Gagauzia, an autonomous region nestled within Moldova, stands at a critical juncture where the echoes of history converge with the demands of modern geopolitics. Home to the Gagauz people, a Turkic-speaking minority with deep Orthodox Christian roots, this small yet significant territory embodies a delicate blend of cultural identity, political autonomy, and external pressures. Positioned strategically between Europe and Russia, Gagauzia has become a theater for competing influences, creating a multifaceted socio-political landscape that continues to evolve.
Moldova’s push toward European integration, while maintaining its historical and cultural ties to Russia, places Gagauzia in an increasingly tenuous situation. Granted autonomy in 1994 to address its distinct ethnic and cultural identity, the region has since become a point of contention within Moldova’s political landscape. Gagauzia’s orientation toward Russia—evident in its cultural affinities and economic partnerships—often clashes with Moldova’s European aspirations, intensifying debates over the boundaries of autonomy in a unitary state.
This article delves into the intricate balancing act that defines Gagauzia’s existence, navigating between Moldova’s westward ambitions and its enduring connections to the East. It examines the region’s leadership struggles, the resilience of its cultural identity, and the far-reaching effects of global geopolitical rivalries on its domestic stability. By unpacking the complex dynamics of Gagauzia’s “oppressed position,” this exploration sheds light on the broader challenges of regional autonomy, minority rights, and the interplay between international politics and local realities.
Overview of Gagauzia
Nestled in the southern reaches of Moldova, Gagauzia spans approximately 1,832 square kilometers (707 square miles). Its landscape is largely rural, with agriculture serving as the backbone of its economy. Rolling fields and small settlements define the region, emphasizing its agrarian nature and close ties to the land.[1] Geographically, Gagauzia shares proximity to Ukraine along its southern and eastern borders, creating cross-border cultural and economic interactions. While not directly bordering Romania, its location near the southwestern Moldovan frontier links it to broader regional dynamics influenced by the European Union (EU). These neighboring regions contribute to Gagauzia’s geopolitical significance and its role in cross-border trade and relations.
Gagauzia’s population estimates vary between 124,000 and nearly 173,000, depending on the source. According to TURKSOY, The International Organization of Turkic Culture, Gagauzia has a 172,500 population.[2] However, it is believed that significant emigration, driven by economic and social factors, has reduced this number, with current estimates suggesting a population closer to 100,000. The demographic shift poses challenges for preserving the region’s cultural and linguistic identity.
The linguistic landscape of Gagauzia reflects its cultural diversity and historical influences. While Russian serves as the dominant language in administration, media, and daily communication, the Gagauz language—a Turkic language—is an essential part of the region’s identity. Efforts to preserve and revitalize Gagauz are ongoing, particularly through educational programs and cultural initiatives. Moldovan (Romanian) is also taught in schools as part of the national curriculum, enabling integration with the broader Moldovan society. Russian is also a common language among Gagauz people. This multilingual environment highlights the region’s ability to maintain its distinct identity while fostering connections with its neighbors and the Moldovan state.
Eastern Orthodox Christianity is central to Gagauzia’s identity, influencing its traditions and community cohesion. Religious practices and celebrations continue to underpin social life, reinforcing the region’s connection to its faith.
Gagauzia enjoys a degree of autonomy within Moldova, governed by its People’s Assembly and an executive leader known as the Bashkan. This framework grants the region authority over critical areas such as education, culture, and local governance, while maintaining its integration within the Moldovan state. This delicate balance has usually underscored its efforts to manage internal affairs while navigating its role in the broader national context. However, in recent years Gagauz politicians state that this autonomy is under considerable threat by the Moldovan government. Therefore, this article aims at explaining how and why the autonomy of Gagauzia is at risk.
Gagauzia’s Economy
Gagauzia exhibits a distinctive economic profile, primarily shaped by its reliance on agriculture and niche industrial sectors.
As of 2022, Gagauzia’s gross domestic product (GDP) was estimated at approximately US$336 million, accounting for 2.3% of Moldova’s overall economy. Despite its contributions, the region’s GDP per capita stood at US$2,686, ranking among the lowest in the nation, mirroring the economic conditions of other rural Moldovan areas. Agriculture remains the backbone of Gagauzia’s economy, contributing 27% to the region’s GDP. The manufacturing sector, which represents 16% of GDP, focuses heavily on agro-industrial production, including wine and food processing.[3]
Unlike the broader Moldovan economy, which prioritizes trade with the EU, Gagauzia has historically focused on exports to commonwealth independent states (CIS) and Türkiye. The region’s key exports include wine (destined for CIS countries), agricultural produce (shipped to the EU), and textiles (mainly to Türkiye). Imports primarily come from Türkiye, followed by the EU and other CIS nations. However, exports to Russia have significantly declined, dropping from 17% in 2019 to just 2% of total exports in 2023.[4]
Export Blockade to Russia: A Challenge for Gagauzia
The sharp drop in Gagauzia’s exports to Russia is the result of several interconnected factors such as geopolitical tensions and sanctions, trade restrictions and barriers, and logistical disruptions.
The ongoing Russia-Ukraine conflict has led to sweeping Western sanctions on Russia, disrupting trade flows and diminishing Russia’s capacity for economic engagement. Moldova’s increased alignment with EU policies under the EU Association Agreement has further shifted trade focus away from Russia.[5]
Russia has imposed import restrictions on Moldovan goods, including those from Gagauzia, due to ongoing political tensions. At the same time, Russia has prioritized imports from other CIS nations, sidelining Moldovan exporters. Logistical barriers have further exacerbated Gagauzia’s difficulties, particularly in its ability to export goods to Russia. The Ukraine war has disrupted key overland trade routes traditionally used by Moldova and Gagauzia to access Russian markets. This disruption has increased logistical challenges, forcing exporters to rely on less efficient and costlier routes.[6]
Evolution of Gagauzia’s Political Status Since the 1994 Autonomy Agreement
Gagauzia’s political status underwent a significant transformation with the adoption of the 1994 Autonomy Agreement, which granted the region a unique form of self-governance within the Republic of Moldova. This agreement emerged as a response to tensions in the early 1990s, when the Gagauz people sought to assert their cultural and political identity amidst Moldova’s post-Soviet transition. The potential for separatist movements prompted Moldova to negotiate a framework that would integrate Gagauzia while respecting its distinctiveness.
The 1994 autonomy agreement that established Gagauzia’s self-governance within Moldova was not solely a domestic achievement; it also bore the mark of Türkiye’s influential diplomacy, led by then-President Süleyman Demirel.[7] Türkiye’s involvement in this process was deeply rooted in historical and cultural connections, as the Gagauz people, a Turkic ethnic group, share linguistic and cultural ties with the Turkish nation.
Süleyman Demirel and his administration emerged as key mediators during a critical juncture when Moldova faced significant ethnic tensions in the wake of the Soviet Union’s collapse. The Gagauz population’s demands for independence heightened the risk of conflict, prompting Türkiye to advocate for a peaceful solution that upheld Moldova’s territorial integrity while granting the Gagauz people recognition of their distinct rights and identity.
The autonomy agreement established Gagauzia as the Autonomous Territorial Unit of Gagauzia (ATUG), granting it the right to manage internal affairs in areas such as education, culture, and local governance. Crucially, the agreement also recognized the Gagauz people’s right to secede if Moldova were to lose its independence—a clause designed to address fears of potential unification with Romania.
Under President Demirel’s guidance, Türkiye championed dialogue and compromise as the foundation for resolving the Gagauz issue. Turkish officials engaged with both Chişinău and Comrat, fostering an atmosphere of trust and mutual understanding. This mediation was instrumental in narrowing differences between the Moldovan government and Gagauz leaders, paving the way for a historic agreement.
Beyond diplomacy, Türkiye extended significant cultural and educational support to Gagauzia, reinforcing its unique identity within an autonomous framework. Scholarships, cultural exchange programs, and economic aid became essential tools in strengthening the bond between Türkiye and the Gagauz people. These initiatives helped preserve the region’s cultural heritage while promoting development and integration within Moldova’s broader structure. This is the reason why Gagauz people still call Süleyman Demirel as their “father”.[8]
Over the years, Gagauzia has leveraged its autonomy to preserve its cultural heritage and language while maintaining a unique political identity. The region’s legislative body, the People’s Assembly, and its executive leader, the Bashkan, serve as pillars of self-governance. However, the autonomy has not been without challenges. Tensions periodically arise between Gagauzia and the central government in Chişinău, particularly over economic resources, political representation, and foreign policy alignment. For instance, Gagauzia’s alignment with Russia, especially in trade and cultural matters, has often contrasted with Moldova’s aspirations for European integration.
Despite these challenges, the autonomy framework has provided a mechanism for managing disputes and avoiding the kind of violent conflict seen in other post-Soviet regions. Gagauzia’s political evolution highlights the delicate balance of maintaining local autonomy within a unitary state while navigating broader geopolitical pressures. Today, the region continues to serve as a case study in managing ethnic and cultural diversity through negotiated self-governance even though it has several challenges.
Gagauzia at a Crossroads: Autonomy Amid Geopolitical Rivalries
Geographically and politically, Gagauzia sits at the heart of a broader geopolitical puzzle. Moldova’s steady push toward European integration places it firmly under the influence of the EU, while Gagauzia’s deep-rooted cultural and economic ties to Russia introduce a natural friction. This duality mirrors the post-Soviet region’s ongoing search for identity, equilibrium, and progress amidst the competing forces of the East and the West. For Gagauzia, its autonomy serves as both a protective mechanism to safeguard its Turkic heritage and a source of constraint within the framework of a unitary Moldovan state.
Moldova’s aspiration to align with the EU often clashes with Gagauzia’s preference for stronger connections with Russia. Referenda within the autonomous region have consistently revealed significant support for policies favoring Moscow, largely driven by the region’s economic dependency on Russian markets and a shared cultural resonance. This divergence underscores the complexity of crafting a cohesive national strategy that balances Moldova’s European ambitions with Gagauzia’s distinct priorities.
For Russia, Gagauzia represents a strategic lever—a point of influence to counteract the West’s growing presence in Moldova. Through economic incentives, cultural outreach, and political backing, Moscow has worked to deepen its relationship with the region. Meanwhile, European actors advocate for Moldova’s integration into the EU’s democratic and governance frameworks, often clashing with Gagauzia’s claimed pro-Russian orientation. As a result, Gagauzia has become not only a cultural microcosm but also a focal point in the broader geopolitical contest between the East and the West.
The Impact of Gagauzia’s Cultural and Economic Ties with Russia on Its Relationship with Moldova
The Gagauz people maintain deep cultural ties with Russia, reflected in their predominant use of the Russian language in everyday life. This strong cultural bond is particularly noticeable in their media preferences and educational systems, which are more aligned with Russian traditions and standards than those of Moldova or Europe.
Economically, Gagauzia relies heavily on Russia for trade and financial support. The region’s agricultural products, such as wine and sunflower oil, find significant markets in Russia. Additionally, remittances from Gagauz workers in Russia constitute a substantial portion of local incomes, further deepening economic interdependence. The most important item is natural gas which Russia exports to Gagauzia. In April 2024, head of the Gagauz autonomous republic of Moldova, Evgenia Gutul who met with Russian President Vladimir Putin, said “First, we asked the Russian leadership to give benefits to our Gagauz exporters for the supply of goods to Russia. Second, to provide residents of our autonomy with a discount on gas. Third, to grant access to the Russian payment infrastructure.” After the meeting, an agreement with Promsvyazbank (PSB) on cooperation in the banking and finance sector was signed between Russia and Gagauzia, which allowed 25,000 people to use the Russian MIR payment system.[9]
Gagauzia’s Role in the Geopolitical Rivalry Between Russia and Europe
Gagauzia occupies a strategic position in the geopolitical contest between Russia and Europe. Its cultural and economic ties to Russia make it a focal point for Moscow’s efforts to counter Western influence in Eastern Europe. Russia employs soft power tactics—including trade incentives, cultural programs, and political backing—to bolster its presence in Gagauzia, thereby challenging Moldova’s pro-European trajectory. Evghenia Guthul’s visit to Moscow in March 2024 made this perspective clear. She said, “I told Putin about the illegal actions of Moldova’s authorities who are taking revenge on us for our civic positions and for standing by our national interests.”[10]
This alignment with Russia often leads to friction between Gagauzia and Moldova’s central government, especially as Moldova seeks closer ties with the EU. Gagauzia’s consistent support for Russia-led initiatives, such as favoring the Eurasian Economic Union (EEU) over EU integration, complicates Moldova’s foreign policy and underscores the broader geopolitical tug-of-war in the region.
As a culturally distinct and autonomous entity, Gagauzia exemplifies the challenges of balancing historical affiliations with Russia against aspirations for European integration. Its geopolitical significance lies in its potential to influence Moldova’s direction, making it a critical factor in the broader struggle for dominance in the post-Soviet landscape.
Consequences of Gagauzia Leadership’s Moscow Ties: Sanctions
The growing friction between Moldova, the autonomous Gagauzia region, and the Shor Party has placed the region at the crossroads of internal governance and external geopolitics. Recent sanctions by the Moldovan government and the EU reveal a concerted effort to address what they perceive as threats to Moldova’s sovereignty and constitutional integrity.
The region overwhelmingly supported closer ties with the Russia-led Customs Union while asserting their right to declare independence if Moldova were to lose sovereignty. A referendum in February 2014 invited the people of Gagauzia to voice their stance on two pivotal choices: aligning more closely with Europe or strengthening bonds with Russia. A third, more contentious question probed whether Gagauzia should pursue independence if Moldova were to lose its sovereignty—such as in the event of a unification with Romania, forming a single state.[11] This referendum, though declared unconstitutional by Moldova, highlighted Gagauzia’s distinct political resolve and commitment to reflecting the will of its people.
Another development in 2023 caused increased opposition to Gagauzia from both the central Moldovan government and the EU. The election of Evghenia Gutul as Bashkan exacerbated tensions. Backed by the Shor Party, her agenda has been claimed to be pro-Russian and collided with the central government’s pro-EU policies, creating a flashpoint for political conflict. The Shor Party, under the leadership of oligarch Ilan Shor, has long been considered as a destabilizing force in Moldovan politics. With a platform often characterized as Eurosceptic and pro-Russian, the party gained traction among Moldova’s rural and pro-Russian populations, including in Gagauzia. However, Gutul refused these allegations claiming that the government’s priority is the welfare of the people and said “Despite promises of European values over the past four years, we have seen a decline in both the economy and social spheres. Our relations with strategic partners such as the Russian Federation and other post-Soviet countries have deteriorated. By constitution, Moldova is a neutral, sovereign country, and we must maintain that neutrality without choosing sides in geopolitics. However, today, our president acts according to the directions of the West.”[12] According to Guțul, Gagauzia’s agrarian economy has suffered significant losses, particularly due to the loss of access to the Russian market, which has traditionally welcomed its abundant fruits, vegetables, and wine products. She believes that Moldova and Gagauzia must cooperate and maintain friendly relations with all countries for the benefit of their people.[13]
In June 2023, Moldova’s Constitutional Court declared the Shor Party unconstitutional, citing illegal financing and efforts to destabilize the constitutional order. The party was dissolved, marking a severe blow to its political operations within Moldova.[14]
The oppression of Gagauzia by the Moldovan government continued, further compounded by EU sanctions. In October 2024, the EU enacted sanctions against prominent Gagauz officials, including Evghenia Gutul, the leader of Gagauzia. These sanctions were a response to alleged efforts to stoke separatism and destabilize Moldova. Evghenia Gutul, facing accusations of attempting to erode Moldova’s sovereignty through her political stance and affiliations has been under travel ban by the EU, restricting her movement within EU countries. In addition, her assets have been frozen to block financial transactions and investments tied to her leadership. In addition to her, sixteen officials, including Gutul’s deputy, have been restricted from receiving funds or economic resources, either directly or indirectly, and have been banned from traveling within the EU.
Those pressures from the central Moldovan government and the EU push Gagauzia more toward Russia and naturally Türkiye, which is a prominent protector of Turkic minorities all around the world.
Türkiye’s Support for Autonomous Gagauzia
The relationship between Türkiye and Gagauzia is a testament to Türkiye’s dedication to supporting Turkic and culturally linked communities around the world. Rooted in shared heritage and strategic cooperation, Türkiye has been instrumental in fostering Gagauzia’s cultural preservation and economic development while respecting Moldova’s sovereignty.
Türkiye has long recognized the unique cultural heritage of the Gagauz people. Through the Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency (TİKA), Türkiye has supported numerous cultural and educational initiatives aimed at preserving and promoting the Gagauz identity. TİKA has contributed to the establishment and maintenance of cultural institutions in Gagauzia, such as the Dimitriy Kara Çöban Museum in Beșalma, which showcases the region’s history and traditions. Scholarships and exchange programs have been facilitated to allow Gagauz students to study in Türkiye, fostering stronger people-to-people ties.
Economic collaboration is another cornerstone of Türkiye’s support for Gagauzia. Türkiye has invested in infrastructure projects and development programs designed to boost the region’s economy. Notable initiatives include infrastructure projects and trade and business ties. Türkiye has financed the construction and renovation of roads, schools, and healthcare facilities in Gagauzia, enhancing the region’s accessibility and quality of life. Türkiye has actively encouraged Turkish businesses to invest in Gagauzia, aiming to create jobs and stimulate economic growth in the region. This initiative is part of a broader strategy to strengthen economic ties and support the development of Gagauzia. In November 2019, a delegation from the Organization of Turkic States (OTS) attended the 5th “Invest Gagauzia” International Investment Forum held in Comrat, Gagauzia. The forum attracted over 400 participants, including ambassadors, diplomats, and businesspeople from Türkiye. Discussions focused on the investment potential of Gagauzia, with Turkish businesses exploring opportunities in various sectors.[15]
When it comes to foreign policy, Türkiye’s approach to Gagauzia is characterized by its balanced diplomacy. While firmly supporting Moldova’s territorial integrity, Türkiye has worked to ensure that Gagauzia’s autonomy is respected and its development needs are addressed. The relationship is built on mutual respect and shared aspirations for regional stability and prosperity. Gagauzia’s leadership, including Bashkan Evghenia Gutul, has consistently highlighted the warmth and sincerity of relations with Türkiye, describing it as a partnership rooted in “brotherhood.”
A Question of Fairness
The EU’s proactive engagement in Moldova, particularly through sanctions targeting Gagauz leaders, whom they brand as “pro-Russian”, is claimed to reflect a strategic commitment to preserving the country’s sovereignty and democratic integrity. These measures form part of a broader approach aimed at stabilizing Moldova in the face of geopolitical pressures, particularly from Russia, and ensuring its trajectory aligns with European values and governance standards. Meanwhile, some of the actions which the EU pushes Moldova to implement are contradictory with Moldova’s constitution. Article 11 of the constitution states that “the Republic of Moldova proclaims its permanent neutrality” and “the Republic of Moldova does not accept the presence of any foreign military troops on its territory”.[16]
As of November 2024, there are no Russian troops stationed in Gagauzia,[17] however, the country actively engages in international defense cooperation, particularly through partnerships with NATO and the United States (U.S.), focusing on training, joint exercises, and defense reforms. Moldova joined NATO’s Partnership for Peace (PfP) program in 1994, marking the beginning of its collaboration with the alliance. This partnership emphasizes practical bilateral cooperation, including defense and security sector reform, military training and exercises and capacity building. In 2014, at the NATO Summit in Wales, allied leaders offered to bolster support for Moldova through the Defence and Related Security Capacity Building (DCB) Initiative, further deepening the partnership.[18] Held in September 2023, “Exercise Rapid Trident”, a multinational exercise involved U.S., Moldovan, and Romanian forces. The training focused on land navigation, small unit tactics, and combat casualty care, enhancing the operational capabilities of the Moldovan military.[19] In April 2024, U.S. troops participated in the “Joint Combined Exchange Training (JCET) 2024” alongside Moldovan and Romanian forces. This exercise aimed to improve interoperability and readiness among the participating nations.[20] In May 2024, another group of U.S. soldiers arrived with a U.S. Air Force cargo plane.[21]
Given that the Moldovan central government has already engaged in actions that cast doubt on the country’s constitutional neutrality, it seems unjust to place excessive pressure on Gagauzia under the pretext of an exaggerated “Russian influence” or “Russian threat.” Some experts comment that “the separatist threat in Gagauzia is overstated”. According to Maksim Samorukov, a fellow at Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, the Gagauz autonomy is modest in size, economically underprivileged, and significantly reliant on financial support from Moldova’s state budget, as well as revenues generated from agriculture and labor exports to the EU. Historically, their economic links with Russia were minimal, and these ties have diminished to almost nonexistence following the recent geopolitical shifts. The Gagauz community generally do not advocate for separatism. While deeply skeptical of the central government in Chișinău, they maintain a strong pro-Russian stance, recognizing Russia’s historical role in facilitating their migration to what is now Moldova from Romania and Bulgaria in the early 19th century. Despite this affinity for Russia, the Gagauz are largely satisfied with their status as Moldovan citizens, as long as Moldova refrains from unifying with Romania and respects their autonomy and self-governance.[22]
The Debate Over Referendums
Article 75 of Moldova’s constitution states that “Problems of utmost importance confronting the Moldavian society and State shall be resolved by referendum and the decisions adopted according to the results of the republican referendum shall have supreme legal power.”[23]
On February 2, 2014, Gagauzia organized two referendums to measure the population’s preferences regarding international alliances. An overwhelming 98.4% of voters expressed support for aligning with the Customs Union, comprising Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Russia. In contrast, 97.2% of participants rejected deeper integration with the EU. In addition to these votes, 98.9% of respondents endorsed a proposal granting Gagauzia the right to declare independence if Moldova were to lose its sovereignty, such as through a potential unification with Romania.[24] This referendum was announced illegal by the Moldovan government and was not recognized by the capital.[25]
Likewise, on October 20, 2024, Moldova conducted a landmark constitutional referendum to decide whether the nation’s fundamental law should be amended to embed EU membership as a national strategic goal. This initiative aimed to secure Moldova’s pro-European orientation and safeguard it from potential reversals by future administrations. The results of the referendum revealed a deeply polarized electorate, with the pro-EU camp achieving a narrow victory. 50.4% of participants endorsed the constitutional amendment supporting EU membership. 49.6% opposed the change. The slim margin reflects the significant divide within Moldovan society over the direction of the country’s future, particularly regarding its alignment with the EU versus other geopolitical powers.[26] While “no” voters have been accused of being “paid votes,” allegations also suggest that Russia may have influenced the results.
Although the constitutional amendment reaffirms Moldova’s commitment to joining the EU, the close vote underscores the need for greater efforts to unify public opinion and strengthen internal cohesion to facilitate accession processes. The narrow victory highlights deep divisions among Moldova’s population, signaling potential difficulties in forging consensus on national policies moving forward.
Gagauzia’s Autonomy Under Threat
The results of the 2024 referendum carry profound implications for Moldova’s political and geopolitical future, even though the pro-EU outcome had a slim margin. These results were further reinforced by the presidential elections, which proved unfavorable for the autonomy of Gagauzia.
On October 20, 2024, Moldova conducted also its presidential election along with the referendum, which required a runoff on November 3 as no candidate achieved the majority needed to win outright in the first round. The race came down to a decisive showdown between the incumbent President Maia Sandu, representing the pro-European Action and Solidarity Party (PAS), and Alexandr Stoianoglo, a former Prosecutor General supported by the pro-Russian Socialist Party. In the decisive second round, Maia Sandu was re-elected with 54.97% of the vote, while Alexandr Stoianoglo received 45.03%.[27]
Maia Sandu’s policies or approach could be perceived as risking the autonomy of Gagauzia for several reasons, typically tied to tensions between Moldova’s central government and the region’s so-called pro-Russian stance. Maia Sandu, as a pro-European leader, has emphasized stronger governance from Chișinău and reducing external influences, particularly from Russia. Policies aimed at strengthening Moldova’s national unity and reducing decentralization might be seen as threatening Gagauzia’s autonomy. The Gagauz perceive such actions as diminishing their self-governance rights granted under Moldova’s Constitution.
Gagauzia has historically been skeptical of Moldova’s EU aspirations, as the Gagauz population largely favors closer ties with Russia. Sandu’s pursuit of integration with the EU, including constitutional amendments solidifying Moldova’s European trajectory, directly contrasts with Gagauzia’s preferences. This tension raises fears among the Gagauz that EU alignment may lead to reduced autonomy or policies less sympathetic to their cultural and political identity.
Gagauzia’s strong pro-Russian sentiment clashes with Sandu’s Western-oriented policies. Her efforts to limit Russian influence in Moldova—such as what she describes as combating disinformation and addressing alleged Russian interference—may indirectly affect Gagauzia, where ties with Russia are deeply entrenched. Such moves risk alienating Comrat and fostering perceptions of neglect or targeted suppression.
Sandu’s focus on integrating Moldova into the EU economy may deprioritize region-specific needs, such as agricultural subsidies and labor exports, which Gagauzia heavily relies on. A shift in trade and economic policies could deepen economic vulnerabilities in Gagauzia, straining relations further.
While Sandu has not explicitly threatened Gagauzia’s autonomy, her administration’s firm stance against separatism in regions like Transnistria may lead Gagauzia to fear a more hardline approach against its own autonomy.
President Sandu’s pro-European policies, combined with efforts to centralize governance and reduce Russian influence, are seen by many in Gagauzia as a potential risk to their autonomy. For Gagauzia, maintaining self-governance within Moldova is essential, and any perceived encroachment on this autonomy could lead to heightened tensions between the regional and central governments.
Considering the Gagauz people’s commitment to Moldova, its constitution, and territorial integrity—provided the country does not merge with Romania—a prudent policy for Sandu would be to avoid alienating Gagauzia and instead work to strengthen its ties with the capital. Supporting Gagauzia in balancing its relationships with both the West and Russia would be a constructive approach. A good first step could be suspending the prohibition on diplomatic missions accredited in the Republic of Moldova from meeting with officials of the Gagauz autonomy.
[1] Bulut, R. (2016). THE ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL STRUCTURE OF GAGAUZIAN TURKS. Journal of Mehmet Akif Ersoy University Economics and Administrative Sciences Faculty, 3(2), 60-71.
[2] Gagauzia country profile, TURKSOY, https://www.turksoy.org/en-US/gagauzia-moldova.
[3] Alina Kunde, Focus on Gagauzia, slow economic progress despite fiscal priviliges, https://www.german-economic-team.com/en/newsletter/focus-on-gagauzia-slow-economic-progress-despite-fiscal-privileges/?utm_source=chatgpt.com.
[4] Alina Kunde, Focus on Gagauzia, slow economic progress despite fiscal priviliges, https://www.german-economic-team.com/en/newsletter/focus-on-gagauzia-slow-economic-progress-despite-fiscal-privileges/?utm_source=chatgpt.com.
[5] Galiya Ibrahimova, Will Gagauzia Become Moldova’s Second Breakaway Region?, https://carnegieendowment.org/russia-eurasia/politika/2024/05/gagauzia-moldova-putin-shor?lang=en.
[6] Alina Kunde, Focus on Gagauzia, slow economic progress despite fiscal priviliges, https://www.german-economic-team.com/en/newsletter/focus-on-gagauzia-slow-economic-progress-despite-fiscal-privileges/?utm_source=chatgpt.com.
[7] Vladimir Socor, Moldovan Sovereignty and Gagauz Autonomy: A Balance Vulnerable to Moscow’s Mischief, https://webarchive.archive.unhcr.org/20230521215910/https://www.refworld.org/docid/51f8c1984.html.
[8] Ankara hosted “Süleyman Demirel from the eyes of Gagauzians” panel, https://www.egirdirakingazetesi.com.tr/haber/47851/Ankarada-Gagauzlarin-Gozunden-Suleyman-Demirel-Soylesisi-Duzenlendi-.
[9] Gagauzia and Russia discuss discounts on gas, exports to Russia — head of republic, TASS, https://tass.com/economy/1772565.
[10] Alexander Tanas, “Leader of restive Moldova region tells Putin locan rights being crushed”, https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/leader-restive-moldova-region-tells-putin-local-rights-being-crushed-2024-03-06/.
[11] Dumitru Minzarari, The Gagauz Referendum in Moldova: A Russian Political Weapon, The Jamestown Foundation, https://jamestown.org/program/the-gagauz-referendum-in-moldova-a-russian-political-weapon/
[12] Esra Karahindiba, How does Gagauzia keeps it autonomy?”, https://harici.com.tr/en/how-does-gagauzia-keep-its-autonomy/
[13] Ibid.
[14] Moldovan court bans pro-Russian party, BBC, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-65952878.
[15] Turkic Council delegation attended the 5th “Invest Gagauzia 2019” International Investment Forum, https://www.turkicstates.org/en/news/turkic-council-delegation-attended-the-5th-invest-gagauzia-2019-international-investment-forum?.
[16] The Constitution of Moldova, https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Moldova_2016.
[17] Maksim Samorukov, “In Odesa’s Shadows: What is Russia’s Strategy in Moldova?” Carnegie Russia Eurasia Center, https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2024/10/moldova-russia-strategy?lang=en¢er=russia-eurasia.
[18] Relations with the Republic of Moldova, NATO, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_49727.htm?.
[19] Catalina Carrasco, Infantry and artillery coıme together for multinational exercise in Moldova, https://www.army.mil/article/270327/infantry_and_artillery_come_together_for_multinational_exercise_in_moldova?.
[20] The US Troops in Moldova in emerging Plan B for Ukraine, Asia Times, https://asiatimes.com/2024/04/us-troops-in-moldova-in-emerging-plan-b-for-ukraine/?.
[21] US troops arrived in Moldova with military aid, https://newsukraine.rbc.ua/news/us-troops-arrived-in-moldova-with-military-1716070798.html.
[22] Maksim Samorukov, “In Odesa’s Shadows: What is Russia’s Strategy in Moldova?” Carnegie Russia Eurasia Center, https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2024/10/moldova-russia-strategy?lang=en¢er=russia-eurasia.
[23] Constitution of the Republic of Moldova, the decisions adopted according to the results of the republican referendum shall have supreme legal power.
[24] Tonny Rianna, “Moldova, the EU and the Gagauzia state”, New Eastern Europe, https://neweasterneurope.eu/2014/02/14/moldova-the-eu-and-the-gagauzia-issue/.
[25] Moldova’s Gagauzia region, remains largely pro-Russian, DW https://www.dw.com/en/moldovas-gagauzia-region-remains-largely-pro-russia/a-70658570.
[26] Gabriel Gavin, “Moldova votes yes to joining EU by tiny margin”, Politico, https://www.politico.eu/article/moldova-votes-yes-join-european-union/.
[27] Paul Kirby, “Pro-EU leader wins Moldova election despite alleged Russian meddling”, BBC, https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cz7w9dglzzlo.
