The attacks in Magdeburg (Germany), New Orleans (USA), Vancouver (Canada) and Liverpool (UK) since late 2024 highlighted once again both the effectiveness of vehicles as weapons and the difficulties in preventing hostile vehicle attacks (HVA). In addition, the reactions of decision-makers to these incidents further demonstrated the limited understanding of the dynamics underlying such attacks. This is partially due to a lack of common terminology on HVA, of data on the issue, and of a narrative that restricts the tactic to terrorism. This misunderstanding impacts responses to HVA, including the development and implementation of hostile vehicle mitigation (HVM) measures.

To better deal with the threat posed by HVA, three factors must be considered: First, the “normalization” of vehicles as weapons since 2015; second, there is now enough data available to recognize HVA patterns; and third, terrorism is not the main motivation, but rather everyday crime, such as domestic violence. For our analysis of nearly 800 HVA incidents worldwide that have occurred since 1 January 2021, we focus on the threat posed by “vehicles as weapons” against people and define such attacks as attempts to significantly and intentionally intimidate, injure or kill one or more people with a vehicle. This definition is close to the one used by Great Britain’s National Protective Security Authority (NPSA),[1] which also includes the use of vehicles in attacks targeting buildings. The known number of HVA incidents is misleading, as only a few countries maintain a specific statistical category for crimes of this nature. Hence, we describe our figures as “minimum numbers”, bearing in mind that numerous such incidents are not recorded, neither by the media nor by officials. Furthermore, our statistics do not include incidents resulting from fleeing the scene of an accident, road rage, accidents in general or the thousands of cases in which vehicles are used as a battering ram in robberies.

The “normalization” of the use of vehicles as weapons

Since 2014, the number of vehicle attacks has steadily increased worldwide, initially due to terrorism and since 2020 due to political violence and a newfound awareness of the tactic’s effectiveness. Three key factors accelerated this development: First, the awareness that a vehicle is the simplest, most efficient and most effective means of committing violence due to its easy access, ease of use, destructive power and minimal logistical effort. These advantages were underlined by Al-Qaeda and the so-called “Islamic State” organizations, notably in their propaganda platforms “Inspire” (AQ) and “Dabiq” (IS), where vehicles were described as the “ultimate mowing machines.”[2]

Second, the success of vehicular attacks encourages other perpetrators to also use vehicles as weapons. This development became apparent in 2017, when far-right extremists adopted the tactic and used it in attacks against the Finsbury Park Mosque in London on 19 June 2017 and against demonstrators in Charlottesville, Virginia, USA, on 12 August. This problem is also visible in attacks targeting the police, as was the case in Ireland in 2024 or against demonstrators, notably in 2021 and 2025 in the United States or in 2022 and 2023 in Germany.

And third, vehicular attacks are regularly encouraged as a violent tactic in and out of extremist circles. Outside extremist circles, the promotion or support for hostile vehicle attacks is visible not only in the aggressive rhetoric of chat groups but also in the reversal of the victim/perpetrator status[3] or the justification of the attacks as “self-defense”, as was often the case in Germany in 2022 and 2023 during the peak of the “Last Generation” protests in the country. The overall rhetoric in such cases is that drivers are simply exercising their right to use their car as a weapon if they deem it necessary.

Short-term factors such as headlines or political situations can also act as catalysts for hostile vehicle attacks. In 2020 and 2021, anti-vaccination or other COVID-19-related policies were often a motive for HVA, and the protests of the “Black Lives Matter” movements in the U.S. became a regular target of HVA over the same period. The terrorist attack by Hamas on 7 October 2023 in Israel and the Israeli government’s response to this attack also instigated a new wave of HVA in the Israel/Palestine region, as did the policies of U.S. President Donald Trump, in particular those relating to immigration.

Those developments have led to a significant increase overall in hostile vehicle attacks from 2020 onward. Both the increasing frequency of HVA and the high diversification of the motives behind such attacks suggest that the tactic has been “normalized”, i.e., its use is no longer exceptional.

The primary motives, targets and locations of HVA

The main motivation for HVA incidents is personal or remains undefined. This includes cases such as those in Magdeburg, where the attack was motivated by revenge against the German justice system; in Los Angeles, where the attacker targeted the crowd outside the club following his expulsion from the venue; or in Vancouver and Liverpool, where the motives for the attacks remain unknown to this date. They also include the growing number of attacks in which unhappy patrons in a restaurant choose to express their displeasure by targeting employees with their car. The second motivation is terrorism, albeit with a significant outlier: To date, 92% of terrorist hostile vehicle attacks have occurred in the Israel/Palestine region, of which a significant portion occurred since October 2023. The region plays such an important role in this case that, should we exclude the number from that region, terrorism would not even crack the top five motivations for HVA.

The third main motive is domestic violence, in which the attacker tried to injure or kill their respective partners or ex-partners with a vehicle. This has become a significant issue, especially in the United States, Germany and the United Kingdom. In fourth place are arguments or fights, which, as our study does not include cases of road rage, focus on the incidents in which one of the persons involved in the argument gets into a car and attempts to run over the other person. One of the most tragic incidents of this type occurred in Germany in September 2025, when an 18-year-old ran over boys aged 12 and 13 after getting into an argument with them. Finally, hate crime motivated HVA—Islamophobia, racism or antisemitism, for example—round up the top five. In 2025, politically motivated HVA that have not been categorized as terrorism, such as attacks on protesters, are becoming more frequent, notably in reaction to the policies of the Trump administration in the United States, and could become one of the top five motivations for HVA by the end of the year.

Unsurprisingly, the targets of HVA are a reflection of the motivations behind them. The most targeted group is civilians, such as people waiting at a bus stop, patrons and employees in a restaurant, pedestrians or shoppers. Second are security personnel, whether police officers, soldiers or security guards. This category also includes emergency services such as paramedics and firefighters. Even without the Irish and Israel/Palestine outliers, it must be stated that when it comes to attacks against security forces, the latter would still be the second-highest target group, and therefore, the outliers play no role for this category.

In third place as a target, in line with the importance of domestic violence as a trigger for HVA, are partners or ex-partners. One of the particular aspects of the attacks targeting those victims is the high rate of collateral casualties, such as children or bystanders who happen to be with or around the targeted person at the time. Additionally, these attacks cause significant material damage, as the partners will often be attacked with the car while they are sitting in their homes or shelters or in their own vehicles.

The fourth most targeted group is protesters, because drivers from the annoyed to the politically opposed increasingly decide to drive through blockades and, in some cases, through security barriers and even security personnel. Peculiar to this target group are the “casual” reasons given for running over protesters or police officers in such cases, which have seldom to do with the positions defended by the protesters. Attackers will invoke being late for work, having had a green light, having an urgent appointment or simply having had no time to wait. In one particular case, the attacker invoked a case of mistaken identity, as he thought he was driving through a protest by climate activists rather than pro-Palestinian demonstrators, to whom he might have been more sympathetic.

Lastly, the fifth most targeted group is government officials and buildings. The particular aspect of this type of target is that attackers target random employees inside the building by trying to crash through it. Along the way, they injure security personnel or employees standing outside, and in some cases, the attackers thus reach the building. Like the attacks occurring in and around restaurants, the building is secondary to the primary target, the employees, even if the symbolic value of the structure does play a small role. Among the particular locations for such attacks are embassies and consulates, as well as revenue, tax or justice buildings and their employees.

In terms of location, our data shows that the attack location is usually incidental to the target itself. Whereas the risk assessment conducted as part of hostile vehicle mitigation planning used to give a significant role to the symbolic value of a location as a target, this no longer appears to be the case. HVA incidents most often occur where the target finds itself, whether at a bus stop, in a parking lot, on a sidewalk or in a market. Attackers will usually “take what is available to them” rather than forcing the issue on a particular location. As the plans for the attack against the Taylor Swift concert in Vienna in August 2024 have shown, the focus of the attackers was not the stadium itself but rather the “Swifties” gathering outside the stadium to enjoy the atmosphere. This also underlines the weakness of the diffusion and displacement effects of security measures when it comes to HVA, as attackers will target the fringe of a protected area while benefiting from the same casualty rate and attention they would get from attacking the secure zone. However, this does not mean that major locations do not play a role in the selection of a target, but the choice will be based on the possibility for a high casualty rate rather than the value of the site itself.

An important misconception about hostile vehicle attacks is that perpetrators launch their attack from a distance in order to maximize speed and inflict maximum damage. Our data shows that this is very rarely the case, as the acceleration usually takes place within 40 meters of the attack site and that attackers will wait to be as close as possible to the target before accelerating. This is quite different, however, from the attack distance, which can stretch to multiple kilometers. Examples of this difference include the attacks in Nice (France) and Berlin (Germany) in 2016 and the attacks in Magdeburg and New Orleans at the end of 2024. In other words, the attacks begin once the vehicle is inside the secured area.

Development and modus operandi of planned hostile vehicle attacks

 Although most hostile vehicle attacks could be qualified as “spontaneous” and highly opportunistic, planned attacks like those motivated by terrorism are far more elaborate and often lead to a higher casualty rate. Specific to terrorism, HVA have the following characteristics:

• They are framed by a purpose that can be ideologically or morally streamlined.
• There is a higher degree of coherence when it comes to the motivation.
• Although the attacker acts alone, he is often linked to a broader structure like a network, whether online or offline.
• The likelihood that the attacker is willing to die during the attack is higher.
• Planned attacks often include a second wave of attack.

These elements were visible during the attack against the synagogue in Manchester on 2 October 2025 or in the attack in New Orleans. They also contrast with the attack in Magdeburg, which, although planned for nearly a year, did not demonstrate a degree of ideological or structural coherence, nor did it involve a broader network or a second wave.

The planning of an HVA, whether for terrorism or other reasons, has the following common denominators:

• The scouting phase of possible targets or target sites lasts on average six weeks and continues up to about one hour prior to the attack.
• Attackers look for weaknesses such as the quality of the security measures or the professionalism of security personnel.
• Attackers try to assess patterns such as traffic flows, delivery times, peaks and lows of attendance, possible obstructions and rotation phases of security personnel. This also includes individual patterns such as periods when security personnel take breaks or their general habits.
• The response of security personnel and emergency responders. How fast do emergency services arrive on site? Which routes do they use? Do the security personnel behave in an orderly, professional fashion, or do they panic?

Using this information, attackers try to assess the best opportunity to attack in order to maximize damage while minimizing the chances of failure. This is important because despite the planning, HVA remain opportunistic in nature. The attacker in Magdeburg used the sudden absence of a police vehicle acting as a barrier to enter the perimeter and to attack; the attacker in Vancouver waited for the garbage trucks that were used as barriers to be removed in order to enter the secure area; and the attacker in Liverpool used the sudden arrival of an ambulance to breach the perimeter and be in a position to attack.

The latter two attacks, in addition to the terrorist attack in Munich in February, also provide examples of a disturbing HVA trend that started to emerge in 2025: the use of deception to create an opportunity for attack. This raises very serious questions for hostile vehicle mitigation planners, who are confronted with the necessity to create lanes and access for emergency services at venues. And while the human factor plays a huge role in mitigating this problem, technical issues remain. Fortunately, some planners are already coming up with solutions to this challenge, as exemplified by the security infrastructure at Neckar stadium in Stuttgart, Germany.

Another worrying trend in 2025 is the use of artificial intelligence (AI) to plan attacks. AI is mostly used to obtain information on weaknesses and vulnerabilities, but also where to get weapons or certain materials. It provides attackers not only with information which they would otherwise not get access to, but also significantly reduces the time needed to collect information and thereby shortening the planning phase. AI in such cases is used as a tool, and even though there is no known HVA planned by an AI, known cases in which the technology has been used to help with the planning are increasing.

Evolution and future trends of HVA

The threat of hostile vehicle attacks has grown way beyond the terrorism silo to which it was nearly exclusively confined until the end of the 2010s. It has become more diverse, lethal and arguably more casual and common, turning into one of the most serious threats to the security of public spaces around the world. It is also becoming a more sophisticated tactic because the use of vehicles as “Molotov cocktails” to attack a specific person or site is increasing, and attackers are showing a greater capacity to wait for the right moment and, if necessary, create the right moment using deception. Combined with the knowledge made available by emerging technologies such as AI, this sophistication could significantly increase the destructive potential of HVA, making the tactic even more attractive for would-be attackers.

The prevention of HVA—and not only through hostile vehicle mitigation—requires that the problem must now be understood also outside the prism of terrorism, i.e., as a daily threat to the security of public spaces. In addition, it is necessary to understand that hostile vehicle attacks are no longer exceptional and part of an “acceptable risk” and that their use and lethality are increasing. The data made available by research such as ours makes it possible to not only better understand the problem and its trends but also contribute to developing solutions that can significantly reduce the impact of HVA. The data can help with the human element of prevention, such as identifying patterns or behaviors that could be linked to HVA; it can assist in better identifying high-risk areas for HVA, which would allow an efficient and effective implementation of HVM measures; and it can support event organizers and decision makers to better understand the threat level they are facing rather than working with assumptions, which has too often been the case up to now.

It remains to be determined if the increase of hostile vehicle attacks since 2020 is linked more broadly to the various periods of crises this decade is experiencing, all of which have contributed to a more tense sociopolitical climate: the COVID-19 pandemic and its management; the intense political polarization in which the use of violence to express political grievances is becoming more common; and the multiplication of regional conflicts and growing economic disparity between individuals and societies. It can be argued, however, based on the consistency of the use of HVA over the same period, that the problem is here to stay, and therefore, we must learn to use the tools and resources at our disposal to develop holistic and efficient solutions that will keep our public spaces safe.

[1] National Protective Security Authority, “Hostile Vehicle Mitigation (HVM),” NPSA, Last updated September 15, 2025, https://www.npsa.gov.uk/specialised-guidance/hostile-vehicle-mitigation-hvm.

[2] Yara Bayoumi, “Isis urges more attacks on Western ‘disbelievers,’” The Independent, September 23, 2014,  https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/isis-urges-more-attacks-on-western-disbelievers-9749512.html.

[3] Elizabeth Crisp, “DeSantis: Florida drivers have right to hit protesters if they need to ‘flee for your safety,’” The Hill, June 12, 2025, https://thehill.com/homenews/state-watch/5346295-desantis-florida-immigration-protests-drivers/.