Significant progress has been made in establishing Türkiye as a major regional gateway for the transit of natural gas, especially in enabling the shipping of gas from Turkmenistan and Azerbaijan to Europe. Its strategic positioning in the global energy market is strengthened by its participation in significant infrastructure projects like the Trans-Anatolian Natural Gas Pipeline (TANAP) and the Southern Gas Corridor (SGC). In addition to enhancing its geopolitical might, Türkiye’s role as a vital transit route helps diversify Europe’s energy sources and reduce its reliance on Russian gas.[1]
On 1 March 2025, Turkmenistan started providing natural gas to Türkiye under a swap agreement via Iran, marking a significant turning point in this endeavor. After almost thirty years of discussions, this agreement creates new pathways for Caspian gas to reach European markets and diversifies Türkiye’s energy imports. Nevertheless, the agreement also entails intricate geopolitical factors and technical difficulties, necessitating collaboration amongst numerous parties in Central Asia, Türkiye, and Europe.[2]
Turkmen Gas Deal
As part of a historic deal to diversify its energy supplies and lessen reliance on established suppliers, Türkiye formally started importing natural gas from Turkmenistan on 1 March 2025. The agreement, which was signed on 11 February 2025 between Turkmenistan’s national energy firm, Türkmengaz, and Türkiye’s state-owned pipeline operator, BOTAŞ, permits the import of Turkmen gas through Iran through a swap arrangement.[3] By this arrangement, Iran receives gas from Turkmenistan and sends an equal amount to Türkiye. By expanding supply routes and fortifying economic relations with both Turkmenistan and Iran, this arrangement improves Türkiye’s energy security and is consistent with Ankara’s overarching plan to establish itself as a major energy hub between Central Asia and Europe.[4] Notwithstanding its strategic importance, the agreement may encounter obstacles that could compromise its long-term viability. Türkiye’s dependence on Iran’s infrastructure, which has a history of supply interruptions, is a major worry.[5]
The stability of the gas flow is also threatened by U.S. sanctions on Iran’s energy sector and the technical shortcomings of Iran’s aging infrastructure. These ambiguities might compromise the arrangement’s dependability and influence Türkiye’s attempts to diversify its energy sources.[6] To reduce these risks, Türkiye is negotiating a five-year renewal of the gas supply agreement with Turkmenistan, with talks expected to be completed within the year. Creating a straight pipeline across the Caspian Sea to completely avoid Iran is a longer-term solution that would give Türkiye a more secure and independent energy supply. If completed, this project would strengthen Türkiye’s position as a vital regional hub for energy transit.[7]
The Trans-Caspian Pipeline: Key to Unlocking Turkmen Potential
For Turkmenistan’s gas to reach European markets in substantial quantities, most analysts agree that the Trans-Caspian Gas Pipeline must be constructed. This proposed undersea pipeline would connect Baku in Azerbaijan and Turkmenbashi in Turkmenistan, even reaching the Tengiz gas reserves in Kazakhstan. The pipeline would allow Turkmen gas to connect directly to the existing (SGC) infrastructure through Azerbaijan, avoiding Iran and Russian territory. The construction of this pipeline is crucial to increasing Turkmen gas supplies to Türkiye from the present 2 billion cubic meters (bcm) to an anticipated 15 bcm annually, with an eye toward the European market, according to Türkiye’s ambassador to Ashgabat.[8]
Interest in the Trans-Caspian Pipeline has evolved over time. In 2019, several European and Chinese companies expressed interest in funding the project, although at that time, nothing concrete was done. As a “project of common interest,” the European Commission says the trans-Caspian pipeline idea makes sense as an extension of the (SGC) network.[9] However, there are several challenges facing the project, including the expensive expense of constructing underwater infrastructure, Caspian Sea environmental concerns, and potential opposition from Russia and Iran, which have historically opposed new pipeline routes that could lessen their influence in the region.[10]
Despite these challenges, recent geopolitical developments have given the concept a fresh boost. Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine significantly altered European energy goals and heightened interest in finding alternatives to Russian gas supplies.[11] The United States (U.S.) has explicitly proposed replacing Russian gas in Europe with Turkmen gas and has offered assistance for the development of a gas hub in Türkiye. Turkish Energy Minister Alparslan Bayraktar recently reiterated the significance of constructing the Trans-Caspian Gas Pipeline to “increase gas purchases from Turkmenistan,” demonstrating the continued state backing for the project.[12]
Azerbaijan-Türkiye Partnership
Long-term agreements and strategic infrastructure projects like the Trans-Anatolian Natural Gas Pipeline (TANAP), which have strengthened bilateral energy connections, are the main drivers of the steady increase in gas exports. As Türkiye works to diversify its supply sources and lessen its reliance on outside suppliers, Azerbaijani gas is becoming an increasingly important part of its energy security plan. Azerbaijan’s standing as a significant regional energy exporter is also strengthened by this trend.[13]
To further solidify this partnership, BOTAŞ and SOCAR have inked four new agreements to improve natural gas delivery and exchange, paving the way for the delivery of Turkmen gas to Türkiye, which promotes greater supply diversification and regional energy connectivity, and for the transportation of Azerbaijani gas to both Europe and the Nakhchivan Autonomous Republic via Türkiye, fortifying Türkiye as a vital energy transit corridor.[14]
New Agreements and Investments
A continuous rise in natural gas imports has strengthened Türkiye’s position as a vital Caspian gas transit hub and its growing energy partnership with Azerbaijan. Türkiye’s increasing reliance on Azerbaijani gas to cover its energy demands is demonstrated by the 6.68 bcm of natural gas it bought from Azerbaijan in 2024. This upward trend persisted throughout the middle of 2024; in July alone, Azerbaijan’s gas exports to Türkiye reached 1.004 bcm, a 13.65% increase from the previous year.[15] SOCAR’s recent announcement on 6 January 2025 to invest US$7 billion in Türkiye’s energy sector over the next several years further highlights the two countries’ growing energy cooperation.[16] In addition to demonstrating the expanding strategic and economic relations between the two countries, this significant investment also highlights Türkiye’s critical position in Azerbaijan’s long-term energy vision and regional energy security policy.[17]
European Energy Security
Enhancing European energy security, particularly as the continent looks to diversify its gas imports and reduce its reliance on Russian supplies, depends heavily on the expanding collaboration between Azerbaijan and Türkiye. By 2027, Azerbaijan wants to double its gas exports to Europe, with an annual delivery target of about 20 bcm. This objective supports market stability and the European Union’s (EU) plan to secure alternative energy sources.[18] More than half of Azerbaijan’s total exports during the first seven months of 2024 were gas, with 7.8 bcm exported to Europe. This increase highlights Azerbaijan’s growing significance as a major regional energy supplier. Through infrastructural initiatives like the TANAP, Türkiye serves as a vital transit hub, facilitating the seamless flow of Azerbaijani gas to European markets and bolstering the continent’s energy resiliency.[19]
Alignment with the EU’s Energy Diversification Strategy
The EU’s energy diversification policy includes the EU Clean Industrial Deal (CID), which addresses several important goals to change the energy landscape of the continent. The expansion of renewable energy is a key component of the CID, with the goal of increasing the proportion of renewable energy in the EU’s energy mix to 42.5% by 2030, with aspirations to achieve 45%. In addition to supporting the REPowerEU plan, which seeks to install 320 GW of solar-photovoltaic capacity by 2025 and approximately 600 GW by 2030, the agreement includes significant investments in renewable energy sources such as wind and others. To lessen Europe’s dependency on fossil fuels, especially Russian energy imports, this expansion is essential.[20]
Apart from the expansion of renewable energy, the CID emphasizes energy efficiency, with a goal of increasing efficiency by 11.7% by 2030. To lower overall energy consumption and emissions, this entails modernizing buildings, streamlining industrial operations, and encouraging energy-saving technologies. In order to further the EU’s objective of reducing its reliance on non-renewable energy sources, the CID also supports the phase-out of coal and other fossil fuels. Simultaneously, the agreement promotes the development of clean technologies, including hydrogen, solar, wind, and battery technologies, which will boost the EU’s competitiveness in the global green technology market and support the expansion of green industries.[21]
Finally, by funding digitalization, interconnectivity, and better grid infrastructure throughout Europe, the CID encourages energy market integration. By balancing supply and demand throughout the continent, these policies aim to guarantee a more sustainable, dependable, and efficient energy system. The CID is a key component of the EU’s larger plan to diversify energy sources, lower carbon emissions, and promote sustainable industrial growth because of its emphasis on clean technologies, energy efficiency, renewable energy expansion, and energy market integration.[22]
Influence of the Turkmen Gas Deal on the Geopolitical Balance in the Caspian Region
In several ways, the 2018 Convention on the Legal Status of the Caspian Sea has fundamentally changed the region’s geopolitical environment. The consolidation of Russia’s military supremacy is among its most prominent effects. The pact essentially prevents a possible NATO or Chinese military presence in the Caspian by forbidding the deployment of naval vessels from non-signatory nations, guaranteeing that Russia’s Caspian Flotilla will continue to be the region’s preeminent naval force. The convention strengthened Russia’s strategic advantage in the region.[23]
Additionally, by encouraging peace, security, and cooperation among the Caspian littoral governments, the pact promotes regional cooperation. In addition to promoting cooperative efforts in fields including resource exploitation, environmental preservation, and maritime operations, it offers a framework for amicable dispute resolution.[24] A key clause for the growth of regional energy is the agreement’s clarification of regulations pertaining to pipeline construction on the Caspian seabed. It enables nations to build pipeline projects inside their industries, which could lead to the construction of new energy infrastructure.[25]
The agreement’s prohibition on foreign military influence is another important feature that contributes to the reduction of external powers’ presence in the Caspian area. In addition to reducing regional tensions, this clause encourages economic cooperation between the member nations.[26] While the treaty has settled long-standing conflicts, especially those between Russia and Iran, it strengthens Russia’s hegemonic status in the area. For many years to come, the framework created by this agreement will continue to shape regional security and energy growth, as well as the geopolitical dynamics of the Caspian.[27]
Contribution of the Deal to the Southern Gas Corridor’s Objectives
The SGC’s strategic goals are being advanced in large part by the new gas deal with Turkmenistan and the expanding energy relationship between Azerbaijan and Türkiye. Diversifying supply sources is one of the main objectives of the SGC to lessen Europe’s reliance on Russian gas.[28] This goal is directly supported by the addition of Turkmen gas and an increase in Azerbaijani exports. These agreements improve energy security for Europe and Türkiye by extending supply channels and integrating new energy sources, resulting in a more stable and varied gas supply. Additionally, the agreements support the EU’s overarching objective of market integration within its energy sector by enhancing regional trade and connectivity, especially in southeast Europe.[29]
Expanding transportation capacity to handle the increasing volume of gas exports is another important goal of the SGC. This objective is in line with Azerbaijan’s pledge to double its exports to Europe by 2027, to reach about 20 bcm yearly. Additionally, these advances encourage greater regional cooperation, necessitating coordination between European countries, Azerbaijan, Türkiye, and Turkmenistan. The SGC’s role as a crucial energy corridor linking the Caspian area to Europe is strengthened by this collaboration, which also expands diplomatic connections and economic integration throughout the region.[30]
The SGC has geopolitical importance in addition to economic and energy security, particularly for the U.S. and the EU. The corridor promotes energy independence in the region and strengthens geopolitical stability by lowering southeastern Europe’s reliance on Russian gas.[31] Additionally, even though the SGC’s primary focus is on natural gas, it helps with the energy transition by providing a coal substitute, which lowers carbon emissions. These latest events highlight the continuous advancement of the SGC’s main objectives, which include long-term energy security, regional cooperation, and supply diversification.[32]
Impact of the Deal on Türkiye’s Position as a Regional Energy Hub
Türkiye’s status as a regional energy hub is greatly enhanced in several ways by the recent agreement to import Turkmen gas. First, by lowering Türkiye’s reliance on a small number of suppliers, the deal to import up to 2 bcm of Turkmen gas yearly improves Türkiye’s energy diversity. Türkiye’s energy security is enhanced by this diversification, which also solidifies its position as a more dependable energy partner in the area.[33]
Türkiye’s position as an energy transit nation is greatly influenced by its advantageous geographic location and current energy infrastructure. This stance is strengthened by the agreement with Turkmenistan since Türkiye is now a crucial transit hub for gas traveling from Turkmenistan to European markets. This increases Türkiye’s significance in the global energy scene by securing its strategic role as a conduit between Eastern energy producers and Western consumers.[34]
Additionally, the agreement supports Türkiye’s overarching objective of attaining strategic autonomy through energy source diversification and bolstering its position as a center for energy transit. Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan is promoting this vision, which seeks to increase the country’s power and independence internationally. The agreement gives Türkiye more political clout in the region, especially when it comes to Russia and Iran, who have traditionally opposed such energy projects.[35] By lessening Europe’s need for Russian energy supply, the agreement also harmonizes Türkiye’s energy policy with European interests. Türkiye thereby strengthens its standing as an important ally in European energy security. Economic advantages of the agreement also include possible transit fees and greater use of Türkiye’s energy infrastructure, which includes pipelines, LNG terminals, and storage facilities. In addition to bolstering Türkiye’s economic expansion, these advances increase its geopolitical clout and allow it to take the lead in regional energy diplomacy.[36]
The Evolution of Türkiye’s Energy Infrastructure Considering the New Deal
With the recent agreement to import Turkmen gas, Türkiye’s energy infrastructure is about to undergo a major upheaval. Through the integration of renewable energy targets, the expansion of transit infrastructure, and the diversification of energy sources, this development will transform the nation’s energy landscape.[37] Through a swap agreement with Iran, the arrangement with Turkmenistan adds a crucial new natural gas supply to Türkiye’s energy mix, supplying up to 2 bcm per year. By diversifying, Türkiye lessens its dependency on established suppliers like Russia, enhancing its energy security and lowering its susceptibility to supply interruptions and geopolitical unrest.[38]
Türkiye needs to make investments to enhance its energy transport infrastructure in order to handle the increased gas flow. Although the nation currently has a strong base thanks to five LNG terminals, seven gas pipelines, and storage facilities, more funding is required to manage the influx of Turkmen gas and other energy supplies. Supporting Türkiye’s changing energy role will require updating energy infrastructure, increasing LNG storage, and improving pipeline capacity.[39]
Türkiye is concentrating on expanding its renewable energy capacity in addition to its traditional energy infrastructure. By 2035, the nation wants to triple its wind energy production and increase its solar energy production fivefold. Achieving these goals will need major investments in transmission networks to support the fluctuating nature of renewable energy.[40] Furthermore, Türkiye will increase the overall efficiency of its energy system with a US$20.2 billion investment in energy efficiency over the next seven years, which will support both its goals for renewable energy and its overarching goal of becoming a major energy hub.[41]
Challenges and Future Prospects
Although Azerbaijan has made notable strides, it still faces significant obstacles in its ambitious objective of doubling gas exports to Europe by 2027. Within the next three years, the country needs to boost its export volume by over 50% to fulfill its commitments to the EU. However, existing infrastructure and production capacity constraints pose substantial challenges. While Azerbaijan has progressively increased its gas supply to European markets through key pipelines like the Trans-Adriatic Pipeline (TAP) and the TANAP, reaching this ambitious goal will demand extensive investments in extraction, processing, and transportation infrastructure.[42]
In addition to infrastructure limitations, Azerbaijan’s efforts are further complicated by external factors, including regional competition for export routes, shifting energy demand, and geopolitical challenges. To overcome these obstacles, Azerbaijan and Türkiye are actively seeking ways to expand gas supply capacity. One prominent strategy involves integrating Turkmen gas into their energy partnership. A possible approach is a gas swap agreement with Iran, which would enable Turkmen gas to pass through Iranian territory before reaching Türkiye. While this arrangement could help boost supply, it faces considerable challenges, such as international sanctions on Iran’s energy sector and uncertainties regarding the reliability of existing infrastructure.[43]
The building of a Trans-Caspian Pipeline, which would directly connect Turkmenistan and Azerbaijan across the Caspian Sea, is an alternate and more calculated strategy. This long-discussed but unfinished project would give Turkmen gas a more reliable and autonomous way to travel across Türkiye to reach European markets. Notwithstanding the initiative’s political and technical difficulties, it demonstrates Azerbaijan and Türkiye’s resolve to lessen their reliance on a single gas supply while enhancing their positions as Europe’s major energy suppliers.[44]
With projections indicating that Turkmen gas exports might reach up to 15 bcm per year over the next 20 years, there are long-term plans to greatly increase them. Favorable market circumstances, continuous collaboration among participating nations, and large investments in infrastructure and technology would all be necessary for this increase. A crucial part of this growth is the introduction of Turkmen gas into the European market, which would improve energy diversity and lessen dependency on Russian supplies.[45]
Significant infrastructure improvements are required to make this vision a reality. In this sense, the Trans-Caspian Pipeline—which provides a direct connection between Turkmenistan and Azerbaijan for integration into European energy networks—remains one of the most important projects. However, funding support, environmental factors, and geopolitical alignment are all necessary for the project to succeed. Notwithstanding these obstacles, moving forward with this project might revolutionize the energy environment in the area and solidify Azerbaijan’s standing as a vital energy provider to Europe.[46]
Conclusion
The regional energy environment is changing significantly because of Türkiye’s efforts to import gas from Turkmenistan and Azerbaijan and to facilitate its flow to Europe. As Türkiye looks to diversify its supply chains and solidify its position as a vital energy hub, this initiative has wide-ranging implications for energy security, geopolitics, and economic cooperation. Türkiye and Turkmenistan signed a historic deal in March 2025 to supply 1.3 bcm of gas for the rest of the year. By extending their natural gas supply agreement until 2030, Türkiye and Azerbaijan strengthened their energy connections at the same time. These events demonstrate Türkiye’s growing significance in regional energy transit and its strategic relevance to the energy security of Europe.[47]
The Southern Gas Corridor (SGC), a vast pipeline network intended to move gas from the Caspian Sea region to Europe, is a major facilitator of these efforts. The SGC is a key component of the EU’s energy diversification strategy and consists of the Trans-Anatolian Pipeline (TANAP), the Trans-Adriatic Pipeline (TAP), and the South Caucasus Pipeline. Azerbaijan’s commitment to nearly doubling its gas exports to Europe—targeting 20 bcm annually by 2027—further reinforces the corridor’s strategic relevance. However, considerable difficulties remain. There are market and geopolitical uncertainties surrounding the proposed Trans-Caspian Gas Pipeline (TCGP), which would span the Caspian Sea and directly connect Turkmenistan and Azerbaijan. Additionally, Türkiye’s recent successful test of gas transit via Iran introduces further complexity, as international sanctions could impact long-term feasibility.[48]
In line with its larger goal of establishing itself as a regional energy hub, Türkiye is working to ease the flow of gas from Turkmenistan and Azerbaijan into Europe. To achieve this goal, infrastructural expansion will be essential. With plans for expanded pipeline capacity and Turkmen gas already flowing, Türkiye is evolving from a transit state to a key participant in Eurasian energy corridors. To guarantee the longevity of these programs, however, issues including transit dependability, infrastructure funding, and geopolitical concerns need to be resolved. These changes have broader geopolitical ramifications that go beyond energy markets, impacting regional power dynamics and strengthening the economic and cultural bonds between Turkic countries. Türkiye’s role in international energy diplomacy is expected to significantly expand as it maintains its position as a crucial energy bridge connecting producers and consumers.
[1] Agata Łoskot-Strachota and Adam Michalski, “The start of a process? Turkey and Turkmenistan are planning gas cooperation,” Centre for Eastern Studies, March 23, 2024, https://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/analyses/2024-03-29/start-a-process-turkey-and-turkmenistan-are-planning-gas-cooperation.
[2] “Turkey, Turkmenistan agree gas supply deal for March,” Reuters, February 11, 2025, https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/turkey-turkmenistan-agree-gas-supply-deal-march-2025-02-11/.
[3] “Turkmenistan’s natural gas is flowing to Turkey: energy minister,” Turkish Minute, March 4, 2025, https://www.turkishminute.com/2025/03/04/turkmenistans-natural-gas-is-flowing-to-turkey-energy-minister5/.
[4] “Türkiye seeks to extend gas deal with Turkmenistan for 5 years,” Europe, February 25, 2025, https://english.news.cn/europe/20250225/9123bb57e6c9458dbc0cd8de0dec97d1/c.html.
[5] Adam Michalski and Marcin Popławski, “Problematic diversification. Turkey’s gas agreement with Turkmenistan,” Centre for Eastern Studies, February 20, 2025, https://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/analyses/2025-02-20/problematic-diversification-turkeys-gas-agreement-turkmenistan.
[6] “Turkmenistan’s natural gas is flowing to Turkey: energy minister.”
[7] “Turkmenistan signs agreement to supply gas to Türkiye as of March 2025,” Ener data, February 12, 2025, https://www.enerdata.net/publications/daily-energy-news/turkmenistan-signs-agreement-supply-gas-turkiye-march-2025.html.
[8] Teymur Atayev, “Turkmen Gas Flows to Türkiye: Implications for Europe’s Energy Future,” The Caspian Post, March 3, 2025, https://caspianpost.com/opinion/turkmen-gas-flows-to-tu-rkiye-implications-for-europe-s-energy-future.
[9] Samantha Fanger, “Azerbaijan and Türkiye Solidify Key Energy Alliance with Turkmen Gas Deal,” Caspian Policy Center, June 13, 2024, https://caspianpolicy.org/research/energy/azerbaijan-and-turkiye-solidify-key-energy-alliance-with-turkmen-gas-deal.
[10] Teymur Atayev, “Turkmen Gas Flows to Türkiye: Implications for Europe’s Energy Future.”
[11] “Impact of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine on the markets: EU response,” European Council, January 15, 2024, https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/eu-response-russia-military-aggression-against-ukraine-archive/impact-of-russia-s-invasion-of-ukraine-on-the-markets-eu-response/.
[12] Teymur Atayev, “Turkmen Gas Flows to Türkiye: Implications for Europe’s Energy Future.”
[13] “Natural gas supply deal between Azerbaijan and Türkiye extended up to 2030,” Anadolu Agency, June 4, 2024, http://et.aa.com.tr/41894.
[14] “Türkiye-Azerbaijan natural gas supply deal extended to 2030,” Daily Sabah, June 4, 2024, https://www.dailysabah.com/business/energy/turkiye-azerbaijan-natural-gas-supply-deal-extended-to-2030.
[15] “Azerbaijan increases natural gas supply to Türkiye,” Azer News, September 28, 2024, https://www.azernews.az/oil_and_gas/231904.html.
[16] “Azerbaijan’s state oil company to invest $7bn in Turkey,” https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/azerbaijan-oil-company-socar-invest-7bn-turkey.
[17] “Agreement reached on transportation of Turkmen gas to Türkiye,” Daily Sabah, May 14, 2024, https://www.dailysabah.com/business/energy/agreement-reached-on-transportation-of-turkmen-gas-to-turkiye.
[18] Toghrul Ali, “Azerbaijan Strengthens Commitment to Double Gas Exports to Europe,” Caspian Policy Center, August 3, 2024, https://www.caspianpolicy.org/research/regional-south-caucasus/azerbaijan-strengthens-commitment-to-double-gas-exports-to-europe.
[19] David O’Byrne, “Azerbaijan’s gas exports increase, but Baku still challenged to meet EU goal,” Eurasianet, August 21, 2024, https://eurasianet.org/azerbaijans-gas-exports-increase-but-baku-still-challenged-to-meet-eu-goal.
[20] “Five key action areas to put Europe’s energy transition on a more orderly path,” McKinsey, August 8, 2023, https://www.mckinsey.com/capabilities/sustainability/our-insights/five-key-action-areas-to-put-europes-energy-transition-on-a-more-orderly-path.
[21] Kara Anderson, “What is the European Green Deal?,” Greenly, June 10, 2024, https://greenly.earth/en-us/blog/ecology-news/what-is-the-european-green-deal.
[22] Ibid.
[23] World Economic Forum, “What the new Caspian Sea deal means for military balance in the region,” September 12, 2028, https://www.weforum.org/stories/2018/09/what-a-new-caspian-sea-deal-means-for-military-balance-in-the-region/.
[24] “Convention on the Legal Status of the Caspian Sea,” August 12, 2028, http://www.en.kremlin.ru/supplement/5328.
[25] Shiri Shriyev, “The Vital Role of the Caspian Sea,” Global Asia, December 2023, https://globalasia.org/v18no4/cover/the-vital-role-of-the-caspian-sea_shiri-shriyev.
[26] “The Caspian Sea Treaty,” IISS 24, November 2018, https://www.iiss.org/publications/strategic-comments/2018/the-caspian-sea-treaty/.
[27] Shiri Shriyev, “The Vital Role of the Caspian Sea.”
[28] Marco Siddi, “The Southern Gas Corridor: Challenges to a geopolitical approach in the EU’s external energy policy,” Finnish Institute of International Affairs, 2017, https://fiia.fi/en/publication/the-southern-gas-corridor.
[29] “Azerbaijan: Southern Gas Corridor,” https://www.ebrd.com/work-with-us/projects/psd/azerbaijan-southern-gas-corridor.html.
[30] Aleksandra Jarosiewicz, “Southern Gas Corridor managed by Azerbaijan and Turkey,” Centre for Eastern Studies, July 18, 20212, https://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/osw-commentary/2012-07-18/southern-gas-corridor-managed-azerbaijan-and-turkey.
[31] Bilyana Chobanova and Oleksandr Antonenko, “Why Southern Gas Corridor is a chance for energy efficiency?,” Euractiv, December 11, 2020, https://www.euractiv.com/section/azerbaijan/opinion/why-southern-gas-corridor-is-a-chance-for-energy-efficiency/.
[32] “The United States Strongly Supports the Southern Gas Corridor Project,” Caspian Policy Center, January 25, 2018, https://www.caspianpolicy.org/research/energy-and-economy-program-eep/the-united-states-strongly-supports-the-southern-gas-corridor-project.
[33] “Turkmenistan’s natural gas is flowing to Turkey: energy minister.”
[34] Karim Elgendy, “Turkey’s energy hub ambitions have new momentum after Assad’s fall,” Chatham House, December 17, 2024, https://www.chathamhouse.org/2024/12/turkeys-energy-hub-ambitions-have-new-momentum-after-assads-fall.
[35] Gönül Tol, “Amid regional upheaval, Turkey looks to energy to secure strategic autonomy,” Middle East Institute, March 3, 2025, https://mei.edu/publications/amid-regional-upheaval-turkey-looks-energy-secure-strategic-autonomy-0.
[36] Antonia Colibasan, “Turkey’s Evolving Geopolitical Strategy in the Black Sea,” Foreign Policy Research Institute, December 4, 2024, https://www.fpri.org/article/2024/12/turkeys-evolving-geopolitical-strategy-in-the-black-sea/.
[37] David O’Byrne, “Turkey begins receiving gas from Turkmenistan under Iran swap deal: minister,” S&P Global, March 3, 2025, https://www.spglobal.com/commodity-insights/en/news-research/latest-news/natural-gas/030325-turkey-begins-receiving-gas-from-turkmenistan-under-iran-swap-deal-minister.
[38] “Turkey begins receiving Turkmen gas via Iran – Turkish energy minister,” Interfax, March 3, 2025, https://interfax.com/newsroom/top-stories/110128/.
[39] “The infrastructure needed across Eastern Europe to achieve the region’s energy transition goals,” Atlantic Council, October 10, 2024, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/news/transcripts/the-infrastructure-needed-across-eastern-europe-to-achieve-the-regions-energy-transition-goals/.
[40] Francesco Siccardi, “Understanding the Energy Drivers of Turkey’s Foreign Policy,” Carnegie Europe, February 28, 2024, https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2024/02/understanding-the-energy-drivers-of-turkeys-foreign-policy?lang=en¢er=europe.
[41] “Turkey’s $20 Billion Energy Efficiency Drive: A Bold Step Towards Sustainability,” CEO Today, January 13, 2025, https://www.ceotodaymagazine.com/2025/01/turkeys-20-billion-energy-efficiency-drive-a-bold-step-towards-sustainability/.
[42] David O’Byrne, “Azerbaijan’s gas exports increase, but Baku still challenged to meet EU goal,” Eurasianet, August 21, 2024, https://eurasianet.org/azerbaijans-gas-exports-increase-but-baku-still-challenged-to-meet-eu-goal.
[43] Samantha Fanger, “Azerbaijan and Türkiye Solidify Key Energy Alliance with Turkmen Gas Deal,” Caspian Policy Center, June 13, 2024, https://caspianpolicy.org/research/energy/azerbaijan-and-turkiye-solidify-key-energy-alliance-with-turkmen-gas-deal.
[44] Teymur Atayev, “Turkmen Gas Flows to Türkiye: Implications for Europe’s Energy Future.”
[45] Adam Michalski and Marcin Popławski, “Problematic diversification. Turkey’s gas agreement with Turkmenistan.”
[46] Luke Coffey, “No Better Time for a Pipeline across the Caspian,” Hudson, August 9, 2024, https://www.hudson.org/trade/no-better-time-pipeline-across-caspian-luke-coffey.
[47] Samantha Fanger, “Azerbaijan and Türkiye Solidify Key Energy Alliance with Turkmen Gas Deal.”
[48] Dalga Khatinoglu, “Turkey Excludes Iran from Turkmen Gas Transit Route,” Iran International, May 17, 2024, https://www.iranintl.com/en/202405172688.
