After a steady erosion of bilateral relations under his Conservative predecessors, British Prime Minister Keir Starmer is cautiously pursuing a rapprochement with China. Starmer is courting Chinese investment in the flagging British economy and wants to prevent Britain from becoming a party in the U.S.-led trade war against China. The automobile and financial services sectors are especially fruitful domains for UK-China economic cooperation.

On the flip side, Britain has invoked its national security legislation to protect critical industries from strategic dependence on China. The UK and China’s once-thriving collaboration in the artificial intelligence (AI) domain has unraveled as AI ethics is one of the few areas of viable cooperation. In the security sphere, Britain staunchly opposes Chinese revanchism in the Indo-Pacific region and decried China’s economic support for Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Starmer’s government is under pressure from the Conservative Party and human rights activists to take a more hardline stance against Chinese conduct toward Hong Kong dissidents and Uyghurs in Xinjiang.

Although Starmer has aligned with Europe over the U.S. on the Ukraine War, Britain will face fierce American backlash if it repeats that approach in its relations with China. The rapidly rising threat of Chinese corporate and political espionage adds a political wrinkle to potential cooperation with Britain. Britain’s impending adoption of the Foreign Influence Registration Scheme (FIRS) could sharpen tensions over that issue. These headwinds suggest that Starmer is unlikely to revive the spirit of win-win cooperation that defined Prime Minister David Cameron’s “Golden Age of UK-China Relations” a decade ago. 

Introduction

Britain is trying to reset its increasingly fraught relationship with China. On 18 October, British Foreign Secretary David Lammy met with his Chinese counterpart, Wang Yi, in Beijing. Lammy urged Britain and China to “find pragmatic solutions to complex challenges” and hailed the vast scope of mutually beneficial economic cooperation.[1] At the G20 Summit exactly one month later, British Prime Minister Sir Keir Starmer took Lammy’s outreach a step further. Starmer became the first British Prime Minister to meet with Chinese President Xi Jinping since 2018 and extolled the importance of a “strong UK-China relationship.”[2]

Promising rhetoric, but is a thaw in UK-China relations on the horizon? There is a prevailing mood of skepticism in Britain on this question. Former Channel 4 news correspondent Ian Williams warned that Starmer’s overtures toward Beijing would strain UK-U.S. relations and signaled weakness as China was simultaneously convicting 45 Hong Kong pro-democracy protesters.[3] The Financial Times editorial board highlighted Xi’s dismissive body language and grim-faced handshake with Starmer as emblematic of the sour state of UK-China relations.[4] It warned of the lack of cogency in the UK’s strategy toward China and expressed only fleeting hopes that the Labour government’s audit would yield a firmer strategic outlook.

This pessimistic depiction reflects the view that the British foreign policy establishment lacks a grand strategy toward China. UK policy toward China tends to mirror the vicissitudes of the U.S. approach and reflect the divergent worldviews of successive prime ministers. This means that Britain’s relationship with China is prone to drastic and swift vacillations.

During the 2010-24 period of unbroken Conservative Party leadership, British policy toward China swung across a pendulum from David Cameron’s “Golden Age” rhetoric in the early 2010s to Rishi Sunak describing China as a threat to the UK way of life in September 2023. Starmer wants to strike a middle ground between these two contrasting approaches and inject stability into the UK-China relationship. The crux of Starmer’s G20 message to Xi was that Britain wants to build a “pragmatic and serious relationship” with China.[5]

Starmer’s realpolitik approach to engaging with China adheres to the following logic. Britain has common interests with China that enable tactical cooperation, as well as normative and strategic divergences with Beijing that will perennially lead to tensions. Britain wants China to expand its investments in major economic sectors and avoid a large-scale trade war with Beijing. Yet Britain also wishes to avoid becoming overdependent on Chinese supply chains, uphold human rights in Hong Kong and Xinjiang, contain China’s antagonism toward Taiwan and counter China’s strengthening cooperation with Russia. For Britain’s reset with China to succeed, it needs to compartmentalize areas of common interest from geopolitical tensions and exercise restraint on areas where it disagrees with China.

Trade and Investment without Strategic Dependence: Starmer’s Approach to UK-China Economic Relations 

Since Starmer’s election victory in July 2024, Britain has sent positive signals to China about its desire to ease trade tensions. On 19 September, Britain’s Chancellor of the Exchequer Rachel Reeves held wide-ranging discussions with Chinese Vice Premier He Lifeng on economic cooperation.[6] On 1 October, Sky News reported that Reeves was planning to convene a UK-China Economic and Financial Dialogue (EFD) meeting in Beijing in early 2025.[7] On 29 October, Britain’s Business and Trade Secretary Jonathan Reynolds declared that he was “certainly open to having a conversation about” rebooting the UK-China Joint Economic and Trade Commission (JETCO) negotiations.[8]

On the surface, these statements are harbingers of sweeping changes in UK-China trade policy. Due to backlash against Hong Kong’s crackdown on pro-democracy protesters and bilateral tensions that coincided with the COVID-19 pandemic, JETCO talks were last held in August 2018 and EFD negotiations have not transpired since June 2019. In early 2022, Prime Minister Boris Johnson tasked Britain’s Department of International Trade with reviving the JETCO negotiations. Johnson’s plans were repeatedly derailed by Conservative Party MPs concerned about China’s human rights record.[9] Sunak emulated Johnson’s shadow campaign to revive JETCO in late 2023, only to face similar roadblocks.[10] As the Labour Party possesses an overwhelming parliamentary majority and has a much less influential contingent of China hawks, Starmer could be able to revive EFD and JETCO with relative ease.

While the potential resumption of EFD and JETCO is encouraging, mistrust could undermine the efficacy of these dialogue formats. Global Times commentator Wang Yi was optimistic about JETCO’s potential revival but expressed skepticism about Britain’s commitment to treating China fairly.[11] As China has invested 68.5 billion GBP in the British economy since 2000, which is more than the combined sum of its investments in France, Germany and Italy, concerns in Britain about over-exposure to China persist.[12] A return to the win-win spirit of the Golden Era of UK-China cooperation under Cameron appears to be a remote prospect.

Due to these mixed signals, where are the prospects brightest for UK-China commercial cooperation and where might old pitfalls endure? One sector with significant growth potential is the automobile industry. In August, Chinese car manufacturer Chery launched electric and petroleum-powered variants of its Omoda-5 SUV in Britain. Chery has already built a network of 60 dealerships and plans to increase that tally to over 100 by the end of 2024.[13] Chery’s entry into the British market coincides with the growth of BYD and SAIC’s presence. As Starmer seeks to uphold his election campaign promise to ban the sale of new combustion-engine cars by 2030, Britain is unlikely to join the EU in imposing tariffs on Chinese-made electric vehicles.[14] This could allow for a more durable UK-China dialogue on climate change, which was cited as a priority area during Lammy’s visit.

The EFD’s revival could stimulate a resurgence of UK-China financial sector cooperation. Even as Conservative policy toward China pivoted sharply in a hawkish direction, Economic Secretary to the Treasury Bim Afolami warned of the competitive disadvantages that would follow disengagement from China.[15] At the 2023 China International Finance Annual Forum, Minister of State in the Department for Business and Trade Lord Dominic Johnson praised the “enormous contributions” of the forty Chinese financial institutions operating in London and extolled the services that British banks could provide to China.[16] The Shein $66 billion IPO on the London Stock Exchange, which is slated for early 2025, will provide a litmus test for the growth potential of UK-China cooperation in the financial sphere.

As China asymmetrically retaliated against the EU’s imposition of EV tariffs in August with an anti-dumping investigation into European pork and dairy products, concerns are growing in Brussels about a disruption of China-EU agricultural trade.[17] Britain could capitalize on supply chain disruptions triggered by the EU-China trade war. In August, Britain signed a $259 million pork export deal with China which could create 1,500 jobs and Chinese demand for British pork has doubled over the past three years.[18]

While port infrastructure and the steel industry remain contentious areas, the most significant headwinds in UK-China commercial engagement pertain to the artificial intelligence (AI) and semiconductors spheres. Chinese investors hold equity in 36 of Britain’s 61 major semiconductor firms and made 7% of all investments in the British chip sector from 2014 to 2024. The pervasiveness of Chinese investment suggests that an abrupt decoupling in the semiconductor sphere would have serious adverse consequences for British industry.[19] Sunak’s 1 billion GBP May 2023 investment pledge to help British chipmakers divest from China did little to assuage concerns in the sector.

Even though his rhetoric toward China has a softer edge than Sunak’s, Starmer appears to be continuing his predecessor’s policy of divesting from China. After a thorough national security assessment, the British government decreed on 6 November that Chinese-registered company Future Technology Devices International Holding Ltd sell 80.2% of its Scotland-based chip company.[20] The tighter enforcement of the National Security and Investment Act would reciprocally limit British outbound investments in China’s semiconductor and AI industries and lead to more induced sales of Chinese technological investments.[21]

The main bright spot for cooperation in the AI sphere remains the dialogue between the UK and China about the possible negative implications of the surrender of human control over AI systems.[22] Britain’s invitation of China to the November 2023 Bletchley Park AI summit was a critical step toward ensconcing long-term cooperation on AI safety and JETCO’s revival could deepen engagement in this space in 2025. 

Selective Containment: Starmer’s Strategy to Counter the China Challenge 

To generate momentum for Britain’s reset with China, Starmer’s government has advanced a selective containment policy toward Beijing. AUKUS is a key cornerstone of Britain’s efforts to challenge Chinese influence in the Indo-Pacific. Despite Starmer’s past concerns that AUKUS could jeopardize Britain’s commercial links with China and calls for “realism” on Britain’s Indo-Pacific ambitions in March 2023, he has shown no sign of divesting from the trilateral partnership with Australia and the United States.

Much like his Conservative predecessors, Britain has consistently pressured China on its alleged supply of military-use goods to Russia. During his trip to Beijing, Lammy warned that China’s support for Russia in the Ukraine War could strain relations with Europe.[23] On 7 November, Britain sanctioned 10 Chinese entities and two Hong Kong-based entities for their role in supporting Russia’s war effort.[24] The Chinese Embassy in Britain reacted furiously to this decision, stating that “the UK’s actions violate international law and harm the legitimate rights and interests of Chinese companies.”

Although British Defense Secretary John Healey condemned provocative Chinese cross-strait military exercises,[25] the Labour government has been circumspect about inflaming tensions with Beijing over the issue. Starmer has not greenlit any noteworthy military assistance to Taiwan, this contrasts with Sunak’s past approval of submarine-related exports amidst cross-strait tensions in 2023. From 16-18 October, former Taiwanese President Tsai Ing-Wen was scheduled to visit Britain and Taiwanese officials were pushing for her to address the House of Commons. The Foreign Office reportedly intervened to derail this visit, as it immediately preceded Lammy’s China trip.[26]

This episode is not indicative of broader tensions in the UK-Taiwan relationship, as UK businesses flocked to September’s SEMICON Taiwan event, but instead, reveals the potential limits of British cooperation with Taipei. As the Labour government is simultaneously conducting a defense review and audit of British policy toward China, Starmer’s willingness to counter Chinese contention in the South China Sea is also an open question.[27] It is possible that Britain could nominally reinforce its historical policy of neutrality in South China Sea disputes and rebalance its security ties more firmly towards Europe.

While Starmer’s restraint toward Taiwan and the South China Sea would reassure Beijing of his commitment to a reset, Britain’s engagement with China on human rights also suggests a desire to compartmentalize frictions. Minister of State for Care Stephen Kinnock, who previously served as shadow Asia Minister, urged Britain to initiate a UN General Assembly resolution calling for an advisory opinion from the International Court of Justice (ICJ) on China’s alleged action in Xinjiang.[28] Lammy strongly aligned with the party consensus in opposition but has since dropped his rhetoric on Xinjiang to streamline a rapprochement with China.

Due to Hong Kong’s imposition of Basic Law Article 23 and the associated crackdown on dissidents, Lammy faced intense appeals to raise the case of imprisoned Giordano and Apple Daily Jimmy Lai to Chinese officials. Lammy treaded cautiously on the issue during his trip to Beijing. After mounting criticism, Lammy warned on 26 November that Lai’s treatment amounts to “cruel and unusual punishment” but his commitment to human rights in Hong Kong has been questioned by activist groups and Starmer’s Conservative critics.[29]

The UK-China Reset in the Age of President Donald Trump 

President Donald Trump’s return to the White House on 20 January 2025 raised the prospect of a trade war between the U.S. and Britain. Reynolds says that the UK is prepared for “all eventualities” if Trump imposes tariffs on the British economy. While Britain was initially encouraged by the fact that Canada, Mexico, and China were in Trump’s crosshairs, it has also been impacted by Trump’s sweeping tariff agenda. After Trump announced plans to slap Britain with 10% tariffs on 3 April, Lammy expressed “regret” about the return of U.S. protectionism and bemoaned its negative consequences for quality of life in Britain.[30] These tariffs compound angst in Britain over Trump’s apparent disregard for Europe’s position on the Ukraine War and belief that European security concerns are not of vital importance to the U.S.

In the near term, China could be a valuable hedge partner that mitigates the negative impacts of a trade war on Britain. In January 2025, Rachel Reeves argued that re-engagement with China would add one billion GBP in wealth to Britain’s economy.[31] At the February 2025 UK-China strategic dialogue summit, Wang Yi highlighted China’s support for free trade and multilateral solutions to global challenges.[32] Despite an ongoing scandal around China’s alleged technological pilfering of Britain’s BN-2T Islander cargo drone and populist angst over Prince Andrew’s dalliances with Beijing, China’s role in Britain’s macroeconomic strategy is becoming increasingly important.

Despite this trend, Britain still views China as a long-term threat and will want to constrain the scope of its economic engagement with Beijing. To hedge against overreliance on China, Britain could focus on finalizing its free trade agreements with the Gulf Cooperation Council and India. Even before the trade war with the U.S. intensified, the Labour government has cited these agreements as top priorities. It could then use potential alignments with Trump’s China policy as bargaining chips for tariff reduction. While it came at the cost of Britain’s openness to foreign investment, Johnson’s crackdown on Huawei in 2020 served the dual purpose of appeasing Trump and aligning himself with the Conservative Party consensus.[33] A measured crackdown on Chinese access to Britain’s electric vehicle market and chip manufacturers could serve a similar purpose for Starmer.

The debate surrounding China’s interference in British political life could pose an even graver risk to Starmer’s reset than Trump’s presidency. In a blistering July 2023 report, Britain’s Intelligence and Security Committee labeled government efforts to combat the China threat as “completely inadequate.”[34] The MI5’s alert on suspected Chinese agent Christine Lee, who was closely connected to British Labour MP Barry Gardiner, and the 2023 arrests of two British nationals for spying for China added to concerns. The thoroughness of British regulations in Chinese business activity was also called into question. All seventeen Chinese takeover deals raised to British Cabinet ministers in 2023 met the national security threshold for approval.[35]

The Labour Party’s candidates spoke passionately about combatting the Chinese threat to Britain’s democratic way of life during the election campaign, but Starmer’s subsequent actions have faced criticism. The Foreign Influence Registration Scheme (FIRS), which would force Chinese-aligned influencers and lobbyists to disclose their affiliations, did not pass in 2024 as scheduled.[36] After lengthy policy deliberations, the UK government announced that FIRS will take effect on 1 July 2025. Despite fierce Conservative pressure to include China in the FIRS scheme’s enhanced tier, the Starmer government has only announced severe criminal penalties for undisclosed Russian and Iranian agents.

Media exposure to Chinese influence operations in Britain or a major offensive Chinese cyberattack could force Starmer to change the tone of his rhetoric toward China. There is a recent precedent to support this hypothesis. The 7 May data breach of the UK Armed Forces payment network, which was linked to Chinese cyber warriors, played a key role in inflaming UK-China tensions during Sunak’s last weeks in power.[37]

While UK-China relations are on a stronger footing than they were under Sunak, a return to Cameron’s Golden Era is an impossibility and a genuine reset could prove elusive. As China strengthens its no-limits partnership with Russia and cross-strait tensions remain high, it will be hard for Beijing to shake off its image as a security threat to Britain and its allies. Mistrust and misperceptions could disrupt the fragile UK-China reset even more than policy disagreements and trade wars.

The speed and depth of the UK-China reset will depend markedly on the trajectory of the U.S.-UK Special Relationship. If Britain’s efforts to rally a European “coalition of the willing” in support of Ukraine’s long-term security gain steam and trade tensions with Washington flare, Starmer will double down on Britain’s re-engagement with China. If the U.S.-UK divide heals, a more arms-length approach to China will likely beckon. To predict the direction of Britain’s re-engagement with China, the friendly-but-uncertain dynamic between Starmer and Trump is of critical importance.

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[2] “We want “strong” UK-China Relationship, says Starmer,” BBC, November 18, 2024 (Accessed on November 25, 2024).

[3] Ian Williams, “Keir Starmer’s Desperate Cozying up to Beijing,” The Spectator, November 18, 2024,

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[4] “Britain Needs a Coherent China Strategy,” Financial Times, November 19, 2024,

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[5] Jessica Elgot, “Starmer Aims to Build “Pragmatic and Serious Relationship” in Meeting with Xi,” The Guardian, November 17, 2024,

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[6] “Chinese Vice Premier Talks with UK Chancellor of the Exchequer on Economic Cooperation, Xinhua, September 19, 2024,

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[7] “UK and China in Talks about Resuming Economy Discussions, Sky Reports,” Reuters, October 1, 2024,

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[8] Graham Lanktree, “UK Open to Restarting China Trade Talks,” Politico, October 29, 2024,

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[9] Eleni Courea, “Boris Johnson’s Plan to Restart China Trade Talks Angers MPs,” Politico, February 10, 2022,

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[10] Eleni Courea, “Rishi Sunak’s Government Quietly Revives Plan for China Trade Talks,” Politico, October 16, 2023,

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[11] Wang Yi, “UK’s Interest in Talks over Reopening JETCO Welcome, but Concrete Actions Needed,” Global Times, October 30, 2024,

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[12] “UK Remains Leading Destination for Chinese Investment in Europe,” Smith Stone Walters, August 15, 2024,

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[13] “Chinese Giant Chery Could Build Cars in UK,” BBC, September 8, 2024,

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[14] Graham Lanktree, “Don’t Expect Britain to Copy EU and American Tariffs on Chinese Cars,” Politico, September 3, 2024,

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[15] Kalyeena Makortoff, “UK Cannot Afford to Give “Cold Shoulder” to China, Says City Minister,” The Guardian, May 20, 2024,

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[16] UK’s Financial Services Remain Attractive to Chinese Investors: Minister, Global Times, September 3, 2023,

https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202309/1297489.shtml., (Accessed on November 23, 2024).

[17] “China Hits Back at EV Tariffs with European Dairy Probe,” Financial Times, August 21, 2024

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[18] “UK Landed 200 Million Pork Export Deal with China,” Euromeat News, August 16, 2024,

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[20] “Acquisition of 80.2% of Shares in Future Technology Devices International Limited by FTDI Holding Limited,” Cabinet Office, November 6, 2024,

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[21] Graham Lanktree, “UK Signals Potential Curbs on Chinese Investment Amidst “Derisking” Push,” Politico, April 17, 2024,

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[22] Scott Singer, “How the UK Should Engage China at AI’s Frontier,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, October 18, 2024,

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[23] “UK’s Lammy Warns China over Support for Russia in Ukraine,” RFI, October 18, 2024,

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[25] George Allison, “Britain Condemns Chinese Military Drills Near Taiwan,” UK Defence Journal, October 14, 2024,

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[26] Eleni Courea, “Former Taiwan Leader was Due to Visit UK for Two Days in October, Leak Shows,” The Guardian, November 24, 2024,

https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2024/nov/24/former-taiwan-leader-tsai-ing-wen-uk-visit-october-leaked-letter., (Accessed on November 25, 2024).

[27] “New UK Government Raises Question of Change in South China Sea Policy,” RFA, July 12, 2024,

https://www.rfa.org/english/news/southchinasea/uk-labour-china-07122024035631.html., (Accessed on November 25, 2024).

[28] Eleni Courea, “Labour Backtracks on Push for Genocide Ruling on China’s Treatment of Uyghurs,” The Guardian, October 17, 2024,

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[29] “David Lammy: Treatment of Jimmy Lai ‘Becoming Cruel and Unusual Punishment,’” Independent, November 26, 2024,

https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/keir-starmer-hong-kong-british-foreign-office-mps-b2653877.html., (Accessed on November 25, 2024).

[30] Jamie Grierson, “Trump Claims Starmer is “Very Happy” about Tariffs imposed on Britain,” The Guardian, April 4, 2025,

https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2025/apr/04/trump-starmer-very-happy-tariffs-britain., (Accessed on April 4, 2025).

[31] Jones Hayden, “Reengagement with China” to Boost British Economy by Up to £1B, Reeves says in Beijing, Politico, January 11, 2025, https://www.politico.eu/article/reeves-says-reengagement-with-china-to-boost-uk-economy-by-up-to-1b/., (Accessed on April 5, 2025).

[32] Kawala Xie, “Wang Yi Sends Free Trade Message at Revived UK-China Strategic Dialogue,” South China Morning Post, February 13, 2025, https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3298587/wang-yi-sends-free-trade-message-revived-uk-china-strategic-dialogue., (Accessed on April 5, 2025).

[33] Dan Sabbagh, “Boris Johnson Forced to Reduce Huawei’s Role in 5G Networks,” The Guardian, May 22, 2020,

https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2020/may/22/boris-johnson-forced-to-reduce-huaweis-role-in-uks-5g-networks., (Accessed on November 25, 2024).

[34] Cristina Gallardo, “British Response to China Threat ‘Completely Inadequate,’ Damning Report Warns,” Politico, July 13, 2023,

https://www.politico.eu/article/uk-response-to-china-threat-damning-report-warns-intelligence-security-technology/., (Accessed on November 25, 2024).

[35] “Britain Warms to Chinese Takeovers,” The Telegraph, September 15, 2024,

https://www.telegraph.co.uk/business/2024/09/15/chinese-takeovers-uk-companies-national-security/., (Accessed on November 25, 2024).

[36] Ian Williams, “Labour are Bowing to China’s Influence,” The Spectator, August 20, 2024,

https://www.spectator.co.uk/article/labour-are-bowing-to-chinas-influence/., (Accessed on November 25, 2024).

[37] Dan Sabbagh, “Around 270,000 UK Forces Exposed to Chinese Hackers,” The Guardian, May 7, 2024,

https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/article/2024/may/07/270000-uk-forces-records-thought-to-have-been-exposed-to-chinese-hackers., (Accessed on November 25, 2024).