty.[23] The NSS should support top-tier research initiatives, such as the cancer research center at Harvard University, which has the potential to outcompete China and Russia and attract global talent.[24] In addition, the strategy could have addressed broader public health priorities, including preventive care, mental health services, and programs to reduce healthcare inequities, all of which directly impact national resilience and the country’s ability to project power abroad.
How will it shape future administration sub-strategies?
The NSS offers insight into priorities for future strategies. The National Defense Strategy (NDS) will elaborate on global deterrence, with an emphasis on the Western Hemisphere, bolstering border security, and reinforcing the importance of collective security through offshore balancing. The strategy was released in January 2026, and a preview was presented at the Ronald Reagan Defense Forum. The presentation aligns with the priorities outlined in the NSS. The Secretary of War identified four key priorities: focusing on the Western Hemisphere and homeland defense, increasing burden-sharing, revitalizing the defense industrial base, and countering China.[25]
If the Trump administration proceeds with producing a Global Posture Review (GPR), the review is likely to reflect dramatic changes from President Biden’s GPR. A “Peace Through Strength” GPR would likely recommend a reduced U.S. military posture in Europe and the Middle East while increasing troop presence in the Western Hemisphere, particularly in Latin America and the Caribbean. Finally, U.S. security interests in Africa appear to be significantly deprioritized, raising the possibility of shutting down the United States Africa Command (USAFRICOM). Unlike the first Trump administration, the White House will probably not produce a U.S. strategy on Africa.[26] By contrast, Africa deserves more policy attention. The Trump administration should consider continuing President Biden’s African Leadership Summit Initiative Plan. The African Leadership Summit Implementation Plan is strategic guidance that is shaped by a modern and more competitive outlook on Africa. Africa has the fastest-growing economies with massive critical minerals, and youth represent more than fifty percent of the population. The United States, along with the rest of the international community, should engage in aid and development, trade, investments, commercial diplomacy opportunities, and additional entrepreneurial initiatives to help counter recurring violent extremism, regional poverty, and predatory dominance from China.[27]
NSS policy implementations: major benefits, implications, and recommendations
The NSS implementation process is likely to involve surprises, predictions, challenges, and contradictions. The administration may face obstacles that impede the achievement of NSS priorities, including poor interagency coordination, budget constraints, eroding legislative support, misalignment with international norms and the rule of law, and failure to address national priorities that directly impact the American people. Several major recommendations follow:
The Need for Functional National Security Agencies and Manpower: To achieve the strategic goals of the NSS, the administration must ensure that all relevant agencies, departments, and offices are effective in fulfilling their roles and responsibilities. The proclaimed “means” in the strategy are not fully aligned with current implementation efforts.
The White House National Security Council (WHNSC), established by the National Security Act of 1947, should provide guidance to relevant government entities. However, a skeleton WHNSC is severely limited in advising national security leadership and coordinating an effective interagency process. Significant expert attrition has further weakened the Council. The administration should rebuild the WHNSC and fully utilize the expertise of its personnel.[28]
Implementation Plans and Alternatives: The administration should develop a comprehensive implementation plan or ensure that each relevant agency produces its own. These plans should clearly identify alternatives, specifying which office or department will handle each responsibility. For example, the State Department has reduced key offices such as the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor. An implementation plan should identify an alternative bureau or office to carry out these responsibilities. This approach is not only about safeguarding departments but also about ensuring that the administration can successfully execute its peace deals. Critical entities should receive the same institutional support as the Development Finance Corporation (DFC). The latest NDAA has equipped the DFC to expand its strategic investments overseas, particularly in wealthier states.[29]
A key question remains: what is the alternative to the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID)? In response to humanitarian needs in Jamaica, Congress criticized the slow response and demanded State Department action.[30] Similarly, diminishing FEMA resources pose challenges, especially in light of increasingly severe annual hurricane seasons and rising temperatures.
Maintaining the American Global Alliance System: The NSS emphasizes power and influence, but the administration should maintain America’s traditional alliance system without over-relying on transactional diplomacy. Smart diplomacy should aim to produce fairness, mutual respect, and a favorable balance of power. The NSS should underscore maintaining and growing America’s alliances with acute pragmatism.
The Need for Subnational Diplomacy and More CODELS: U.S. global engagement is likely to be limited. While the administration may not attend forums such as the Copenhagen or Paris Accord summits, the absence of executive leadership has created opportunities for city-state diplomacy and increased participation of elected officials in global forums. Boosting subnational diplomacy is critical. Additionally, Congressional delegations (CODELS) should be encouraged to attend key international summits, including the Organization of American States (OAS) Summit, the World Economic Forum, the Munich Security Conference, the World Trade Ministerial Conference, the NATO Summit, the G7 Summit, and others.
Espouse International Organization Reform over Withdrawal: The administration has proceeded with withdrawals from and defunding of international organizations and treaties, having exited 60 organizations. While some international organizations are slow or stagnant, outright withdrawal carries significant consequences. Instead, the United States should work with the international community to implement rapid, effective reforms with accountability. The United States receives an abundance of information exchanges on critical global issues that it would not receive domestically, and it helps build global norms and rules through its membership in these international organizations.
These withdrawals undermine the implementation of the international rules-based order, embolden U.S. nondemocratic adversaries and competitors to shape the global system to their advantage, negatively affect humanitarian and health programs, hinder research and policy recommendations on combating climate change, and limit U.S. companies’ access to consultations on global labor, trade, and digital standards.
Prioritize Addressing Additional Domestic Security Issues: While the NSS primarily addresses U.S. global posture, domestic security directly affects the country’s ability to project power abroad. To appear stronger, the NSS should also address non-traditional security issues, including domestic extremism, gun violence, political violence, and the affordability crisis. The post-COVID-19 environment has exacerbated international fragility. Current domestic security initiatives, such as tough immigration enforcement and border security, require refinement. The administration must develop clearer rules of engagement in U.S. cities and towns to prevent instability.
Strengthen Alignment Between the Executive and Legislative Branch: Recent legislation, including the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2026 (NDAA26), demonstrates a lack of alignment with the executive branch. Congress has passed bipartisan measures that do not fully reflect NSS priorities. For example, NDAA26 strengthens support for NATO, characterizes Russia as a threat to regional stability, maintains U.S. forces at no fewer than sixty-six troops under U.S. European Command, ensures the protection of the Baltic States, and provides security assistance to Ukraine. The bill also secured DEIA programs in the Department of State and Department of War, despite the codification of President Trump’s executive order (EO 14151) ending certain DEI programs. The Pickering and Rangel Fellowships and the reestablishment of service volunteer teams focused on women’s issues in the military are preserved.[31]
Final Thoughts
The 2025 National Security Strategy (NSS) represents a major shift from the United States’ traditional global leadership role since the end of the Cold War. The NSS demonstrates a new approach that diminishes U.S. leadership in defending the international rules-based order, reframing the country as a more transactional regional power. Additionally, the NSS serves as strategic guidance that outlines the executive branch’s priorities; however, over time, it is subject to significant change. While the doctrine reflects several of Trump’s priorities, unpredictable domestic and foreign developments will likely influence and alter those priorities. No one foresaw COVID-19, and the Trump administration was forced to adapt to a global health crisis that contributed to the deaths of millions of Americans and significantly impacted job security. Furthermore, the administration will undoubtedly learn that achieving its priorities requires effective implementation mechanisms, international organizations, and cooperation with allies and partners. Dismantling or diminishing key national security and foreign policy institutions, withdrawing from international organizations, and disengaging with allies and partners does not reduce the United States’ global role; rather, it has the potential to undermine U.S. power and influence and impede the achievement of national security objectives.
[1] The White House, National Security Strategy, November 2025, https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2025/12/2025-National-Security-Strategy.pdf.
[2] Ibid., pp. 3-4.
[3] Ibid., p. 9.
[4] Ibid., p. 9.
[5] Ibid., p. 10.
[6] Marco Rubio, “Marco Rubio: An Americas First Foreign Policy,” Wall Street Journal, January 30, 2025, https://www.wsj.com/opinion/an-americas-first-foreign-policy-secretary-of-state-rubio-writes-western-hemisphere-too-long-neglected-a81707b0.
[7] The White House, “Fact Sheet President Donald J. Trump Strengthens the Policy of the United States Toward Cuba,” June 30, 2025, https://www.whitehouse.gov/fact-sheets/2025/06/fact-sheet-president-donald-j-trump-strengthens-the-policy-of-the-united-states-toward-cuba/.
[8] The White House, National Security Strategy, November 2025, p. 27.
[9] The White House, “Fact Sheet: President Donald J. Trump Solidifies Economic and Defense Partnership with The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia,” November 18, 2025, https://www.whitehouse.gov/fact-sheets/2025/11/fact-sheet-president-donald-j-trump-solidifies-economic-and-defense-partnership-with-the-kingdom-of-saudi-arabia/.
[10] National Defense Authorization Act, 2026, https://rules.house.gov/sites/evo-subsites/rules.house.gov/files/documents/rcp_xml-2.pdf.
[11] The White House, National Security Strategy, November 2025, p. 4.
[12] “US launches strikes against ISIS in Nigeria,” BBC News, December 25, 2025, https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cj69j8l918do.amp.
[13] Linda Qiu, “Fact-Checking Trump’s Justification for the Venezuela Operation,” The New York Times, January 8, 2026, https://www.nytimes.com/2026/01/08/us/politics/venezuela-trump-maduro-fact-check.htm.
[14] “Trump names Louisiana governor as Greenland special envoy, prompting Danish alarm,” NBC News, December 21, 2025, https://www.nbcnews.com/news/amp/rcna250426.
[15] “SPLC sees rising tide of violence as Hate Crimes Awareness Month kicks off,” SPL Center, October 1, 2025, https://www.splcenter.org/resources/stories/hate-crimes-awareness-month-kicks-off/.
[16] Lucas Fluegel, “For Bioweapons Experts, Trump’s UN Speech Presents a Window of Opportunity,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, December 4, 2025, https://carnegieendowment.org/posts/2025/12/biological-weapons-trump-united-nations-strengthen-treaty?lang=en.
[17] The White House, National Security Strategy, November 2025, p. 11.
[18] The White House, National Security Strategy, December 2017, https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/NSS-Final-12-18-2017-0905.pdf.
[19] Asha Castleberry Hernandez, “What did Trump’s First 100 Days Tell Us about the Next National Security Strategy?,” TRENDS Research and Advisory, May 26, 2025, https://trendsresearch.org/insight/what-did-trumps-first-100-days-tell-us-about-the-next-national-security-strategy/?srsltid=.
[20] “Bangladesh seeks to join international security force in Gaza, Arab News, January 11, 2026, https://www.arabnews.com/node/2628926/amp.
[21] The White House, “Construction of Arctic Security Cutters,” Presidential Actions, October 8, 2025, https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/2025/10/construction-of-arctic-security-cutters/.
[22] The White House, National Security Strategy, November 2025, p. 14
[23] “Leading Causes of Death,” U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, https://www.cdc.gov/nchs/fastats/leading-causes-of-death.htm.
[24] “Trump administration freezes 2.2 billion in grants to Harvard,” Harvard T.H. Chan School of Public Health, April 15, 2025, https://hsph.harvard.edu/news/trump-administration-freezes-2-2-billion-in-grants-to-harvard/.
[25] U.S. Department of War, “Remarks By Secretary of War Pete Hegseth at The Reagan National Defense Forum,” December 6, 2025. https://www.war.gov/News/Speeches/Speech/Article/4354431/remarks-by-secretary-of-war-pete-hegseth-at-the-reagan-national-defense-forum-a/.
[26] The White House, “Remarks by National Security Advisor Ambassador John R. Bolton on The Trump Administration’s New Africa Strategy,” December 13, 2028, https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/briefings-statements/remarks-national-security-advisor-ambassador-john-r-bolton-trump-administrations-new-africa-strategy/.
[27] U.S. Department of State, “Implementation of U.S. Commitments,” 2022 U.S.-Africa Leaders Summit Implementation Plan (Archived), https://2021-2025.state.gov/u-s-africa-leaders-summit-implementation/.
[28] The National Security Council, The Obama White House: History, (2018), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/administration/eop/nsc/history.
[29] “Statement on The Final Negotiated Text of The FY26 National Defense Authorization Act,” Foreign Policy For America, December 9, 2025, https://www.fp4america.org/2025/12/09/fp4a-statement-on-the-final-negotiated-text-of-the-fy26-national-defense-authorization-act/.
[30] “Clarke and Meeks Lead Letter To Secretary Rubio Urging Humanitarian and Recovery Assistance To Jamaica in Wake of Hurricane Melissa,” November 10, 2025, https://clarke.house.gov/clarke-and-meeks-lead-letter-to-secretary-rubio-urging-humanitarian-and-recovery-assistance-to-jamaica-in-wake-of-hurricane-melissa/.
[31] U.S. Representative Chrissy Houlahan, “Houlahan Champions Key Reforms and Readiness Investments in the FY26 National Defense Authorization Act,” https://houlahan.house.gov/news/documentsingle.aspx?DocumentID=4852.
