Populations living outside their country of origin who maintain social, cultural, or political ties to their homeland, known as diaspora communities, have increasingly been positioned as instruments of soft power within contemporary state strategies.[1] Through cultural diplomacy and symbolic recognition, governments seek to mobilize their overseas populations to promote cultural narratives, reinforce national legitimacy, and advance political interests. Such engagement often relies on the assumption that diasporas represent cohesive and loyal extensions of the nation-state.^[2] However, this assumption tends to overlook the fragmented political realities of diaspora communities, whose identities are shaped by multiple components, including contested belonging, host-country integration, and transnational socio-cultural and political exposure.^[3]

These tensions become most visible during times of political crisis. When states experience instances of democratic backsliding, nationalist policy shifts, or international scrutiny, diasporas may respond through disengagement, dissent, or critique.^[4] This reality complicates state efforts to manage national narratives beyond territorial borders. As a result, identity emerges as both a resource and a constraint, capable of amplifying state influence through mobilization and visibility under conditions of stability, while generating resistance during moments of political crisis.^[5]

Globally, states have increasingly turned to identity as a mechanism of soft power, seeking to extend influence beyond territorial borders through their diaspora populations. Rather than relying solely on traditional diplomatic tactics, governments now engage in overseas communities as cultural representatives and political advocates, situating diaspora as symbolic extensions of the nation-state.^[6] This approach reflects a broader shift in public diplomacy, in which identity-based appeal is treated as a strategic asset that is capable of shaping international perception and political outcomes.

One of the most common strategies utilized involves cultural and heritage diplomacy. States sponsor language programs, cultural festivals and heritage initiatives that are aimed at reinforcing national identity among diaspora populations while simultaneously projecting a curated image of the nation abroad. South Korea, for example, has expanded its King Sejong institutes worldwide to provide language instruction alongside cultural programming centered on history, media, and cultural heritage. These initiatives encourage diaspora communities to behave as cultural intermediaries, strengthening emotional ties to the homeland while also enhancing the nation’s global image.^[7] India pursues a similar approach through large-scale symbolic events such as the annual Pravasi Bharatiya Divas (PBD), which brings together Non-Resident Indians (NRIs) to celebrate heritage, recognize prominent diaspora members and reaffirm their connections to the Indian state.^[8] Collectively, such efforts often emphasize identity markers such as shared history, tradition, and cultural continuity, framing diasporas as custodians of an authentic national culture within international settings.

Beyond cultural initiatives, governments employ symbolic recognition and elite incorporation to strengthen diaspora alignment while simultaneously encouraging political advocacy. Prominent diaspora members are publicly celebrated, appointed to advisory councils, or invited to participate in national events to reinforce the perception of loyalty and inclusion. In the United States, the Consulate General of India in New York honored four Indian and Indian American women in 2024 for their achievements in public service and community empowerment, signaling both recognition and broader engagement with professional diaspora leaders.^[9] The recognized individuals are often positioned to defend state policies and counter critical media narratives, particularly during periods of international scrutiny, effectively extending national influence abroad. Similarly, diaspora lobbying networks in countries such as the United States and the United Kingdom are actively encouraged to promote India’s strategic interests, including trade and policy initiatives. This form of engagement is informal but remains highly strategic as it relies on emotional appeals to patriotism and feelings of belonging rather than more explicit directives. These arrangements serve a dual purpose of signaling appreciation to the overseas populations while additionally enhancing national prestige in host societies through the association with successful transnational figures, reinforcing the perception that the diaspora is an active and loyal extension of the state.^[10]

Economic instruments further reinforce identity-based engagement. Remittance policies, investment incentives, and preferential access to citizenship or residency rights are frequently used as rewards for continued attachment to the homeland; these measures deepen material ties while reinforcing the idea that national identity extends beyond territorial residence. Several countries have pursued formal remittance facilitation, such as special banking channels and matching programs that encourage diaspora associations to invest in community projects. For example, Mexico’s Tres por Uno program matches each dollar remitted by diaspora groups with additional government funds invested in local development projects, effectively tying social remittances to home-country public infrastructure and services. Other states have created diaspora bonds and investment products that invite diaspora members to contribute to national financing, tapping into the patriotic sentiment.^[11] Citizenship and residency benefits also serve as economic engagement tools, such as “right of abode” or dual citizenship policies that grant diaspora members legal rights to live, work, or own property in their homeland, as can be seen in many European states where diaspora cards or residency schemes encourage entrepreneurial capital and skills back into the economy.^[12]

These strategies rest on a central assumption that shared identity produces political alignment. However, this assumption obscures the plural and contested nature of diaspora belonging.^[13] While identity-based engagement can enhance visibility and legitimacy under stable political conditions, it can additionally increase state exposure to dissent when political developments undermine shared values or moral attachment.^[14] The mobilization of identity as soft power, therefore, carries inherent risks, particularly when diaspora communities interpret engagement efforts as attempts at narrative control rather than inclusion.

While these dynamics are observable on a global scale, from the rapid expansion of South Korea’s cultural institutes to the growing financial statecraft of emerging African economies, they can be demonstrated through the contrasting examples of Türkiye and India. Both nations have built a robust, multilayered, institutional framework to manage their overseas citizens, yet each case reveals a different facet of the identity-soft power phenomenon. By examining these two distinct models, a better understanding of how the strategic mobilization of diaspora can function as a transformative national asset in times of stability, and as a complex constraint in times of domestic political tensions.

Türkiye: From “Guest Workers” to Strategic Assets

Türkiye’s approach to its diaspora represents one of the most institutionalized and politically ambitious engagement strategies in the world. With over 6.5 million citizens living abroad, and approximately 5.5 million who reside in Western Europe, the Turkish state has successfully transitioned from a passive actor in labor migration into a proactive governor of transnational identity. This evolution reflects the broader shift of identity-based appeal and the way it is treated as a strategic asset that is capable of shaping international perception.^[15]

The “diasporic turn” in Turkish statecraft began under the Justice and Development Party (AKP). Central to this was the establishment of the Presidency for Turks Abroad and Related Communities (YTB, Yurtdışı Türkler ve Akraba Topluluklar Başkanlığı) in 2010. Unlike previous administrators, the YTB was designed as a “soft power” hub, specifically put in place to preserve Turkish identity, language, and cultural ties among citizens abroad. This YTB mandate is fulfilled through a multi-dimensional strategy that prioritizes the “ontological security” of the diaspora.^[16] One aspect of this strategy is emphasis on language and educational continuity through the implementation of bilingual education programs and Anadolu Reading Houses to ensure that post-migrant generations maintain proficiency in their Turkish mother tongue. Additionally, there are other youth engagement strategies that include institutions hosting “Turkish Youth Camps” in cities like Istanbul and Rize, educational academies, and scholarship programs that exist to coordinate education for over 15,000 international students. Moreover, the YTB manages institutionalized “Kin” diplomacy, which involves individuals and communities beyond citizens who share history and culture, incorporating heritage preservation projects such as oral history initiatives and the inventory of Turkish-Islamic monuments in regions like the Balkans and the Caucasus.^[17] There is also significant focus on raising awareness about discrimination and combating Islamophobia, framing the state as the ultimate protector of Turkish identity in increasingly polarized host societies.^[18]

Alongside the YTB, the Diyanet (Presidency of Religious Affairs) operates as a critical transnational state apparatus. Through funding mosques and deploying state-trained imams to Europe, the Diyanet provides a state-sanctioned religious identity that acts as a buffer against host-country assimilation.^[19] This institutional reach allows Ankara to project a “Sunni-Muslim Nationalist” identity directly into the heart of European civil society, furthermore framing the diaspora as a loyal extension of the homeland. A particular turning point for Turkey’s diaspora engagement was the introduction of external voting in 2012, a reform that transformed the diaspora from a source of financial remittances into an incorporated, decisive political electorate.

During the 2023 presidential elections, President Erdoğan secured roughly 59% of the international vote, with even higher margins in Germany at 67% and France at 66%.^[20] By comparison, his overall share of the vote within Türkiye was narrower, around 52%, reflecting a more divided domestic electorate.[21] As a result, this voting bloc serves as a transnational faction that helps legitimize domestic policies.^[22] By mobilizing these voters, the state effectively counters domestic opposition and can further project a narrative of global Turkish unity.

Turkish leadership centers on a risk of cultural loss. President Erdoğan’s 2008 declaration in Cologne that “assimilation is a crime against humanity” serves as a baseline of this strategy.^[23] There is encouragement surrounding integration, but not assimilation, which is a tactic that positions Türkiye as the ultimate protector of its citizens against European Islamophobia and marginalization. As a result, this reinforces “Neo Ottoman” identity sentiments. This attitude represents a self-reliant, religiously conservative, and philosophically distinct from Western liberal values projection.^[24] In this framework, the diaspora are no longer just migrants. Rather, they stand as cultural ambassadors that are tasked with asserting Türkiye’s prestige on the global stage.

The “Long-Arm” of the State

Nonetheless, while Türkiye’s diaspora engagement began as a soft-power project to build cultural bridges, scholars have noted a significant transition toward what is termed “transnational authoritarianism.”^[25] This shift reflects a move from “positive governance,” which is focused on attraction and public diplomacy, to “negative governance,” which prioritizes the monitoring and control of perceived political risks. As Türkiye experienced domestic political transformation following the 2013 Gezi protests as well as the 2016 coup attempt, its diaspora strategy was largely repurposed to manage internal polarizations that had spilled over into the transnational space. This shift manifested through several strategic adjustments, including using infrastructure originally established for cultural engagement and community support (such as YTB and the Diyanet) as a way to categorize and monitor diaspora groups based on their ideological alignment with the state and prioritizing engagement with regime-friendly segments of the overseas population while marginalizing dissident groups such as Kurdish activists and members of the Gülen movement.^[26] As a result, this long-arm approach to governance creates somewhat of a strategic challenge. Although it strengthens links to loyalist groups, it often tends to generate friction with host governments, which may view such activities as external interference in their internal affairs. For state soft power, this often calls into question the home state’s image, as the tools of mobilization used may lead to increased international scrutiny and tensions.

With this consideration, this case demonstrates that identity as a soft power resource is highly sensitive and determined by the domestic political climate. When a state’s engagement strategy shifts from inclusion to control, the diaspora falls short of being able to be a bridge of influence and instead can become a site of international domestic conflict.

India: The Vishwa Bandhu, Elite Statecraft and Civilization Branding

While Türkiye’s diaspora strategy is highly centralized and politically oriented, focusing on loyalty, ideological alignment, and transnational voting, India’s approach is comparatively decentralized and more economically and culturally focused. Where Türkiye prioritizes narrative control through the YTB and Diyanet, India emphasizes informal diplomacy and professional recognition in order to foster recognition abroad. This contrast highlights how similar goals of diaspora engagement, which involve mobilizing overseas populations, can be pursued through different institutional structures while simultaneously continuing to underestimate the risks that are inherent in each approach.

India possesses the world’s largest diaspora, with approximately 35 million Non-Resident Indians (NRIs) and Persons of Indian Origin (PIOs) spread across 200 countries. India’s diaspora strategy is characterized by the Vishwa Bandhu or “Global Friend” philosophy, which serves as an opposing model to more interventionist approaches by positioning its overseas population as a strategic “force multiplier.”^[27] New Delhi leverages its large diaspora to enhance India’s global influence through several key dimensions. One such dimension is using Vishwa Bandhu as a diplomatic brand, utilizing the “Global Friend” identity to emphasize a collaborative narrative. This allows the diaspora to act as informal diplomats who protect an image of India as a reliable first responder to global crises, such as the Vaccine Maitri (Vaccine Friendship) initiative during the COVID-19 pandemic, where the country provided free vaccines and medical supplies to roughly 100 countries.^[28]

Additionally, India has pioneered an interesting model of symbolic recognition that targets high-achieving diaspora members to serve as political advocates. Established in 2003, the Pravasi Bharatiya Divas (PBD), a biennial convention, brings overseas Indians together with the Government of India to reinforce cultural, economic and political ties. While attendance at the PBD convention is broadly open to registered members of the Indian diaspora, symbolic honors such as the Pravasi Bharatiya Samman Award are bestowed on select individuals and organizations that have made noteworthy contributions, including fostering understanding of India abroad, supporting Indian interests, engaging in social and humanitarian work associated with India, and overall strengthening ties with host societies.^[29]  As a result, the state converts individual professional success into national soft power. Parallel to this framework are additional strategic advocacy initiatives, such as the 2024 Indian Consulate recognition of a prominent Indian American woman for their public service.^[30] This represents a calculated effort to elevate these high-achieving diaspora figures, allowing India to cultivate trust within Western corridors of power, counter critical media narratives, and reinforce its strategic autonomy on the global stage.^[31] Whereas Türkiye focuses on political alignment, India mobilizes its diaspora largely through cultural recognition and economic incentives, illustrating the divergent paths to achieving soft power.

Moreover, the current Indian administration has reframed the diaspora’s identity from migrants to custodians of Indian civilization. Through the promotion of initiatives such as International Yoga Day and “Know India” programs, the state encourages the diaspora to act as cultural ambassadors to curate an image of India as a culturally rich power to facilitate smoother diplomatic relations in host countries. Additionally, by fostering a sense of pride in “Indianness,” the state provides the diaspora with a stable identity. This is particularly effective in the U.S. and the UK, where the “model” minority narrative allows the diaspora to lobby for India’s interests (civil nuclear deals or trade agreements) under the assumption of shared values.^[32]

Economic Statecraft: Strategic Force Multiplier

India’s economic relationship with its overseas community represents the most sophisticated example of diaspora-led statecraft, shifting from basic financial support to high-tech strategic investment. India is the largest recipient of remittances globally, securing a record $135.46 billion in 2024-2025.^[33] These inflows are a critical macroeconomic pillar, accounting for approximately 3% of India’s national GDP and compensating for nearly half of the nation’s merchandise trade deficit. Moreover, the diaspora has transitioned from providing family support to becoming strategic impact investors. Currently, NRIs account for around 35% of India’s Foreign Direct Investment (FDI), moving beyond traditional real estate and bank deposits into more sophisticated outlets such as startups, healthcare infrastructure, and green technology.^[34]

Furthermore, the diaspora is a primary driver of India’s transition to a knowledge economy. In the U.S. and UK, the high concentration of Indian professionals in Silicon Valley and London’s financial hubs has created a “brain gain” effect. As a result, these networks facilitate the transfer of high-tech skills in AI, fintech, and aerospace, directly aligning with the Viksit Bharat (Developed India) 2047 goals.^[35] When looking at Western markets, diaspora-led companies such as those in the UK, with a combined annual turnover of over £36 billion, act as vital cultural bridges.^[36] By creating an ecosystem that fosters brain circulation and strategic investment, New Delhi has successfully converted its overseas community into a permanent non-territorial pillar of its national economic security, while simultaneously leveraging these networks to project a curated image of India.

The Fragmentation of “Hindutva”

Despite its successes, India’s identity-based strategy faces growing dissent, similar to Türkiye’s, although manifested differently. The rise of nationalism beyond borders, linked to domestic ideologies like Hindutva, has created fissures within the diaspora. While it mobilizes a conservative core, it tends to alienate other segments, including religious minorities and a more liberal professional youth in North America and Europe.^[37] Clashes between diaspora groups over domestic Indian politics can turn the diaspora from a soft power asset into a reputational liability. An example of this is the 2022 Leicester unrest in the UK. While Leicester has long been celebrated as a global model of multicultural integration, it became the field for transnational polarization following an India-Pakistan cricket match. The weeks following saw unprecedented street clashes, marches, and sectarian slogans such as Jai Shri Ram, which was interpreted by local communities as far more than religious expressions but as the importation of Hindutva-linked political ideology from the subcontinent. The unrest demonstrated how domestic Indian political tensions spill over into the diaspora. For the UK government, a community previously viewed as a stable “model” minority was suddenly seen through the lens of communal fragility and forced local police and national politicians to view diaspora organizations with a new level of scrutiny, focusing on foreign state influence rather than community integration.^[38] This visibility of exclusive nationalist narratives during the unrest alienated more liberal, secular, and minority segments of the British-Indian community, which challenges the state’s attempt to mobilize a loyalist core and ended up fracturing the broader diaspora, making it harder for India to project a unified front on the international stage.

An “Alignment Trap” in Diaspora Statecraft

Ultimately, the mobilization of identity as soft power carries inherent risks. Both Türkiye and India operate on the assumption that a shared cultural or national identity will inherently produce political alignment. Yet, evidence shows that diaspora communities are plural, contested, and cannot be mobilized as a monolith.^[39] Despite their differences, Türkiye and India both remain susceptible to what can be termed as the “Alignment Trap,” which is seen when states prioritize narrative control over inclusion, as they attempt to enforce a singular identity that often triggers dissent and invites host-country scrutiny. This demonstrates that, regardless of institutional design or engagement goals, mobilizing identity as soft power carries inherent risks of fragmentation and vulnerability.

In order to ensure that diaspora engagement serves as a sustainable tool of diplomacy rather than a source of transnational tension, certain shifts in strategy should be considered, including prioritizing inclusive cultural diplomacy over political mobilization, establishing boundaries for domestic political exportation, leveraging diaspora pluralism as a strategic asset, and adopting an engagement model that favors a civil society at the forefront approach.^[40] Primarily, prioritizing inclusive cultural diplomacy would shift states’ focus back to broader cultural and economic initiatives, such as language programs or investment opportunities, that appeal to the entire diaspora rather than narrow ideological narratives that alienate minorities.^[41] Additionally, a policy framework that discourages the use of state-funded diaspora institutions for domestic political campaigning or monitoring, in order to curb the exporting of polarization to host countries, is required.^[42] Moreover, instead of viewing dissent as a threat, states should be open to recognizing that a diverse diaspora is a sign of a vibrant national culture and engaging with various segments of the diaspora allows states to build deeper and more resilient ties across a multitude of host countries.^[43] Finally, diaspora engagement would benefit from a shift away from security-oriented ministries toward more independent cultural or economic foundations in order to reduce the perception of a “narrative control” and encourage more organic, bottom-up participation from the community.^[44]

A state’s greatest transnational strength lies not in enforcing political uniformity, but in embracing the intrinsic pluralism of its global community. For diaspora engagement to be a sustainable asset, policymakers must move beyond this fallacy of monolithic enforcement and recognize that true soft power is built on diversity and genuine and organic civilization attraction, rather than state-led mobilization.^[45]

[1] Alan Gamlen, “Diaspora Engagement Policies: What Are They, and What Kinds of States Use Them?” COMPAS Working Paper, University of Oxford, 2006, https://www.compas.ox.ac.uk/wp-content/uploads/WP-2006-032-Gamlen_Diaspora_Engagement_Policies.pdf.

^[2] Maria Koinova, Diaspora Entrepreneurs and Contested States (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2021).; Francesco Ragazzi, Governing Diasporas in International Relations: The Transnational Politics of Croatia and Former Yugoslavia (Abingdon, UK: Routledge, 2017), https://www.routledge.com/Governing-Diasporas-in-International-Relations-The-Transnational-Politics-of-Croatia-and-Former-Yugoslavia/Ragazzi/p/book/9780367206550: 340; Alan Gamlen, Michael Cummings, and Paul Vaaler, “Explaining the Rise of Diaspora Institutions,” Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies 45, no. 4 (2019): 492–516.

^[3] Dipto Das et al., “How do the Global South Diasporas Mobilize for Transnational Political Change?” (ResearchGate, 2026), https://www.researchgate.net/publication/399930731_How_do_the_Global_South_Diasporas_Mobilize_for_Transnational_Political_Change; Michael Collyer and Russell King, “Producing Transnational Space: International Migration and the Extra-Territorial Reach of State Power,” Progress in Human Geography 39, no. 2 (2015): 185–204, https://doi.org/10.1177/0309132514521479.; Overseas Development Institute (ODI), “How Can Governments Better Support Diaspora Contributions to Social, Cultural, and Economic Development?” ODI Insights, 2023, https://odi.org/en/insights/how-can-governments-better-support-diaspora-contributions-to-social-cultural-and-economic-development/

^[4] Christophe Jaffrelot, Modi’s India: Hindu Nationalism and the Rise of Ethnic Democracy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2021), https://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctv1dc9jzx; Fiona Adamson, “The Growing Importance of Diaspora Politics,” Current History 115, no. 784 (2016): 291–97, https://doi.org/10.1525/curh.2016.115.784.291.; Das et al., “How do the Global South Diasporas Mobilize?”

^[5] Migration Policy Institute, “Diaspora Engagement Policies: Government Efforts to Boost Diaspora Remittances Earn Mixed Results,” Migration Policy (November 5, 2025), https://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/diaspora-engagement-policies.

^[6] Gamlen, Diaspora Engagement Policies; Collyer and King, “Producing Transnational Space.”; Koinova, Diaspora Entrepreneurs; Devesh Kapur, “Indian Diaspora as a Strategic Asset,” Economic and Political Weekly 38, no. 5 (2003): 445–448, https://doi.org/10.2307/4413159.

^[7] “11 New King Sejong Institutes Open in 9 Countries as Global Demand for Korean Language Surges,” Korea Times, June 30, 2025, https://www.koreatimes.co.kr/lifestyle/20250630/11-new-king-sejong-institutes-open-in-9-countries-as-global-demand-for-korean-language-surges; “Sharjah Announces the Establishment of the King Sejong Institute,” Sharjah24, May 23, 2023, https://sharjah24.ae/en/articles/2023/05/23/sharjah-announces-the-establishment-of-the-king-sejong-institute.

^[8] “18th Pravasi Bharatiya Divas Convention Begins in Bhubaneswar,” DD News, January 8, 2025, https://ddnews.gov.in/en/18th-pravasi-bharatiya-divas-convention-begins-in-bhubaneswar/; Pravasi Bharatiya Divas (PBD India), official site, https://www.pbdindia.gov.in/.

^[9] “Four Prominent Women Honoured by Indian Consulate, Diaspora Organisation on International Women’s Day,” The Economic Times, March 8, 2022, https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/latest-news/four-prominent-women-honoured-by-indian-consulate-diaspora-organisation-on-international-womens-day/articleshow/108382616.cms.

^[10] Das et al., “How do the Global South Diasporas Mobilize?”; MPI, “Diaspora Engagement Policies.”

^[11] MPI, “Diaspora Engagement Policies.”; The Global Knowledge Partnership on Migration and Development (KNOMAD), “Remittances and Diaspora Resources,” 2024, KNOMAD Thematic Working Group, World Bank, https://knomad‑ois.assyst.in/thematic‑working‑group/remittances‑and‑diaspora‑resources. Accessed March 3, 2026; “Nigeria Seeks Managers for Planned $10 Billion Diaspora Fund,” Reuters, April 26, 2024, https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/nigeria-seeks-managers-planned-10-billion-diaspora-fund-2024-04-26/

^[12] KNOMAD/OIS, “Remittances and Diaspora Resources”; ODI, “How Can Governments Better Support Diaspora Contributions?”

^[13] Koinova, Diaspora Entrepreneurs, 1-31.

^[14] Das et al., “How do the Global South Diasporas Mobilize?”; ODI, “How Can Governments Better Support Diaspora Contributions?”

^[15] Kaya, Turkish Diaspora Politics in Europe, 45-48.

^[16] Zeynep Yanasmayan, “Diaspora Governance and Political Polarization: The Case of Turkey,” Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies 46, no. 10 (2020): 2140.

^[17] Kerem Öktem, Turkey’s New Diaspora Policy: The Challenge of Inclusivity, Outreach and Capacity (Istanbul: Istanbul Policy Center–Sabancı University, August 2014), https://ipc.sabanciuniv.edu/Content/Images/CKeditorImages/20200327-00032456.pdf

^[18] Kaya, Turkish Diaspora Politics in Europe, 112; Chiara Maritato, “Turkey as the ‘Liberator’ of Muslims in Europe: The Circulation of Islamophobia as a Political Remittance,” Partecipazione e Conflitto 15, no. 2 (2022): 444–465, https://doi.org/10.1285/i20356609v15i2p444.

^[19] Bahar Baser and Ahmet Erdi Öztürk, “Positive and Negative Diaspora Governance in Context: From Public Diplomacy to Transnational Authoritarianism,” Middle East Critique 29, no. 3 (2020): 319–334.

^[20] “Turkey’s Election: Why the Diaspora Vote Matters,” Migration Policy Institute, May 2023.

[21] Sinem Adar, Yaşar Aydın, Cengiz Günay, and Günter Seufert, The Turkish Diaspora Landscape in Western Europe: Between the AKP’s Power Aspirations and Migrants’ Grievances, SWP Comment 2024/C 20 (Berlin: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, May 21, 2024). https://www.swp-berlin.org/publikation/the-turkish-diaspora-landscape-in-western-europe?

^[22] Kaya, Turkish Diaspora Politics in Europe, 112.

^[23] “Turkish Prime Minister Says ‘Assimilation is a Crime Against Humanity’,” The Local Germany, February 11, 2008, https://www.thelocal.de/20080211/10293.

^[24] Kaya, Turkish Diaspora Politics in Europe, 112; Bahar Baser, “The Great Transformation of Turkish Diaspora Policy: A Neo-Ottomanist Turn,” London Metropolitan University Research Report, 2022, https://repository.londonmet.ac.uk/8091/; Yaşar Aydın, The New Turkish Diaspora Policy: Its Aims, Their Limits and the Challenges for Associations of People of Turkish Origin and Decision‑Makers in Germany, SWP Research Paper, No. RP 10/2014 (Berlin: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, 2014), https://www.swp-berlin.org/publications/products/research_papers/2014_RP10_adn.pdf

^[25] Adamson, “The Growing Importance of Diaspora Politics,” 293; Baser and Öztürk, “Positive and Negative Diaspora Governance,” 322.

^[26] Baser and Öztürk, “Positive and Negative Diaspora Governance,” 322.

^[27] Kapur, “Indian Diaspora as a Strategic Asset,” 446; S. Jaishankar, “India’s Future Strategic Choices: Complications of the Mass,” Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), 2023; “The Diaspora Effect: Driving Bilateral Ties and Remittances to India,” India Brand Equity Foundation (IBEF), 2024.

^[28] Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, “Vaccine Maitri,” https://www.mea.gov.in/vaccine-maitri.htm. Accessed 2026; S. Jaishankar, “India’s Future Strategic Choices: Complications of the Mass,” CSIS, 2023.

^[29] Pravasi Bharatiya Divas (PBD India), “About the Convention,” Official Site, accessed 2025; Embassy of India, Abu Dhabi, “Nominations for Pravasi Bharatiya Samman Awards – 2023,” https://www.indembassyuae.gov.in/pravashi-bhartiya-samman.php. Accessed 2026.

^[30] “Four Prominent Women Honoured by Indian Consulate,” The Economic Times, March 8, 2022.

^[31] C. Raja Mohan, “India and the Diaspora: A Strategic Asset,” ISAS Working Papers, 2022.

^[32] Arpita Mitra, “India’s Civilisational Ties with the World: An Underexplored Theme in India’s Soft Power Discourse,” Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (MPIDSA), 2023, 47–49; S. Devesh Kapur, Diaspora, Development, and Democracy: The Domestic Impact of International Migration from India (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2010), 182–185.

^[33] KNOMAD/OIS, “Remittances and Diaspora Resources,” 2024; (ODI), “How Can Governments Better Support Diaspora Contributions?”

^[34] IBEF, “The Diaspora Effect,” 2024; “Foreign Direct Investment in India: FDI Trends & Insights,” IBEF, January 2026, https://www.ibef.org/economy/foreign-direct-investment.

^[35] Constantino Xavier and Nicolas Blarel, “India’s Tryst with its Diaspora: From Estrangement to Re-engagement,” Centre for Social and Economic Progress (CSEP), October 24, 2024, https://csep.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/11/India-Tryst-with-its-diaspora.pdf; Press Information Bureau, “PM Launches ‘Viksit Bharat @2047: Voice of Youth’,” Ministry of Education, Government of India, December 11, 2023, https://pib.gov.in/PressReleaseIframePage.aspx?PRID=1985077.

^[36] Grant Thornton UK, the High Commission of India, and FICCI, “India in the UK: The Diaspora Effect,” 2020; updated in Grant Thornton, “India Meets Britain Tracker 2025,” June 19, 2025, https://www.grantthornton.co.uk/news-centre/india-meets-britain-2025/.

^[37] Jaffrelot, Modi’s India, 312-315.

^[38] Charlotte Littlewood, “Hindu-Muslim Civil Unrest in Leicester: Motivation, Propaganda and the Role of Social Media,” The Henry Jackson Society, 2022, 12-15, https://henryjacksonsociety.org/publications/hindu-muslim-civil-unrest-in-leicester/.

^[39] Koinova, Diaspora Entrepreneurs, 1-31

^[40] Alan Gamlen, Human Geopolitics: States, Emigrants, and the Rise of Diaspora Institutions (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2019), 188–192.

^[41] International Organization for Migration (IOM), “Global Best Practices in Diaspora Engagement,” 2022, https://publications.iom.int/system/files/pdf/global-best-practices-in-diaspora-engagement.pdf.

^[42] Baser and Öztürk, “Positive and Negative Diaspora Governance,” 322.

^[43] Improving cooperation on diaspora engagement, final report of Session 5 on diaspora engagement, Development Practitioners Forum, (n.p.: n.p., 2018), 3–5, https://www.dev-practitioners.eu/media/event-documents/PN_Session_5_Final_Report.pdf.

^[44] Gamlen, Diaspora Engagement Policies.

^[45] Ragazzi, Governing Diasporas, 340.