Since Russia launched its “special military operation” in Ukraine in February 2022, most European Union (EU) and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) member states have aligned behind a common policy of supporting Kyiv and confronting Moscow through economic sanctions, military assistance to Ukraine, and diplomatic isolation. Yet Hungary, under Prime Minister Viktor Orbán, has consistently diverged from this “consensus” and emerged as the EU and NATO’s most prominent advocate for a more cautious approach to Russia. Budapest has resisted strict sanctions, maintained close economic ties with Russia, especially in energy, and advocated dialogue over confrontation. In doing so, Hungary has carved out a distinct and complex role within Europe’s evolving geopolitical landscape: one that presents itself as a moderating voice amid growing East-West polarization, but often at the cost of alienating Western allies who see Budapest’s stance as undermining the unity needed to counter Russia in Ukraine.

As a frontline NATO country bordering Ukraine’s western flank, Hungary occupies a strategically sensitive position in the alliance. At the same time, its heavy dependence on Russian energy significantly constrains its foreign policy options and grants Moscow a degree of leverage over Budapest. Hungary’s position illustrates the internal frictions within NATO and the EU, where divergent national interests complicate efforts to present a unified front against Russia amid this ongoing war in Ukraine. More broadly, Budapest’s approach reflects deeper tensions within the West about how to balance national sovereignty, economic pragmatism, and collective security commitments in an era of renewed geopolitical confrontation between great powers.

From Soviet Satellite to NATO Member

Like many nations in Central and Eastern Europe, Hungary spent the decades following World War II firmly under the Soviet Union’s authoritarian grip. Yet by the 1970s, a distinct shift in national discourse had emerged, increasingly oriented toward engagement with the West.[1] This pivot was closely tied to Hungary’s neo-liberal economic policies, which sought growth through limited market reforms and greater openness to Western trade and finance.[2] The 1980s marked a deepening of this Western orientation. Hungary joined the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, and despite opposition from Moscow, it established formal diplomatic relations with the European Economic Community—the forerunner of today’s EU.[3] These moves signaled Budapest’s growing desire to assert a more autonomous foreign policy, particularly during the twilight years of Soviet rule, when Mikhail Gorbachev’s policies of Glasnost and Perestroika loosened Moscow’s hold on its satellite states.[4]

Capitalizing on this moment of relative liberalization, Hungary accelerated its westward turn. The watershed moment came in 1990, when the country held its first multi-party democratic elections in over four decades.[5] Under Prime Minister József Antall, the new government prioritized Euro-Atlantic integration as a pillar of its foreign and security policy.[6] While NATO membership remained a longer-term ambition at the time, the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact in 1991 was a pivotal turning point that cleared the way for Hungary to pursue deeper strategic ties with the West.

This trajectory culminated on 12 March 1999, when Hungary, Poland, and the Czech Republic became the first former Warsaw Pact members to join NATO.[7] Its accession marked both a symbolic and practical transformation in Hungary’s security posture—from a Soviet satellite to a committed member of the Transatlantic Alliance. In the years that followed, Hungary actively participated in NATO-led missions, including the Kosovo Force (KFOR) and the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan after the launch of the U.S.-led “War on Terror” in 2001.[8] Today, Hungary remains one of only a handful of NATO countries to meet the alliance’s two percent GDP defense spending benchmark.[9] This legacy of westward integration continues to shape Budapest’s strategic outlook, including its complex stance on the ongoing conflict in Ukraine.

Despite Hungary’s membership in NATO and the EU since 1999 and 2004, respectively, there are multipolar dimensions to Budapest’s foreign policy with Orbán at the helm.[10] Hungary’s ties with the Organization of Turkic States (OTS), which is part of its “Eastern Opening” policy aimed at diversifying international partnerships beyond the EU, is one case in point.[11] In a grander geopolitical and geoeconomic context, Hungary aspires to act as a “keystone state,” skillfully navigating the competing interests of major global powers—namely the United States, Russia, and China—while at times positioning itself as a bridge among them.[12] This strategic posture aims to enhance Hungary’s autonomy and consolidate its role as a sovereign actor within a shifting geopolitical landscape. Hungary’s geography lends itself naturally to this ambition: situated at the crossroads of East and West, the country is well-placed to serve as a critical gateway for energy transit and trade routes essential to the broader project of Eurasian integration. Infrastructure initiatives such as the Budapest-Belgrade-Piraeus cargo railway and the East-West Gate Terminal exemplify Hungary’s efforts to cement its status as a logistics and commercial hub connecting European markets with Eurasia’s expanding economic networks.[13] In times of geopolitical volatility—particularly in the wake of the Ukraine conflict beginning in February 2022—Hungary’s role as a Central European transit point pursuing a “connectivity-based strategy” becomes all the more strategic, enabling it to leverage both geography and diplomacy to maintain relevance and flexibility on the international stage.[14]

A Calculated Distance: Hungary’s Divergent Stance on the Ukraine War

When Russia annexed Crimea in 2014, Hungary’s leadership adopted a posture of deliberate detachment, framing the development as a matter outside Budapest’s direct concern. Because Ukraine was not a member of NATO, Orbán argued that the annexation did not trigger obligations or defensive commitments under the Transatlantic Alliance. Guided by a doctrine of “strategic calmness,” Hungary cautiously navigated the growing geopolitical fault lines between NATO and Ukraine on one side, and Russia on the other.[15] By 2017, Orbán’s government positioned itself against Ukraine’s prospective NATO membership.[16]

In the years preceding Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, Orbán cultivated a notably close relationship with President Vladimir Putin. The two leaders met over a dozen times, including once just weeks before the war began.[17] During that period, Orbán publicly downplayed concerns about the imminence of conflict and instead emphasized the enduring value of Hungarian-Russian bilateral ties, particularly in the areas of energy cooperation and economic engagement.

Since the outbreak of hostilities, Orbán has consistently diverged from the mainstream EU response. He has vocally criticized the Western sanctions regime imposed on Moscow, warning that such punitive measures risk inflicting greater economic harm on European economies than on Russia itself. The Hungarian government has opposed EU bans on Russian fossil fuel imports and resisted calls for greater military support to Ukraine. Notably, Budapest has refused to allow Western arms deliveries to directly enter Ukraine from Hungarian territory, with Foreign Minister Peter Szijjarto declaring a few days into the war that “the reason for making this decision is that such deliveries might become targets of hostile military action and … we have to ensure the security of Hungary … that we are not getting involved in that war.”[18]

Within the EU, Hungary has frequently exercised its veto power to obstruct collective efforts aimed at bolstering Kyiv, insisting that its positions are grounded in Hungary’s national interest. Orbán’s stance aligns with the Kremlin in viewing Ukraine not as a future NATO or EU member but as a geopolitical buffer between Russia and the West. This vision underpins Hungary’s strategic calculus and continues to shape its approach to the ongoing war and Europe’s security architecture more broadly.

Since the onset of Russia’s “special military operation” in February 2022, Hungary’s distinct posture on the conflict has placed increasing strain on its relations with much of the Euro-Atlantic community, particularly the countries with front-line exposure to the conflict. Relations with the Baltic and Scandinavian states, as well as with France, Germany, and especially Poland, have become especially fraught.[19] Policymakers in these countries often argue that Budapest’s approach undermines transatlantic cohesion and tacitly advances Moscow’s strategic aims. In their eyes, Hungary’s alleged accommodation of the Kremlin constitutes not merely a diplomatic divergence but a fundamental breach of collective security norms. The severity of the backlash is underscored by Berlin’s recent characterization of Hungary’s Ukraine policy as a security threat.[20]

Nevertheless, Hungary’s stance has not disrupted its relations with all of its Western partners. Notably, Slovakia remains aligned with Budapest on many aspects of the Ukraine conflict, making it the most closely aligned EU and NATO member with Hungary on issues such as opposition to stricter sanctions on Moscow.[21] Meanwhile, ties with Cyprus, Greece, Italy, and Romania have remained largely unaffected by Hungary’s Ukraine policy, indicating a more nuanced and differentiated European response.[22] The relative stability of these relationships, despite Hungary’s foreign policy vis-à-vis Russia and Ukraine, is rooted in a range of country-specific considerations. Chief among them are shared strategic interests in maintaining functional bilateral cooperation across various domains such as trade, investment, energy, tourism, transport, migration policy (in Italy’s case), and border management (in Romania’s case). These governments have, to varying degrees, sought to compartmentalize their relations with Hungary, limiting the impact of tensions surrounding the war. Compared to the more hawkish posture of Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, and Sweden, states like Greece have adopted a more restrained approach toward Russia, which has helped sustain stable ties with Budapest since February 2022. Although not necessarily aligned with Hungary’s position on the conflict—particularly in the cases of Italy and Romania—these countries have generally favored pragmatic engagement over confrontation in their bilateral relations with Hungary.

As for Hungary’s relationship with the United States, there were significant bilateral tensions over the war during President Joe Biden’s term, during which Budapest’s approach clashed sharply with Washington’s. However, those frictions have since diminished following the return of President Donald J. Trump to the Oval Office in January 2025.[23]

Moreover, the Trump administration has, at least in principle, welcomed Hungary’s bridging role between the West and Russia. On 16 October 2025, Trump held a phone call with Putin to discuss the war in Ukraine.[24] Shortly afterward, Trump announced plans to meet the Russian leader “within two weeks” at a summit in Budapest, aimed at negotiating an end to the conflict.[25] Following Trump’s announcement, Orbán declared, “Budapest is essentially the only place in Europe today where such a meeting could be held, primarily because Hungary is almost the only pro-peace country.”[26] However, only days later, Trump cancelled the summit due to a perceived lack of diplomatic progress, explaining that he did not want a “wasted meeting” in Budapest, and imposed sanctions on Rosneft and Lukoil, Russia’s two largest oil companies.[27]^{, [28]}

The Energy Factor in Hungary’s Foreign Policy

Hungary’s entrenched dependence on Russian energy—spanning natural gas, crude oil, and nuclear cooperation—plays a pivotal role in shaping both its cautious stance on the war in Ukraine and its positive bilateral relationship with Moscow. This reliance is not simply a matter of economic convenience, but a structural feature of Hungary’s energy architecture, deeply rooted in historical legacies and reinforced by long-term contracts and infrastructure realities.

Approximately 65 percent of Hungary’s crude oil imports originate from Russia, delivered via the Druzhba (“Friendship”) pipeline, which is an enduring artifact of the Soviet era that continues to bind Central European energy markets to Russian supply chains.[29] This reliance was exposed in August 2025, when Ukraine struck the pipeline on three separate occasions in retaliation for Russian attacks on Ukrainian infrastructure.[30] These incidents underscored not only the vulnerability of Hungary’s energy transit routes but also the geopolitical complexities of its intermediary position in the region.

Hungary’s natural gas dependence is even more acute: 80-95 percent of its supply comes from Russia under a 15-year Gazprom contract signed shortly before Moscow’s “special military operation” in February 2022.[31] Given Hungary’s economic and energy priorities, Budapest’s opposition to gas and oil sanctions is unsurprising, and it is reasonable to conclude that no Hungarian government would accept such measures.[32] Throughout the war, Hungary and Slovakia have thus blocked comprehensive EU sanctions on Russian hydrocarbons.[33]

The nuclear sector is also an important dimension to Hungary’s relationship with Russia. Hungary’s sole nuclear power plant, Paks, currently supplies around 47 percent of the country’s electricity.[34] It operates exclusively on Russian nuclear fuel and depends on technical and logistical cooperation with Moscow. Even more consequential is the Paks II expansion project, for which Russia’s state-owned nuclear energy giant Rosatom serves as the main contractor.[35] A key, yet often overlooked, factor is Hungary’s longstanding familiarity with the Russian nuclear energy system, alongside its reliance on Moscow for the handling of spent nuclear fuel.[36] This technical and logistical interdependence is critical to understanding Budapest’s steadfast refusal to relinquish the arrangement, despite mounting external pressure.[37]

This multidimensional energy dependence has far-reaching geopolitical implications. It significantly constrains Hungary’s room for maneuver in aligning with broader EU and NATO strategies aimed at isolating Russia. Orbán’s government, facing both practical energy constraints and a deliberate political calculus, has framed continued cooperation with Moscow as a matter of national interest and energy sovereignty. However, critics argue that this interdependence amounts to strategic vulnerability—one that not only limits Budapest’s foreign policy options but also risks entrenching Hungary as an outlier within the European security community at a time of unprecedented East-West confrontation.

Minority Politics and Historical Memory: The Domestic Lens on Ukraine

Like all nations, Hungary’s foreign policy is deeply shaped by its domestic political dynamics. Hungary’s internal divisions in relation to the war in Ukraine are pronounced and largely fall along ideological lines. Left-leaning political forces have generally aligned themselves with the prevailing “EU consensus”, advocating for solidarity with Kyiv and endorsing the West’s agenda of supporting Ukraine through arms transfers and crippling sanctions on Russia.[38] In contrast, Orbán’s right-wing government approaches the conflict through a markedly different lens, one that is closely tied to the historical and cultural experience of ethnic Hungarians living beyond the country’s modern borders.[39]

For the Hungarian right, Ukraine is not viewed solely as a geopolitical flashpoint or an arena for great power rivalry, but as a state whose treatment of its ethnic Hungarian minority in Transcarpathia (historically part of Hungary, now Ukraine’s Zakarpattia Oblast) remains a central concern.[40] This region, which housed part of the historical “Greater Hungary” prior to the post-World War II border settlements of 1947, continues to hold symbolic and emotional significance for many Hungarians, particularly those on the political right.[41] Accordingly, Budapest has expressed persistent unease about Ukrainian policies that are seen as undermining the linguistic and cultural rights of ethnic Hungarians. Measures such as language laws passed by the Ukrainian government, particularly the 2017 education law, which restricted minority-language instruction, have been interpreted in Hungary as direct affronts to the Hungarian identity and historical memory.[42]

This ethnic dimension critically shapes Orbán’s posture toward Kyiv. Though Hungary was the third country in the world to recognize Ukraine’s 1991 independence and supported its Euro-Atlantic integration, relations frayed after the 2014 Maidan revolution.[43] The political transformation that followed in Ukraine coincided with what many in Hungary perceived as an uptick in nationalist sentiment and legislation that marginalized national minorities, particularly Hungarians in Zakarpattia. These developments have reinforced the Hungarian right’s narrative that Ukraine does not fully respect its ethnic minorities, a perception that continues to influence Budapest’s cautious and often contrarian stance within the EU and NATO regarding the conflict.

Orbán’s foreign policy, therefore, cannot be fully understood without appreciating the domestic political imperatives and historical sensibilities that drive it. For his government and its support base, national identity, historical memory, and minority rights are not abstract concerns but core elements of statecraft—especially when it comes to neighbors with sizeable Hungarian communities. This framing helps explain Hungary’s ambivalent position on the Ukraine war and its broader divergence from the dominant Western approach.

Strategic Realism or Ideological Affinity? Decoding Hungary’s Russia Policy

There are underlying ideological dimensions to the Ukraine-related tensions between Hungary and many of its Western allies that go beyond the immediate context of the war itself. To grasp the roots of this friction, one must consider the broader political and economic rifts that began to surface between Budapest and Brussels following Orbán’s return to power in 2010. Since then, Hungary’s increasingly contentious relationship with EU institutions has played a central role in shaping Orbán’s political identity—both domestically and internationally—as a leader who resists the liberal norms of Brussels in the name of national sovereignty.[44] This ongoing clash is not merely institutional but ideological: Orbán has positioned himself as a defender of a conservative, nationalist vision that rejects what he portrays as the overreach of supranational governance.

Although ideological considerations certainly color Hungary’s foreign policy posture, it is the pragmatic calculus behind Budapest’s approach to the war in Ukraine that provides the more compelling lens through which to understand its position.[45] At the core of Hungary’s stance lies a sober assessment: that Russia is unlikely to be decisively defeated on the battlefield and will remain a formidable global actor for the foreseeable future—possibly for decades.[46] Hungarian officials do not believe that NATO or the EU will ever directly intervene militarily in Ukraine, and without such intervention, they contend, Kyiv’s prospects of reclaiming all territory within its internationally recognized borders are extremely slim.[47] Additionally, the Orbán government assesses that Washington’s long-term strategic focus lies primarily in East Asia and domestic affairs rather than in Europe—a view that helps explain Budapest’s motivation to keep channels open for maintaining constructive ties with Moscow.[48] Moreover, while Hungary is actively pursuing diversification away from Russian oil and gas, policymakers in Budapest acknowledge that such a transition cannot be achieved in the near term.[49] This recognition underscores a key motivation behind Hungary’s continued efforts to maintain a constructive relationship with Moscow.

Although the Hungarian government formally rejects Russia’s annexation of Ukrainian land and maintains support for Ukraine’s territorial integrity in principle, there is a prevailing conviction in Budapest that certain geopolitical outcomes—such as Russia’s continued control over Crimea and much of the Donbas—are increasingly irreversible. From this perspective, Hungarian policymakers argue that both Ukraine and its Western partners would be better served by recognizing the limits of what can realistically be achieved militarily, and by seeking a negotiated resolution before the costs of war grow even steeper.

In the view of Hungary’s leadership, Ukraine faces a grim strategic landscape, where all available options range from unfavorable to catastrophic. Time, in their estimation, is working against Kyiv: the longer the war continues, the narrower and less advantageous any potential diplomatic resolution is likely to become.[50] Since the outbreak of the conflict in February 2022, Budapest has consistently advocated for a swift ceasefire and peace negotiations—not out of sympathy for Moscow, but from a belief that prolonging the war will only result in further Ukrainian territorial losses and human suffering. Hungary’s reluctance to support indefinite military aid to Ukraine or maximalist sanctions against Russia is rooted in this bleak, if unsentimental, reading of the war’s strategic trajectory.

Conclusion: Strategic Autonomy or Risky Isolation?

Hungary’s posture toward the conflict in Ukraine reflects a deliberate balancing act shaped by historical memory, geopolitical realities, and national self-interest. Frequently mischaracterized in Western media as either overtly pro-Russian or stubbornly and naively “neutral,” Budapest’s approach is more complex than such binary framings suggest. Although Orbán’s government has avoided endorsing Russia’s “special military operation,” it has also resisted policies it views as detrimental to Hungary’s strategic and economic interests—most notably, sanctions targeting Russian oil and gas, which remain critical to the country’s energy security. At the same time, Hungary has supported 18 EU sanctions packages and aligned itself with Western partners in key multilateral fora, including voting to condemn Russian aggression at the United Nations.[51]^{, [52]} Additionally, the government in Budapest has never shied away from labeling Russia the aggressor in this conflict.

This dual approach reflects not ideological sympathy for Moscow, but a pragmatic reading of Hungary’s constraints and priorities. Energy dependence, economic vulnerability, and concerns over the treatment of ethnic Hungarians in Ukraine all factor into a foreign policy that seeks to shield the country from the fallout of a prolonged and uncertain war. Orbán’s continued engagement with the Kremlin—often viewed with suspicion by allies—is less a sign of allegiance than a strategic hedge aimed at preserving flexibility amid a shifting global order.

At the core of Hungary’s divergence from the EU and NATO mainstream lies a fundamental skepticism of what Orbán’s government sees as idealistic or unsustainable objectives—particularly the notion of a total Ukrainian military victory or the long-term isolation of Russia. This perspective, reinforced by a broader defense of national sovereignty over supranational consensus, has positioned Hungary as both a critic of Western orthodoxy and a “keystone state” navigating between great powers.

Whether this strategy enhances Hungary’s autonomy or exacerbates its marginalization within the Transatlantic Alliance remains uncertain. What is clear, however, is that Budapest’s approach is not born of passivity or provocation, but of a calculated effort to chart a course that serves its distinct national interests. In rejecting open confrontation with Russia, Hungary is not turning away from the West—it is asserting its own agency within it. The sustainability of this posture will depend on how well Hungary can balance its desire for strategic independence with the collective imperatives of the Euro-Atlantic institutions it has long sought to be part of.

[1] NATO, “HUNGARY AND NATO,” https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/declassified_227051.htm.

[2] When Socialist Hungary Went Neoliberal,” An interview with Adam Fabry, Jacobin, September 28, 2019, https://jacobin.com/2019/09/hungary-neoliberalism-soviet-union.

[3] NATO, “HUNGARY AND NATO.”

[4] Ibid.

[5] Ibid.

[6] Ibid.

[7] NATO, “Allied Command Transformation Celebrates 25 Years: Hungary, Czech Republic, and Poland’s NATO Alliance Membership,” Allied Command Transformation, March 15, 2024, https://www.act.nato.int/article/25-years-of-czech-republic-hungary-poland/.

[8] “Hungary is a reliable NATO member and partner in peacekeeping,” Oeconomus Economic Research Foundation, July 16, 2024, https://www.oeconomus.hu/en/oecofocus/hungary-is-a-reliable-nato-member-and-partner-in-peacekeeping/.

[9] Grace Jones and Olivia Leiwant, “U.S. Engagement with Hungary: Reshaping NATO’s Collective Alliance,” Belfer Center, February 13, 2024, https://www.belfercenter.org/publication/us-engagement-hungary-reshaping-natos-collective-alliance.

[10] István Tarrósy, Hajer Trabelsi, and Zoltán Vörös, “Hungary’s Relations with the BRICS in the Context of the Changing World Order,” Central European Journal of International and Security Studies 18, no. 4, December 19, 2024, https://www.cejiss.org/hungary-s-relations-with-the-brics-in-the-context-of-the-changing-world-order.

[11] “Understanding The Overlap of Hungary’s “Eastern Opening” and Cooperation of Turkic States,” Eurasian Research Institute, https://www.eurasian-research.org/publication/understanding-the-overlap-of-hungarys-eastern-opening-and-cooperation-of-turkic-states/.

[12] Carlos Roa, “Hungary’s Keystone Gamble: Balancing East and West in a Multipolar World,” The Geopolitics, October 12, 2024, https://thegeopolitics.com/hungarys-keystone-gamble-balancing-east-and-west-in-a-multipolar-world/.

[13] Ibid.

[14] Ibid.

[15] Benjamin Novak, “Ukraine War Forces Hungary’s Orban Into Political Contortions,” The New York Times, February 27, 2022, https://www.nytimes.com/2022/02/27/world/europe/ukraine-russia-hungary-orban.html.

[16] Péter Krekó and Patrik Szicherle, “Why Is Hungary Blocking Ukraine’s Western Integration?,” Atlantic Council, January 16, 2018, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/ukrainealert/why-is-hungary-blocking-ukraine-s-western-integration/.

[17] John Feffer, Interview with the Author, April 16, 2022.

[18] “Hungary will not allow lethal weapons for Ukraine to transit its territory – FM,” Reuters, February 28, 2022, https://www.reuters.com/world/hungary-will-not-allow-lethal-weapons-ukraine-transit-its-territory-fm-2022-02-28/.

[19] Attila Demkó, Interview with the Author, September 5, 2025.

[20] Germany now considers Hungary a security threat and is preparing to take tough action,” Atlatszo, September 1, 2025, https://english.atlatszo.hu/2025/09/01/germany-now-considers-hungary-a-security-threat-and-is-preparing-to-take-tough-action/.

[21] Natália Silenská, “Slovakia, Hungary refuse to back latest EU sanctions on Russia, says Szijjártó,” Euractiv, June 23, 2025, https://www.euractiv.com/section/politics/news/slovakia-hungary-refuse-to-back-latest-eu-sanctions-on-russia-says-szijjarto/.

[22] Attila Demkó, Interview with the Author, September 5, 2025.

[23] Ibid.

[24] John Sudworth and Sarah Smith, “Putin-Trump call a curveball for Zelensky ahead of White House meeting,” BBC, October 17, 2025, https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cze63r34213o.

[25] Sean Seddon, “Zelensky to make case for missiles at White House, after Trump and Putin agree meeting,” BBC, https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/crmxz37nv3zo.

[26] Henry Austin, “Trump and Putin’s planned summit in Hungary boosts an authoritarian ally,” NBC News, October 17, 2025, https://www.nbcnews.com/world/hungary/trump-putins-planned-summit-hungary-boosts-authoritarian-ally-rcna238138.

[27] “Hungary PM Orban says preparations for Trump-Putin summit still ongoing,” Reuters, October 22, 2025, https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/hungary-pm-orban-says-preparations-trump-putin-summit-still-ongoing-2025-10-22/.

[28] Kristen Holmes and Kevin Liptak, “How Trump’s plans for a Budapest summit with Putin turned into sanctions on Russia,” CNN, October 24, 2025, https://www.cnn.com/2025/10/23/politics/trump-putin-russia-reversal-sanctions-summit.

[29] Wolfgang Pusztai, Interview with the Author, August 30, 2025.

[30] “Hungary bans Ukrainian drone commander over Druzhba pipeline strikes,” The New Voice of Ukraine, August 28, 2025, https://english.nv.ua/nation/attack-on-druzhba-oil-pipeline-orban-confirms-ban-on-entry-for-ukrainian-army-drone-unit-commander-50540707.html.

[31] Wolfgang Pusztai, Interview with the Author, August 30, 2025.

[32] Attila Demkó, Interview with the Author, September 5, 2025.

[33] “Hungary and Slovakia block Russian sanctions package, Budapest says,” Reuters, June 23, 2025, https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/hungary-slovakia-block-russian-sanctions-package-budapest-says-2025-06-23/.

[34] Wolfgang Pusztai, Interview with the Author, August 30, 2025.

[35] Ibid.

[36] Attila Demkó, Interview with the Author, September 5, 2025.

[37] Ibid.

[38] Ibid.

[39] Ibid.

[40] Ibid.

[41] Ibid.

[42] Clara Marchaud, “Language rights of Hungarian minority in Ukraine at the heart of Kyiv-Budapest spat,” Euractiv, June 27, 2024, https://www.euractiv.com/section/global-europe/news/language-rights-of-hungarian-minority-in-ukraine-at-the-heart-of-kyiv-budapest-spat/.

[43] “Ukrainian Independence Day: Paying Tribute to Ukraine’s Thousand-Year-Old Relationship with Hungary,” Hungarian Conservative, August 24, 2022, https://www.hungarianconservative.com/articles/culture_society/ukrainian-independence-day-paying-tribute-to-ukraines-thousand-year-old-relationship-with-hungary/.

[44] Marc Santora and Helene Bienvenu, “Secure in Hungary, Orban Readies for Battle with Brussels,” The New York Times, May 11, 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2018/05/11/world/europe/hungary-victor-orban-immigration-europe.html.

[45] Wolfgang Pusztai, Interview with the Author, August 30, 2025.

[46] Attila Demkó, Interview with the Author, September 5, 2025.

[47] Ibid.

[48] Ibid.

[49] Ibid.

[50] Ibid.

[51] European Commission, “EU adopts 18th package of sanctions against Russia,” July 18, 2025, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_25_1840.

[52] Julian Borger, “UN votes to condemn Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and calls for withdrawal,” The Guardian, March 2, 2022, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/mar/02/united-nations-russia-ukraine-vote?utm_source=chatgpt.com.