In a rapidly shifting geopolitical landscape, EU-GCC relations have emerged from decades of procedural dialogue to confront new strategic imperatives. Their evolution spans the 1989 Cooperation Agreement and stalled free trade talks to a recent surge in political, economic, and security engagement. Crises such as the war in Ukraine and Middle Eastern instability have catalyzed unprecedented momentum, even as structural divergences continue to constrain deeper alignment. Achievements and persistent challenges alike now shape a partnership standing at a crossroads, with the potential either to remain fragmented and reactive or to mature into a strategic alliance equipped for an era of global volatility.
The Evolution of EU-GCC Relations
The 1989 Cooperation Agreement (CA) between the GCC and the European Economic Community (the precursor to the EU) serves as the foundation of contemporary EU-GCC relations. Resulting from negotiations that began in 1985, the CA established a formal framework for engagements between the two regions and outlined three main objectives: first, to strengthen inter-institutional cooperation; second, to advance economic and technical cooperation in key sectors (including, but not limited to, energy, industry, and trade); third, to support the GCC countries in their economic development and diversification efforts.[1]
Crucially, the CA also foresaw the creation of a platform to facilitate political cooperation, known as the Joint Council (JC). The latter serves as a forum that brings together senior representatives of the member states of both blocs, with the aim of advancing cooperation on sectoral areas of mutual interest through regular meetings. Besides, the Joint Cooperation Committee (JCC) was also established as a supporting body for the JC’s work.[2] Since its creation, the JC has represented the main engine powering EU-GCC dialogue, providing a structured and recurring framework for advancing cooperation, reviewing progress, and setting strategic priorities across various sectoral domains.
A year later, in 1990, negotiations were launched to establish a comprehensive Free Trade Agreement (FTA) between the two regions. However, the talks faced significant hurdles from the outset, as Brussels insisted on the prior inauguration of the GCC customs union as a precondition for advancing the agreement. From a Gulf perspective, however, this insistence was perceived as a protectionist measure aimed at shielding the EU’s petrochemicals industry from GCC competition.[3]
Although the early enthusiasm for the new partnership was strong, meaningful engagement between the two organizations failed to develop significantly in the early 1990s, with the sole exception of economic cooperation, which led to the formation of working groups in the energy, environment, and industrial sectors, as well as the holding of training sessions and seminars focused on customs, public administration, and standards.[4]
By the mid-1990s, frustration with slow progress had grown large on both sides, prompting a recalibration in how to advance relations. This included a partial de-prioritization of FTA negotiations and a growing focus on expanding economic cooperation to less traditional areas, stimulating cultural engagement through media and university cooperation, as well as deepening political ties through the establishment of a senior-level political dialogue.[5]
However, throughout the 2000s and 2010s, EU-GCC engagement remained largely dialogue-driven and declaratory, anchored in institutional frameworks. While these platforms enabled regular political consultations and technical cooperation, they failed to yield substantial economic or geopolitical results. Although the GCC customs union was launched in 2003, FTA talks stalled due to persistent disagreements over tariffs, procurement rules, and political conditions. Ultimately, negotiations were suspended in 2008,[6] reinforcing the perceptions of a relationship more procedural than strategic. A major effort in the institutionalization process of EU-GCC relations was the creation of the 2010-2013 Joint Action Programme (JAP), a programmatic document designed to breathe new life into and give a more structured focus to EU-GCC ties. Adopted at the 2010 EU-GCC JC in Luxembourg, the JAP aimed to overcome long-standing issues with ensuring the concrete implementation of the EU-GCC partnership by setting forward realistic suggestions for pragmatic cooperative initiatives in fourteen areas of common interest.[7]
Table 1: 2010-2013 EU-GCC Joint Action Programme
Subjects | |
Economic, financial, and monetary cooperation | Investment |
Trade cooperation | Energy |
Transport | Environment and climate change |
Industry | Combating money laundering and terrorist financing |
Intellectual property rights | Telecommunications and information technology sector |
Higher education and scientific research | Tourism |
Culture and mutual understanding | Antiquities and museums |
The main merits of the JAP laid in its ability to provide a coherent framework regrouping all ad hoc initiatives in different sectors, heightening the sense of urgency for advancing cooperation and enhancing the visibility of inter-institutional engagements. Most importantly, it signaled a shared intent by both blocs to elevate their relationship to a strategic level, transforming it into a partnership grounded in interdependence and mutual understanding.[8]
However, despite its measured achievements in advancing technical cooperation, the JAP experience was ultimately short-lived. From a Gulf perspective, the fact that, by the end of the JAP, no tangible progress had been made toward reviving the stalled FTA negotiations was perceived as a sign of the EU’s lack of political will to pursue a more structured and mutually beneficial partnership. Consequently, the GCC declined to renew its commitment to the initiative in 2012, citing the absence of meaningful breakthroughs, particularly in the FTA talks, as a key factor in its decision.[9]
In addition to the JAP’s incapacity to move the needle on FTA negotiations, two main factors contributed to undermining the JAP’s role in further institutionalizing EU-GCC relations. First, the programme lacked a robust institutional pillar, particularly one that would facilitate regular high-level engagement on political and security matters. Second, it was not supported by dedicated financial resources, limiting its capacity to implement concrete initiatives envisioned under the JAP framework.[10] Moreover, the emphasis on a broad yet scarcely operational list of cooperation areas, rather than a laser-focused approach targeting a few strategically significant domains, further limited the JAP’s transformative potential.[11]
While the JAP experience fell short of its initial ambitions, subsequent geopolitical developments significantly redrew the power balance of the Middle East and North Africa, most notably the 2011 Arab Uprisings and the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), further distancing the two blocs, highlighting divergent priorities, and exposing the limits of their strategic alignment.
In the aftermath of the widespread political turmoil that reshaped the regional order in the early 2010s, the EU’s strong support for regime change across the region was perceived as a worrisome development by most GCC countries, which instead interpreted these events as destabilizing for regional stability and a threat to security.[12] Similarly, the EU’s contributions to the JCPOA negotiations further deteriorated an already fragile relationship. Many in the GCC criticized the nuclear deal for overlooking key issues, particularly Iran’s ballistic missile program and regional proxy activities. As a result, parts of the GCC saw the EU’s approach as overly conciliatory toward Tehran and inattentive to the broader security dynamics of the Gulf, further limiting trust and political alignment.[13]
This deterioration in trust stemmed not only from specific geopolitical events but also from structural differences in how the EU and the GCC approach foreign policy. These underlying tensions have been explored by scholars such as Christian Koch, who identified three core challenges in EU-GCC relations: diverging internal decision-making processes, a tension between bilateralism and multilateralism, and a normative gap. First, while the EU champions a bottom-up approach grounded in Brussels’ capacity to independently formulate policy on specific matters, the Gulf countries tend to adopt a top-down model, where national governments tightly control decision-making. As a result, the GCC Secretariat holds limited autonomous authority and plays a largely coordinative rather than directive role, constraining its ability to act as a unified policy actor in external relations. Second, although both sides rhetorically support multilateral cooperation, EU member states prioritize national interests, and the GCC lacks the institutional cohesion to act collectively, making meaningful multilateral engagement difficult to achieve. Third, the EU has anchored its foreign policy on a political conditionality approach that recognizes normative principles as the key foundation for a lasting partnership, while the GCC countries have historically rejected external criticism as interference in internal affairs. This normative disconnection caused friction between the two blocs, especially as EU bodies, such as the European Parliament, push these issues more assertively.[14]
Despite limited progress on major institutional issues, the two blocs have recorded modest successes in more technical and sector-specific areas of cooperation. This progress is reflected in the proliferation of dialogue tracks. In 2017, the two blocs launched the “Dialogue on Trade and Investment Issues”, intending to increase cooperation on addressing trade barriers and regulatory challenges that hindered bilateral trade and investment.[15] In 2019, the “EU-GCC Dialogue on Economic Diversification” was established to support the Gulf’s transition toward post-oil economies. The initiative fosters links between European and Gulf business communities through policy dialogues, technical workshops, and targeted outreach, strengthening cooperation in areas such as innovation, green growth, and private sector development.[16]
Notably, efforts at fostering issue-specific dialogues were not limited to economic matters but also political and societal engagement, as showcased by the launch of the “Enhanced EU-GCC political dialogue, cooperation and outreach” in 2020. The three-year project sought to deepen political cooperation, support GCC national transformation agendas, and foster mutual understanding through diplomacy, public engagement, and institutional dialogue, particularly by engaging with youth and women.[17]
Overall, while these sector-specific dialogues illustrate a clear willingness on both sides to strengthen cooperation, particularly in technical and economic areas, they also underscore the narrow and fragmented nature of the EU-GCC partnership. As Silvia Colombo has argued, EU-GCC relations suffered from structural constraints in terms of format, content, and actors. Despite the proliferation of thematic dialogues, efforts to build a robust multilateral framework were undermined by dominant bilateral ties between individual EU and GCC states. Furthermore, although economy-driven initiatives such as the trade and diversification dialogues showed promise, they often sidelined political and security cooperation, limiting the partnership’s strategic depth in a rapidly evolving regional geopolitical landscape. Finally, engagement remained largely institutional and transactional, with minimal societal interaction or public diplomacy. As a result, communication gaps persisted, and opportunities for meaningful people-to-people engagement, especially across youth and civil society, remained underdeveloped, reinforcing misperceptions on both sides.[18]
Towards A New Momentum
The COVID-19 pandemic and the 2021 Kabul airlift prompted the EU to recognize its strategic underinvestment in Gulf relations. As Europe scrambled for supply chains, it was Gulf countries, particularly Qatar and the UAE, that stepped up. Acting as critical logistical hubs, they facilitated the delivery of essential medical equipment, vaccine supplies, and repatriation efforts at a moment when global mobility was paralyzed. Their quiet but vital support to EU crisis response operations underscored an often-overlooked truth: the EU’s resilience in global emergencies increasingly depends on strategic partnerships with the Gulf.
This interdependence was further laid bare during the chaotic aftermath of the U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan. Qatar and the UAE provided indispensable support in evacuating European military personnel, diplomats, and at-risk Afghans.[19] The message was clear: when geopolitics turns volatile, the Gulf can no longer be viewed as just an energy supplier, but as a security and logistics partner of first resort.
High Representative for Foreign Affairs Josep Borrell’s landmark visit to Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE in late 2021—the first of its kind in years—marked a recalibration of the Gulf posture of Brussels. “The European Union is quite absent from the region,”[20] Borrell admitted during his stop in Doha. “The Gulf wants an increased European Union presence, and we have a strategic interest in engaging with them.”[21] His remarks captured a long-overdue shift in tone, signaling the EU’s renewed commitment to regional diplomacy.
Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022 provided further impetus. As European countries scrambled to diversify away from Russian hydrocarbons, Gulf energy exporters emerged as indispensable alternatives. The war did not just alter energy flows; it redefined strategic priorities. The EU’s engagement with the GCC is no longer just about trade or soft diplomacy; it’s about hard security, energy resilience, and geopolitical agility in a contested global landscape. Contextually, the reconciliation within the GCC bloc after the 2017-21 Gulf crisis, formalized in the Al Ula Declaration in January 2021, has revitalized the GCC project and enhanced the group’s role as a significant institutional actor in the global arena.[22]
The Strategic Partnership Takes Shape
The first major outcome of this renewed political attention from the EU toward the GCC region took tangible form during the EU-GCC JC held in Brussels in February 2022, which endorsed a JAP for the period 2022-2027.[23] Crucially, the adoption of the new JAP marked a significant breakthrough, ending nearly a decade of inertia since the previous JAP stalled in 2013. By agreeing on a forward-looking framework for institutional, policy, and technical cooperation, both blocs demonstrated renewed political will to reinvigorate their partnership. The relaunch of the JAP signaled a clear intent to move beyond past stagnation and translate strategic dialogue into concrete, coordinated action.
A second significant milestone in EU-GCC relations was the release of the Joint Communication on a “Strategic Partnership with the Gulf.”[24] Published in May 2022, the document serves as a strategic blueprint outlining key issues and actionable points to enhance engagement between the EU and the GCC, as well as its individual member states.
Notably, the Joint Communication signaled a shift in the EU’s perception of the Gulf. First, it acknowledged the central role the Gulf Arab countries have come to occupy in the evolving global order, emphasizing the region’s growing geostrategic relevance as an “important gateway”[25] connecting Europe, Asia, and Africa. Second, it recognized that the concerns and interests of Gulf partners have a direct bearing on the EU’s long-term stability, identifying six core areas for intensified cooperation and concrete actions to operationalize collaboration.
Table 2: Areas for EU-GCC intensified cooperation
Areas | |
Economic Prosperity | Green transition and sustainable energy |
Regional stability and global security | Humanitarian and development |
People-to-people | Institutional |
Recognizing that diplomatic relevance and strategic influence depend on sustained on-the-ground presence, strong interpersonal networks, and institutional continuity, the EU has actively increased its regional diplomatic footprint. Prior to the COVID-19 pandemic, EU diplomatic delegations were present only in the UAE, Saudi Arabia, and Kuwait. In September 2022, shortly after the Communication’s release, the EU inaugurated a permanent delegation in Qatar,[26] and plans are underway to open a similar office in Oman,[27] bringing the EU into near-complete diplomatic coverage across the GCC. Concurrently, the EU’s top foreign policy figures, including the Presidents of the European Council and Commission and the High Representative for Foreign Affairs, have conducted regular visits to Gulf capitals, reaffirming the region’s newfound centrality in Brussels’ foreign policy agenda.
At the institutional level, EU-GCC relations have been bolstered through the establishment of new platforms for dialogue on security and defense matters. In January 2024, the first EU-GCC Regional Security Dialogue brought together senior officials from both institutions for frank exchanges on paramount security issues of strategic interest for each bloc. Discussions also explored opportunities for enhanced cooperation in five specific areas: maritime security, cybersecurity, non-proliferation, counter-terrorism, as well as disaster preparedness and emergency management.[28] The second iteration of the Dialogue was held in April 2025, with EU and GCC representatives expanding the talks to also include countering drug trafficking and international organized crime.[29] The regularity of the engagement and the broadening of the security matters examined speak volumes about the growing resolve of the two blocs to elevate security cooperation to a key pillar in EU-GCC relations.
In April 2024, the inaugural High-Level Forum on Regional Security and Cooperation, an initiative led by the EU Special Representative for the Gulf, Luigi Di Maio, brought together European and Gulf foreign ministers for discussions on regional and international security issues. Although his appointment in May 2023 was initially met with some skepticism,[30] Di Maio has gradually gained credibility among Gulf policymakers through consistent engagement and visible advocacy.[31]
In parallel, cooperation has expanded in sectoral areas. In April 2024, during the World Future Energy Summit in Abu Dhabi, the EU and the GCC jointly launched the EU-GCC Green Transition Project to facilitate cooperation through the exchange of best practices and business opportunities in energy transition and green technology.[32] In May 2024, the European Chamber of Commerce opened its doors in Riyadh, signaling a desire for a deeper European economic presence in the Gulf. While the Chamber’s core aim is to facilitate trade and investment ties between the two regions, it also seeks to make a positive contribution to regulatory and customs cooperation.[33] The EU has also supported a GCC Emergency Management Center project, based in Kuwait, focused on enhancing nuclear and radiological emergency preparedness.[34] Another concrete example is the Young Leaders in Regional Diplomacy initiative, an initiative spearheaded by Special Representative Di Maio, which brought young GCC diplomats to Brussels for direct engagement with senior EU officials, junior EU diplomats, and policy stakeholders.[35]
Such people-to-people initiatives are increasingly central to the EU-GCC relationship. EU delegations in Gulf capitals have actively promoted cultural and social engagement by hosting events and festivals, such as the European Film Festival in Abu Dhabi,[36] the European Food Festival in Riyadh,[37] and the European Day of Languages.[38] Significantly, the European Commission has introduced a five-year multiple-entry Schengen visa for nationals of Saudi Arabia, Oman, and Bahrain.[39] Emirati citizens already enjoy visa-free travel to the Schengen Area for up to three months.
On 16 October 2024, the EU and GCC held their first-ever summit in Brussels, an event that marked a historic milestone in their institutional relationship.[40] Held under the theme “Strategic Partnership for Peace and Prosperity,” the summit brought together leaders and top representatives from both organizations and their member states at a critical juncture in bilateral engagement. The presence of key GCC leaders—including Qatar’s Emir Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad Al Thani, Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, and Bahraini Crown Prince Salman bin Hamad Al Khalifa—as well as all EU heads of government,[41] underscored the high level of political commitment to this process.
The post-summit communiqué reaffirmed previous declarations and emphasized ongoing priorities such as trade, energy and climate cooperation, digital and physical connectivity, humanitarian assistance, and fostering people-to-people exchanges. In parallel, it highlighted the importance of joint diplomatic coordination on major global challenges, including the Russian war in Ukraine, the war in Gaza, and broader regional tensions.[42]
The summit made concrete progress. The two blocs agreed to accelerate discussions toward a possible EU-GCC FTA, deepen energy collaboration through the EU-GCC Energy Experts Group, and institutionalize a cooperation mechanism for disaster response between the EU’s Emergency Response Coordination Centre and the GCC Emergency Management Center.[43] Politically, the two sides jointly endorsed the “Global Alliance for a Two-State Solution” to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and proposed a coordinated approach to maritime security in the Red Sea.[44]
More recently, the EU has significantly ramped up its political attention toward the region. In February 2025, Brussels launched the Directorate-General for the Middle East and North Africa (DG MENA), which includes a dedicated department focused exclusively on the Gulf.[45] This marks a notable institutional shift, as it represents the first regional DG ever created by the EU, underscoring the growing strategic weight of the MENA region, and particularly the Gulf, in the EU foreign policy architecture.
Challenges and Way Forward
To fully unlock the potential of the EU-GCC strategic partnership, both sides must move beyond symbolic gestures and confront three persistent challenges that continue to hinder deeper cooperation. Addressing these interlinked issues will be crucial for advancing a more credible, resilient, and forward-looking partnership.
First, the EU should sustain the strategic coherence and outcome-oriented momentum catalyzed by the 2022 Joint Communication. To remain a credible actor in the Gulf, Brussels needs to project both institutional discipline and operational agility, demonstrating to its partners that even a complex, multi-layered bureaucracy can act decisively when its interests align. Key to this is preserving internal coherence within the EU and ensuring Brussels’ capacity to deliver concrete, timely results that resonate with Gulf priorities.
On the one hand, the proliferation of official actors engaging with the region risks diluting messaging and creating institutional overlaps. While the establishment of DG MENA marks a strategic inflection point, the EU must articulate clear mandates and coordination lines across its diplomatic architecture and ensure that these are communicated with clarity to avoid confusion among Gulf counterparts and ensure policy traction on the ground.
On the other hand, the past EU practice of pursuing ambitious statements without consistently backing them with tangible outcomes risks undercutting the diplomatic capital and political goodwill generated thus far. Without persistent visible advancements, there is a real danger of reinforcing stereotypes of EU inefficiency and its inability to operationalize strategic intentions. Both blocs must commit to measurable, trackable progress, particularly in flagship areas such as security cooperation. For instance, the newly proposed working groups under the EU-GCC Regional Security Dialogue should be launched swiftly and empowered with clear objectives, timelines, and resources to move beyond rhetorical convergence and deliver substantive collaboration.
Second, persistent sticking points must be tackled with pragmatic solutions. Chief among these is the long-delayed EU-GCC FTA. While the 2024 summit pledged to revive momentum, Brussels appears to have quietly pivoted to bilateral negotiations, most notably with the UAE,[46] whose regulatory readiness and economic diversification make it a frontrunner for a standalone deal. This signals a strategic recalibration by the EU: moving from its traditional bloc-to-bloc diplomacy to a more flexible, differentiated engagement. The reality is that the GCC remains far from homogeneous. Economic structures, reform trajectories, and regulatory environments vary significantly across the six states. Waiting for all to converge on a single set of standards risks perpetuating paralysis, thereby diminishing the appeal of the FTA. Instead, fast-tracking agreements with the most aligned partners could generate a domino effect, using market access and European investment as leverage to encourage laggards to catch up. Over time, this staged approach may lay the groundwork for an umbrella deal that brings coherence to a fragmented trade landscape. This shift toward bilateralism seems confirmed by the recent EU Council’s decision, which authorizes the European Commission to launch negotiations with each GCC country to establish Strategic Partnership Agreements (SPAs). While addressing the same topics outlined in the ‘Strategic Partnership,’ they aim to offer a more tailored and efficient platform to deepen cooperation. This approach allows each GCC nation to set the pace and identify specific areas for advancing its partnership with the EU.[47]
However, although the bilateral track promises quick returns, it does not serve as a silver bullet for institutional deadlocks. Some small GCC countries might end up negotiating with the EU on a state-to-organization level, which could weaken their position and reduce the likelihood of achieving mutually satisfactory agreements. Furthermore, the proliferation of bilateral deals also risks undermining the GCC’s role as the primary interlocutor for Brussels. Therefore, while a cautious, measured approach to bilateral talks could stymie helpful change and inject new momentum into long-stalled negotiations, the EU and the GCC should double down on efforts to maintain a bloc-to-bloc approach as the norm for deepening relations between the two regions.
Third, the EU and the GCC should strive to present a united front against regional developments that, with their broader geopolitical fallouts, could further destabilize the Middle East’s already volatile landscape, thereby hindering EU-GCC common endeavors to promote regional security, political stability, and economic growth. Against the background of the June 2025 Israel-Iran military escalation and U.S. strikes on Iranian nuclear facilities,[48] the EU and the GCC should ramp up joint diplomatic efforts to press conflicting parties to avert a possible regional war of attrition.[49] A conflict of such magnitude could plunge the Middle East into a years-long cycle of instability and chaos, with negative spillover externalities poised to become pressing national security threats for regional and extra-regional countries alike. Therefore, when engaging with the U.S., Israel, and Iran, the EU and the GCC should present a united front, anchoring their regional policy on a de-escalatory diplomatic approach that prioritizes political and dialogue-based solutions while highlighting the short-lived returns of pursuing short-term military wins.
Although a flurry of high-profile diplomatic engagements speaks volumes about a shared commitment to deepening ties, spoilers on both sides risk diluting the transformative impact of the EU-GCC strategic partnership by reinforcing mistrust, exposing policy incoherence, and diverting attention from long-term strategic priorities. From the war in Gaza to the Iranian nuclear issue, intra-European divisions, both within the EU institutions and among member states, have often undermined the EU’s efforts to meaningfully leverage its economic, aid, and political power to bring about substantive change in these critical issues for regional security and stability.[50] This internal fragmentation has undermined Brussels’ capacity to ensure consistency and decisiveness in its Middle East policy, thereby partially damaging the EU’s reputation as a major supporter of a rules-based international order and leading to accusations of double standards from its Gulf partners.[51] To restore its credibility as a global player, the EU not only needs to ensure cohesion of purpose and means in its foreign policy, but also to ground its approach in clear political leadership and a strategic vision that bridges values and interests. Without greater coherence and credibility in responding to regional crises, the EU risks reducing its partnership with the GCC to technical cooperation, lacking real strategic depth.
Looking ahead, the 29th EU-GCC Joint Council and Ministerial Meeting, scheduled for late 2025 in Kuwait, represents a crucial opportunity to reaffirm the strategic relevance of the partnership and, most importantly, operationalize key initiatives outlined in the 2022 Joint Communication, demonstrating unified resolve in addressing regional security challenges. To fulfill the ambitions of a true strategic partnership, translating high-level commitments into effective policy coordination and measurable outcomes is crucial. This urgency has only intensified amid rising tensions sparked by the Israel-Iran confrontation. Clear priorities, credible follow-through, and sustained engagement will determine whether this renewed momentum can deliver lasting impact or dissolve into another cycle of unfulfilled promises.
[1] European Council, “Cooperation Agreement between the European Economic Community, of the one part, and the Countries Parties to the Charter of the Cooperation Council for the Arab States of the Gulf (the State of the United Arab Emirates, the State of Bahrain, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, the Sultanate of Oman, the State of Qatar and the State of Kuwait) of the other part,” https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/documents/treaties-agreements/agreement/?id=1988065. (accessed June 16, 2025).
[2] Ibid.
[3] Abdullah Baabood, “EU-GCC Relations: A Study in Inter-Regional Cooperation,” Gulf Research Center, (2009). https://www.grc.net/publication/361. (accessed June 16, 2025).
[4] Nivien Saleh, “The European Union and the Gulf States: A Growing Partnership,” Middle East Policy 7, no. 1 (1999): 50-71, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1475-4967.1999.tb00341.x.
[5] Ibid.
[6] “Gulf Arabs may suspend EU free trade talks,” Reuters, December 24, 2008, https://www.reuters.com/article/business/gulf-arabs-may-suspend-eu-free-trade-talks-idUSTRE4BN172/. (accessed June 16, 2025).
[7] European External Action Service, “Joint Action Programme 2010-2013,” January 1, 2010, https://www.eeas.europa.eu/node/4221_en. (accessed June 18, 2025).
[8] Angelos Lenos, EU-GCC relationship: Towards “strategic partnership,” (PhD thesis, University of Warwick, 2013): 164-210, https://wrap.warwick.ac.uk/id/eprint/59738/. (accessed June 16, 2025).
[9] Tom Arnold, “Gulf states take harder line with EU over free-trade agreement,” The National, July 1, 2013, https://www.thenationalnews.com/business/gulf-states-take-harder-line-with-eu-over-free-trade-agreement-1.302864. (accessed June 16, 2025).
[10] Angelos Lenos, EU-GCC relationship: Towards “strategic partnership.”
[11] Silvia Colombo and Camilla Committeri, “Need to Rethink the EU-GCC Strategic Relation,” in Bridging the Gulf: EU-GCC Relations at a Crossroads, ed. Silvia Colombo (Roma, Nuova Cultura: 2014): 19-45.
[12] Christian Koch, “Constructing a viable EU-GCC partnership,” London School of Economics and Political Science, January 14, 2014, https://eprints.lse.ac.uk/55282/. (accessed June 19, 2025).
[13] Gerd Nonneman, “European Policies Towards the Gulf: Patterns, Dynamics, Evolution, and the case of the Qatar Blockade,” Journal of Arabian Studies 10, no. 2 (2020): 278–304, https://doi.org/10.1080/21534764.2020.1883575.
[14] Christian Koch, “Constructing a viable EU-GCC partnership.”
[15] European Commission, “Gulf region,” https://policy.trade.ec.europa.eu/eu-trade-relationships-country-and-region/countries-and-regions/gulf-region_en (accessed June 19, 2025).
[16] European External Action Service, “The EU-GCC Dialogue on Economic Diversification Project,” https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/EUintheGCC_en. (accessed June 19, 2025).
[17] European External Action Service, “Enhanced EU-GCC Political Dialogue, Cooperation and Outreach,” March 8, 2021, https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/enhanced-eu-gcc-political-dialogue-cooperation-and-outreach_und_en. (accessed June 19, 2025).
[18] Silvia Colombo, “Overcoming Structural Constraints in EU-GCC Relations: The Format, the Content and the Actors,” in The European Union and the Gulf Cooperation Council: Towards a New Path (eds) Silvia Colombo and Adel Abdel Ghafar (Singapore, Palgrave Macmillan: 2021): 9-32.
[19] “Qatar lauded for its role in Afghanistan evacuations,” Al Jazeera, August 30, 2021, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/8/30/qatar-emerges-as-key-player-in-afghanistan-after-us-pullout. (accessed June 20, 2025); RFI, “French foreign minister heads to UAE to see airlift operation from Afghanistan,” August 23, 2021, https://www.rfi.fr/en/france/20210823-french-foreign-minister-heads-to-uae-to-see-airlift-operation-from-afghanistan-taliban-evacuation. (accessed June 20, 2025).
[20] European External Action Service, “Foreign Affairs Council: Remarks by the High Representative/Vice President Josep Borrell at the press conference,” October 19, 2021, https://www.eeas.europa.eu/delegations/tunisia/foreign-affairs-council-remarks-high-representativevice-president-josep-borrell-press-conference_und_en?s=126. (accessed June 20, 2025).
[21] Ibid.
[22] Christian Koch, “After Al-Ula: Implications for GCC-EU Relations,” Manara Magazine, March 16, 2021, https://manaramagazine.org/2021/03/after-al-ula-implications-for-gcc-eu-relations/. (accessed June 20, 2025).
[23] European Council, “Co-Chairs’ Statement – 26th EU-GCC Joint Council and Ministerial Meeting,” February 22, 2022, https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2022/02/22/co-chairs-statement-26th-eu-gcc-joint-council-and-ministerial-meeting/. (accessed June 20, 2025).
[24] European Commission, “Joint Communication to the European Parliament and the Council: A strategic partnership with the Gulf,” May 18, 2022. https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/joint-communication-%E2%80%9Cstrategic-partnership-gulf%E2%80%9D_en. (accessed June 20, 2025).
[25] Ibid.
[26] Qatar MOFA, “European Union Delegation Premises Inaugurated in Qatar,” September 7, 2022, https://mofa.gov.qa/en/qatar/latest-articles/latest-news/details/1444/02/17/european-union-delegation-premises-inaugurated-in-qatar. (accessed June 20, 2025).
[27] Embassy of the Sultanate of Oman, Brussels, Belgium, https://www.fm.gov.om/brussels/?sfw=pass1684938476. (accessed June 20, 2025).
[28] European External Action Service, “GCC: first Regional Security Dialogue with the EU held in Riyadh,” January 25, 2024, https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/gcc-first-regional-security-dialogue-eu-held-riyadh_en.
[29] European External Action Service, “EU-GCC: Second meeting of the EU-Gulf Cooperation Council Regional Security Dialogue,” April 24, 2025, https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/eu-gcc-second-meeting-eu-gulf-cooperation-council-regional-security-dialogue_en. (accessed June 20, 2025).
[30] Sunniva Rose, “Shock as Luigi Di Maio lined up as EU’s first Gulf envoy,” The National, November 24, 2022, https://www.thenationalnews.com/world/2022/11/24/shock-as-luigi-di-maio-lined-up-as-eus-first-gulf-envoy/. (accessed June 20, 2025).
[31] Abdel Aziz Aluwaisheg, “GCC-EU strategic partnership passes an important milestone,” Arab News, April 25, 2024, https://www.arabnews.com/node/2499306. (accessed June 20, 2025).
[32] European External Action Service, “European Union Launches ‘EU-GCC Green Transition Project’ at the World Future Energy Summit,” April 18, 2024, https://www.eeas.europa.eu/delegations/united-arab-emirates/european-union-launches-%E2%80%98eu-gcc-green-transition-project%E2%80%99-world-future-energy-summit_en. (accessed June 20, 2025).
[33] “European Chamber of Commerce opens in Riyadh,” Arab News, May 08, 2024, https://www.arabnews.com/node/2506956/saudi-arabia. (accessed June 20, 2025).
[34] European External Action Service, “A milestone achievement of the European Union support to the Gulf Cooperation Council’s Emergency Management Centre related with preparedness for and response to a nuclear or radiological emergencies,” February 27, 2024, https://www.eeas.europa.eu/delegations/saudi-arabia/milestone-achievement-european-union-support-gulf-cooperation-council%E2%80%99s-emergency-management-centre_en. (accessed June 20, 2025).
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[43] Ibid.
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