As the world shifts from an era dominated by the United States (U.S.) as the unchallenged global leader, we are transitioning into a multipolar era characterized by the rise of multiple global superpowers, as well as middle and emerging powers. This change in the global order signals the dawn of a new phase of post-American primacy, driven by several key factors that have reshaped international dynamics and redistributed influence across a broader spectrum of nations.
The post-World War II global order has been significantly weakened by the rise of multipolarity, driven by the growing economic and political influence of several emerging powers. Countries including China, Russia, and India are at the forefront of this shift, challenging the established order. China, through its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and military expansion, seeks to rival U.S. dominance. Russia’s war in Ukraine signals its disregard for the “rules-based international order,” undermining global stability and challenging the principles of sovereignty and territorial integrity that form the foundation of the post-World War II international system. Likewise, India, with its rapidly growing economy and independent foreign policy, is positioning itself as a global power.
Meanwhile, Brazil, Türkiye, and the Gulf states are emerging as key middle powers, asserting both regional and global influence. These nations, through strategic, military, and economic moves, are reshaping international norms, weakening Western dominance, and driving a more complex, multipolar global landscape. Emerging and middle powers have become more selective in their strategic partnerships, prioritizing their economic, energy and security needs over traditional alliances, often aligning with both Western and non-Western powers to maximize their own national interests and regional influence. This trend reflects a broader desire among these countries to reduce dependence on any single global power.
As these rising powers assert themselves in key regions and global institutions, the perception of America’s singular dominance continues to fade. The result is a more fragmented and competitive global order, where power is increasingly diffused among multiple actors, each seeking to shape global dynamics in ways that reflect their own priorities and ambitions. This evolving landscape challenges the U.S.’ ability to unilaterally influence international affairs and signals the emergence of a more complex and multipolar world.
To remain a reliable global leader capable of addressing pressing international challenges such as climate change, terrorism and rising extremism, the risk of future pandemics and other global health crises, and the rapidly advancing field of artificial intelligence (AI), along with its unknown risks, the United States must recalibrate its foreign policy. The U.S. also faces an evolving global security landscape, with conflicts in Ukraine, Gaza, and Sudan exposing limitations in its influence to bring about resolutions and the rise of asymmetrical warfare complicating traditional strategies. Additionally, far-right extremism within Western democracies presents a growing internal and external challenge.
A reoriented U.S. foreign policy should not only focus on immediate threats but also on leveraging opportunities by engaging strategically with emerging powers and responding to their evolving needs. By forming partnerships that address the economic and security interests of these rising actors, the U.S. can position itself as a forward-looking leader in a multipolar world. This approach would enhance America’s ability to anticipate long-term global trends while promoting stability and cooperation on the international stage.
Ultimately, these global challenges cannot be tackled by any single nation alone; they require collective international cooperation and a commitment to building alliances that foster mutual benefits and shared solutions.
Section One: Shifts in the Global Order
Throughout history, the distribution of power in the global order has always been subject to change, leading to cyclical patterns of rise and decline. These shifts, marked by periods of stability and instability, are an inherent part of the international system. Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, the bipolar structure of the Cold War gave way to a unipolar world order dominated by the United States. This transition allowed the U.S. to assume the role of a global hegemon, shaping and preserving the liberal international order it had established.[1]
While the U.S. does not conform to the conventional definition of an empire, it has undeniably positioned itself as one of the most formidable powers in history. By any measure, the U.S. has dominated the global military, economic, political, technological, and cultural spheres for decades. However, despite its dominance, the U.S. has exhibited signs of relative decline in the international system, though not comparable to the collapse of the Soviet Union, nor is it akin to the fall of Rome; the new great power competition (GPC) has shifted with the re-emergence of multipolarity over the years in the global landscape.
Great Power Dynamics: China, Russia, and Middle Powers
The growth of China, Russia’s comeback, and the advent of middle powers such as India, Brazil, Japan, and the Gulf states have all shaped the great power struggle of the twenty-first century. In the economic realm, the U.S. and China are the two largest economies in the world in terms of both nominal and purchasing power parity (PPP); the U.S. leads nominally, while China has been at the top in PPP since 2016 when it surpassed the United States. As of 2024, both nations account for 43.2% and 34.5% of global GDP in nominal and PPP terms, respectively. Both nations have much greater GDPs than the third-ranked countries, Japan (nominal) and India (PPP).[2] However, the balance of influence in the economic sphere is currently shifting toward China, with the formation of financial institutions such as BRICS, Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), and Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) that have rivaled the U.S.-led Bretton Woods System and liberal global order.
Militarily, the U.S. continues to dominate through its military and naval power and outspends the competition. In 2023, the U.S. accounted for nearly 40% of military expenditure by countries globally with US$916 billion, outspending the next nine highest spenders who combined make up US$883 billion in defense spending.[3] Unsurprisingly, the U.S. ranks number one in the Annual Global Fire Power rankings in terms of military strength, followed by the Russian Federation in second place, and thirdly by the People’s Republic of China.[4] However, the global power dynamics have transformed since World War II, with more nations globally, whether legally or illegally—North Korea, allegedly Iran—possessing nuclear capabilities that would deter the use of military force and the possibilities of an all-out war in the 21st century, with mutual assured destruction (MAD) shutting down the possibility of such extreme global consequences.
While competitors like China, Russia, and its allies in the BRICS did not officially state their intentions of shifting the dependence away from the U.S. and liberal international institutions, their actions speak otherwise. The U.S. will most likely need to fortify its alliances and partnerships to offset the expanding influence of the other great powers and their allies—through forging new alliances and fortifying current ones in areas where American interests are threatened.
Section Two: The 2024 Presidential Election and its Impact on U.S. Foreign Policy
The upcoming U.S. presidential election will have profound implications for the future of American foreign policy, undoubtedly impacting the future of the war in Ukraine, tensions in the Middle East, and the broader global balance of power, as key issues like nuclear proliferation, climate change, and shifting alliances will hinge on the objectives of the next incoming administration. Under a Harris-led administration, the world may see a renewed emphasis on continued multilateralism, with a focus on strengthening NATO and existing alliances. This administration is also likely to foster new partnerships with emerging powers in the Global South, reflecting a commitment to building a more inclusive global order.
Conversely, the potential return of Trump could signal a marked shift toward anti-globalism, characterized by economic nationalism and a decreased U.S. involvement in global institutions. Such a pivot would have significant consequences for international allies and partnerships, potentially leading to a re-evaluation of global alliances and a retraction from traditional multilateral engagements.
During the Obama administration, the U.S. began its strategic pivot to Asia, focusing on countering China’s growing influence while drawing down its involvement in costly “forever wars” in the Middle East. This shift aimed to end prolonged military engagements and address emerging global priorities. As part of this reorientation, the Obama administration, in coordination with the P5+1 nations, negotiated the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) with Iran. The agreement sought to limit Iran’s nuclear program in exchange for sanctions relief, intending to stabilize the region and prevent nuclear proliferation.
In contrast, the Trump administration repudiated the JCPOA, opting instead for a strategy of maximum pressure. By withdrawing from the agreement and reimposing stringent economic sanctions, Trump’s approach aimed to coerce Iran into renegotiating the deal under stricter conditions, hoping to curb its nuclear ambitions and regional activities. This policy shift has led to Iran accelerating its nuclear program, diminishing the prospects for immediate diplomatic resolutions.
Trump’s term also saw threats to the U.S.’ commitment to NATO, with Trump labeling the alliance as obsolete and criticizing member countries for not meeting their defense spending commitments. This stance posed a challenge to transatlantic unity and raised concerns about the future of collective security.
In contrast, the Biden administration has focused on reinforcing transatlantic relations, particularly in response to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Biden’s efforts to rebuild alliances and support Ukraine have strengthened the U.S.’ position in Europe and reassured allies of America’s commitment to collective defense.
The Biden administration has also made efforts to revive the JCPOA, yet the political climate has complicated these efforts. The recent escalation of violence in the Middle East, particularly following Israel’s response to the October 7th Hamas attack and the U.S.’ staunch support for Israel, has further strained relations with Iran. This situation casts doubt on the likelihood of re-engaging Iran in negotiations under the current circumstances.
This essential flip-flopping of American foreign policy hinders the U.S.’ ability to project strength and commitment through continuity and steady leadership. It also undercuts the U.S.’ ability to tackle global challenges like nuclear proliferation, climate change, and collective defense as inconsistency creates uncertainty among both allies and adversaries, reducing the effectiveness of long-term strategic initiatives and weakening the trust needed for international cooperation.
As the election approaches, the platforms of the Harris-Walz campaign and the potential return of Trump highlight the divergent paths U.S. foreign policy might take. Analyzing these positions is crucial to understanding the direction the U.S. will pursue come 20 January 2025, when a new president will take office.
The Harris-Walz vision for American Foreign Policy
On Iran: Harris has signaled that as President she will “take whatever action is necessary”[5] to defend American forces along with the nation’s interests from Iran and its proxies. Harris has also recently stated that preventing Iran from obtaining a nuclear weapon will be a top priority for her administration if elected.[6]
Following former President Trump’s decision to withdraw the U.S. from the JCPOA in 2018, Harris, who was then a sitting Senator from California, labeled his decision reckless and one that “jeopardizes national security.”[7] At the time, Senator Harris admitted the deal may not be “perfect” but served as “the best available tool for the U.S. to prevent Iran from developing nuclear weapons and to avoid military conflict in the Middle East.” Fast forward to her 2019 run for President, Harris noted she would consider rejoining the JCPOA so long as Iran committed to “verifiable compliance.”[8]
Today, as the U.S.’ diplomatic relationship with Iran has even further deteriorated, Harris is expected to continue down a similar path as Biden, aiming to reduce tensions with Iran, either through a revised nuclear deal or at a bare minimum, an understanding to pause Iran’s nuclear weapons development in exchange for some form of sanctions relief.[9] Nonetheless, regional tensions between Israel and Iranian proxies, mainly Hamas, Hezbollah, and the Houthis, will continue to undermine constructive efforts.
Russia and the Ukraine war: Vice President Harris recently reaffirmed that the U.S.’ commitment to Ukraine is “unshakeable,” emphasizing that the country will continue to support Ukraine militarily and diplomatically until a just and lasting peace is achieved. Harris advocates for the provision of advanced weaponry to Ukraine, including systems capable of striking deeper into Russian-held territory, a long-standing request by Kyiv as it seeks to repel Russian forces and regain lost territory. Harris has also recently stated she would refuse a bilateral meeting with Russian President Vladimir Putin to discuss the war unless Ukraine is present at the negotiation table.[10]
Harris remains a staunch proponent of a decisive U.S. response in Ukraine, viewing it as essential not just for Ukraine’s sovereignty but for broader global security. She argues that if Russian aggression is left unchecked, it could embolden other authoritarian powers, particularly China, which has increasingly signaled its intent to assert control over Taiwan. For Harris, the conflict in Ukraine is not simply about winning a battle but defending the principles of democracy and the international order, which she sees as fundamental to U.S. foreign policy.
Like President Biden, Harris frames U.S. involvement in Ukraine as part of a broader effort to protect Western democracy and uphold global stability. She views it as America’s responsibility to defend its allies and stand firm against autocratic threats. In her perspective, maintaining U.S. leadership is essential not only for deterring aggression but also for promoting peace and reinforcing the global order built on democratic values. Harris argues that supporting Ukraine is crucial for safeguarding the principles that underpin international stability, seeing American leadership as a key driver in shaping a peaceful and secure world.
On Israel: Similar to her Democratic and Republican predecessors, Harris remains committed to ensuring Israel reserves the right to defend itself against all aggression—and that includes guaranteeing Israel has the means to do so, including recently acknowledging she would not support an arms embargo on the Jewish state.[11] The Biden-Harris Administration has already overseen US$12.5 billion in military aid to Israel since 7 October 2023.[12]
While Harris has expressed a commitment toward establishing a permanent ceasefire and ultimately working toward a two-state solution, this goal may be more symbolic than actionable. Politicians often make statements on Palestinian statehood as a form of “virtue signaling,” intended to demonstrate moral alignment or solidarity with the Palestinian cause, primarily to appeal to voters. However, as the situation stands, the prospect of meaningful progress toward a two-state solution would likely require significant changes in leadership—both in Israel and within the Palestinian Authority—to create the conditions for constructive negotiations.
Despite the fact that Harris is running for office, she is also part of the current administration. It is rare for a presidential candidate—who is also the current Vice President—to break with the policies of a sitting president. However, if elected, Harris could shift her Middle East policy away from Biden’s approach, which has been unpopular with both the progressive wing of the Democratic Party and Arab-American voters, particularly in key swing states, which will remain crucial once again for the mid-term elections in 2027.
Trump-Vance campaign
On Iran: During his first administration, Trump implemented a “maximum pressure” campaign against Iran, imposing harsh economic sanctions in response to Iran’s nuclear activities, regional influence through proxy groups, and its ballistic missile program. This approach followed his May 2018 decision to withdraw the U.S. from the JCPOA. After exiting the agreement, the Trump administration reinstated and intensified sanctions, aiming to force Tehran into renegotiating the nuclear deal under stricter terms.
However, despite Trump’s efforts, his strategy did not stop Iran from advancing its ballistic missile program or supporting proxy groups like Hamas, which was involved in the 7 October terrorist attack against Israel. Instead, the campaign inflamed Iran’s hardliners and pushed the regime closer toward America’s strongest adversaries—Russia and China. Given Trump’s decision to abandon the nuclear deal, Iran now views the U.S. as an unreliable negotiating partner, with trust between the two nations at its lowest point since the 1979 Iranian Revolution.
Nonetheless, the former president recently admitted he would be open to holding new rounds of talks with Iran were he re-elected, remaining firm that Iran must not be allowed to maintain nuclear weapons. However, the current ongoing regional conflict makes the feasibility of re-starting nuclear talks—whether with Harris as President, or Trump—extremely difficult, especially without a permanent ceasefire in Gaza and Lebanon.
Russia and the Ukraine war: During his only debate with Harris, Trump declined to explicitly state whether he wants Ukraine to emerge victorious in its war against Russia. While offering no concrete details or peace plan, Trump asserted that he could negotiate an end to the conflict within “24 hours.” Meanwhile, Trump’s running mate, Ohio Senator JD Vance, recently outlined what a potential peace settlement might entail, suggesting the creation of a heavily fortified demilitarized zone to protect Ukraine from future land incursions. In exchange, Ukraine would agree to maintain its neutrality, meaning it would not seek NATO membership—a long-standing point of contention in the conflict.[13]
Trump has argued that the financial burden of the war in Ukraine should largely fall on European nations, as they have more at stake both economically and in terms of regional stability, and therefore should lead the effort in supporting Ukraine. If elected, Trump could potentially push for a settlement that forces Ukraine to the negotiation table even if the terms are not in their ideal favor—threatening to reduce military aid if Ukraine does not negotiate a peace deal with Russia. If Ukraine refuses, the bulk of the financial burden funding the war will fall on America’s European allies.
The current challenge remains that the European arms industry is grappling with delays in producing 155 mm artillery ammunition due to significant shortages of essential raw materials such as gunpowder and explosives, compounded by bureaucratic bottlenecks.[14] These production challenges could potentially force the EU to reconsider its reluctance to purchase U.S. weapons, despite its long-standing goal of achieving strategic autonomy and building a stronger, self-sufficient European defense industry and reducing its dependency on non-European suppliers.
For a future Trump administration, such a scenario could be viewed as a strategic advantage, as it would strengthen U.S. arms sales while simultaneously reinforcing the argument that European defense remains reliant on American support—further justifying Trump’s emphasis on rebalancing NATO responsibilities and encouraging European allies to boost their own defense capabilities.
Trump has long been critical of what he perceives as an unequal distribution of defense responsibilities within NATO, frequently calling on European nations to increase their defense spending and reduce reliance on U.S. military and financial resources. He contends that the U.S. is already overstretched globally and that European nations should do more to safeguard their own security interests. While in office, Trump’s threat to leave NATO until the allied partners “pay their fair share” resulted in several member countries committing to increase their defense spending, with some meeting the 2% GDP target that Trump had emphasized as a benchmark.
By advocating for a European-led approach to the Ukraine conflict, Trump reinforces his broader “America First” stance, which emphasizes limiting U.S. involvement in overseas conflicts and prioritizing domestic issues. While he sees the conflict through a lens of strategic interest, believing the U.S. should not fully disengage, his focus remains on ensuring that American resources are directed primarily toward national concerns. This position aligns with Trump’s longstanding push for more isolationist and nationalist policies, where global responsibilities are shared more equitably and the U.S. refrains from overextending its military and financial commitments abroad.
On Israel: Classifying himself as Israel’s “protector,”[15] Trump reiterated his unwavering support for Israel in its ongoing “War on Terror,” particularly in response to the recent escalation in the Middle East following the events of 7 October.[16] He claimed that, if re-elected, he would quickly “settle” the situation, but offered no specific details or concrete strategies for achieving this. This lack of clarity raises questions about his approach to addressing the complexities of the conflict. In contrast, JD Vance, his running mate, typically offers more structured and detailed perspectives on foreign policy issues while on the campaign trail.
Recently, Vance criticized President Biden’s handling of the Israel-Gaza conflict, calling it contradictory. He argued that Biden’s concern over Palestinian casualties conflicts with his threat to withhold precision-guided munitions designed to minimize civilian harm. Vance contends that the U.S. has a history of unsuccessful attempts to “micromanage” wars in the Middle East and should instead focus on empowering Israel to decisively eliminate Hamas as a military threat.
If elected, Vance and Trump aim to prioritize an even broader peace agreement with the aim of establishing formal relations between Israel and Saudi Arabia. However, Vance asserts that achieving such a diplomatic breakthrough is only possible once Israel has successfully neutralized Hamas as a military force, thereby stabilizing the region and paving the way for meaningful negotiations.[17] However, Saudi Arabia maintains that it will not formally recognize Israel without the establishment of a Palestinian state,[18] making Trump’s proposed second “peace deal of the century” contingent on a two-state solution.
Section Three: A less reactive foreign policy, self-reflection, and harnessing opportunities
To navigate growing global competition and shifting alliances among emerging powers, the U.S. must not only reinforce its core foreign policy mission of promoting freedom, advancing democracy, and protecting human rights worldwide but also focus on leveraging opportunities rather than solely addressing security challenges or focusing on short-term, crisis-driven foreign policy. Moving beyond a reactive approach to crises, the U.S. should adopt a proactive strategy that engages emerging powers through shared development goals, economic cooperation, and sustainability initiatives, thereby expanding its influence.
By fostering long-term partnerships that support regional stability and sustainable development, the U.S. will be able to build mutual trust with the Global South while counterbalancing the strategic ambitions of rival powers. By engaging constructively rather than relying solely on military or security-driven measures, proactive engagement will not only strengthen alliances but also position the U.S. as a leader in shaping global development and stability.
This shift is particularly urgent in the Middle East, where America’s unwavering support for Israel’s military operations in Gaza and Lebanon after 7 October risks further damaging its already fragile regional reputation. The U.S.’ standing in the Middle East has been steadily eroded by its prolonged wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. Despite administering over US$372.6 billion in foreign aid to the region from 1946 to 2020—far surpassing its aid contributions to Asia (US$284.6 billion) and Sub-Saharan Africa (US$200 billion)—U.S. influence remains tenuous. This foreign assistance, separate from humanitarian aid, has been directed toward advancing American foreign policy goals, such as countering Iranian influence, supporting counterterrorism efforts, and promoting Arab-Israeli peace.[19]
Recently, U.S. foreign aid to the Middle East has increasingly aimed to address emerging challenges, including competition with Russia and China.[20] China, in particular, has gained significant influence in the region through its economic assistance programs, which are perceived as more focused on fostering stability compared to U.S. efforts. This has allowed China to position itself as a more reliable partner, complicating America’s strategic objectives in the region.
In terms of humanitarian aid, the U.S. has provided US$28.3 billion to the region since 2010, making it the largest donor to Iraq and Syria and a top donor to Yemen alongside Saudi Arabia, in response to the country’s humanitarian crisis. Yet, despite these significant financial commitments, the U.S. continues to struggle with maintaining trust and credibility in the region, as its policy actions often appear inconsistent with its stated objectives of peace and stability.
For instance, an Arab Barometer poll from 2023 found that in Tunisia and Libya, where the U.S. has invested considerable effort in supporting successful political transitions since the so-called “Arab Spring” uprisings,[21] both nations remained skeptical of the intentions behind U.S. aid, with “only 18% of rural and 15% of urban Tunisians agreeing that U.S. assistance is motivated by a desire to improve people’s lives.”[22] Such a low standing can be contrasted when analyzing the influence of great power competition throughout the Middle East. In Libya, 35% of respondents view China’s “objectives in providing foreign assistance as aiding either economic development or internal stability.”[23]
To counter these setbacks and restore its influence, the U.S. must adopt a proactive and cooperative approach that focuses on rebuilding trust and strengthening diplomatic relations, allowing it to reestablish its role as a stabilizing force in the region. A critical element of this strategy should include increasing State Department funding for public diplomacy initiatives, specifically to address the growing threat of sophisticated disinformation campaigns, fuelled by both state and non-state actors, as well as the proliferation of AI-generated deepfakes that distort U.S. foreign policy objectives and undermine its credibility.
Addressing this challenge requires enhanced coordination between the U.S.-government-funded Open Technology Fund (OTF) and the Global Engagement Center (GEC), both of which focus on countering disinformation, supporting Internet freedom against repressive government censorship, and promoting open communication channels. Well-funded and strategically aligned programs can more effectively combat foreign state propaganda, build resilience against digital authoritarianism, and strengthen the integrity of U.S. messaging abroad.
3.1 Self-Reflection: Coming to terms with regional peace
However, to truly regain credibility and influence in the region, the U.S. must also make a firm commitment to upholding its decades-long promise of supporting the establishment of a sovereign and independent Palestinian state. Taking a definitive stance on this issue would demonstrate that American policy is guided by principles of fairness and justice rather than political expediency, thus paving the way for a more balanced and respected role in the region.
America’s greatest strategic misstep remains its attempt to disengage from the Middle East and pivot its focus eastward in response to its strategic competition with China without first resolving the long-standing Israeli-Palestinian conflict in a region heavily influenced by regional proxies. The grand strategy to shift attention to Asia will continue to be overshadowed by the ongoing instability in the Middle East. To truly prioritize the Indo-Pacific, the U.S. must address the two-state solution, regional tensions, and the rise of asymmetrical proxy warfare, which continues to undermine stability throughout the Middle East, threatening to further entangle U.S. interests, making a sustainable pivot increasingly difficult to achieve. If left unresolved, especially in the wake of the tragedies following 7 October, security will continue to deteriorate, increasing risks to innocent civilians, potentially disrupting the energy market, and further complicating global trade relations.
3.2 Building bridges with the Global South based on shared goals
By fostering partnerships based on shared development goals, economic cooperation, and sustainability initiatives, the U.S. can build stronger alliances, create new markets for American businesses, and contribute to global stability. This approach also positions the U.S. as a collaborative partner, capable of addressing broader global challenges like poverty and climate change, which, in turn, strengthens its soft power and international standing.
Future investments in renewable energy will significantly reshape the geopolitical landscape as the world shifts away from fossil fuels. To maintain its leadership in the global energy economy, the U.S. must strategically capitalize on this transition. However, escalating great power competition, particularly between the U.S. and China, threatens to slow the path to achieving net-zero emissions by 2050. Intensifying economic and geopolitical rivalries have already led to increased tariffs on Chinese-made goods, such as electric vehicles, which are ultimately passed on to consumers, raising costs. Similarly, market restrictions on affordable Chinese solar panels as well as on the metals and critical minerals needed for rechargeable batteries, are hindering global access to clean energy technologies. As a result, nations with limited financial resources are faced with even higher-priced solutions, making it more difficult for them to transition to renewable energy.
In order to balance its competition with China while ensuring a smooth global energy transition that leaves no one behind, the U.S. must seize this opportunity to strengthen its own supply chains, invest in affordable green technologies, and support energy infrastructure development in emerging economies. Such efforts would not only create new export markets for American renewable energy producers but also reduce the developing world’s dependence on Chinese goods, thereby expanding U.S. influence in key regions. A central pillar of this strategy should include increased investments in innovation, particularly in technologies that support the UN’s Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs).
By prioritizing sustainable development and green energy solutions, the U.S. can promote economic growth in the Global South, significantly improving the lives of millions while simultaneously advancing shared global objectives. For example, investing in renewable energy infrastructure would deepen partnerships with these regions, positioning the U.S. as a leader in sustainable energy and a viable alternative to China’s expanding BRI, which aims to cement its economic and strategic dominance across emerging markets. Proactively engaging in such projects would enable the U.S. to not only counter China’s growing reach but also to strengthen its own standing as a collaborative partner that contributes to global stability and prosperity.
Conclusion
American exceptionalism is rooted in the belief that the U.S. is uniquely positioned among nations due to its values, commitment to human rights, and political system, having been established as a democratic republic born from a revolution that rejected monarchical rule.[24] This ideology portrays America as a global leader and moral exemplar, framing its actions as guided by principles of democracy, freedom, and opportunity.
According to political scientist Stephen Walt, a prominent advocate of realist theory, this belief has long influenced U.S. foreign policy, leading American presidents to govern under the impression that the United States is both “destined” and “entitled” to play a dominant role in international affairs.[25] This sense of responsibility and entitlement often drives U.S. engagement on the world stage, justified by the conviction that America has a duty to promote and protect its values globally.
The 20th-century intellectual Reinhold Niebuhr was a vocal critic of American exceptionalism, urging for “greater humility in U.S. foreign policy.”[26] He argued that America’s self-perception as a morally superior force could lead to overconfidence and justify reckless interventions abroad. His concerns were echoed in later U.S. actions, such as the unilateral invasion of Iraq and its unconditional support for Israel’s recent military campaigns in Gaza and Lebanon—reflecting Niebuhr’s warnings about the dangers of pursuing foreign policy without self-restraint and a nuanced understanding of global complexities—especially in the Middle East.
Before any adaptations in its policy abroad, America must first take care of its own house, specifically addressing its internal political divisions, which are nearing a breaking point. To truly embody Ronald Reagan’s vision of Washington as the “shining city upon a hill,” America must heal its deep-rooted polarization, which reached its peak during the 6th January insurrection. A repeat of such events would undermine core American values—democracy, individual freedom, equality, and the rule of law—threatening the country’s role as a symbol of hope for aspiring democracies worldwide.
Pragmatic engagement
President Biden assumed office, positioning himself as a defender of democracy, committed to countering the rise of autocratic regimes and ensuring that American democratic values would endure amidst growing far-right extremism. However, as the global landscape shifts toward multipolarity, the next U.S. president may need to consider a more balanced approach that combines realism with value-based principles.[27]
This could involve reassessing the degree to which the U.S. promotes its ideological agenda, focusing instead on pragmatic engagement that strengthens strategic partnerships without undermining American values. For example, China’s non-interference policy allows it to build influence by respecting the domestic realities of its partners. While the U.S. should not abandon its role as a promoter of human rights and democratic values, it must be more discerning in how and when to push these ideals, ensuring that it doesn’t alienate critical allies in regions like the Indo-Pacific, where maintaining a strong coalition is vital to countering China’s strategic ambitions.
The U.S. should continue to position itself as a global leader by championing human rights while recognizing that its leadership in a multipolar world requires strategic flexibility. To avoid appearing hypocritical, the U.S. must align its actions with its values by adapting its promotion of human rights and democracy to the unique political, cultural, and social contexts of each country, rather than applying a one-size-fits-all approach. A balanced and transparent strategy will enhance U.S. credibility, allowing it to remain a trusted partner while advancing its values in a sustainable and contextually appropriate manner—a balance that its adversaries have often struggled to achieve.
[1] Mearsheimer, John J., Great Delusion: Liberal Dreams and International Realities. Yale University Press, 2018, https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctv5cgb1w.
[2] “Comparing United States and China by Economy.” 2024, Statistics Times. August 29, 2024, https://statisticstimes.com/economy/united-states-vs-china-economy.php#google_vignette.
[3] Peter G. Peterson Foundation, “The United States Spends More on Defense Than the Next 9 Countries,” April 22, 2024, https://www.pgpf.org/blog/2024/04/the-united-states-spends-more-on-defense-than-the-next-9-countries-combined.
[4] “2024 Military Strength Ranking | GFP Annual Ranking,” Global FirePower, https://www.globalfirepower.com/countries-listing.php.
[5] Harris, K., “A New Way Forward,” https://kamalaharris.com/issues/, Retrieved September 19, 2024.
[6] “Kamala Harris says Iran is greatest adversary of US,” Al Jazeera, October 8, 2024, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/10/8/kamala-harris-says-iran-is-greatest-adversary-of-us.
[7] Jennewein, C., “Sen. Harris: ‘Reckless’ Withdrawal from Iran Deal ‘Jeopardizes National Security,” Times of San Diego, May 8, 2018, https://timesofsandiego.com/politics/2018/05/08/sen-harris-pulling-out-of-iran-deal-jeopardizes-national-security/
[8] Council on Foreign Relations, “Kamala Harris,” August 21, 2019, https://www.cfr.org/article/kamala-harris.
[9] Von Hein, S., “US election: How would Kamala Harris deal with Iran?,” Deutsche Welle, July 26, 2024, https://www.dw.com/en/us-election-how-would-kamala-harris-deal-with-iran/a-69764798
[10] Fedor, L., “FTSE 100: UK equities record best week since start of year,” Financial Times, October 8, 2024, https://www.ft.com/content/b5570512-dc07-481b-a6c2-74e9adbb7ec4.
[11] Halpert, M., “Harris rejects claims she would support Israel arms embargo,” BBC News, August 8, 2024, https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cg798l439ydo.
[12] Masters, J., and Merrow, W., “U.S. aid to Israel in four charts,” Council on Foreign Relations, May 31, 2024, https://www.cfr.org/article/us-aid-israel-four-charts#chapter-title-0-4.
[13] Vazquez, M., & DeYoung, K., “Vance says Trump’s plan to end war in Ukraine could include creating demilitarized zone,” The Washington Post, September 13, 2024, https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2024/09/12/vance-trump-ukraine-russia-war-plan/.
[14] Myroniuk, A., & Yehoshyna, V., “EU shell-production capacity, supplies to Ukraine fall far short of promises,” Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, July 8, 2024, https://www.rferl.org/a/ukraine-weapons-shells-european-union-eu-war-russia-investigation/33025300.html.
[15] McCammon, S., “Trump tells Jewish voters they have ‘no excuse’ for supporting Harris,” NPR, September 20, 2024, https://www.npr.org/2024/09/20/g-s1-23859/trump-jewish-voters-israel-election-2024.
[16] Dawsey, J., DeYoung, K., and LeVine, M., “Trump’s Israel-Gaza policy and donor reactions,” The Washington Post, May 27, 2024, https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2024/05/27/trump-israel-gaza-policy-donors/.
[17] Senator JD Vance, “Senator Vance blasts President Biden’s “Incoherent” handling of the Israel-Hamas war,” [Video], YouTube, May 12, 2024, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1zSJEf-V_Go.
[18] Tanios, C., “Saudi Arabia forms global alliance to push Israeli-Palestinian two-state solution,” Reuters, September 27, 2024, https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/saudi-arabia-forms-global-alliance-push-israeli-palestinian-two-state-solution-2024-09-27/.
[19] Congressional Research Service, “U.S. foreign assistance to the Middle East: Historical, Recent Trends, and the FY2021 Background Request,” August 15, 2023, https://sgp.fas.org/crs/mideast/R46344.pdf.
[20] Ibid.
[21] Feierstein, G. M., “As great power competition in the Middle East heats up, polling data shows a complex picture of popular attitudes,” Middle East Institute, February 21, 2023, https://www.mei.edu/publications/great-power-competition-middle-east-heats-polling-data-shows-complex-picture-popular.
[22] Arab Barometer, “As great power competition in the Middle East heats up, polling data shows a complex picture of popular attitudes,” February 21, 2023, https://www.arabbarometer.org.
[23] Ibid.
[24] Mack, B. L., “A brief history of American exceptionalism,” Yale University Press, February 28, 2027, https://yalebooks.yale.edu/2017/02/28/a-brief-history-of-american-exceptionalism/.
[25] Walt, S. M., “The myth of American exceptionalism,” Foreign Policy, October 11, 2011, https://foreignpolicy.com/2011/10/11/the-myth-of-american-exceptionalism/.
[26] Christopher S. Chivvis, “The Humility of Restraint: Niebuhr’s Insights for a More Grounded Twenty-First-Century American Foreign Policy,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (blog), November 22, 2021, https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2021/11/the-humility-of-restraint-niebuhrs-insights-for-a-more-grounded-twenty-first-century-american-foreign-policy?lang=en.
[27] Clifton, M., “What U.S. foreign policy could look like under Harris,” Semafor, October 4, 2024, https://www.semafor.com/article/10/04/2024/what-us-foreign-policy-could-look-like-under-harris.
