China’s rapid economic growth and expanding role within the international community have made it the center of any discussion surrounding the Indo-Pacific. However, the region is home to more than one emerging superpower. A massive population, a quickly growing economy, and growing geopolitical ambitions make India China’s logical competitor. However, India’s role in the Indo-Pacific is often sidelined in favor of China’s activism in the South China Sea.
This research attempts to outline India’s strategy in the Indo-Pacific, its strategic position, and its international partners. It concludes that India holds a number of strategic positions in the Indo-Pacific, namely the Andaman and Nicobar Islands and the Straits of Malacca, giving it substantial leverage both in peace and during a potential conflict. Furthermore, its growing cooperation with the United States and other nations in the region serves to secure and shore up potential weaknesses in its military and domestic industries.
Nonetheless, China still maintains a significant lead in key industries and economic indicators, most pressingly, semiconductor manufacturing. The two nations’ relations have fluctuated, defined by periods of rapprochement, economic cooperation punctuated by geopolitical cooperation and violent border disputes.
Sino-Indian Relations
Today much of the two countries’ conflict is driven by border disputes on the isolated North Eastern Border, where India claims the currently Chinese-administered region of Aksai Chin (to the far north), and China, in turn, claims much of India’s easternmost state, Arunachal Pradesh. Today, the two sides maintain an uneasy border along the “Line of Actual Control”, an isolated, heavily militarized boundary that snakes through the Himalayan mountains.
These disputes reached a crescendo in 1962 with the outbreak of the Sino-Indian war, which ended in a decisive Chinese victory, after which they secured their control over Aksai Chin.[1] While the Sino-Indian war was the largest and most deadly border conflict, sporadic battles have continued to this day. More recently in 2020-2021,[2] and again in 2022,[3] when Indian and Chinese soldiers fought brutal melee battles at the Line of Actual Control.
After the 1962 war, there was a prolonged period of strained relations. Diplomatic ties were fully restored only in 1976 with the resumption of the exchange of ambassadors. Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi’s visit to China in 1988 opened a new chapter in bilateral relations. As relations have become less hostile, the two countries’ economies have become increasingly intertwined.
There has been steady development in exchanges and cooperation in military and security fields, including military-to-military dialogues, joint military exercises, information sharing on security issues, and cooperation on counter-terrorism efforts, although this has been punctuated by periods of tension. Initiatives like the Year of China-India Exchange (2011) and the Year of China-India Friendship and Cooperation (2012) have expanded cultural exchanges. Nonetheless, in recent years, there has been an increasing element of strategic competition between the two countries. While the most visible aspect of the Chinese-Indian conflict, these border disputes are part of a wider geopolitical, economic, and strategic competition that the two emerging superpowers have engaged in for decades.[4]
Semiconductors
China surpasses India in most economic and quality-of-life indicators, a distinction evident across several key industries. Notably, China leads significantly in semiconductor chip manufacturing, which both nations view as a crucial industry for the 21st century.
Semiconductor chips are now the foundation of modern society, used in everything from smartphones to ballistic missiles. Their manufacturing is a highly complex process that relies on strategic resources such as copper and silicon. In the 21st century, these chips have become essential to naval warfare, where missiles are the dominant weapons for warships. Modern naval warfare has evolved into an arms race between increasingly advanced missiles and equally sophisticated air defenses,[5] all of which require a steady supply of advanced microchips. The effectiveness of land-based anti-ship missiles in Ukraine further highlights the vulnerability of even the largest warships to these advanced missile technologies.
China far outstrips India in this sector, with 44 semiconductor foundries[6] to India’s four.[7] However, India does have several factors in its favor: its democratic nature and less antagonistic relations with the U.S., which have promoted cooperation between the two nations. An example of such collaboration includes the “Strategic semiconductor partnership” between U.S. General Atomics and Indian 3rdiTech, focused on the aforementioned precision-guided ammunition and “Security electronic platforms.”[8] India is much more able to accelerate its semiconductor industry through international cooperation and Indian companies are currently collaborating with Taiwanese Powerchip Semiconductor Manufacturing Corp (PSMC), Japanese Renesas Electronics Corp, and Thai Stars Microelectronics.[9]
Taiwan’s semiconductor industry makes up 68% of global supply, including 90% of the most advanced varieties. Moreover, 60% of China’s semiconductor supply is sourced directly from Taiwan. Taipei’s grip on such a vital industry, not only to China but to the world, has been termed its “Silicone Shield,”[10] as a potential invasion or indeed any major disruption to the global supply chain, would not only be crippling for China but would likely incentivize a military response from the U.S. and its allies, mainly India. ASML, the Dutch company that is the sole manufacturer of lithography machines essential for chip production, and the Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company (TSMC) have both confirmed that, in the event of an invasion, they could remotely disable the infrastructure necessary for chip fabrication.[11]
At the same time, the U.S. has launched a campaign of sanctions that have effectively stopped China’s import of U.S.-made chips and severely limited its access to fabrication technology and machinery.[12] Taiwan’s stranglehold on the semiconductor industry, combined with the U.S. effort to cripple China’s developing domestic industry, has ensured that China does not yet have the semiconductor capacity to risk a military confrontation in the Indo-Pacific.
Despite these challenges, China continues to make significant progress, now producing 16% of its domestic semiconductor needs.[13] In 2023, China began mass-producing a chip just two generations behind the most advanced ones manufactured in Taiwan and the U.S.
China’s growing confidence in high-tech sectors and its ability to manufacture essential components domestically will doubtlessly translate into growing confidence to act more decisively in the Indo-Pacific and a widening of the gap when it comes to communications, computing, and the defense industry when compared to India.
An essential element in mitigating a more aggressive China is the nation’s fear of a “foreign supply shock”[14]—an unexpected event that decreases supply and increases prices.[15] In China’s case, it is almost certain that a war in the Indo-Pacific would cripple the supply chains that China relies on for its enormous domestic chip market. In 2023, China imported $349.4 billion worth of semiconductor chips—more by value than its imports of crude oil.[16] Electronics remain vital to China’s export-driven economy, making up 28% of the country’s exports in 2000.18 These exports are also essential for several emerging markets that China aims to dominate, including electric vehicles (EVs), artificial intelligence (AI), and satellites.
Semiconductor manufacturing is closely linked to China’s military-industrial complex and national strategy, particularly through the policy of “Civil-Military Fusion” (CMF). This policy promotes cooperation, resource sharing, and technology exchange between civilian and military sectors. It involves utilizing civilian resources and facilities for military purposes during wartime and leveraging civilian technological advancements to enhance military capabilities.[17]
The criticality of semiconductor chips to China’s military is such that the armed forces play a central role in China’s effort to prop up new firms and achieve national self-sufficiency. When combined with state support, contracts for defense-related production keep uncompetitive Chinese companies in business long enough to develop their technologies for the global market. For instance, Jingia Micro, originally developed Graphical Processing Units (GPUs) under military contract for use in radar and satellites. However, through the CMF program in 2019, they expanded into the civilian market[18] and again in 2024 successfully expanded into AI computing.[19]
As mentioned, China has not been able to develop its advanced chip manufacturing capabilities past the point that limitations on China’s imports are not damaging, and U.S. sanctions, focused on “advanced manufacturing capabilities” have been quite effective.[20]
As China seeks to insulate itself against a possible supply shock, satisfy its domestic market’s appetite, and secure the resources necessary for a robust, technologically advanced military amid foreign sanctions or blockades, it will become more capable militarily.
Freedom of Navigation
A key concern for India regarding the South China Sea doubtlessly mirrors that of nearly all the nations involved in the developing conflict: Freedom of Navigation. A 2017 report by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) details just how crucial free access to the South China Sea is for world trade; a third of all global shipping passes through the sea, totaling an estimated US$3.4 trillion.[21]
For India, the issue of maritime trade is magnified. Trade by land is exceptionally challenging as the only land routes out of the country must pass through the steep mountains on India’s northern border. As such, 95% of India’s trade is by sea,[22] and 55% of that trade passes through the South China Sea and the Straits of Malacca.[23]
To ensure the free passage of these vital sea lanes, the U.S. Navy regularly conducts Freedom of Navigation Operations (FONOPs) in waters it considers international. Between 2015 and 2023, 39 such operations took place.[24] FONOPs serve as a powerful tool for U.S. power projection, allowing the U.S. to enforce its interests and position itself as a credible counterweight to China, particularly in the South China Sea, despite the region’s distance from the U.S. Should India want to ensure freedom of trade in the South China Sea, they must be more willing to deploy their assets further afield and ensure freedom of navigation for themselves. Having said that, India has also demonstrated a willingness to engage in similar law enforcement and to take international leadership roles at sea, most notably, in the Straits of Malacca.
Straits of Malacca
The narrow passage connecting the Indian Ocean and the South China Sea, between Indonesia and Malaysia, the Straits of Malacca sees 94,000 ships[25] pass through each year despite being only 40 km wide at its narrowest point.[26] While these waterways are already crucial to international trade, the Straits of Malacca are even more essential to China, both for the South China Sea and wider social, economic, and geopolitical aims in the Indo-Pacific. While the Straits of Malacca carry an enormous amount of China’s exports, they more crucially carry somewhere around 80% of the nation’s oil imports.[27] In peacetime, control of the Straits of Malacca positions India as one of the cornerstones of free trade and a nation that China must appease if it wants to keep its oil flowing. However, in wartime, the straits become even more essential, denying China 80% of its oil would cripple its military-industrial complex and its ability to wage a war of any kind in the South China Sea or Indo-Pacific.
Andaman and Nicobar Islands
Akin to China in the South China Sea, New Delhi has recognized the essential nature of islands as both claims to territory and staging posts for military operations. In this case, they come in the form of the Andaman and Nicobar Islands, India’s farthest-flung Union Territory. Since the beginning of the 21st century, their essential role as India’s gateway to the Straits of Malacca and the South China Sea has seen the outpost become a center for New Delhi’s strategic aims in the Indo-Pacific.
In 2001, all of India’s military operations in Andaman and Southeast Asia were united under the banner of the Joint Andaman and Nicobar Command (ANC). This is an entirely unique organization, created to synthesize the operation of the Army, Navy, and Air Force, all of which must operate in synergy in the unique environment of the South China Sea. The wider strategic purpose of the ANC is encapsulated by its four “strategic-specific tasks”: sea-based deterrence, economic and energy security, forward presence, and naval diplomacy.[28]
While the military project in the Andamans serves to secure strategically vital waterways and cripple China in the event of a shooting war, it also serves India’s wider strategic objective of presenting itself as a world power and a leader in the international community.
Since 1995 India has conducted naval exercises with several nations. The first exercise involved Indonesia, Singapore, Sri Lanka, and Thailand.[29] These early exercises marked the start of India’s involvement in the successful anti-piracy campaign in the Straits of Malacca.
Starting in 2012, these exercises transitioned to become “Operation Milan”, a massive biannual multinational exercise around the Andaman and Nicobar Islands. The inaugural exercise in January 2012 involved 14 nations and focused on “maritime terrorism, piracy, and poaching as well as humanitarian and search and rescue operations.”[30] Subsequently, Operation Milan has expanded massively in scale, with the 2024 edition involving close to 20 ships from allied nations and lasting 8 days.[31] The Andamans lend further credibility to India’s participation in international alliances like the QUAD,[32] the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue made up of India, Japan, Australia, and the U.S., all of which share a common cause in containing the growing China’s influence and securing access to the Indo-Pacific.[33] These exercises demonstrate India’s ability to lead, both in international law enforcement but also in the emerging international coalition in the Indo-Pacific.
The ANC and the wider project to reinforce the Andaman and Nicobar Islands and, in turn, India’s eastern flank is a direct response to Indian concern over Chinese activism. In 1994, there was a flurry of speculation that China was constructing a listening and radar post on Myanmar’s Coco islands, just 55 km from Andaman, from which it was believed they could listen in on Indian military communications and observe top secret missile tests conducted in the Andamans.[34] While this turned out to be false, the construction of a runway, radar station, and other military facilities on the island in 2023 reignited these concerns, especially as Myanmar has become much more closely allied to China since 2021.[35]
India-Russia Cooperation
World powers continue to court India as it becomes more evident that it will play a significant role in international politics. These nations do this for a variety of reasons, but India’s economic and strategic strength has set expectations and continues to forge a unique path between them.
India’s once-strong alliance with Russia is weakening, particularly in the area of defense. Russian weapon exports, which were once the cornerstone of their partnership, made up 64% of India’s arms imports from 2013 to 2017. However, this figure dropped to 45% in 2022[36] and continues to decline steadily.[37]
Several factors contribute to this decline. In recent years, the war in Ukraine has prompted India to turn to the United States for more advanced and reliable weapons systems. For example, Russian main battle tanks, namely the T-90 and T-72 M models,[38] make up the core of India’s armored forces but have been effectively countered by U.S. and UK-made Javelin and NLAW anti-tank weapons in Ukraine.[39]
Despite the Russia-Ukraine conflict and India’s improving relations with the U.S., India has stood by its ally. Indeed, in 2023, 57% of Indians had favorable opinions of Russia compared to a median of just 17% in the other countries polled.[40] This positive sentiment extends to India’s diplomatic relations and New Delhi has repeatedly declined to condemn Russia for its war in Ukraine.[41]
Since the start of the Ukraine war, Indian imports of Russian oil have increased massively (13-fold).[42] While this supports the Russian war effort in defiance of Western sanctions, it’s also a decision rooted firmly in self-interest. It’s estimated that Indian oil refiners saved US$10.5 billion by buying heavily discounted Russian oil,[43] and it’s easy to see why India has seized the opportunity. India is dependent on imports for 87.7% of its oil and the Indian external affairs minister pointed out that New Delhi’s responsibility will always be to secure discounted energy for its population, most of which don’t have the income to withstand inflated oil prices.[44] Moving forward, exactly how India will resolve its close relationship with Russia with growing cooperation with the U.S., especially as its strategic focus shifts toward China remains unclear.
As India has moved away from Russian weapons, its ties with the U.S. have become stronger. In 2024, during the second meeting of the U.S.-India initiative on Critical and Emerging Technologies (CET), the two nations concluded a deal for 31 MQ-9B drones (Predator Drones), specifically for deployment to the Line of Actual Control and the Indian Ocean.[45]
This deal is particularly significant due to the U.S.’s willingness to support the development of India’s indigenous defense industry. The drones will be armed with domestically produced weaponry and eventually joined by 97 “Made-in-India” drones.[46] Additionally, discussions are also underway for American companies to consult on India’s indigenous advanced UAV program.[47]
The fact that India is the only non-NATO country to receive permission to purchase fully weaponized predator drones has made procurement the most visible part of the initiative.[48] However, the iCET produced several other agreements for cooperation in numerous industries, including microchip manufacturing but also in AI and quantum computing, critical minerals supply chains, biotech and pharmaceutical production and development, telecommunications, and civilian and defense space technology.[49]
While adding 31 drones may not significantly boost India’s overall military capabilities, author Arzan Tarapore argues that the key to effectively enhancing India’s defense, especially when it cannot afford a costly and resource-intensive modernization like China’s,[50] lies in the U.S. assisting India in acquiring a few “high-value niche military capabilities,” including U.S.-made transportation aircraft.
The recent drone deal represents the furtherance of this idea. The devastating effect of drones against a technologically and militarily superior opponent has been a proven battlefield tactic in Ukraine.[51] As India develops its drone industry and UAVs become easier to manufacture, the effect of a low-cost, highly flexible asset like high-quality UAVs will magnify India’s defense capabilities and enable it to punch above its weight in near-peer conflict and peacetime.
Despite the U.S. and India’s recent history of cooperation, their relations so far have been defined by India’s unwillingness to commit to siding with the U.S. definitively. Indeed, some commentators believe this to be a crippling barrier to U.S.-India cooperation. Ganguly and Mistree, writing for Foreign Affairs, argue that India must look past the two nations’ rocky relationship if it wants to seriously counter a growing China,[52] while others argue that India is fundamentally unwilling to sacrifice its strategic autonomy and that the U.S. would be foolish to hope for a future alliance.[53]
Nonetheless, this relationship is fraught with mutual distrust. During the Cold War, the U.S. consistently supported Pakistan, providing military and economic aid, which deepened the rift between India and the U.S.[54] The sudden American withdrawal from Afghanistan further complicated matters, leaving India to recess and reorganize its regional strategy in the face of shifting power dynamics in its neighborhood.[55]
U.S. President Joe Biden referenced the nation’s shared values, saying, “The United States and India— the world’s oldest and largest democracies—are a combined force for global good.”[56] It remains to be seen if shared values and cooperation agreements will grow into a reliable defense partnership.
Conclusion
Throughout this research, there is one recurring theme—that while China outstrips India in key industries and domestic military production, India’s careful balancing of relations over the years has meant that it is far better placed to fill in these gaps through strategic partnerships with a variety of nations.
India has successfully leveraged its shared interests and amicable relations with the West to quickly catch up to China in several key industries and looks set to advance these relationships further. However, the uncertainty surrounding its relationship with Russia raises the question of whether or not India can secure the arms it needs to establish itself as an undisputable superpower in the Indo-Pacific.
India’s strategy toward the South China Sea and the broader Indo-Pacific reflects a keen awareness of its own strengths and its opponents’ weaknesses. By developing the Andaman Islands as a strategic hub to secure the Strait of Malacca, India effectively exploits China’s vulnerabilities and leverages its unique geography to project power and safeguard its maritime interests. However, India’s ability to outcompete its rivals in the region will depend on its willingness and capacity to take a leading role in force projection and enforcing international law in the South China Sea. Additionally, India’s success will hinge on realizing its emerging strategic partnerships and reducing economic dependence on its rivals.
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