On September 30 this year in the northwestern
German town of Osnabrück, 24 men officially became the first graduates of
Islamkolleg Deutschland, a program started four years ago by the German
government to train local imams.[1]
The “made in Germany” training initiative aims to better integrate Muslim
communities into society by ensuring religious leaders in the country speak
German and are well-versed in the country’s customs and traditions.[2]
Another significant objective of the program is to reduce the
influence of foreign governments, particularly Turkey, on the Muslim community
in Germany, which is estimated to total 5.5
million or 6% of the population. Many
foreign-trained imams are financially supported by their home countries,
raising concerns about potential political agendas and conflicts of interest.
The training programs intend to create imams who are free from external
influences, contributing to the peaceful coexistence of religious and cultural
groups in Germany.[3]
The imam training initiative has encountered resistance from leading Turkish groups such as the Turkish-Islamic Union for Religious Affairs or DITIB, an umbrella organization of 900 mosques in Germany, and Milli Görüş, a religious political movement in Turkey. Some Islamic scholars[4] accuse the German government of “domesticating” Islam, arguing that the imam training program represents an effort by the state to influence religious affairs by controlling religious leaders.[5] The German Council of Sciences and Humanities is an independent body that advises Germany’s state and federal governments and helped devise a plan for the training of imams. They see the program as necessary to ensure that imams operate within the framework of German laws and values and that mosques facilitate integration and counter extremism.[6] Legal challenges could arise regarding the constitutionality of state involvement in religious training.
From guest workers to political targets: A brief
overview of Muslim immigration
The modern history of
Islamic communities and the issue of Islamic extremism in Germany are
intertwined, and they have evolved significantly in the 20th and 21st
centuries.
The first significant wave
of Muslim immigration to Germany occurred during the 1950s and 1960s when the
country experienced a labor shortage. Many Turkish and Arab workers were
invited to work in Germany as part of the “guest worker” program. These immigrants
established the foundation for the Muslim community in Germany. Over time,
Islamic organizations and mosques were established to serve the needs of the
growing Muslim population. Some of these organizations are aligned with
different Islamic traditions, such as Sunni or Shia. One of the prominent
organizations is the DITIB, which is closely linked to the Turkish government.[7]
Germany welcomed half a
million refugees in 2015 and another 750,000 the next year. Some of these
refugees came from North Africa, but most came from Syria
and Iraq, where Islam is the dominant religion. This influx raised concerns
about integration and security, but it also demonstrated the willingness of
Germany to provide refuge to those fleeing conflict. That said, xenophobes opposed to these immigration policies have been
responsible for attacks on mosques and even people; pro-refugee politician
Walter Lübcke was murdered in front of his home in 2019.[8]
In the 1990-2000s, Germany started experiencing issues related
to Islamic extremism. Some radicalized individuals and groups emerged, leading
to concerns about terrorism and the radicalization of youth. Several Germans
played a significant role in the planning and execution of the September 11,
2001 terrorist attacks in the United States. The so-called “Hamburg Cell” were
a group of Islamist extremists based in the northwest German city. Mohamed
Atta, the ringleader, helped plan the attacks and piloted American Airlines
Flight 11, which crashed into the North Tower of the World Trade Center.
Another member of the Hamburg Cell, Marwan Al-Shehhi, flew United Airlines
Flight 175 into the South Tower. The group, which also included Ziad Jarrah,
who was part of the hijacking team on United Flight 93, had a network of
supporters and facilitators in Germany. Some of these individuals provided
logistical support, including helping the hijackers with housing, finances, and
false documents.[9]
While the Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz,
Germany’s domestic intelligence agency, monitors and keeps track of religious
activities and religious radicalization in the Muslim community, the
organization must respect the right of individuals to hold diverse religious
and political beliefs, as long as they do not violate German laws or democratic
values enshrined in the
German constitution. The imam training initiative
allows the government to proactively reduce the potential for Islamic
extremism in the country by promoting a form of Islam that is in line with the
country’s values of democracy, tolerance, and religious pluralism.[10]
Programs such as Islamkolleg Deutschland often involve
collaboration between government bodies and academic institutions. Government
agencies may have a role in overseeing or shaping the curriculum to ensure it
aligns with state objectives, such as integration and social cohesion.
Universities and academic departments of Islamic studies are often involved in
designing and delivering the educational content and often have a say in the
academic aspects of the curriculum. Training programs may also involve collaboration
with Islamic associations or religious councils. The
University of Osnabrück in northwestern Germany, for example, established a
two-year course for imam training, which began in 2021. The University of
Osnabrück’s imam college is run by an association independent from the
university but supervised by its academics, indicating a close collaboration
between the university and the program.
Ensuring the quality and standardization of
imam training programs across different European countries can be complex.
Variations in curriculum, accreditation, and oversight can lead to disparities
in the education and qualifications of imams. There may be differences in the recognition of certification among
different Islamic communities and organizations.[11]
Some may not accept the authority of certain certifying bodies or
institutions. Beyond formal training and certification, an imam’s
credibility within their community is crucial. They must build trust among the
congregants they serve. Germany’s approach to Islam can vary at the
federal and state levels, as some issues related to religion fall under the
jurisdiction of individual states or Länder.[12]
This can lead to variations in policies and practices regarding Islamic
religious education, mosque construction, and other matters related to Islam.[13]
There are also concerns about the financial
support for imams and the question of who will pay their salaries once they are
trained. Unlike the Catholic and Protestant churches in Germany, which are
funded through a special tax, there is no similar system for Muslims. Unlike
some Christian denominations with established systems of financial support,
Muslim communities in Europe often rely on donations. Sustaining these programs
and offering competitive salaries for imams can be a financial burden. This
financial challenge may affect the sustainability of imam training programs and
the ability to attract qualified candidates.[14]
Lastly, there is a practical challenge in finding job opportunities
for the graduates of these programs. Imams are often poorly paid and rely on
donations from the faithful. The salary range is from €1,000 to €2,000 a month.
Job prospects in Islamic welfare work and other fields need to be expanded to
provide viable career paths for trained imams.[15]
Conclusion
The concept of “Euro Islam”
refers to a vision of Islam that is adapted to the European context and is
characterized by its compatibility with European values, laws, and societal
norms. It is often seen as a way to reconcile Islamic faith with the realities
of living in European societies.[16]
The notion of Euro Islam acknowledges the diversity of Muslims living in Europe
and seeks to develop an Islamic identity that fosters integration, social
cohesion, and peaceful coexistence with non-Muslim communities. Many Muslims, for example, either don’t believe in gender equality
or have not been exposed to the idea. Imams are trained to promote this
European value in their sermons and other teachings.[17]
The initiative to train local Imams in Germany
represents a significant step towards fostering this type of integration; however, it is not without its complexities
and challenges, ranging from concerns about religious freedom and government
interference to issues related to funding, curriculum development, and ensuring
the quality of religious education.
The imam training initiatives in Germany have
significant implications for the country’s Muslim community and society as a
whole. By producing locally trained imams, Germany aims to bridge the cultural
gap between religious leaders and the younger, more German-speaking generations
within its Muslim community. This could potentially lead to better integration
and social cohesion. Reducing the dependence on foreign-trained imams can help
diminish the influence of external actors, such as Turkey, in German mosques.
It can also contribute to a more diverse and inclusive religious landscape in
which imams reflect the realities of Muslims in Germany.
The success of these initiatives, however,
depends on overcoming resistance from certain religious groups and addressing
funding and job placement challenges. Additionally, it raises broader questions
about the relationship between religious communities and the state, as well as
the role of religion in a secular society.
To improve and strengthen imam training in
Germany, the German government and relevant stakeholders should consider the
following policy suggestions and recommendations:
• Foster
inclusive dialogue with representatives from various Muslim communities and
religious organizations. Involve them in the decision-making process, including
curriculum development and oversight, to ensure that the training programs are
sensitive to the diverse perspectives within the Muslim community.
• Establish
transparent and sustainable funding mechanisms for imam training programs. This
can include a combination of public funds, private donations, and support from
religious organizations. Ensure that funding is allocated fairly to avoid
perceptions of favoritism.
• Develop clear accreditation standards and
mechanisms for monitoring the quality of imam training programs. Independent
oversight bodies, which include experts in Islamic studies, can help maintain
academic rigor and ensure that the programs adhere to established educational
standards.
• Integrate
cultural competency and interfaith education into the curriculum. Imams should
be equipped not only with religious knowledge but also with an understanding of
the local culture, legal norms, and interfaith relations to promote peaceful
coexistence.
• Promote
the placement of locally trained imams in public institutions, such as
hospitals, prisons, and the armed forces. This can help bridge the gap between
religious leaders and various segments of society, fostering social cohesion.
• Create
career pathways and opportunities for imams within German society. Encourage
their involvement in educational institutions, social services, and community
development beyond their roles as religious leaders. This can improve their
long-term job prospects and financial stability.
• Ensure that the government’s involvement in
religious training respects the principles of religious freedom and separation
of church and state. Develop legal safeguards to prevent undue interference in
religious affairs while supporting integration efforts.
• Understand that the benefits of locally
trained imams may not be immediately apparent. It is a long-term investment in
the social and cultural fabric of Germany, and policymakers should remain
committed to the initiative even in the face of initial challenges.
• Collaborate with other European countries
facing similar challenges and share best practices in imam training. Learning
from the experiences of other nations can provide valuable insights and
solutions.
[1] “Germany’s first cohort of locally trained imams
graduates,” Deutsche Welle, September 30, 2023, https://www.dw.com/en/germanys-first-cohort-of-locally-trained-imams-graduates/a-66971875.
[2] “Germany launches training centre for
homegrown imams,” France 24, June 15, 2021, https://www.france24.com/en/live-news/20210615-germany-launches-training-centre-for-homegrown-imams.
[3] Alba Sanz, “Germany launches its first imam
training centre,” Atalyar.com, June 17, 2021, https://www.atalayar.com/en/articulo/politics/germany-launches-its-first-imam-training-centre/20210616154810151686.html.
[4] Lukas Wick, “Domesticating Islam?” Frankfurter
Allgemeine Zeitung, April 21, 2011,
https://en.qantara.de/content/imam-training-in-germany-domesticating-islam.
[5] “Turkish groups oppose Germany’s state-backed
imam training center,” The Daily Sabah,
June 16, 2021, https://www.dailysabah.com/politics/turkish-groups-oppose-germanys-state-backed-imam-training-center/news.
[6] Enes Bayrakli, Farid Hafez, and Leonard Faytre, “Engineering a European Islam: An Analysis of Attempts to Domesticate European Muslims in Austria, France, and Germany.” Insight Turkey, vol. 20, no. 3 (2018): pp. 131–156, http://www.jstor.org/stable/26469848.
[7] Ahmet Yükleyen & Gökçe Yurdakul, “Islamic
Activism and Immigrant Integration: Turkish Organizations in Germany,” Immigrants
& Minorities, vol.29, no. 1 (2011), pp. 64-85, DOI: 10.1080/02619288.2011.553134.
[8] Lacin Idil Oztig, “Islamophobic
Discourse of European Right-Wing Parties: A Narrative Policy Analysis,” Social
Currents, vol. 10, no.
3 (2023), pp. 225-244, https://doi.org/10.1177/23294965221139852.
[9] Guido Steinberg, “The
Threat of Jihadist Terrorism in Germany,” Elcano Newsletter, 2008 https://media.realinstitutoelcano.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/12/ari142-2008-steinberg-jihadist-terrorism-germany.pdf.
[10] “Germany set to train own imams to prevent
extremism,” AhvalNews, January 4, 2021, https://ahvalnews.com/german-muslims/germany-set-train-own-imams-prevent-extremism.
[11] Welmoet Boender, “Professionalizing the Imam in Europe:
Imam Training Programs as Sites of Deliberative Engagement,” Religions,
vol. 12, no. 5 (2021): p. 308, https://doi.org/10.3390/rel12050308.
[12] In the German political
landscape, Länder refers to the 16
states that make up the Federal Republic of Germany. The Länder have their own
governments, parliaments, and constitutions, and they have significant autonomy
in areas such as education, culture, and policing. The Länder also have representation
in the Bundesrat, the upper house of the German parliament, which represents
the interests of the Länder at the federal level. The Länder play an important
role in the German political system and are a key feature of German federalism;
see: Eric Langenbacher, The German Polity, Twelfth Edition, (Rowman
& Littlefield, 2021)
[13] Dr. Niels Valdemar Vinding and Dr Raida Chbib, “Education and Training of Muslim Religious Professionals in Europe
and North America,” Akademie für Islam in Wissenschaft und
Gesellschaft, Goethe Universität, Frankfurt am Main, 2020, https://aiwg.de/wp-content/uploads/2020/12/AIWG_International_Report_Webversion.pdf.
[14]Jenny Berglund, “Publicly Funded Islamic Education
in Europe and the United States,” The Brookings Project on U.S. Relations
with the Islamic World, vol. no. 21, April 2015, https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/Final-Web-PDF.pdf.
[15]
Zia Weise, “Wanted: Imams made in Germany,” Politico,
December 17, 2019, https://www.politico.eu/article/germany-imam-training-islam-in-society/.
[16] Faruk Sen, “Euro-Islam: Some empirical evidences,” in Islam and Muslims in Germany, eds.
Ala Al-Hamarneh and Jörn Thielmann, Brill Series: Muslim Minorities, vol. 7 (2008), pp.31-48.
[17] J.
Nielsen, “The question of Euro-Islam: Restriction or opportunity?” in Islam in Europe: Diversity, Identity and
Influence, eds. A. Al-Azmeh and E. Fokas, (Cambridge University Press,
2012), pp. 34-48.