A series of foreign policy steps taken by Armenia in the past two years indicates a long-term deviation in the country’s traditional geopolitical posture—moving away from reliance on Russia and toward an alignment with the West. While growing ties with the United States (U.S.) and the European Union (EU) are often described as resolutely anti-Russian moves aimed at pushing Armenia to escape the Russian sphere of influence, Yerevan is in fact trying to build a diversified, multi-vector foreign policy. This fits into the trend spread across Eurasia where reliance on a single major power is increasingly unpopular and instead countries, small and large, pursue multiple choices in foreign policy.
The Scope of Armenia’s Shift
Armenia is signaling a major shift in its foreign policy, moving away from its traditional reliance on Russia and seeking closer ties with the EU and the U.S. The signing of a strategic partnership agreement with the United States on 15 January 2024 marked a new stage in bilateral relations.[1] The document includes a number of stipulations, though the most interesting is Washington’s support to boost Armenia’s border security and its military capacity. As to the EU, the latter has expanded its civilian monitoring mission in Armenia and initiated a visa liberalization process with Yerevan, while Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan stated in early January that Armenia aims to pursue EU membership.
The West has its own reasons to push for closer contact with Armenia. Firstly, it is because Yerevan now increasingly seeks to diversify its foreign policy. By building a more expansive type of relations with Yerevan, the West hopes to widen the gap between Russia and Armenia. The calculus is rooted in pure geopolitics. While Russia is preoccupied in Ukraine, the EU and the U.S. try to undermine Russian influence elsewhere. Secondly, because of the complicated relations between Georgia and the West over the failed EU integration process,[2] Tbilisi is no longer seen by Brussels and Washington as a strategic partner. In that sense, Armenia is seen as a replacement for Georgia, a new actor upon which the West wants to base its influence in the South Caucasus. Thirdly, there is also the factor of the Armenian diaspora. Though often exaggerated, the diaspora is nevertheless an important player when it comes to swaying opinion in some Western capitals. Last but not least, Armenia is increasingly seen as the only surviving democracy in the region where, as per the Western view, non-democratic governance has gained a dominant position.
Explaining Armenia’s Diversification Drive
Armenia’s nascent pivot comes amid growing dissatisfaction with Moscow’s security guarantees, particularly after the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh war and Azerbaijan’s 2023 military takeover of the separatist entity. Yerevan’s frustration with Russia’s perceived inaction, coupled with increasing Western engagement in the South Caucasus, has accelerated this foreign policy transition.
Relations between Armenia and Russia have been deteriorating, with Armenia reducing its purchases of Russian military equipment from 96% to less than 10%[3] while strengthening defense ties with India, France, Greece, and Iran. Yerevan also requested the removal of Russian border guards from Zvartnots Airport, signaling a potential shift in its security arrangements. Armenian officials have been openly critical of Russian state media narratives and have questioned Moscow’s future reliability as a security ally.
Despite these developments, Armenia remains economically and strategically tied to Russia. Bilateral trade reached $7.3 billion in 2023, a 43% increase from the previous year, highlighting Armenia’s economic dependence on Russia. In 2024, this figure was expected to rise to between US$14 billion and US$16 billion.[4] Moreover, the country is still part of Russia-led institutions such as the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) and the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU), and withdrawing from these organizations would carry significant economic and security risks. While Armenia has sought to strengthen its relationships with other partners, including Iran and France, none can fully replace the level of security Moscow historically claimed to offer.
Russia has made clear that it views Armenia’s deepening ties with the West as a geopolitical betrayal. Moscow could use economic leverage to pressure Yerevan, particularly given Armenia’s trade dependence on the Russian market. Moreover, although Russia is currently focused on the war in Ukraine, it still holds influence over Armenia’s energy, banking, and transportation sectors. The Russia-Azerbaijan angle should be added to this. Baku and Moscow have become closer and despite occasional tensions, as evidenced by the downing of the Azerbaijani plane by Russian missiles, the two countries share similar views when it comes to Armenia. The latter is regarded as undermining security in the South Caucasus and it is quite possible that Russia could push Azerbaijan’s ambitions to pressure Armenia.
Cautious Armenia
In the short term, Armenia is likely to continue balancing between Russia and the West while testing the feasibility of deeper integration with the EU, but also remaining in the Russia-led integration projects. A complete Western tilt remains unlikely unless Yerevan can secure alternative economic and security guarantees to protest.
In the long run, the risk of Russian response remains a key concern in Yerevan. Indeed, though the Armenian PM and the country’s FM seemed positive about the drive toward the West, there are also voices within the government that take a more restrained position. For instance, in mid-January, Armenian Economy Minister Gevorg Papoyan argued that the country’s foreign policy does not involve “thinking about replacing the Eurasian Economic Union.”[5] The Armenian leadership clearly understands the limits of its pivot and that membership with the EAEU is highly beneficial to the country’s economy. Moreover, there is also a clear understanding in Yerevan that Armenia’s membership within the EAEU is incompatible with the EU membership as the two multilateral institutions are mutually exclusive. So, the Armenian leadership, as are the EU officials, is ready to develop Armenia-EU relations forward as much as the legal and geopolitical constraints would allow it. For instance, in a 2023 interview, right after the fall of the remnants of the Nagorno-Karabakh enclave, Pashinyan argued that “Armenia is ready to be closer to the European Union, as much as the European Union considers it possible.”[6]
Wider regional dynamics too do not favor Armenia’s closer geopolitical ties with the West. It is not only Russia that considers Armenia’s push westward problematic. In fact, Armenia’s all neighbors, perhaps except for Georgia, are openly against the EU’s expansion to the South Caucasus. One such powerful actor is Iran. Long seen as an ally to Armenia because of the distrust between Tehran and Baku, the Islamic Republic has now shifted its calculus and considers Armenia’s pivot as potentially troublesome. Indeed, Iran, similar to Russia and Turkey, considers the South Caucasus falling within its sphere of influence and therefore sees the presence of any non-regional actor in the region as harming its core interests. This is especially so with the EU, separate European countries or the U.S. Indeed, when the EU sent an unarmed mission to Armenia’s border with Azerbaijan, Iran was not happy and even issued critical statements.[7] Similarly, Yerevan’s decision to sign a strategic partnership with the U.S. counters the Islamic Republic’s core imperative of building a buffer zone along its borders to keep U.S. influence at bay.
There is also Turkey, which, though not as antagonistic to Armenia’s westward push, nevertheless has always watched Western influence in the South Caucasus with caution. Though deeply integrated within the Euro-Atlantic community, Turkey has its own set of interests, which often do not correlate with what the EU or the U.S. have pursued in the South Caucasus. Turkey and Armenia have their own negotiations track over the potential opening of the border and even restoration of diplomatic ties.[8]
Azerbaijan too sees Armenia’s pivot with caution and even some degree of animosity. Baku’s own relations with the West have notably deteriorated since Baku took over Nagorno-Karabakh and the Armenian population fled the territory. The European Parliament, for example, has long condemned the internal political situation in Azerbaijan and the latter left the Parliament Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE) in early 2024, citing animosity toward Baku.[9] Moreover, in early February, Baku decided to shut down the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) office in the country.[10] Given this trend, Baku’s attitude toward Armenia deepening its ties with the West is likewise negative. Indeed, Baku has demanded the withdrawal of the European Union monitoring mission from the Armenia-Azerbaijan border and cited it as one of the major impediments to the signing of the peace treaty with Yerevan.[11]
This leaves Georgia as Armenia’s only neighbor, which is largely indifferent to what Yerevan would choose in its foreign policy. Yet given Armenia’s geography—its overland link with the European Union goes through Georgia, which gained a candidate status in December 2023[12]—what happens in Georgia’s foreign policy deeply matters to Yerevan. And there are not all that augurs well for Armenia. Georgia’s ties with the EU and the U.S. have reached their lowest point. Political ties degraded due to mutual acrimonious accusations of purposeful undermining of relations. Tbilisi accuses the West of interfering in internal affairs, while Washington and Brussels believe that the ruling party of Georgia, Georgian Dream (DG), has become increasingly authoritarian. Therefore, Armenia is in a difficult geographic position. Should Georgia and the EU/U.S. further degrade their historically close ties, Armenia’s efforts to connect to the West would likely bear little results. Indeed, a physical/land connection is vital even in today’s world. The logic of EU or NATO expansion eastward has always followed geography. For instance, accepting Moldova and perhaps even Ukraine in the longer run would be much easier for the EU than Georgia and especially Armenia, which do not share a border with any EU country.
Russia Repositioning in the South Caucasus
More importantly, Armenia’s Western pivot highlights structural changes in Russia’s foreign policy toward Yerevan and the South Caucasus overall. Moscow’s preoccupation with its war in Ukraine has limited Russia’s ability to exert influence over its immediate neighbors or distant territories where it maintained bases. Indeed, Russia has withdrawn from Nagorno-Karabakh in 2023 and is expected to leave Syria after the fall of Bashar al-Assad. In short, Ukraine is being prioritized over other regions, which has impacted Moscow’s relations with Armenia, allowing the latter to push for a more diversified foreign policy.
There are also changes in how Russia approaches its relations with Georgia and Azerbaijan. The Middle Corridor, a trade route connecting the Black Sea with the Caspian and further Central Asia with the EU, has expanded following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. All major actors from China to the EU are now pouring investments and expanding political ties with the countries lying along the route. Russia might be responding to this development by building closer ties with Azerbaijan and Georgia to either preclude the operation of the corridor or take part in its evolving infrastructure.
This causes the repositioning of Russia’s influence in the South Caucasus. Moscow is far from being comfortable with its war in Ukraine, which has sucked its resources and ability to project a confident posture in the region. A glance at Armenia-Russia relations indicates that Moscow is no longer able to be the major actor in the region. This has also a far bigger implication. For the past two centuries, the South Caucasus has largely fallen within Russia’s sphere of influence. Even following the breakup of the Soviet Union, Moscow still held undisputed influence over Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia. Yet now preoccupied with the military front elsewhere, Moscow is unable to resist other actors’ (Turkey, Iran, and China) geopolitical encroachment.
Looking Ahead
Thus Armenia’s shift in foreign policy is more of an attempt to pursue a multi-vector foreign policy than a complete break with Russia. It also reflects a much wider development—Russia repositioning itself in the South Caucasus in an effort to maintain its posture while being militarily preoccupied elsewhere.
As argued above, Armenia’s shift away from its long-standing alliance with Russia is, however, fraught with challenges, which explains why breaking away from Moscow-led integration structures like the CSTO and the EAEU has not yet materialized. Indeed, a full withdrawal from these organizations and closer integration with the West could provoke retaliatory measures from Russia, including economic sanctions or political interference.
Moreover, neither the EU nor the U.S. is willing or able to support Armenia security-wise. Geographic distance serves as a powerful impediment, as does an unfriendly geopolitical environment in which Armenia finds itself. In addition, the collective West is now preoccupied with other more urgent matters, such as Ukraine, and the Middle East, as well as internal problems.
What could deepen Armenia’s pivot toward the West is a swift peace treaty with Azerbaijan and a full restoration of ties with Turkey. In this way, Yerevan will be able to minimize potential threats and focus more on further diversification of political and more importantly, economic ties away from dependence on Russia.
[1] “Charter on Strategic Partnership Between the United States of America and the Republic of Armenia,” US Embassy in Armenia, January 17, 2025, https://am.usembassy.gov/charter-on-strategic-partnership-between-the-united-states-of-america-and-the-republic-of-armenia/.
[2] Emil Avdaliani, “Will Georgia’s Eurasian Pivot Lead to Rapprochement With Russia?,” Carnegie Politika, August 19, 2024, https://carnegieendowment.org/russia-eurasia/politika/2024/08/georgia-west-russia-relations-pivot?lang=en.
[3] “Armenia’s purchases of military equipment from Russia reduced from 96% to less than 10% – Security Council Secretary,” Arka, June 3, 2024, https://arka.am/en/news/politics/armenia_s_purchases_of_military_equipment_from_russia_reduced_from_96_to_less_than_10_security_counc/?sphrase_id=2487605.
[4] “Дмитрий Вольвач: товарооборот России и Армении за первое полугодие 2024 года вырос в 2,5 раза,” Ministry of Economic Development of the Russian Federation, September 16, 2024, https://www.economy.gov.ru/material/news/dmitriy_volvach_tovarooborot_rossii_i_armenii_za_pervoe_polugodie_2024_goda_vyros_v_25_raza_.html.
[5] Arshaluys Barseghyan, “Armenian Economy Minister says Armenia ‘not replacing’ Eurasian Economic Union with EU,” OC Media, January 14, 2025, https://oc-media.org/armenian-economy-minister-says-armenia-not-replacing-eurasian-economic-union/.
[6] “Pashinyan: “Armenia is ready to be closer to the European Union, as much as the European Union considers it possible,”” Commonspace.eu, October 18, 2023, https://www.commonspace.eu/news/pashinyan-armenia-ready-be-closer-european-union-much-european-union-considers-it-possible.
[7] “Iranian Ambassador expresses Tehran’s attitude towards EU mission in Armenia,” Arminfo, February 6, 2025, https://arminfo.info/full_news.php?id=88967&lang=3.
[8] “Turkey, Armenia make progress in normalisation talks,” Reuters, July 30, 2024, https://www.reuters.com/world/turkey-armenia-make-progress-normalisation-talks-2024-07-30/.
[9] “Facing expulsion, Azerbaijan quits European parliamentary body,” Eurasianet, January 25, 2024, https://eurasianet.org/facing-expulsion-azerbaijan-quits-european-parliamentary-body.
[10] “Azerbaijan officially notifies USA of USAID country office closedown,” Arminfo, February 6, 2025, https://arminfo.info/full_news.php?id=88939&lang=3.
[11] “Azerbaijan wants EU monitoring mission to leave,” Eurasianet, December 18, 2024, https://eurasianet.org/azerbaijan-wants-eu-monitoring-mission-to-leave.
[12] “Georgia celebrates gaining EU candidate status,” Euronews, December 16, 2024, https://www.euronews.com/2023/12/16/georgia-celebrates-gaining-eu-candidate-status.
