On 8 August 2025, the White House hosted a critical meeting for the South Caucasus. At the invitation of U.S. President Donald Trump, Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev and Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan traveled to Washington, where together with Trump they signed the seven-article Washington Declaration.[1]
The Washington Declaration is seen as an important step toward ending the conflict between Azerbaijan and Armenia that has lasted for more than three decades. The declaration includes provisions such as the initialing of the 17-article peace treaty text completed in March, a joint decision by Azerbaijan and Armenia to apply for the dissolution of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) Minsk Group, and the opening of the “Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity” (TRIPP) transit corridor, which will connect Azerbaijan with its exclave Nakhchivan through Armenian territory.
Both leaders thanked U.S. President Donald Trump for his support in establishing peace in the South Caucasus and stated that they could jointly nominate President Trump to be awarded the Nobel Peace Prize.[2]
Before the trilateral meeting, President Trump held separate 30-minute one-on-one meetings with each leader. During these talks, Aliyev and Trump signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) that envisions the establishment of a Strategic Working Group to prepare a Strategic Partnership Charter. This document is regarded as an important step toward institutionalizing the deepening relations between the two countries.[3]
In addition, President Trump announced the suspension of Section 907 of the 1992 Freedom Support Act, which had blocked Azerbaijan from receiving direct U.S. assistance.[4] The law, adopted with the support of the influential Armenian lobby of the time, had made Azerbaijan the only post-Soviet country ineligible for direct American aid.
On 11 August, following the Washington Summit, Armenia and Azerbaijan released to the public the text of the peace agreement they had initialed.[5]
Over 30 Years of Peace Efforts Between Armenia and Azerbaijan
The conflict between Azerbaijan and Armenia, known as the “Nagorno-Karabakh Issue”, began in the late 1980s with demands for the unification of Azerbaijan’s Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Region (NKAO), which had an ethnic Armenian majority, with Armenia.
In the early 1990s, protests in Armenia and Karabakh quickly escalated into large-scale armed conflict. The Armenian armed forces occupied not only the former Nagorno-Karabakh but also seven surrounding regions, mostly inhabited by Azerbaijanis. More than 30,000 people lost their lives during the war, which lasted over four years, and over one million were displaced from their homes.[6]
In 1994, a ceasefire agreement was signed in Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan, through Russian mediation.[7] According to the agreement, Armenian forces were supposed to withdraw from the occupied territories; however, this did not happen until 2020. The Azerbaijani cities under occupation were largely destroyed, and their infrastructure was devastated.
For three decades, the sides tried to resolve the conflict through the OSCE Minsk Group, co-chaired by the United States, Russia, and France. However, the group’s proposals, most notably the Madrid Principles, were rejected by political circles in Armenia, the de facto authorities in Karabakh, and the Armenian diaspora.[8]
In September 2020, the Second Karabakh War erupted between Azerbaijan and Armenia, lasting 44 days and resulting in Azerbaijan liberating most of its previously occupied territories.
The conflict ended with a trilateral statement signed on 9 November 2020, between Russian President Vladimir Putin, Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev and Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan. Under the terms of the statement, Armenia committed to returning the remaining occupied territories to Azerbaijan within specified timelines. Russian peacekeeping forces were deployed to the region for a period of five years with the consent of both parties, and they were given control of the 5 km-wide Lachin Corridor, which connected Armenia and Karabakh. Additionally, Armenia agreed to the opening of the route linking Azerbaijan to its exclave Nakhchivan, which would be controlled by the Russian Federal Security Service.[9] This route, later named the “Zangezur Corridor” by Azerbaijan, would become a significant topic of geopolitical discussion not only between Baku and Yerevan but also among regional and global powers.
In March 2022, Azerbaijan proposed signing a peace agreement with Armenia based on five basic principles. These principles envisaged mutual recognition of their territorial integrity.[10] This approach implied that Armenia would formally recognize Karabakh as part of Azerbaijan. However, Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan’s statement that “expectations regarding Karabakh’s status need to be lowered” sparked opposition within the country and led to protests. Pashinyan’s remarks were negatively received not only by opposition groups in Armenia but also by the separatist regime in Karabakh.[11] However, these demonstrations, which initially drew 10,000-15,000 participants, quickly lost momentum and failed.
In October of the same year, a critical development occurred in the peace process between Azerbaijan and Armenia. At the European Political Community summit in Prague, the parties met under the mediation of European Council President Charles Michel and French President Emmanuel Macron. During this meeting, the leaders of Azerbaijan and Armenia reaffirmed their commitment to the United Nations Charter and the 1991 Alma-Ata Declaration, recognizing each other’s sovereignty and territorial integrity.[12]
Within the framework of the agreement reached in Prague, an EU civilian mission (EUMCAP) of 40 people was deployed to the Armenia-Azerbaijan border for two months. At the time, Azerbaijan did not oppose the temporary mission, as the prospect of a peace agreement between Baku and Yerevan through EU mediation seemed realistic. However, it rejected the deployment of the mission on its own side of the border. Later, the initially limited mission was expanded into a two-year civilian Monitoring Mission—EUMA, and in January 2025, it was decided that the mission would remain in Armenia until 2027.
Azerbaijan has frequently expressed discomfort with the presence of the EU Monitoring Mission. According to Baku, some European countries acting under the EU Mission have pursued their own strategic agendas in Armenia.[13] In December 2024, Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev criticized the EU Mission, claiming that it served as a cover for establishing NATO infrastructure along the Armenia-Azerbaijan border.
According to the draft peace agreement initialed in Washington, a third country’s forces should not be deployed along the common borders of Azerbaijan and Armenia. As it stands, this would mean changing the mandate of the EU mission currently stationed at the Armenian border until 2027. The Armenian authorities argue that, if a peace agreement is signed, there would no longer be a need for a European mission.
The drafting of the peace agreement was finalized in March 2025. Azerbaijan maintains that the anti-terror operation carried out in Karabakh in September 2023 contributed to moving the negotiations forward. Following this operation, the separatist regime in Karabakh dissolved itself, and Azerbaijan announced an integration plan for the Armenian population in the region.[14] However, within a short period, around 105,000 ethnic Armenians migrated to Armenia. Following a mutual agreement between the leaders of Azerbaijan and Russia, Russian peacekeeping forces withdrew from the area, marking the first time in Azerbaijan’s history that no foreign forces were present within its borders.[15]
The completed draft peace agreement does not include any provisions for the return of Armenians to Karabakh. Azerbaijan evaluates this issue based on the “principle of reciprocity” and argues that Azerbaijanis who were forced to leave Armenia in the late 1980s should also have the right to return to Armenia. Despite criticism from the diaspora and opposition, the Armenian government maintains that under the current circumstances, the return of Karabakh Armenians is both unrealistic and potentially dangerous. Prime Minister Pashinyan stated that bilateral negotiations on this issue would not serve the interests of the displaced population but would rather create a new source of tension between Armenia and Azerbaijan, adding that Karabakh Armenians must settle in Armenia and live there as full citizens.[16]
Although numerous issues between Azerbaijan and Armenia have remained unresolved since 2020, the two sides have succeeded in reaching a consensus on certain matters. Within this framework, the border delimitation commission, co-chaired by Azerbaijani Deputy Prime Minister Shahin Mustafayev and Armenian Deputy Prime Minister Mher Grigoryan, conducted border delimitation and demarcation work last year, successfully finalizing a 12-kilometer section of the Armenian-Azerbaijani border.[17]
As a result, four villages in the Gazakh region, which had been under Armenian control since the 1990s, were returned to Azerbaijan through negotiation. The agreement was subsequently ratified by the parliaments of both countries, giving it official status.
In July of this year, prior to the Washington meeting, the leaders of Azerbaijan and Armenia held a historic direct dialogue in Abu Dhabi, United Arab Emirates (UAE), without the involvement of mediators. Many political analysts believe that this encounter significantly contributed to the success of the subsequent Washington talks. For the first time, the parties met in the UAE, a neutral country with good relations on both sides, where they discussed a wide range of issues aimed at normalizing relations.[18]
Obstacles to the Peace Agreement
Although the initialing of the peace agreement text by Azerbaijan and Armenia in Washington is a historic step for both countries, it does not mean that the peace agreement has been signed. One of the conditions put forward by Azerbaijan for signing the peace agreement is the amendment of Armenia’s constitution.[19] The issue lies in the preamble of the Armenian constitution adopted in 1995, which refers to Armenia’s Declaration of Independence.[20]
The Declaration of Independence of the Republic of Armenia, which officially proclaimed Armenia’s independence from the USSR, was adopted on 23 August 1990, at the first session of the Supreme Council of Armenia. At the beginning of the 12-point declaration, the legal basis of independent Armenia was set, based on the joint decision made on 1 December 1989, by the Supreme Soviet of the Armenian SSR and the Executive Committee of Nagorno-Karabakh to “reunification of the Armenian SSR with the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Region”. Baku sees this as Armenia’s territorial claims against Azerbaijan.
Even though Armenia has changed its constitution several times, the part of the Declaration of Independence that talks about joining Karabakh to Armenia has remained. In 1998, the Central Election Commission of Armenia used this constitutional article as a reason to approve the candidacy of Robert Kocharyan, who became Armenia’s second president. The Armenian Constitution says that to run for president, a person must be a citizen of Armenia and must have lived in the country for the last ten years. Kocharyan, who was born in Karabakh, only moved to Armenia in 1997, so he did not meet either rule. Still, in Armenia, changing the constitution is not as simple as it seems.
According to the Constitution of Armenia, in order for amendments to be adopted, at least 25 percent of registered voters (as of 2021, the number of registered voters was 2.6 million) and more than 50 percent of those participating in the referendum must vote in favor. This means that at least 650,000 Armenian citizens must say “Yes” to a constitutional amendment.
Some political commentators argue that the constitutional changes adopted during the presidencies of Robert Kocharyan and Serzh Sargsyan were approved through various irregularities. For this reason, it is said that public trust in the current constitution is low.[21]
Although Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan does not admit that his country’s constitution contains territorial claims against Azerbaijan, he has begun work on drafting a new constitution. Armenian Minister of Justice Srbuhi Galyan stated that the draft text of the new constitution should be completed before the 2026 parliamentary elections.
According to the Azerbaijani side, in order for a lasting peace agreement to be signed, Armenia must do its homework, and the Armenian people must give up territorial claims against Azerbaijan.[22]
Azerbaijan has made the dissolution of the OSCE Minsk Group another key condition. In Washington, Azerbaijani Foreign Minister Jeyhun Bayramov and Armenian Foreign Minister Ararat Mirzoyan submitted a joint request to disband the group. Finland, which currently holds the OSCE chairmanship, responded by launching the procedural steps. On September 1, 2025, the OSCE Ministerial Council formally decided to close the Minsk Process along with its related structures. The OSCE Secretariat has been tasked with completing the administrative and technical arrangements for the closure by December 1, 2025.[23]
The Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity (TRIPP)
The most notable point of the Washington agreement was the establishment of a transport corridor between the Nakhchivan Autonomous Republic and mainland Azerbaijan through Armenia. The text emphasized that communication channels between the two countries would be opened on the basis of respect for state sovereignty, territorial integrity, and jurisdiction. The parties agreed on the provision ensuring this connection would be unobstructed, while also allowing Armenia to gain mutual benefits in both international and domestic transportation.
According to the decision, the corridor will be called the “Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity” (TRIPP). A senior official speaking to the Associated Press from the White House stated that the naming of the route in this way was proposed by Armenia.[24] For this project, Armenia will prepare a framework plan together with the United States and a third country to be mutually agreed upon by the parties.
At the trilateral summit, U.S. President Donald Trump announced that Armenia and the United States are establishing an exclusive partnership to develop the corridor, with the possibility of extending it for up to 99 years. Azerbaijan plans to complete the construction of railway lines in the territories it has liberated from occupation along the route by the end of this year; it has also begun work on improving the railway infrastructure in Nakhchivan.
The route that Azerbaijan calls the “Zangezur Corridor”, and which is nowadays referred to as the “Trump Route”, has become one of the main points of contention between the parties since 2020. Azerbaijan has repeatedly declared that if this corridor is not opened, other communication barriers with Armenia will also not be lifted.[25]
Although Armenia interprets Baku’s demands as territorial claims, Azerbaijan has consistently rejected these accusations. Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan emphasized that the statement signed by the leaders of Azerbaijan, Russia, and Armenia on 9 November 2020 mentioned only the Lachin Corridor.[26]
On 18 February 2023, at the Munich Security Conference, President Ilham Aliyev met with Prime Minister Pashinyan and U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken in a trilateral meeting. During the talks, Aliyev proposed the establishment of checkpoints not only at the entry and exit points of the Lachin Corridor but also along the route connecting Azerbaijan to Nakhchivan via Armenia. Aliyev stated that this was an official security measure and that it had been found acceptable by the United States and the European Union.[27]
However, the Armenian side rejected the proposal, opposing the transfer of the Lachin Corridor to Azerbaijani control. Within a month, Azerbaijan established a border control post at the entrance of the Lachin Corridor, thereby taking control of the route.[28]
Following Russia’s war in Ukraine, the route also turned into a geopolitical fault line between the West and Moscow. The importance of the Middle Corridor, which connects China and Central Asia to Europe through the South Caucasus, has grown. Western countries, aiming to reduce Central Asian states’ dependence on Russia and China, supported the development of this alternative route and the creation of new ones, especially the Zangezur route.[29] Although the clause on the opening of communication lines was included in the draft peace agreement between Azerbaijan and Armenia, the parties mutually agreed to remove this provision from the text in August 2024.[30]
The corridor in question also holds strategic importance for Türkiye, Armenia’s western neighbor. Through this route, Türkiye would gain the shortest overland connection to Central Asia. With the launch of peace talks between Azerbaijan and Armenia, steps were also taken toward normalizing relations between Türkiye and Armenia. For this purpose, the two countries appointed special envoys. However, no progress was achieved regarding the reopening of the Armenia-Türkiye border crossing, which was closed in 1993 due to the occupation of Azerbaijani territories.
Armenia also seems satisfied with the agreement between Azerbaijan and the United States. For Armenia, whose economy is heavily dependent on Russia and which is a member of the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU), the opening of borders and the normalization of relations with Türkiye and Azerbaijan are of critical importance, both for economic diversification and for reducing dependency.
During the Soviet period, there was a railway line running south from Armenia’s capital, Yerevan, to Kapan and Meghri. This line was not a continuous passenger route but rather part of the Transcaucasian Railways system. Trains departed from Yerevan, entered Azerbaijan’s exclave Nakhchivan through the Armenian village of Yeraskh, and then reentered southern Armenia, proceeding toward Kapan and Meghri. The Nakhchivan line was also connected to Iran’s Julfa station, making it usable both for domestic routes and foreign trade.
Building a direct railway from Yerevan to the Syunik region entirely through Armenian territory was not feasible during the Soviet era due to geographical challenges. With the outbreak of conflict in the 1990s, this line, like other railway connections between Azerbaijan and Armenia, was deactivated. Now, thanks to the agreement reached, it is indicated that Armenia may once again be able to use this route.
Prime Minister Pashinyan stated that the agreement would end Armenia’s blockade, while Azerbaijan, in return, would gain the opportunity to establish a secure connection to the Nakhchivan Autonomous Republic through Armenian territory. He emphasized that the project promises substantial investments, financial benefits, economic growth, and an elevated regional role for Armenia. As a result of the implementation of this program, international railways, highways, pipelines, and energy transmission lines will pass through Armenian territory.[31]
Reactions to the Washington Declaration
The Washington Declaration received positive reactions from many countries around the world. However, Russia and Iran appear dissatisfied with the agreement.
Russia welcomed the initialing of the peace agreement text by the parties but criticized the role of American companies in the route that would connect Azerbaijan to Nakhchivan. Maria Zakharova, spokesperson for the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, reminded that the tripartite agreements, in which Russia is still a participant, remain valid and that none of the parties have withdrawn from these agreements.
Zakharova also emphasized the importance of considering Armenia’s membership in the EAEU common customs area.[32] All goods passing through the territory of EAEU member Armenia must comply with the EAEU’s customs regulations. This means that Armenia cannot unilaterally set external customs tariffs and must adhere to EAEU policies.
Another important issue concerns the route’s path, particularly along the Armenia-Iran border, where Russian border guards have been present since 1992. Since January 2025, Armenian border guards have only deployed their own personnel at the Agarak border crossing. However, no plan has yet been announced for the complete withdrawal of Russian border guards. Prime Minister Pashinyan stated that Armenia aims to “gradually increase the number of its border guards.”[33]
Some senior Iranian officials expressed stronger reactions to the trilateral agreement in Washington. Ali Akbar Velayati, senior advisor to Iran’s Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, emphasized that the South Caucasus is not a region that Trump can lease.[34] General Sardar Javani, deputy political head of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, claimed that Trump deceived Aliyev and Pashinyan, saying that the two leaders made a bigger mistake than even Ukrainian President Zelensky. Javani stated, “Ignoring the realities of the Caucasus and the interests of other countries in the region, they, under the influence of promises from the U.S., the Zionist regime, and a number of European countries, took an adventurous step for their countries”.[35]
Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi and President Masoud Pezeshkian adopted a more cautious approach. Araghchi noted during a phone call with Armenian Foreign Minister Ararat Mirzoyan and during the visit of Deputy Foreign Minister Vahan Kostanyan to Tehran that Iran’s interests were being safeguarded. Araghchi emphasized that the project involves only a private American engineering company, not a security or military firm, and stated that Armenia would not allow American private security companies into the country.[36]
Analysts suggest that the two different reactions in Iran toward the Washington Declaration stem from internal political disagreements and a desire to satisfy public opinion. Alen Shadunts, an Iranologist, notes, “If the Iranian side accepts that the Americans are reporting in its north, signed in Washington, that new dangers are emerging for the country, it means that they themselves have failed in the South Caucasus.”[37]
President Aliyev and Prime Minister Pashinyan, in interviews with Fox News, stated that the project is not directed against any third country. Pashinyan added that the project would allow Armenia to establish a railway connection with Russia via the territory of Azerbaijan, while Iran would gain access to the Black Sea via Armenian territory.[38]
Relations with Iran are crucial for Armenia, whose borders with two of its four neighbors are closed. Despite religious differences, the two countries have maintained long-standing good neighborly relations. According to a poll conducted in July 2025 by the Washington-based International Republican Institute (IRI), Armenians rank Iran first among their country’s leading allies. The survey found that 53% of participants consider Iran to be Armenia’s most important “political partner.”[39]
During the visit of Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian to Armenia on 18 August 2025, numerous agreements were signed between Armenia and Iran to elevate bilateral relations.[40] Pashinyan expressed Armenia’s willingness to establish a strategic partnership with Iran. However, Iran remains cautious about American companies operating on the northern border. Pezeshkian stated that handing over regional routes to external powers would further complicate the situation in the region.[41]
Conclusion
Although a formal peace agreement has not yet been signed between Azerbaijan and Armenia, the fact that it was initialed in the presence of the U.S. President has brought the parties closer to peace than ever before. The signing of a trilateral declaration with the U.S. President also serves as a confirmation that the parties will approach the agreements reached with greater responsibility. In this way, Azerbaijan and Armenia once again publicly declared, in front of the world, their respect for each other’s territorial integrity and their readiness to cooperate and normalize relations.
The South Caucasus is a strategic crossroads connecting Europe and Asia. The Russia-Ukraine war, changes in the global balance of power, and the formation of new partnerships have increased the importance of this region, and consequently, of Azerbaijan, Armenia, and Georgia. Ensuring stability and peace in the South Caucasus is crucial for the security of Europe’s energy routes and the uninterrupted continuation of East-West trade.
For the implementation of the agreements and the realization of related projects, Azerbaijan and Armenia need to reduce risks in their relations with Russia and Iran. Simultaneous public disclosure of the peace agreement text by both countries, along with constructive statements, is critically important for long-conflicted populations to understand that the “chapter of conflict is closing”.
Amendments to Armenia’s constitution are necessary for the signing of the peace agreement. However, during this process, the parties can take important steps such as defining borders, establishing trust mechanisms, and implementing projects that allow local populations in border areas to benefit from the advantages of normalization.
Accelerating normalization efforts with Armenia will also facilitate investment in Azerbaijan’s liberated territories. Peace between Azerbaijan and Armenia will strengthen cooperation among South Caucasus countries, reduce economic dependence on external actors, and support a more independent political stance.
[1] President.az, “Joint Declaration signed on meeting between President of Azerbaijan and Prime Minister of Armenia held in Washington,” August 9, 2025, https://president.az/en/articles/view/69572. (Accessed: August 10, 2025)
[2] “President Ilham Aliyev proposes joint appeal with Nikol Pashinyan to Nobel Committee for Donald Trump’s nomination,” Azertag, August 9, 2025, https://azertag.az/en/xeber/president_ilham_aliyev_proposes_joint_appeal_with_nikol_pashinyan_to_nobel_committee_for_donald_trumps_nomination-3692991. (Accessed: August 9, 2025)
[3] “Azerbaijan and the US to sign a MoU to develop their strategic partnership,” APA, https://en.apa.az/foreign-policy/azerbaijan-and-the-us-to-sign-a-mou-to-develop-their-strategic-partnership-exclusive-474536. (Accessed: August 9, 2025)
[4] “Trump officially suspended the application of Section 907,” aze.media, August 15, 2025, https://aze.media/trump-officially-suspended-the-application-of-section-907/. (Accessed: August 15, 2025)
[5] Republic of Azerbaijan Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Press release on initialed text of the Agreement on Establishment of Peace and Inter-State relations between the Republic of Azerbaijan and the Republic of Armenia and the Joint Appeal by Foreign Ministers to the OSCE Chairperson-in-Office on the closure of OSCE’s Minsk Process and related structures,” August 11, 2025, https://www.mfa.gov.az/en/news/no33725. (Accessed: August 19, 2025)
[6] Thomas de Waal, Black Garden: Armenia and Azerbaijan Through Peace and War (New York and London: New York University Press, 2003), Available at: https://library.asue.am/open/1876.pdf. (Accessed: August 20, 2025)
[7] “Armenia, Azerbaijan Agree to a Cease-Fire: Caucasus: Moscow brokers truce in former Soviet Union’s longest-running conflict. But fighting continues.,” Los Angeles Times, May 17, 2994, https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-1994-05-17-mn-58811-story.html. (Accessed: August 1, 2025)
[8] “NKR Prime Minister: Madrid Principles Unacceptable to Karabakh Armenians,” MassisPost, July 28, 2014, https://massispost.com/2014/07/nkr-prime-minister-madrid-principles-unacceptable-to-karabakh-armenians/. (Accessed: August 1, 2025)
[9] President of Russia, “Statement by President of the Republic of Azerbaijan, Prime Minister of the Republic of Armenia and President of the Russian Federation,” November 10, 2020, Available at: http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/64384. (Accessed: August 1, 2025)
[10] “Azerbaijan discloses 5 basic principles for normalizing relations with Armenia,” Report, March 14, 2022, https://report.az/en/foreign-politics/azerbaijan-discloses-5-basic-principles-for-normalizing-relations-with-armenia/. (Accessed: August 1, 2025)
[11] “What Pashinyan means by ‘lowering bar’ on Nagorno-Karabakh status?,” NEWS.am, April 14, 2022, https://news.am/eng/news/696691.html. (Accessed: August 1, 2025)
[12] European Council, “Statement following quadrilateral meeting between President Aliyev, Prime Minister Pashinyan, President Macron and President Michel, 6 October 2022,” October 7, 2022, Available at: https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2022/10/07/statement-following-quadrilateral-meeting-between-president-aliyev-prime-minister-pashinyan-president-macron-and-president-michel-6-october-2022/. (Accessed: August 1, 2025)
[13] Onnik James Krikorian, “Azerbaijan Seeks End to EU Mission in Armenia as Pashinyan Offers Border Compromise,” Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume 22 Issue 4, Available at: https://jamestown.org/program/azerbaijan-seeks-end-to-eu-mission-in-armenia-as-pashinyan-offers-border-compromise/. (Accessed: August 2, 2025)
[14] Anadolu Agency, “Azerbaijan unveils reintegration plan for Armenians in Karabakh,” Available at: https://www.aa.com.tr/en/asia-pacific/azerbaijan-unveils-reintegration-plan-for-armenians-in-karabakh/3006166. (Accessed: August 20, 2025)
[15] “Russian peacekeepers start withdrawing from Azerbaijan’s Karabakh region,” Reuters, https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/russian-peacekeepers-have-begun-withdrawing-azerbaijans-karabakh-says-kremlin-2024-04-17/ (Accessed: August 2, 2025)
[16] “Pashinyan says Karabakh issue closed as Armenia and Azerbaijan ‘make peace’,” Civilnet, August 19, 2025, https://www.civilnet.am/en/news/969527/pashinyan-says-karabakh-issue-closed-as-armenia-and-azerbaijan-make-peace/. (Accessed: August 2, 2025)
[17] Konul Shahin, “Armenia-Azerbaijan Border Delimitation: Ensuring Regional Security, Stability, and Development,” Institute for Development and Diplomacy, May 22, 2024, Available at: https://idd.az/media/2024/05/22/idd_policy_brief_-_22_may_-_konul_shahin.pdf?v=1.1. (Accessed: August 3, 2025)
[18] Vasif Huseynov, “Armenia-Azerbaijan Peace Process Gains Momentum with Abu Dhabi Summit,” Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume 22 Issue: 105, July 17, 2025, Available at: https://jamestown.org/program/armenia-azerbaijan-peace-process-gains-momentum-with-abu-dhabi-summit/. (Accessed: August 5, 2025)
[19] “President Ilham Aliyev: International legal norms must be the guarantee of trust between Azerbaijan and Armenia,” Azertag, July 19, 2025, https://azertag.az/en/xeber/president_ilham_aliyev_international_legal_norms_must_be_the_guarantee_of_trust_between_azerbaijan_and_armenia-3666023. (Accessed: August 5, 2025)
[20] “Declaration on Independence of Armenia,” CIS Legislation, Available at: https://cis-legislation.com/document.fwx?rgn=2902. (Accessed: August 20, 2025)
[21] Onnik James Krikorian, “Constitutional Delay in Armenia Threatens to Derail Peace Talks With Azerbaijan,” Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 21 Issue: 96, Available at: https://jamestown.org/program/constitutional-delay-in-armenia-threatens-to-derail-peace-talks-with-azerbaijan/. (Accessed: August 7, 2025)
[22] “We want peace with the Armenian people,” Berliner Zeitung, July 26, 2025, https://epaper.berliner-zeitung.de/article/59d1ac18173ef9571e78e09705e284bdab6d69b71ee26d202d405fa75b9c74bd. (Accessed: August 10, 2025)
[23] OSCE Ministerial Council decision marks new step towards sustainable peace in the South Caucasus, Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, September 1, 2025, https://www.osce.org/chairpersonship/596899 . ( Accessed: September 8, 2025 )
[24] “Leaders of Armenia and Azerbaijan shake hands and sign deal at White House peace summit,” Associated Press, August 9, 2025, https://apnews.com/article/donald-trump-white-house-armenia-azerbaijan-069379e9c4a058c96af38afbf4684829. (Accessed: August 19, 2025)
[25] “President Ilham Aliyev: If Armenia continues to block the Zangezur corridor, its chances of becoming a transit country will drop to zero,” Azertag, July 19, 2025, Available at: https://azertag.az/en/xeber/president_ilham_aliyev_if_armenia_continues_to_block_the_zangezur_corridor_its_chances_of_becoming_a_transit_country_will_drop_to_zero-3665367#:~:text=%E2%80%9CIf%20Armenia%20continues%20to%20block%20the%20process,at%20the%203rd%20Shusha%20Global%20Media%20Forum. (Accessed: August 19, 2025)
[26] “The November 9 document only mentions one corridor, and that is the Lachin corridor. Pashinyan to Aliyev,” Armenpress, May 25, 2023, https://armenpress.am/en/article/1111812. (Accessed: August 19, 2025)
[27] President.az, “Ilham Aliyev was interviewed by TV channels in Munich,” February 18, 2023, Available at: https://president.az/en/articles/view/58995. (Accessed: August 19, 2025)
[28] “Azerbaijan says it established border control point at starting point of Lachin-Khankendi road,” Anadolu Agency, April 23, 2023, https://www.aa.com.tr/en/world/azerbaijan-says-it-established-border-control-point-at-starting-point-of-lachin-khankendi-road/2879312. (Accessed: August 19, 2025)
[29] “James O’Brien: US is considering possibility of trade route bypassing Russia, China via Armenia,” Azerbaijan, Newsam, July 31, 2024. https://news.am/eng/news/836424.html. (Accessed: August 20, 2025)
[30] “Azerbaijan, Armenia Temporarily Remove Zangezur Corridor Issue from Peace Deal, Facilitating Progress in Peace Talks,” Caspian News, August 9, 2024, https://caspiannews.com/news-detail/azerbaijan-armenia-temporarily-remove-zangezur-corridor-issue-from-peace-deal-facilitating-progress-in-peace-talks-2024-8-8-0/ . (Accessed: August 19, 2025)
[31] First Channel News, Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan stated that the agreement would end Armenia’s blockade, while Azerbaijan, in return, would gain the opportunity to establish a secure connection to the Nakhchivan Autonomous Republic through Armenian territory, Available at: https://www.1lurer.am/en/2025/08/18/How-and-under-what-arrangements-will-communication-routes-be-opened-between-Armenia-and-Azerbaijan/1364813 (Accessed: August 20, 2025)
[32] The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, “Commentary by the official representative of the Russian MFA M.V. Zakharova in connection with the negotiations of the leaders of Azerbaijan and Armenia in Washington (USA),” August 9, 2025, https://mid.ru/ru/foreign_policy/news/2040852/ (Accessed: August 20, 2025)
[33] “Russian Border Guards Leave Armenia-Iran Checkpoint,” Azatutyun, December 30, 2024, https://www.azatutyun.am/a/33258387.html (Accessed: August 20, 2025)
[34] “Velayeti: Iran will block the American corridor with or without Russia,” Tasnim News Agency, https://www.tasnimnews.com/tr/news/2025/08/09/3372581/velayeti-iran-rusya-ile-ya-da-rusya-olmadan-amerikan-koridorunu-engelleyecek (Accessed: August 20, 2025)
[35] “General Javani: Pashinyan and Aliyev repeat Zelensky’s fatal mistake,” Reopen media, August 10, 2025, https://reopen.media/en-gb/articles/general-javani-pashinyan-aliyev-zelensky-mistake. (Accessed: August 20, 2025)
[36] Haykakan Zhamanak, “The road is under the sovereignty of Armenia, it was important for us that sovereignty not be violated. Araghchi,” Armtimes, August 15, 2025, https://armtimes.com/hy/article/320099. (Accessed: August 20, 2025)
[37] “Iranian President arrives in Armenia,” Azatutyun, August 18, 2025, https://www.azatutyun.am/a/irani-nakhagahn-ays%D6%85r-kzhamani-hayastan/33506280.html (Accessed: August 20, 2025)
[38] “Armenia and Azerbaijan leaders seek to ease Russian and Iranian concerns after US-brokered peace deal,” Fox News, August 14, 2025, https://www.foxnews.com/politics/armenia-azerbaijan-leaders-seek-ease-russian-iranian-concerns-after-u-s-brokered-peace-deal (Accessed: August 20, 2025)
[39] “Iran Rated Armenia’s Top ‘Partner’,” Azatutyun, July 22, 2025, https://www.azatutyun.am/a/33481093.html (Accessed: August 20, 2025)
[40] “Armenia, Iran sign cooperation agreements in multiple areas,” Armenpress, August 19, 2025, https://armenpress.am/en/article/1227549. (Accessed: August 20, 2025)
[41] “Iran Repeats Concerns Over U.S.-Armenia Corridor Deal,” Azatutyun, August 19, 2025, https://www.azatutyun.am/a/33507463.html. (Accessed: August 20, 2025)
