During the Cold War, the “Space Race” between the United States (U.S.) and the Soviet Union prompted the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) to establish the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (COPUOS) in 1957 to oversee the exploration and use of space for the benefit of all humanity, promoting peace, security, and development.[1] Since then, the UN Office for Outer Space Affairs (UNOOSA) has been established to support and serve as the secretariat for COPOUS. For decades, the Committee has been instrumental in creating the foundational treaties and principles that form the basis of international space law.
However, unlike the Cold War era, the lower cost of entry and access to space infrastructure in the 21st century has enabled middle powers such as France, India, and Japan to expand their space operations in pursuit of strategic military dominance in the realm above. Consequently, the outer space treaties established during the Space Race are ill-equipped to effectively regulate the modern reality of military space programs and space-based weapons. Gone are the days when space was viewed solely as a domain for cooperation and science, with the shift now moving toward the development and testing of anti-satellite weapons (ASATs), the establishment of military space commands, and a redefinition of orbit, not just as a support platform but as a strategic environment in its own right.
What was once a fictional idea of “Space Wars” has become a lived reality, as Former Acting U.S. Defense Secretary Patrick Shanahan stated at the 35th Space Symposium in April 2019, “We’re in an era of great power competition, and the next major conflict may be won or lost in space. Space is no longer a sanctuary – it is now a warfighting domain.”[2] This global competition reflects a classic security dilemma, which in this case suggests that spacefaring states feel compelled to develop their space force to offset and counter perceived threats from peer competitors, transforming what was once a peaceful, non-warring domain into a contested arena for military objectives. This insight examines how the growing weaponization of space is eroding the foundations of existing governance frameworks, creating new security dilemmas while leaving critical civilian infrastructure vulnerable.
Escalation in Orbit: Kinetic and Non-Kinetic Counterspace Weapons
Kinetic ASAT Weapons
Kinetic ASAT weapons are designed to physically destroy satellites, typically by colliding with them. These weapons are designed to be disruptive, and the debris they produce can pose risks for years to come. One of the most widely cited examples occurred in 2007, when China destroyed one of its weather satellites using an SC-19 missile. The test took place at an altitude of approximately 865 kilometers and created over 3,000 trackable fragments, along with tens of thousands of smaller pieces.[3] The debris cloud that followed is still being monitored and continues to pose a threat to other spacecraft.[4] This action called for multiple countries, including the U.S., UK, and Japan, to condemn and protest, as China has not issued an advance warning.[5]
On a lesser scale, India’s test in March 2019 carried its own message. Under the “Mission Shakti” initiative, India successfully destroyed a satellite at an altitude of approximately 282 kilometers using a ground-based interceptor.[6] The government stated that the low orbit was chosen to ensure any debris would quickly fall back to Earth. However, NASA reported that some fragments rose above the altitude of the International Space Station (ISS).[7] These tests, although presented as demonstrations of national capability, contributed to increasing concern over space weaponization.
Non-Kinetic ASAT Weapons
On the other end of the spectrum are non-kinetic ASAT weapons. These tools do not physically destroy satellites but rather interfere with them in other ways, such as jamming communication signals, sending false data to receivers, using blind optical sensors with lasers, or breaching software systems through cyberattacks.[8] Because they often leave no trace, these techniques are more complicated to detect and even more challenging to attribute. This lack of visibility adds an extra layer of risk to already fragile space dynamics.[9]
Strategic Signalling and Case Studies
In November 2021, Russia conducted a kinetic ASAT test of its own, targeting the Kosmos-1408 satellite with a direct-ascent missile. The satellite was destroyed at an altitude of approximately 480 kilometers, resulting in more than 1,500 pieces of trackable debris.[10] In response, astronauts aboard the ISS were instructed to shelter in docked vehicles.[11] NASA and other agencies condemned the test, calling it reckless and unnecessary.[12] The debris cloud it created remained in orbit for months, continuing to pose a threat to both military and civilian systems.[13]
A few months later, space was again implicated in conflict, though this time through cyber means. On 24 February 2022, the same day Russia began its full-scale invasion of Ukraine, a targeted cyberattack disrupted the KA-SAT satellite network managed by Viasat. The attack affected satellite internet access across parts of Europe and Ukraine, including communications used by military and government agencies.[14] According to multiple investigations, the malware used in the attack was linked to Russian military intelligence.[15] Although the satellites themselves were not physically damaged, the operation showed how easily space-based infrastructure could become part of a broader military campaign.
Institutional Responses: National Space Forces and Dual-Use Challenges
The evolution of space security has not been limited to the development of weapons systems. It is also reflected in how states are organizing their militaries. In December 2019, the United States established the Space Force as a separate branch of its armed services. Its mission includes the defense of satellites, the protection of American interests in orbit, and the development of counterspace strategies.[16] Since then, the Space Force has released updated warfighting doctrine and conducted joint exercises such as Space Flag, signalling a clear shift toward treating space as an operational domain.[17]
Although no explicit official statement directly attributed the establishment of the U.S. Space Force to countering Chinese and Russian space programs, strategic analysts widely interpret its creation as a measure aimed at addressing the growing capabilities of these adversaries and narrowing the technological and operational gap in space security. China had already begun moving in this direction with the establishment of the Strategic Support Force in 2015. This (now dismantled)[18] organization integrates space, cyber, and electronic warfare into a unified operational framework, enabling more coordinated and integrated operations.[19] In the same year, Russia followed a similar logic, placing most of its military space functions under the command of its Aerospace Forces, which oversees missile defense, satellite launches, and space situational awareness.[20]
The development of kinetic and non-kinetic ASAT weapons, the formalization of military space forces, and the rise of dual-use technologies are collectively reshaping the nature of outer space. The risks are no longer speculative. They are already here—in the form of orbital debris, vulnerable infrastructure, and unclear rules of engagement. As more actors enter the field and tensions rise on Earth, the potential for miscalculation in space grows.
Space Debris and Collateral Risks for Civilian Infrastructure
The Kessler Syndrome, a theoretical scenario proposed by NASA scientist Donald Kessler, refers to a cascade effect in which collisions between objects in low Earth orbit generate increasing amounts of debris, eventually leading to a self-sustaining chain reaction. This would significantly hinder access to and use of certain orbital regions, making them too hazardous for satellites or spacecraft. Debris resulting from kinetic ASAT tests directly contributes to this risk by dramatically increasing the density of orbital fragments, thereby accelerating the onset of such a scenario.[21] This compromises the whole realm of space and satellite deployment. Debris from kinetic ASAT tests directly contributes to this scenario by significantly increasing the volume of orbital fragments.[22]
Debris clouds generated from these tests continue to roam around critical orbital paths and can lead to accidental collisions, even years after their creation. NASA and other space agencies frequently monitor debris to mitigate collision risks, but avoidance maneuvers are costly and reduce satellite operational lifespans.[23]
The presence of space debris poses a significant hazard to civilian infrastructure that relies on satellites for its operations. GPS enables precise timing for financial transactions, navigation for aviation, and emergency response systems. Disruptions to GPS alone could result in failures across various sectors. Similarly, weather forecasting satellites provide critical data for agriculture and disaster preparedness. Orbital debris poses a constant threat to these crucial services, with potential consequences extending to global economic stability and human safety.[24]
The increasing commercialization of space has further complicated the management of debris. Companies such as SpaceX’s Starlink and Amazon’s Project Kuiper are rapidly deploying extensive satellite constellations. Starlink alone operates thousands of satellites, with projections indicating tens of thousands more by 2030.[25] This exponential growth drastically increases the likelihood of accidental collisions and debris generation. The European Space Policy Institute estimates that orbital satellite density may exceed 60,000 within this decade, substantially increasing operational and collision risks.[26]
Additionally, commercial satellite constellations introduce significant ambiguity in international security. During the 2022 Ukraine conflict, Starlink became a pivotal communication asset, providing crucial communication services in a situation where traditional infrastructure was compromised, underscoring the strategic importance of civilian satellite infrastructure in warfare.[27] Such dual-use capabilities complicate international law and exacerbate the potential for targeted aggression against what seems to be civilian assets.
Space debris presents a critical issue, threatening the reliability of civilian infrastructure and sustainable access to orbit. Without urgent international regulatory intervention, the risks posed by orbital debris and the accelerated deployment of satellites could lead to catastrophic failures in global communication systems and stability for future generations.
Weaknesses in Current Global Governance
1. The Outer Space Treaty (1967)
Commonly referred to as the Outer Space Treaty (OST), the Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, sets out the fundamental principles governing activities in outer space. The treaty, officially adopted by the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) and coming into effect in 1967, bans the placement of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) in outer space, forbids military operations on celestial bodies, and establishes legally binding guidelines for the peaceful exploration and utilization of space for the benefit of all humanity.[28] Since its inception over five decades ago, the latest status report, published in January 2025 by the UNOOSA, shows that 116 states-parties have ratified the Outer Space Treaty, while 23 countries have signed it but have not yet ratified it.[29] The fear of treaty ratification could be due to a fear of national sovereignty infringement, especially with great powers, such as the U.S., which occasionally shuns international treaties to prioritize its national interests, even more so with the current Trump administration’s “America First” policy.
Regarding the issues of space weapons, the Outer Space Treaty stipulates that:[30]
Article I
“The exploration and use of outer space, including the Moon and other celestial bodies, shall be carried out for the benefit and in the interests of all countries, irrespective of their degree of economic or scientific development, and shall be the province of all mankind.”
“Outer space, including the Moon and other celestial bodies, shall be free for exploration and use by all States without discrimination of any kind, on a basis of equality and in accordance with international law, and there shall be free access to all areas of celestial bodies.”
Article IV
“States Parties to the Treaty undertake not to place in orbit around the Earth any objects carrying nuclear weapons or any other kinds of weapons of mass destruction, install such weapons on celestial bodies, or station such weapons in outer space in any other manner.”
“The Moon and other celestial bodies shall be used by all States Parties to the Treaty exclusively for peaceful purposes. The establishment of military bases, installations and fortifications, the testing of any type of weapons and the conduct of military maneuvers on celestial bodies shall be forbidden. The use of military personnel for scientific research or for any other peaceful purposes shall not be prohibited.”
However, despite Article IV’s prohibition of WMDs, it does not explicitly prohibit conventional weapons in space, which means that conventional military weapons like ASAT weapons, laser systems, and kinetic energy weapons do not fall within the specific restrictions. In addition, while the OST creates a technical binding obligation for signatory countries, it lacks enforcement authority; violations do not result in penalties or legal consequences, rendering compliance voluntary rather than compulsory.
2. Liability Convention (1972)
The Liability Convention, formally titled the Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects, was adopted by the UNGA in 1971 and subsequently entered into force in 1972.[31] While the OST established the foundation for international liability regarding damage caused by space objects, it did not develop a complete framework; that responsibility was assigned to the Liability Convention. The Convention was designed to build upon the terms of the OST, as within Article I, it broadly defines “damage” as “loss of life, personal injury or other impairment of health; or loss of or damage to property of States or of persons, natural or juridical, or property of international intergovernmental organizations.”[32]
While the Liability Convention embodies laudable goals, similar to the OST, it is ill-equipped to address the military competition in the current “Space Wars.” The absolute liability provisions of the Liability Convention could require compensation for space-based attacks against ground- or air-based targets. However, belligerents incur no liability for lawful attacks on military objectives. Furthermore, self-defense, duress, necessity, and other lawful acts may also be applicable to negate liability. However, it has been suggested that absolute liability would only suspend vis-à-vis military space activities and might remain applicable to commercial space activities.[33]
3. The Moon Agreement (1984)
The Moon Agreement, officially known as the Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, was adopted by the UNGA in 1979 and took effect in 1984. It reiterates the key points of the Outer Space Treaty concerning the Moon and other celestial bodies, stipulating that these should be used solely for peaceful purposes, their environments should remain undisturbed, and the UN should be notified about the location and purpose of any stations established there.[34] Additionally, the Agreement declares that the Moon and its natural resources are the shared heritage of humanity and calls for the creation of an international regime to oversee the exploitation of these resources once it becomes practical to do so.
Likewise, the Agreement reiterates the terms of the OST on space weaponry and military use:[35]
Article III
“The moon shall be used by all States Parties exclusively for peaceful purposes.”
“Any threat or use of force or any other hostile act or threat of hostile act on the moon is prohibited. It is likewise prohibited to use the moon in order to commit any such act or to engage in any such threat in relation to the earth, the moon, spacecraft, the personnel of spacecraft or man-made space objects.”
”State Parties shall not place in orbit around or other trajectory to or around the moon objects carrying nuclear weapons or any other kinds of weapons of mass destruction or place or use such weapons on or in the moon.”
“The establishment of military bases, installations and fortifications, the testing of any type of weapons and the conduct of military manoeuvres on the moon shall be forbidden. The use of military personnel for scientific research or for any other peaceful purposes shall not be prohibited. The use of any equipment or facility necessary for peaceful exploration and use of the moon shall also not be prohibited.”
Unlike the OST, the Moon Agreement faces adoption limitations, having been ratified by only 17 countries, none of which are major space powers, such as the United States, China, and Russia.[36] Conversely, like other treaties, it lacks clear enforcement mechanisms or penalties for violations, with the most concerning flaw being its outdated provisions, as they do not account for new arrangements proposed after the emergence of private space companies.
4. Artemis Accords
In 2020, NASA, the U.S. Department of State, and representatives from seven other space agencies signed the Artemis Accords, a document that reinforces the commitments of signatory nations to the Outer Space Treaty, the Registration Convention, and the Rescue and Return Agreement, as well as the best practices and norms for responsible civil space exploration and use.[37] Through the Accords, the U.S. has positioned itself as a major power in space governance by setting standards and using soft power to develop soft law, thereby promoting its strategic interests. As of July 2025, there are 56 signatories to the Artemis Accords, which excludes both great powers, Russia and China.[38] The absence of both great powers would indicate that tensions between these powers would increase, which could lead to further efforts to militarize and continue their efforts to weaponize. Similar to the treaties established under COPUOS, the Accords provide their own interpretation of deconfliction through detailed guidance on the establishment and operation of “safety zones” around lunar installations.[39] The necessity of conflict resolution arises because current resolution mechanisms are often ineffective or rarely utilized.
Nevertheless, while the shared consensus between these treaties, excluding the Artemis Accords, is the prohibition on the placement of weapons of mass destruction in space, these treaties overlook the placement of other types of weapons in space, creating a loophole that allows states to install weapons on their satellites without violating the ban. However, as mentioned, the exclusion of Russia and China from the Artemis Accords exacerbates tensions and distrust between these great powers, leading to greater weaponization of outer space. The difficulty of achieving a consensus was evident throughout 2024, when the United States and Japan co-drafted a UN Security Council resolution on preventing nuclear weapons in space, intending to strengthen and uphold the global non-proliferation regime, including outer space.[40] The vote in the 15-member Security Council was 13 in favor, with China abstaining and Russia vetoing the resolution, countering with their own UN resolution that called on all countries to take urgent action to prevent putting weapons in outer space “for all time.”[41] However, similarly, the Russian-drafted resolution was not adopted, as it did not obtain the required number of votes.[42] The representative of the U.S. stressed that Russia is seeking to distract global attention from its development of new satellites carrying nuclear capabilities, an allegation that Russia has denied.[43]
Conclusion
As more countries develop and expand their military presence in space, it becomes increasingly difficult to predict the future of space warfare and strategic stability. The delicate balance between national security interests and the international interests of cooperation and legal regulations will remain a very difficult problem to solve. Without reasonable limitations in the current space treaties, space will remain a highly contested battlefield on Earth whose use will increase global insecurity, cyber warfare, and large-scale disruptions to critical infrastructure. However, with the right policies and treaties, the future of outer space can be directed toward peaceful exploration and cooperation rather than military confrontation.
But is this solution practical? As highlighted throughout the study, space exploration is inherently militaristic in nature. Since the launch of SPUTNIK-1 during the Cold War, countries worldwide have increasingly relied on satellites for essential military services, including GPS, early warning missile detection systems, and reconnaissance of peer competitors; nothing remains hidden anymore. Furthermore, the proliferation and use of ASATs threaten national and international security, as testing these weapons has increased space debris, which is seen as creating an artificial security risk. Referring to Patrick Shanahan’s warning that “space is no longer a sanctuary” but a domain where future conflicts may be fought, in today’s international landscape, outer space is now a warfighting domain, and nations must agree on clear policies to help de-escalate and reduce tensions.
[1] “Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space,” United Nations Office for Outer Space Affairs (UNOOSA) n.d., https://www.unoosa.org/oosa/en/ourwork/copuos/index.html.
[2] “Contested and Congested,” Missile Defense Advocacy Alliance, October 20, 2020, https://missiledefenseadvocacy.org/alert/contested-and-congested/.
[3] T.S. Kelso, “Analysis of the 2007 Chinese ASAT Test and the Impact of its Debris on the Space Environment,” Celestrak, 2007, https://celestrak.org/publications/AMOS/2007/AMOS-2007.pdf.
[4] Anz-Meador, Phillip, John Opiela, and Jer-Chyi Liou, “History of On-orbit Satellite Fragmentations, 16th Edition,” NASA/TP-20220019160, NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS), 2022, https://ntrs.nasa.gov/citations/20220019160.
[5] Shirley Kan, “China’s Anti-Satellite Weapon Test,” CRS Report for Congress, April 23, 2007, https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/tr/pdf/ADA468025.pdf.
[6] Ashley J. Tellis, “India’s ASAT Test: An Incomplete Success.” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, April 19, 2019, https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2019/04/indias-asat-test-an-incomplete-success?lang=en.
[7] Ibid.
[8] Todd Harrison, Kaitlyn Johnson, Makena Young, and Joe Moye, “Space Threat Assessment 2021,” Center for Strategic & International Studies (CSIS), March 31, 2021, https://www.csis.org/analysis/space-threat-assessment-2021.
[9] “Space, Cyber and Defence: Navigating Interdisciplinary Challenges,” European Space Policy Institute, November 3, 2023, https://www.espi.or.at/reports/space-cyber-and-defence-navigating-interdisciplinary-challenges/.
[10] Joey Roulette, “Debris From Test of Russian Antisatellite Weapon Forces Astronauts to Shelter,” The New York Times, November 15, 2021, https://www.nytimes.com/2021/11/15/science/russia-anti-satellite-missile-test-debris.html.
[11] Jeff Foust, “Russia Destroys Satellite in ASAT Test,” SpaceNews, November 15, 2021, https://spacenews.com/russia-destroys-satellite-in-asat-test/.
[12] William Harwood, “Satellite Debris Forces Space Station Crew to Take Shelter; U.S. Blames ‘Reckless’ Russian Missile Test,” CBS News, November 15, 2021, https://www.cbsnews.com/news/satellite-debris-space-station-crew-take-shelter/.
[13] William Graham, “Russia Tests Anti-satellite Missile, Debris Disrupts International Space Station,” NASASpaceFlight, November 15, 2021, https://www.nasaspaceflight.com/2021/11/russia-anti-satellite-missile-debris/.
[14] “NASA Administrator Statement on Russian ASAT Test,” NASA, November 15, 2021, https://www.nasa.gov/news-release/nasa-administrator-statement-on-russian-asat-test/.
[15] David E. Sanger and Kate Conger, “Russia Was Behind Cyberattack in Run-Up to Ukraine War, Investigation Finds,” The New York Times, May 10, 2022. https://www.nytimes.com/2022/05/10/us/politics/russia-cyberattack-ukraine-war.html.
[16] “About the United States Space Force,” United States Space Force, n.d., https://www.spaceforce.mil/About-Us/.
[17] U.S. Space Force, Space Force Doctrine Document 1 (April 2025), https://www.starcom.spaceforce.mil/Portals/2/Space%20Force%20Doctrine%20Document%201%20FINAL_4Apr25.pdf.
[18] Matt Bruzzese and Peter W. Singer, “Farewell to China’s Strategic Support Force. Let’s Meet Its Replacements,” Defense One, April 28, 2024, https://www.defenseone.com/ideas/2024/04/farewell-chinas-strategic-support-force-lets-meet-its-replacement/396143/.
[19] Elsa B. Kania and John K. Costello, “The Strategic Support Force and the Future of Chinese Information Operations,” The Cyber Defense Review 3, no. 1 (2018): 105–22. http://www.jstor.org/stable/26427379.
[20] Challenges to Security in Space: Space Reliance in an Era of Competition and Expansion, Defense Intelligence Agency, 2022, https://www.dia.mil/Military-Power-Publications/.
[21] Todd Harrison, Kaitlyn Johnson, Makena Young, and Joe Moye, “Space Threat Assessment 2021,”
[22] Philip Anz‑Meador, John Opiela, and Jer Chyi Liou, “History of On-Orbit Satellite Fragmentations,” NASA, 2022, https://ntrs.nasa.gov/api/citations/20220019160/downloads/HOOSF_16e_all_for_STRIVES.pdf.
[23] Ibid.
[24] Space, Cyber and Defence: Navigating Interdiciplinary Challenges, ESPI, November 2023, https://www.espi.or.at/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/ESPI-Report_-Space-Cyber-and-Defence-Navigating-Interdisciplinary-Challenges.pdf.
[25] Defense Intelligence Agency, “Challenges to Security in Space – 2022,” https://www.dia.mil/Portals/110/Documents/News/Military_Power_Publications/Challenges_Security_Space_2022.pdf
[26] Space, Cyber and Defence: Navigating Interdiciplinary Challenges.
[27] David E. Sanger and Kate Conger, “Russia Was Behind Cyberattack in Run-Up to Ukraine War, Investigation Finds.”
[28] “Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies,” United Nations Office for Outer Space Affairs, n.d., https://www.unoosa.org/oosa/en/ourwork/spacelaw/treaties/introouterspacetreaty.html.
[29] “Status of International Agreements relating to Activities in Outer Space,” United Nations Office for Outer Space Affairs, n.d., https://www.unoosa.org/oosa/en/ourwork/spacelaw/treaties/status/index.html.
[30] “Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies.”
[31] “Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects,” United Nations Office for Outer Space Affairs, n.d., https://www.unoosa.org/oosa/en/ourwork/spacelaw/treaties/introliability-convention.html.
[32] Ibid.
[33] Sa’id Mosteshar, “Space Law and Weapons in Space,” Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Planetary Science, May, 2019, https://doi.org/10.1093/acrefore/9780190647926.013.74.
[34] “Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies.” United Nations Office for Outer Space Affairs, n.d. https://www.unoosa.org/oosa/en/ourwork/spacelaw/treaties/intromoon-agreement.html.
[35] Ibid.
[36] “Status of International Agreements relating to Activities in Outer Space.”
[37] “Artemis Accords,” n.d., NASA, https://www.nasa.gov/artemis-accords/.
[38] Ibid.
[39] Ibid.
[40] “Press Release: U.S. and Japan-Drafted UN Security Council Resolution on Preventing Nuclear Weapons in Space Receives More Than 60 Cosponsors,” United States Mission to the United Nations, April 24, 2024, https://usun.usmission.gov/press-release-u-s-and-japan-drafted-un-security-council-resolution-on-preventing-nuclear-weapons-in-space-receives-more-than-60-cosponsors/.
[41] Edith M. Lederer, “Russia Proposes UN Resolution on Banning Weapons in Space, After Vetoing Similar UN-Japan Draft,” AP News, May 2, 2024, https://apnews.com/article/nuclear-arms-space-un-russia-us-japan-561ab8ae569afd7ee79789588ca34033.
[42] “For Second Time Since Late April Security Council Fails to Adopt First-Ever Resolution on Preventing Arms Race in Outer Space,” United Nations, May 20, 2024, https://press.un.org/en/2024/sc15700.doc.htm.
[43] Michelle Nicholas, “Russia, US clash at UN over nuclear weapons in space,” Reuters, April 25, 2024, https://www.reuters.com/science/russia-blocks-us-move-un-nuclear-weapons-space-2024-04-24/.
