The Development Road project has landed at the apex of the executive agenda in Türkiye. Recently, President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan met with Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammed Shia Al Sudani[1] on the sidelines of the United Nations (UN) General Assembly in New York City. Erdoğan once again reiterated the significance of the project for Türkiye, Iraq and the region. This was preceded by a four-way ministerial summit between Türkiye, Iraq, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) in August 2024.

Development Road in essence presented itself as a geopolitical opportunity for Türkiye amidst growing regional conflicts. The war in Gaza, tensions in the Red Sea, the Iran-Israel conflict, and the war in Ukraine have all exacerbated regional anxieties, disrupting trade, forcing mass displacement of populations, and prompting decision-makers in major capitals to reconsider alternatives. This environment of insecurity breathed a lease of life into the Development Road project, promising to connect Eastern markets to Europe. The project envisions profound wealth creation in the region, with an estimated US$17 billion of investment.

Beyond its projected economic contributions, Development Road, if realized, would inflict a significant geopolitical rupture among competing actors. Therefore, it has the potential to impact both Türkiye’s bilateral relations and the wider regional setting, having ramifications for global powers as well. This article considers competing views on the Development Road project, analyzing potential impacts on adjacent regions such as Europe and Asia. As the project gains speed, these frictions will likely become more discernible. 

Iran 

Some media reports indicate that Iran has offered Iraq assistance on the implementation of the Development Road.[2] Indeed, Tehran is a major stakeholder in Iraq and has a vast network of influence in the country. Such influence is not easily challenged or altered, as Iran’s position in Iraq is part of its wider geopolitical posturing. While Iran could potentially benefit from the corridor on economic and trade fronts, the likely growth of Turkish influence with the project’s implementation could evolve into a topic of bilateral contention.[3]

Türkiye and Iran share a complex relationship that meshes trends of rivalry, cooperation, mutual interests, and differing views on regional actors. Türkiye’s influence has competed with Iran in theaters such as Syria, Lebanon, and Iraq. Alongside, rivalry in Iraq is also ongoing. Although instances of cooperation exist, Ankara and Tehran have supported rival parties in Iraq’s autonomous Kurdistan Region (KRG) and the Iran militia network is often juxtaposed against Turkish security interests in the area.

Türkiye’s outreach to the central government in Baghdad as part of the Development Road project has brought Ankara into contact with Iraqi political actors under strong Iranian influence. This development marks a significant milestone for Türkiye-Iraq-Iran relations, potentially creating new grounds for future endeavors. There is a nexus of relations between these three countries that has hastened over the course of the last year, culminating in Erdoğan’s historic visit to Baghdad.

Iran would likely object to any move that could curtail its influence in Iraq, which, however, does not necessarily equate to an Iranian veto on the Development Road project. Türkiye has not signaled any position over isolating Iran from the Development Road. Indeed, Turkish policymakers are likely aware that the success of the project depends on Iran’s inclusion into Development Road in some form, or at least Tehran’s tacit nod of approval. To that end, Iran could become a stakeholder in the project.

Iran’s interest in regional economic cohesion is not new. In 2023, then President Ebrahim Raisi and Russian President Vladimir Putin signed an agreement on the construction of a 164-kilometer railway line,[4] which aimed to connect the two countries and facilitate trade as part of the international North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC). THE INSTC was projected to have major trade implications for Iran, Russia, India, and Azerbaijan, but it has not seen much progress. While the INSTC and Development Road could be seen as rival projects, lack of progress on the latter could prompt the Iranian government to eye some opportunity in the Turkish-Iraqi initiative.

Overall, there are several factors that make Iran both a potential ally of the project and a spoiler. It seems likely that Iran would support the project, eyeing revenue and re-inclusion in the international trade dynamic. However, Tehran will be cautious of growing Turkish influence in Iraq as the project progresses.

Russia 

Iran’s position on the Development Road also brings to attention that of Russia, as Moscow too is a key part of the INSTC. Indeed, the INSTC is viewed[5] by Moscow as a key component of the strategy of evading Western sanctions and securing vital transportation routes that lie out of the U.S./NATO influence. However, the project’s lack of progress has proved to be a strategic liability for Russia, which is keen to access markets in South Asia.

Russo-Turkish bilateral relations can be viewed as an asset in this regard, with Ankara having broken with Western allies in the matter of sanctioning Russia. Turkish-Russian trade has continued, albeit with a huge deficit to Moscow’s favor and pressure, particularly from the U.S. on allegations over the trade of sanctioned or dual-use goods. Nevertheless, Türkiye’s position has favored continued economic partnership with Russia in the form of trade, mutual investments, and uninterrupted transportation links.

While Development Road does not envisage a Russian route per se, this could evolve as the project moves ahead. Diversifying the project’s points of connection, Russia could become a party via the Caucasus—much in the same manner that the INSTC attempts to. Given the lack of progress on INSTC, much as in the case of Iran, the project could serve Russian interests and portray a true regional character void of strong U.S./Western influence, which the Russians would prefer outright. However, these developments are unlikely before the war in Ukraine ends and the West and Russia enter a period of détente in the coming period, as Türkiye and the Development Road’s other parties would not seek to provoke Western denouncement of the project at its inception stage. This careful maneuvering not to irk potential Western stakeholders is likely the reason behind Russia’s initial exclusion from the scope of Development Road.

China 

Both Türkiye and Iraq have sought some level of Chinese support for the Development Road project.[6] China itself is pioneering a plethora of trade routes, notably the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). This initiative’s Middle Corridor option lies in proximity to the projected route of Development Road. Iraqi authorities have invited China to invest in the project, relying on already strong trade links. Development Road would significantly benefit from Chinese backing, either through financing, investment into the project, or the project being viewed as a natural component of the BRI.

However, there has been speculation that China is cautious about endorsing the project.[7] China has already developed alternatives to the Development Road in the form of the Middle Corridor. While these initiatives could potentially be linked, there is little initiative to do so. Secondly, China is reported to be postponing investment into the project owing to the fragile nature of security in Iraq. This could be the reason behind China’s reluctance to endorse the project almost a year since it has been on the agenda. The Development Road’s potential to become a rival to the BRI is also a major concern for China. The Development Road will likely receive international and Western interest, positioning competing economic agendas with those of China in the direct vicinity of the BRI. While China could still endorse the project and promise investment, the geopolitics of the equation are likely to stop Beijing from offering a major sponsorship for the project.

U.S. and the European Union (EU) 

The Western position on the Development Road is again ambiguous, like in the cases of Iran, Russia and China. The U.S. is spearheading another regional trade project,[8] the India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC). The project has received Washington’s endorsement and resonates with U.S. foreign policy objectives in the region. IMEC has the potential to further anchor India to the West, tether the bulk of Asian trade through a Western-backed route, and subsequently limit China’s growing power in its neighborhood and the wider region.

IMEC, however, does not come without risks. Aside from the expensive, intermodal transport route with geo-economic hurdles, the war in Gaza has put the project’s Israeli leg into doubt, with the conflict now lasting for over a year. Indeed, Turkish authorities particularly have emphasized the Iraqi route foreseen by Development Road as the safest alternative in the current period of regional turmoil. With IMEC under doubt, American and European positions on Development Road have the potential to align with Türkiye’s.

The U.S., which sees an opportunity to limit Iran’s influence in Iraq, supports the Development Road’s design. U.S. authorities have stated that they support efforts to diversify the Iraqi economy.[9] As the U.S.-led coalition’s mission is set to end by September 2025, there will be a transition period of bilateral partnerships in the energy, logistics, and construction sectors. China’s absence from the Development Road project is yet another point of overlap with the U.S. policy as Washington has become increasingly wary of countries across the vast network of the BRI submitting heavily to Beijing’s influence. Development Road’s autonomy and position as a truly regional project make it more amenable to Washington’s enduring skepticism of China’s economic agenda.

A clear EU position on Development Road has not yet been articulated by any senior authority. Europeans still see IMEC as crucial[10] for the continent’s economic future, diversifying trade and turning the EU into a formidable trading power against Chinese influence. IMEC’s potential to build lasting connections between powers in the Middle East and India is also significant, bringing these areas closer to the European economic orbit. While any opinion from the European leadership on Development Road is lacking, there are several factors in favor of ultimate European support for such an initiative. Türkiye is extremely well integrated into the EU economy through the Customs Union. More than half of all Turkish exports are destined for EU countries, and in turn, Türkiye is a major market for European products. The high level of economic integration is an opportunity to extend trade partnerships into the wider Middle East. The bi-directional trade architecture between Türkiye and the EU would be a major asset for Development Road’s goal of linking Eastern and Western trade.

Conclusion

Development Road has evolved into one of Türkiye’s key foreign policy objectives over the course of the last year. The project was born out of a shifting geopolitical landscape and growing ties between Ankara and the central government in Baghdad. The ramifications of Development Road, however, are profound and are set to impact a set of regional and global actors. Iran, China, the U.S., and the EU are identified as significant possible stakeholders as the project gains speed. All these parties are likely to display some ambivalence in their positions owing to a series of geopolitical factors, sovereign national agendas, and the balance of power across the region.

An initial assessment would have placed Development Road as a natural fit for the Chinese-led Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). While there is still potential for this to materialize, the limited reporting on this topic sheds a different light on Beijing’s strategic rationale for the project. China appears to be exercising a great deal of caution in endorsing the project, despite strong expectations, particularly from Iraq, over a strong role in the project’s future. The exact fit of Development Road into BRI and wider Chinese designs over global trade remains unclear for the time being, hence explaining the lack of immediate interest from Beijing. This position could shift in the short term, particularly as Türkiye looks to re-engage with China on strategic matters, particularly its possible membership to BRICS.[11] The Turkish President’s expected visit to China next year could give some much-anticipated impetus to these endeavors.

Iran is another major party to the Development Road in an indirect manner. Iranian influence in Iraq is unchallenged in the regional order, and Tehran maintains considerable leverage over Iraq’s central government, Türkiye’s newfound interlocutor in Iraq. Development Road has the potential to challenge Iran’s influence in Iraq, opening the central government to Turkish influence. Türkiye and Iran’s already existing rivalries in Northern Iraq are now likely to play out in Baghdad as well. However, as in the case of China, there is considerable nuance in Iran’s position. Iran could greatly benefit from the wealth creation promised by Development Road and could see itself become a tacit support, if not a party, of the project. Iran’s lagging efforts related to the North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC) could motivate stronger support for the Development Road. Here, Iran’s primary rationale will likely be safeguarding its essential influence in Iraq while reaping the benefits of a regional economic project that promises wealth for all parties involved.

Russia’s position on the Development Road is likely to run parallel to the INSTC as in the case with Iran. While Development Road has so far omitted a Russian role or route, this could evolve in the project’s future. The project aligns with Russian interests of creating an alternative regional sphere of trade that is spearheaded by local actors rather than the West. To that end, Russian participation in Development Road’s future could become a prospect once the war in Ukraine comes to an end and Russian tensions with the West subside.

There have been limited comments from Western officials on Development Road. Washington and Brussels appeared fixated on realizing the success of the India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC). While IMEC continues to be a priority on the West’s agenda, as was evident in Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu’s speech at the UN General Assembly, its viability has also been questioned due to conflicts plying the region. U.S. goals of limiting China’s spiraling economic influence are alive, and the EU is seeking to secure its role as a major global trading bloc via IMEC. These goals could be shared with Development Road as well, but there is insufficient unified interest from the U.S. or the EU for this to materialize yet. Likely, the feasibility of IMEC will be put to the test in the coming months, which could then translate into a more concrete position on Development Road, either for or against.

The rivalry between competing trade routes is an undeniable geopolitical parameter shaping both regional and global politics. Development Road is set to become a significant factor in this geopolitical contest and hence is likely to attract interest from the above-mentioned parties soon. The great deal of observable ambivalence in the positions of Iran, Russia, China, the U.S., and the EU signifies the potential of the Development Road project, which at this critical junction could evolve into a platform for cooperation or could exacerbate geopolitical tensions.

[1] Mehmet Yusuf Melikoğlu, “Cumhurbaşkanı Erdoğan, Irak Başbakanı Sudani’yi kabul etti,” Anadolu Ajansı, September 25, 2024, https://www.aa.com.tr/tr/gundem/cumhurbaskani-erdogan-irak-basbakani-sudaniyi-kabul-etti/3341560.

[2] “Iran offers to participate in Iraq’s strategic Development Road,” Shafaq, June 13, 2024, https://shafaq.com/en/Iraq/Iran-offers-to-participate-in-Iraq-s-strategic-Development-Road.

[3] İdris Okuducu, “What Iran Stands to Lose from Iraq’s Development Road Megaproject,” Gulf International Forum, July 18, 2024, https://gulfif.org/what-iran-stands-to-lose-from-iraqs-development-road-megaproject/.

[4] Syed Zafar Mehdi and Burc Eruygur, “Iran, Russia sign railway deal for North-South corridor,” Anadolu Agency, May 17, 2023, https://www.aa.com.tr/en/asia-pacific/iran-russia-sign-railway-deal-for-north-south-corridor/2899651.

[5] Nurlan Aliyev, “Russia’s Vital (and Fragile) New Trade Artery To Iran,” Riddle, September 28, 2024, https://ridl.io/russia-s-vital-and-fragile-new-trade-artery-to-iran/.

[6] “Iraq wants China to be ‘major participant’ in project linking West Asia to Europe,” The Cradle Co, June 3, 2023, https://thecradle.co/articles-id/234.

[7] Shirley Ze Yu, “Çin’in Irak’ın Kalkınma Yolu Projesi’ne temkinli yaklaşmasının dört nedeni,” Şarkull Avsat, 6 August, 2024, https://turkish.aawsat.com/arap-dünyasi/5047866-çinin-irakın-kalkınma-yolu-projesi’ne-temkinli-yaklaşmasının-dört-nedeni.

[8] Alberto Rizzi, “The infinite connection: How to make the India-Middle East-Europe economic corridor happen,” European Council on Foreign Relations, 23 April, 2024, https://ecfr.eu/publication/the-infinite-connection-how-to-make-the-india-middle-east-europe-economic-corridor-happen/.

[9] Rabia Iclal Turan, “US supports ‘all efforts to diversify Iraq’s economy’ after signing of deal on Development Road project,” Anadolu Agency, 24 April, 2024, https://www.aa.com.tr/en/americas/us-supports-all-efforts-to-diversify-iraqs-economy-after-signing-of-deal-on-development-road-project/3200513.

[10] “PM Meloni calls IMEC a “crucial initiative” for Italy’s strategic future,” Decode 39, 20 September, 2024, https://decode39.com/9545/pm-meloni-calls-imec-a-crucial-initiative-for-italy/.

[11] Murat Yetkin, “Türkiye’nin BRICS başvurusu ve Erdoğan’ın gidişi neden açıklanmıyor?,” Yetkin Report, September 28, 2024, https://yetkinreport.com/2024/09/28/turkiyenin-brics-basvurusu-ve-erdoganin-gidisi-neden-aciklanmiyor/#google_vignette.