Türkiye’s policy toward Libya has undergone a notable transformation in recent years, reflecting broader shifts in the Eastern Mediterranean’s geopolitical landscape. The evolution of Ankara’s approach is driven by multiple factors: the persistent instability in North Africa, the emergence of new regional alliances, and the heightened competition over energy resources and maritime boundaries. While Türkiye has maintained a longstanding relationship with the Tripoli-based Government of National Unity (GNU), its recent outreach to the Government of National Stability (GNS), the Libyan National Army (LNA), and the House of Representatives (HoR) in Benghazi signals a strategic recalibration.
This expanded engagement occurs against the backdrop of a region grappling with ongoing conflict, as evidenced by the destabilizing ripple effects of events such as 7th October and subsequent crises. Türkiye’s efforts to diversify its Libyan partnerships are shaped by the broader détente processes underway in the Middle East and North Africa, as well as the intensifying regional power competition in the Eastern Mediterranean. The country’s maneuvers are not only a response to shifting local realities but also an effort to secure its interests against key regional adversaries, including Greece, the Greek-administered Republic of Cyprus (RoC), and Israel.
This piece aims to provide a comprehensive assessment of Türkiye’s evolving Libya policy. By examining recent diplomatic initiatives, energy cooperation, Turkish-Greek rivalry, and broader regional dynamics, it elucidates the implications for the future of the Eastern Mediterranean’s power matrix and offers insight into the prospects for cooperation and stability among parties in Libya.
Recent Developments
Türkiye’s engagement with Eastern Libyan actors has accelerated markedly over the past year. The most prominent developments center on high-level visits and diplomatic contacts between Turkish officials and core figures within the GNS and the LNA, as well as the HoR, which exercise significant influence over Eastern Libya’s political landscape.
In April 2025, the Chief of Staff of the LNA’s ground forces, Saddam Haftar—son of General Khalifa Haftar—visited Ankara for meetings with Türkiye’s Defense Minister Yaşar Güler.[1] This visit, unprecedented in its public profile,[2] represented a significant diplomatic gesture toward the LNA and was followed by further engagements involving Turkish military officials in Benghazi.[3] The symbolism of Saddam Haftar’s attendance at the International Defense Industry Fair (IDEF) in Istanbul further underscored the growing defense-related dialogue between the two parties.
Perhaps the most consequential diplomatic milestone occurred in August 2025,[4] when Ibrahim Kalın, head of Türkiye’s National Intelligence Organization (MİT), traveled to Benghazi for direct talks with General Khalifa Haftar. This meeting, widely viewed as a watershed moment, highlighted Türkiye’s intent to broaden its interlocutors in Libya beyond the Tripoli-based GNU.[5] While Ankara continues to maintain robust relations with Prime Minister Abdul Hamid Dbeibeh and the GNU, its willingness to engage Eastern Libyan actors directly reflects a pragmatic recalibration in pursuit of a more inclusive Libyan strategy.
These developments are embedded in a wider context of intense diplomatic activity. President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan recently hosted a trilateral summit with Dbeibeh and Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni,[6] signaling Ankara’s readiness to coordinate with both regional and European partners. The rationale for Türkiye’s outreach is not simply reactive to the détente process underway since 2021 but is strategically focused on facilitating Libyan unity—particularly in the security sector—and securing access to vital energy and economic assets in the east, including potential offshore deposits in the contested exploration blocks south of Crete. By engaging the Benghazi elite, Türkiye aims to consolidate its influence over Libya’s lucrative petrochemical industry, which remains largely under the control of the GNS and LNA.
Additionally, Türkiye’s engagement with the HoR—the legislative body that appoints the GNS—has introduced a new dimension to its Libya policy.[7] Ankara is increasingly aware that durable stability and influence in Libya require both a comprehensive approach and the cultivation of relationships with all major factions, including those that have historically been skeptical of Turkish involvement. In sum, Türkiye’s recent diplomatic initiatives represent a multifaceted strategy designed to position Ankara as a central actor in Libya’s political future, while also buttressing its leverage in the broader Eastern Mediterranean arena.
Energy cooperation: Maritime agreements
Energy cooperation between Türkiye and Libya has emerged as a cornerstone of Ankara’s evolving foreign policy, with significant implications for regional actors and the delicate balance of power in the Mediterranean. At the heart of this cooperation lie maritime delimitation accords and energy exploration agreements that have the potential to redefine the region’s strategic map.
Türkiye’s existing energy pacts with the GNU have provided a legal and diplomatic foundation for joint exploration and development in contested offshore zones. These agreements, which include rights to explore and exploit hydrocarbon resources in areas claimed by multiple states, have been fiercely contested by Greece, the RoC, and, to an extent, Egypt. The prospect that the GNS and HoR might ratify these accords has fueled speculation about a dramatic expansion of Türkiye’s legal claims and operational footprint in the Mediterranean.
To address these issues, the HoR has established a technical committee tasked with reviewing the agreements between Türkiye and the GNU.[8] This committee’s deliberations are closely watched by regional stakeholders, as its endorsement of Türkiye’s claims would confer additional legitimacy on the memorandum of understanding (MoU) for maritime delimitation signed by Ankara and Tripoli in 2019 and potentially trigger a realignment of alliances and interests. For Türkiye, securing the backing of the HoR would represent a major diplomatic victory, further strengthening its position vis-à-vis Greece and Egypt.
The deepening energy partnership is exemplified by the MoU signed on 25 June 2025,[9] between Libya’s National Oil Corporation (NOC) and Turkish Petroleum (TPAO). This MoU provides for geological and geophysical studies of four offshore areas,[10] many of which lie in waters subject to overlapping claims and international contention. The move has provoked sharp reactions from Athens and Cairo, both of which view Türkiye’s growing influence in Libyan energy affairs as a challenge to their own strategic interests.
Türkiye’s position is that Libya’s sovereign agreement is a sufficient legal basis for the expansion of energy exploration activities. While the arrangement with the GNU has already set a precedent, Ankara now seeks to replicate the model within the GNS-HoR-LNA nexus. Such a development would not only bolster Türkiye’s energy security but also provide leverage in ongoing negotiations over maritime boundaries and resource-sharing among other littorals in the region.
The broader implications of this energy cooperation transcend the immediate Libyan context. Control over hydrocarbon resources and maritime routes is a critical factor in shaping the Eastern Mediterranean’s geopolitical order. Türkiye’s efforts to secure agreements with multiple Libyan factions demonstrate an adaptive approach aimed at maximizing its strategic flexibility, while simultaneously complicating the calculations of rival states. The outcome of the technical committee’s review and the prospects for ratification will be decisive in determining the trajectory of energy cooperation in the region.
Turkish-Greek rivalries: Maritime disputes and strategic competition
The rivalry between Türkiye and Greece in the Eastern Mediterranean is longstanding and multifaceted, encompassing disputes over maritime boundaries, airspace rights, energy resources, and political influence. While both countries have occasionally pursued détente, the underlying tensions remain acute, especially considering Türkiye’s expanded outreach to Libyan actors in Benghazi.
The June 2025 accords between the NOC and TPAO have intensified Greek concerns over Türkiye’s growing footprint in Libya. The joint Turkish-Libyan exploration efforts envisaged in these agreements directly challenge Greece’s claims to maritime jurisdiction in contested waters. Greek authorities perceive Türkiye’s actions as an effort to undermine the existing order and expand Ankara’s sphere of influence.
Greece rejects the 2019 maritime delimitation agreement between Türkiye and the GNU, which demarcates boundaries in a manner favorable to Turkish interests. In response to Türkiye’s overtures to Eastern Libyan factions—traditionally allied with Greece—Athens has recalibrated its diplomatic approach, seeking to develop new partnerships with the Tripoli government. In September 2025, Greece and Libya launched negotiations[11] to demarcate a maritime border, with the GNU’s acting Minister of Foreign Affairs, Al Taher Salem Al Baour, traveling to Athens to initiate talks.
This shift underscores the importance of Türkiye’s expanded outreach, which has had a ripple effect across all actors engaged in the Libyan power struggle. Greek urgency in pursuing new agreements reflects the growing perception that Türkiye’s strategy threatens Athens’ interests not only in Libya but also across the Mediterranean.
Türkiye’s response to Greek-led European initiatives has been to pursue bilateral arrangements with other European states involved in Libya, most notably Italy.[12] The Turkish-Italian partnership, which includes cooperation on defense industry acquisitions and migration management, provides Ankara with an alternative channel for influence and mitigates the impact of the Greek opposition. For Italy’s government, led by Giorgia Meloni, the priority is to prevent Libya from becoming a staging ground for migrant flows into Southern Europe—a concern that dovetails with Türkiye’s own interests in stability and resource access.
The trilateral summit between Erdoğan, Meloni, and Dbeibeh in Istanbul in August 2025 focused on a range of issues, from hydrocarbon cooperation to migration management, highlighting the multidimensional nature of Türkiye’s engagement. Ankara’s ability to leverage its relationships with both Eastern and Western Libyan actors provides it with a unique advantage in navigating the region’s complex power dynamics.
The enduring Turkish-Greek rivalry, therefore, must be understood not only in terms of bilateral disputes but as an integral component of a broader strategic contest over the political trajectory of the Eastern Mediterranean landscape. This rivalry also surpasses mere bilateral tensions and has a significant geopolitical component, directly lying at the center of Türkiye’s ties to the EU, the emergence of an energy alliance between Israel, Greece and the RoC, and the status of other powers—such as the Gulf countries—seeking to influence the Libyan quagmire.
Regional diplomatic dynamics
Türkiye’s recalibrated Libya policy is embedded within a wider framework of regional diplomacy that includes both bilateral and multilateral engagements with key stakeholders. The pursuit of partnerships with Italy, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), partially with Egypt, and other regional actors reflects Ankara’s recognition of the need for a broad coalition to achieve its strategic objectives.
In the case of Italy, the strategic framework guiding efforts to expand its economic and political footprint and position itself as the leading trans-Mediterranean actor aligns closely with Türkiye’s own ambition to enhance interregional connectivity across the broadly overlapping geography of the former Ottoman sphere.[13] Italy’s pursuit of strategic autonomy and its reorientation toward the Mediterraneo Allargato (Enlarged Mediterranean) have effectively produced a pivot to Africa and fostered a complementary relationship with Türkiye across the wider Mediterranean basin.[14] In this regard, Türkiye has sought to deepen cooperation across multiple fronts, recognizing Rome’s pivotal role in European migration policy and its interests in Libya’s hydrocarbon sector. The convergence of Turkish and Italian priorities was evident during the trilateral summit hosted by President Erdoğan, which addressed issues ranging from energy investments to security sector reform. Italian companies, such as ENI, are poised to benefit from expanded opportunities in Libya because of these diplomatic overtures.
Türkiye’s engagement with the UAE is equally significant. Once on the opposing sides in the Libyan conflict, Ankara and Abu Dhabi have moved toward cooperation, driven by shared interests in regional stability and economic development. The UAE’s influence on the LNA in Eastern Libya provides Türkiye with an additional channel for dialogue and cooperation, particularly in the areas of security sector reform and investment.
Beyond bilateral engagements, Türkiye has also historically participated in broader multilateral forums aimed at addressing the Libyan crisis. These include international conferences convened under the auspices of the United Nations, as well as ad hoc coalitions involving regional powers. Ankara’s participation in these initiatives underscores its commitment to shaping the outcome of Libya’s political transition and ensuring that its interests are safeguarded.
Türkiye’s ability to balance its relationships with competing actors—while advancing its own agenda—illustrates the sophistication of its diplomatic strategy. By cultivating ties with both Eastern and Western Libyan factions, as well as external stakeholders, Ankara is positioning itself as a mediator in efforts to resolve the country’s ongoing stalemate. This position could be leveraged at a larger global stage. The United States is yet to take an active interest in the Libyan Question; however, there are indications that it might do so during the Trump Presidency, particularly as President Trump will be concerned with the security of hydrocarbons and the need to shield Libya from Russian influence. These factors could propel Türkiye to the center of a novel U.S.-based engagement with Libya. The brief exchange during President Erdoğan’s recent visit to Washington between President Trump and Turkish Energy Minister Dr. Alparslan Bayraktar regarding the U.S. energy giant Chevron—set to conduct gas exploration in offshore blocks south of Crete—also sparked speculation about potential cooperation in Libyan territories.
The success of this strategy will depend on Türkiye’s capacity to maintain constructive engagement with all parties, adapt to shifting alliances, and respond effectively to the challenges posed by rival powers such as Greece and potential disruptors like Egypt. Ankara has some natural advantages, including having made inroads to a broad group of Libyan stakeholders. Moreover, Türkiye can balance its bilateral position with regional coalitions and broader global alliances. Türkiye’s ties to the Arab Gulf, position as a close ally of the United States, and broad engagement with transatlantic security are all factors that aid Ankara in this regard.
Prospects: A Libyan political settlement?
Looking ahead, several key developments will shape the trajectory of Türkiye-Libya relations and the broader Eastern Mediterranean power matrix. The most consequential question is whether the HoR and, by extension, the GNS will ratify the maritime delimitation accord signed between Ankara and Tripoli. Such ratification would not only consolidate Türkiye’s claims but also provide a diplomatic and legal foundation for expanded energy exploration and military cooperation.
If Türkiye succeeds in securing the endorsement of the HoR and GNS, it will be able to operate in the Eastern Mediterranean from a position of strength, challenging the interests of Greece and, to a lesser extent, Egypt while showcasing its military and economic capabilities. The integration of Turkish defense goods—such as unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs)—into the LNA’s arsenal would further cement Ankara’s role as Libya’s primary security partner.
Beyond economic and energy links, Türkiye may seek to replicate its existing military agreements with Tripoli in Benghazi. The establishment of a Turkish military training mission, the commissioning of defense product sales, and expanded intelligence cooperation are all plausible scenarios. Saddam Haftar’s frequent interactions with Türkiye’s security community suggest a willingness on both sides to deepen collaboration.
Such developments could pave the way for a broader regional cohort focused on stability and political integration. Türkiye’s coordination with Italy, the UAE, and other interested parties may facilitate new initiatives aimed at breaking the deadlock in Libya’s political process. In this context, Ankara’s role as a mediator and security provider would be further enhanced, enabling it to shape the contours of regional order.
However, the prospects for cooperation are not without challenges. The persistence of rivalries, the complexity of Libya’s internal divisions, and the potential for external interference all pose risks to Türkiye’s strategy. The reaction of Greece and Egypt to any expansion of Turkish influence will be critical, as will the ability of Libyan factions to sustain dialogue and avoid renewed conflict.
Ultimately, Türkiye’s outreach to the GNS-LNA-HoR nexus represents both an opportunity and a test. Success will depend on Ankara’s ability to balance competing interests, manage diplomatic tensions, and deliver tangible benefits to its Libyan partners. Other parties are not simply watching idly as Türkiye advances with its agenda in Libya. Greece is actively challenging Türkiye and now engaging the GNU, if not trying to enhance its position with the GNS. Greek positions are aided and emboldened by the European Union (especially France), which views Türkiye’s position in Libya as hostile. Egypt, on the other hand, has already formally contested the June agreement between the NOC and TPAO—and is moving to challenge Türkiye’s maneuvers.[15]
Conclusion
Türkiye’s recalibrated approach to Libya marks a significant evolution in its regional strategy, driven by the imperatives of energy security, maritime jurisdiction, and geopolitical influence. The country’s willingness to engage with both the Tripoli-based GNU and the Eastern Libyan actors—GNS, LNA, and HoR—reflects a pragmatic recognition of the need for inclusivity in pursuit of its interests. Türkiye is not shying from closely coordinating with former military adversaries and recognizes that the Eastern Libya nexus is critical to Ankara’s energy interests and goals for becoming a primary power in the Eastern Mediterranean.
Deepening energy cooperation, the pursuit of maritime agreements, and the expansion of defense and security ties underscore Türkiye’s determination to consolidate amongst the Benghazi elite. The impact of these initiatives is felt not only in bilateral relations with Libya but also in the broader strategic contest with Greece, Egypt, and other regional powers. Türkiye’s diplomatic maneuvering has prompted a series of recalibrations, shifting the stalemate into a new political equation.
Türkiye’s diplomatic strategy is characterized by adaptability, coalition-building, and a willingness to mediate between competing interests. The success of Ankara’s outreach will depend on the ability to secure ratification of key agreements, manage the balance between Eastern and Western governments, and foster stability in a volatile environment. The integration of Turkish defense capabilities into the LNA, the expansion of energy partnerships, and the cultivation of ties with European and Gulf states all contribute to Ankara’s growing influence.
Türkiye’s outreach to Libya is emblematic of a broader shift in the Eastern Mediterranean’s power matrix. By recalibrating its ties to Benghazi and diversifying its partnerships, Ankara is poised to play a leading role in shaping the future of the region. The implications for stability, cooperation, and order are profound, and the unfolding developments warrant scrutiny by all stakeholders.
[1] Can Devrim Yaylalı, “Saddam Haftar’s visit to Ankara marks shift in Turkey’s Libya policy,” Defense News, April 15, 2025, https://www.defensenews.com/global/mideast-africa/2025/04/15/saddam-haftars-visit-to-ankara-marks-shift-in-turkeys-libya-policy/.
[2] Ali Bin Musa, “In Engaging the Haftars, Türkiye Makes Pragmatic Shift in Libya,” Middle East Council on Global Affairs, May 6, 2025, https://mecouncil.org/blog_posts/in-engaging-the-haftars-turkiye-makes-pragmatic-shift-in-libya/.
[3] Khaled Mahmoud, “Saddam Haftar Begins Role as LNA Deputy with Turkish Military Talks,” Asharq Al-Awsat, August 25, 2025, https://english.aawsat.com/arab-world/5178829-saddam-haftar-begins-role-lna-deputy-turkish-military-talks.
[4] “Turkish intelligence chief meets Libya’s Haftar in Benghazi,” Daily Sabah, August 25, 2025, https://www.dailysabah.com/politics/diplomacy/turkish-intelligence-chief-meets-libyas-haftar-in-benghazi.
[5] Ferhat Polat, “Kalın–Haftar meeting: Recalibrating the Eastern Mediterranean equation,” Anadolu Agency, September 1, 2025, https://www.aa.com.tr/en/opinion/opinion-kalin-haftar-meeting-recalibrating-the-eastern-mediterranean-equation/3675358.
[6] Asiye Latife Yılmaz, “Türkiye, Italy, and Libya hold cooperation summit in Istanbul,” Anadolu Agency, August 1, 2025, https://www.aa.com.tr/en/politics/turkiye-italy-and-libya-hold-cooperation-summit-in-istanbul/3648350.
[7] Manolis Kostidis, “Turkey pressing Libya on maritime deal,” Kathimerini, August 26, 2025, https://www.ekathimerini.com/politics/foreign-policy/1278955/turkey-pressing-libya-on-maritime-deal/.
[8] “Libya’s eastern government endorses Turkey maritime deal in surprise shift,” The Arab Weekly, June 30, 2025, https://thearabweekly.com/libyas-eastern-government-endorses-turkey-maritime-deal-surprise-shift.
[9] Başak Erkalan, “Turkish, Libyan national oil companies to begin exploration at 4 sites in Libya,” Anadolu Agency, June 26, 2025, https://www.aa.com.tr/en/energy/oil/turkish-libyan-national-oil-companies-to-begin-exploration-at-4-sites-in-libya/50145.
[10] Vassilis Nedos and Manolis Kostidis, “Turkey to start exploring for gas off Libya,” Kathimerini, June 26, 2025, https://www.ekathimerini.com/economy/energy/1273526/turkey-to-start-exploring-for-gas-off-libya/.
[11] “Libya and Greece border demarcation talks risk alienating Haftar, Turkey,” The Arab Weekly, September 23, 2025, https://thearabweekly.com/libya-and-greece-border-demarcation-talks-risk-alienating-haftar-turkey.
[12] Tunç Demirtaş, “Turkey-Italy-Libya Summit: Cooperation in the Geostrategic Equation,” Politics Today, September 15, 2025, https://politicstoday.org/turkey-italy-libya-summit-cooperation-in-the-geostrategic-equation/.
[13] Michaël Tanchum, “Italy and Turkey’s Europe-to-Africa Commercial Corridor,” AIES, August 25, 2020, https://www.aies.at/publikationen/2020/fokus-20-10.php.
[14] Ibid.
[15] Abdulkader Assad, “Egypt notifies UN of rejection of Libya–Turkey offshore exploration deal,” The Libya Observer, September 27, 2025, https://libyaobserver.ly/news/egypt-notifies-un-rejection-libya-turkey-offshore-exploration-deal.
