The Horn of Africa—comprising Ethiopia, Somalia, Eritrea, Djibouti, and neighboring areas—has emerged as a key region in global trade and security. Straddling the Red Sea and the Bab-el-Mandeb Strait, it carries roughly 10-12% of world maritime commerce.[1] This corridor links Asian markets to Europe via the Suez Canal, making it vital for the EU’s supply chains and access to Middle Eastern, African markets, and the nations of the Indian Ocean. The region is also rich in critical minerals, oil, gas, vast arable land and livestock. As a result, the Horn has become a focal point of international investment and strategic interest: China’s Belt and Road investments (ports and railways in Djibouti and Ethiopia) and a military presence in Djibouti, the U.S. and several European naval operations, and Russia’s expanding defense cooperation and commercial agreements are all reshaping the landscape.[2]
This convergence of external actors has transformed the Horn into a highly competitive geopolitical space, where local conflicts are increasingly internationalized. Port access agreements, security partnerships, and mediation efforts are rarely neutral; they are interpreted through the lens of geopolitical alignment and counter-alignment. The Ethiopia-Somaliland port agreement announced in early 2024 is illustrative: while economically rational from Addis Ababa’s perspective, it triggered diplomatic backlash from Somalia and drew in regional and international stakeholders concerned about sovereignty, precedent, and balance of power.
The Horn’s geography—coastal outlets for landlocked states and chokepoints for global shipping—underpins its importance. For example, landlocked Ethiopia is only 750 km from the Red Sea, and seeks sea access via Djibouti or Somaliland to secure its trade. Instability in the Horn (for instance, Yemeni Houthi attacks) would reverberate globally. Indeed, when in late 2023, Houthis struck dozens of commercial vessels and undersea cables in the Red Sea, it cut 25% of internet traffic between Asia and Europe.[3] Moreover, the Horn abuts the Sahel via Sudan and South Sudan: changes in the Sahel (jihadist expansion, coups in Mali/Burkina Faso) raise the specter of cross-regional spillover. This makes the EU’s interest in the Horn inseparable from security in the wider African continent.
Great-Power Competition and Regional Actors
Multiple powers now vie for influence in the Horn. China has emerged as a major investor and trade partner: it financed the Addis Ababa-Djibouti railway, a new port, and has constructed a military base in Djibouti, ensuring Beijing a foothold on the Red Sea. Russia is also expanding its engagement in the region, with increased security cooperation in Sudan and Eritrea, as well as through arms sales to Ethiopia and Somalia, and even talk of a Russian naval facility in Port Sudan. There is also the United States, which maintains a large base in Djibouti and is committed to anti-piracy and counterterrorism, while Gulf states, particularly the UAE and Saudi Arabia, have made substantial investments in port infrastructure, logistics, and agricultural development across the region. Turkey’s involvement is notable in Somalia (port of Mogadishu, training of Somali forces) and plans for an outpost in Djibouti. Regional actors, including the Houthis in Yemen, have affected maritime security through attacks on commercial vessels.
The region, therefore, is geopolitically highly contested by external actors, pushing the EU to play a more active role. Brussels wants to diversify its supply chains and secure raw materials outside traditional sources such as China. Ethiopia, in particular, is seen as an industrial and logistical hub in Africa. The EU also seeks reliable access to key commodities (coffee, horticulture, metals, possibly hydrocarbons offshore Somalia) and a stable trade corridor linking the Indian Ocean to Europe. A potential transport corridor from Addis Ababa through Djibouti (and potentially Berbera in Somaliland) is seen by Brussels as ideal for connectivity with the region, as it would open new markets for European exports.
At the same time, security concerns drive EU interest. With more than 300 million people living in the Horn and Sahel, instability in these regions directly affects European security by fueling terrorism, extremism, and irregular migration flows toward the Mediterranean. In recent years, the union has focused on protecting maritime routes and bolstering local forces against terrorism (e.g., training missions in Somalia). Ensuring the Horn’s stability is thus tied to EU strategic autonomy. Related to security, the EU maintains several military and civilian missions. For instance, training missions in Somalia (EUTM Somalia, EUCAP Somalia) help build local capacity against Al-Shabaab.[4] The EU also works through regional bodies such as the African Union Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS) and IGAD conflict-resolution processes. The EU also supported initiatives like the Council of Arab and African Coastal States (based in Riyadh) and EU‑African Union summits to coordinate the broader maritime security. The European bloc also has its Special Representative to the Horn of Africa, routinely hosts Horn‑focused ministerials, and leverages trade policy through the EU‑IGAD Economic Partnership Agreement.[5]
Another core EU interest is migration management. The Horn is both a source and transit region for migration. Poverty, conflict and climate shocks send many Eritreans, Ethiopians, Somalis and others toward North Africa or the Gulf. In 2024, for example, fighting in Sudan drove hundreds of thousands of refugees toward Libya and Egypt. Ethiopia itself hosts over a million refugees (from neighboring countries) but also has nationals migrating abroad, often irregularly. The EU has responded by investing in better migration governance with Horn states, exemplified by programs like the Better Migration Management (BMM) initiative. The initiative operates information centers, training and border police programs in Horn countries to curb smuggling. The EU also provides budgets for refugee camps (e.g., in Ethiopia and Sudan) and for voluntary return schemes. In 2024, the EU‑Ethiopia funding package included projects on sustainable responses to displacement and creating legal pathways for migrant workers abroad. In short, Brussels sees migration as both a challenge and a rationale for deeper engagement with Ethiopia and the Horn region overall.
On migration, the EU’s message is about encouraging legal migration that benefits both sides (e.g., formal labor migration, diaspora investment) and preventing irregular flows. Brussels seeks partnerships to improve border management in the Horn (Khartoum Process, support to coast guards) but also to create jobs at home. For example, EU projects in Sudan train displaced youth in farming or crafts, aiming to offer alternatives to risky journeys. The EU also funds refugee camps in the Horn (hosting Somali and South Sudanese refugees, among others) to stabilize large displaced populations. Nevertheless, irregular flows continue: recent EU data show thousands crossing the Sahara or the Red Sea from the Horn to Libya or Yemen each month. Thus, “migration management” remains a central driver of EU policy, even as Brussels stops short of bilateral readmission deals like those with North African countries.
Finally, the EU promotes governance and values in the Horn, although with mixed success. The EU ties many programs to democracy, human rights and the rule of law and increased aid to peacebuilding and institution-building. For instance, the 2024 EU Annual Action Programme for Ethiopia devotes tens of millions to strengthening democratic institutions, transitional justice and social cohesion. The dilemma, however, is finding the right balance between pressuring the governments to open up (e.g., civil society space, free media) and the risk of alienating key partners. Moreover, within the EU’s Global Gateway strategy, a €300+ billion investment initiative for sustainable infrastructure, Brussels signed a €240 million grant package with Ethiopia in April 2025 to cover power grid modernization.[6] These investments are linked to Europe’s own needs: the grant funds renewable energy projects to stabilize the national grid, increases horticulture exports (coffee, fruit) into EU markets, and trains workers in clean-tech and logistics sectors (securing supply chains). In short, development aid is being channelled to create positive economic interdependence.
Ethiopia’s Significance for the EU
Ethiopia is arguably the most important state in the Horn of Africa, the continent’s second-most populous state, and one of its fastest-growing economies. Unlike coastal states whose leverage derives from port access, Ethiopia’s importance lies in the fact that its vibrant economy attracts the neighbors, whether through security cooperation and port access, Nile hydropolitics and cross-border trade, etc. A core driver of Ethiopia’s power lies in its ambition to become a logistics, manufacturing, and export hub for East Africa. Over the past decade, Addis Ababa has invested heavily in industrial parks, transport corridors, and energy infrastructure, seeking to replicate elements of the East Asian development model. Although the civil war in Tigray and subsequent instability disrupted this trajectory, the underlying ambition remains intact. This centrality makes the country indispensable to the European Union, which no longer sees the African country as a development recipient but as a strategic partner whose internal trajectory directly affects European interests in the Red Sea, the Sahel-Horn interface, and the Mediterranean migration system.
Landlocked Ethiopia’s connectivity imperative is particularly consequential. Given the fact that roughly 90 percent of Ethiopian trade transits through Djibouti, for Addis Ababa, diversification of access (for instance, through Berbera) to the sea is an economic necessity and a strategic priority. For the EU, Ethiopia’s connectivity agenda aligns closely with Global Gateway objectives. European policymakers see Ethiopia as a node in alternative trade routes linking inner African production to European markets, reducing reliance on longer, more vulnerable supply chains. The EU’s support for transport infrastructure, customs reform, and logistics modernization is therefore not only developmental but strategic. Relatedly, the EU’s emphasis on strengthening Ethiopia’s tax and customs administration reflects a desire to integrate Ethiopia more deeply into global trade regimes governed by predictable, rules-based standards.
Post-Tigray War EU-Ethiopia Relations
The end of large-scale hostilities in Tigray in late 2022 marked a turning point in EU-Ethiopia relations. During the conflict, Brussels had suspended budget support for Ethiopia and sharply criticized alleged human rights violations, aligning itself with a broader Western push for accountability and humanitarian access. The Pretoria peace agreement and subsequent normalization steps opened the door to re-engagement.
From the EU’s perspective, disengagement from Ethiopia was never a positive geopolitical move. The risk that prolonged isolation could push Addis Ababa further toward alternative partners—particularly China, Russia, or Gulf states—was a key concern. The restoration of budget support and the designation of Ethiopia as a priority country under the Global Gateway framework reflect this pragmatic reassessment. The €240 million Annual Action Programme signed in 2025 is very much reflective of this shift. It represents the EU’s largest single-country grant package in the Horn region and signals long-term commitment rather than crisis-driven engagement. The programme’s structure is notable for its breadth: it spans public finance management, agribusiness modernization, digital skills development, health system recovery, and migration-related labor integration. Investments in digital skills and vocational training aim to support Ethiopia’s industrialization while also addressing European labor shortages in selected sectors. This reflects an integrated EU approach that treats economic resilience, governance capacity, and migration management as interlinked.
Despite the wider convergence of interests, Ethiopia remains a complex and politically fragile partner. Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed’s reform agenda—launched in 2018, derailed by war, and partially revived since 2023—continues to generate both optimism and, at times, skepticism in European capitals. From an EU perspective, Ethiopia’s political trajectory poses a dilemma. Conditioning assistance too strictly on rapid democratic reforms risks undermining post-conflict stabilization and alienating Addis Ababa in favor of the EU’s geopolitical competitors. Brussels has so far opted for a calibrated approach: maintaining pressure through political dialogue and civil society support, while avoiding abrupt funding suspensions.
The EU and Other Key Horn Countries
Somalia, Djibouti, Eritrea and Sudan each raise specific concerns. Despite challenges, Somalia remains geopolitically important. The EU is Somalia’s largest aid donor (up to €4 bn in 2014-2021) and supports the federal government through peacekeeping support and development aid.[7] In November 2025, the EU allocated around $30 million to Somalia.[8] Brussels co-chaired international conferences on Somalia and helps fund AMISOM/ATMIS.[9] Recently, Somalia has begun to strengthen governance (new electoral law, elections planned by 2024) and cooperate on security (counter-terror campaigns). The EU strategy there focuses on continued support to the Somali National Army and political reconciliation while encouraging reforms in the country’s anti-corruption and federalism.
Djibouti, which hosts several foreign bases, is strategically important as the gateway to the Red Sea. The EU has relatively few projects there, but it closely follows Djibouti’s management of Chinese and Gulf investments. European naval ships dock in Djibouti and coordinate with local authorities. The rise of alternative corridors (Ethiopia‑Berbera, or even Ethiopia‑Sudan via Port Sudan) could diminish Djibouti’s monopoly. However, EU analyses suggest Djibouti will remain a key node even in a multi-port future. Thus, Brussels invests in port services and regional integration (e.g., support to Horn transit regimes) that include Djibouti.
Sudan lies on the Horn’s western flank. The 2023 civil war has had a major regional impact. Europe was already a major donor to Sudan, but conflict and sanctions now complicate that. The EU retains humanitarian aid channels and joined U.S.-led efforts for a ceasefire, but has little on-the-ground presence. Ethiopia’s derailed rail link to Port Sudan (destroyed by fighting) and Saudi interest in Port Sudan indicate that Sudan’s geography influences Horn geopolitics.[10] The EU’s immediate concern is the humanitarian—Brussels has pledged hundreds of millions for Sudanese refugees—and, in the longer term, it will need to re-engage on Sudanese reconstruction if peace returns.
Broader Perspective
The EU frames its Horn strategy as complementary to Africa’s own priorities and notes that the bloc’s strengths lie in long-term development aid and normative power. European leaders also worry about “lagging behind” China and Russia and emphasize the need for a “strong and structured” EU presence in the Horn region. Going forward, a savvy EU strategy likely means picking partnership opportunities where possible—for example, co-financing ports or power plants with like-minded donors—while firmly countering destabilizing interference. The 2024 Paris conference on Sudan and the joint IGAD-AU-EU dialogue on the Horn are examples of multilateral initiatives.[11] Indeed, recent forums like the Red Sea Council (bringing Africa and Arab neighbors together) show room for coordination beyond East-West competition. The EU’s challenge is to carve out niches where it adds unique value (sustainable investment, humanitarian aid, conflict mediation) and not just react to Beijing or Moscow. Investing in basic development and good governance—core EU strengths—may yield more durable influence than a purely security-driven “power projection” approach.
In short, the EU should become more geopolitical in its approach to the African continent and especially the vital Horn region. The alternative is being surpassed in investments, trade, and security cooperation not only by China and Russia[12] but also by Turkey, Iran, and India.[13] In the era of the dismantling global order and re-emerging spheres of influence, the EU will need to act more boldly when it comes to the competition over minerals and rare earth elements (REEs). The latter is abundant on the African continent and, given Brussels’ summits with the Central Asian states, which likewise have huge resources of REEs and various minerals, a similar approach could be imitated with the Horn countries. The EU lacks the military component in its foreign policy planning, but it can serve as a powerful source of investments with an ultimate goal of changing the behavior of recipient actors in the Horn region.
Conclusion
In conclusion, the importance of the Horn region for the EU is contingent on how far the relations with the key player, Ethiopia, would go. The country’s significance for Brussels lies in its potential to shape regional outcomes. A stable, economically integrated Ethiopia will serve as an anchor for Horn-wide cooperation, facilitating trade corridors, hosting refugees, and contributing to regional security initiatives. Its participation in peacekeeping efforts, mediation in neighboring conflicts, and leadership within IGAD reinforce this stabilizing potential. Conversely, Ethiopian instability would reverberate across the region. Internal conflict would disrupt trade routes, intensify displacement, and weaken already fragile neighbors. Migration flows toward Sudan, Libya, and onward to Europe would likely increase, while security vacuums could be exploited by extremist groups.
Ethiopia exemplifies the broader logic of the EU’s engagement with the Horn of Africa: influence is earned not through short-term leverage but through sustained presence, institutional partnerships, and credible economic alternatives. Whether Ethiopia ultimately fulfills its potential as a regional anchor or becomes a source of potential instability will be decisive for the Horn’s future—and for the EU’s ability to shape outcomes in one of the world’s most geopolitically consequential regions.
[1] “Bab el-Mandeb Strait: tension at a global trade route,” Coface, May 14, 2025, https://www.coface.ch/news-publications-insights/bab-el-mandeb-strait-tension-at-a-global-trade-route.
[2] M. W. Wilson, “Ports, Power, and Proxy Wars: GCC Engagement in the Horn of Africa,” GRC, June 10, 2025, https://www.grc.net/single-commentary/265#:~:text=The%20Horn%20of%20Africa%2C%20encompassing,vying%20for%20influence%2C%20often%20leading.
[3] “Shifting tides: International engagement in the Horn of Africa and the Red Sea,” ISS Europe, July 10, 2024, https://www.iss.europa.eu/publications/briefs/shifting-tides-international-engagement-horn-africa-and-red-sea#:~:text=trade%20%282%29,between%20Ethiopia%20and%20Somaliland%20has.
[4] “EU Missions in Somalia: Successes, Challenges and Future Prospects,” EU Debates, October 12, 2023, https://www.pubaffairsbruxelles.eu/opinion-analysis/eu-missions-in-somalia-successes-challenges-and-future-prospects/.
[5] “Operation ATALANTA, EUTM Somalia and EUCAP Somalia: mandates extended for two years,” Consilium, December 12, 2022, https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2022/12/12/operation-atalanta-eutm-somalia-and-eucap-somalia-mandates-extended-for-two-years/.
[6] “Ethiopia and European Union Sign €240 Million Grant Agreement,” MOFED, April 3, 2025, https://www.mofed.gov.et/blog/ethiopia-and-european-union-sign-240-million-grant-agreement/#:~:text=The%20program%20includes%20the%20restoration%20of%20basic,psychosocial%20support%20for%20survivors%20of%20gender%2Dbased%20violence.
[7] “The European Union and the Federal Republic of Somalia,” EEAS.Europa. September 9, 2021, https://www.eeas.europa.eu/somalia/european-union-and-federal-republic-somalia_en#:~:text=This%20support%20also%20extends%20to,of%20life%20across%20the%20region.
[8] “EU reinforces humanitarian response with €143 million for Sub-Saharan Africa,” European Commission, November 24, 2025, https://civil-protection-humanitarian-aid.ec.europa.eu/news-stories/news/eu-reinforces-humanitarian-response-eu143-million-sub-saharan-africa-2025-11-24_en.
[9] https://amisom-au.org/2018/07/brussels-meeting-acknowledges-progress-made-in-stabilizing-somalia/.
[10] “AfDB Commits $1.2m for Ethio-Sudan Railway Study,” Addisfortune, June 10, 2020, https://addisfortune.news/news-alert/afdb-commits-1-2m-for-ethio-sudan-railway-study.
[11] “International humanitarian conference for Sudan and neighbouring countries (Paris, 15 April 2024): Communiquè from France, Germany and the European Union [EN/AR],” Relief, April 17, 2024, https://reliefweb.int/report/sudan/international-humanitarian-conference-sudan-and-neighbouring-countries-paris-15-april-2024-communique-france-germany-and-european-union-enar.
[12] H. Notte, “Russia Is Shrewdly Playing the Long Game in Africa,” War on the Rocks, September 17, 2025, https://warontherocks.com/2025/09/russia-is-shrewdly-playing-the-long-game-in-africa/?utm_source=drip&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=WOTR+Daily+Newsletter%3A+September+17.
[13] B. H. Qazi, H. Abbas, I. H. Qaisrani, “Explaining India’s Africa policy: power ambitions and pro-active strategies,” Nature, July 1, 2025, https://www.nature.com/articles/s41599-025-05279-9.
