Türkiye announced on 15 October the discovery of 694 million tons of rare earth element reserves in Eskişehir province. The country applied to the Joint Ore Reserves Committee (JORC) for certification of the discovery a short while ago; however, Türkiye’s quest to find a technology partner to extract and process the reserves began long before.[1] As a source of tension between China and the United States, Türkiye is likely to leverage the reserve discovery to amplify its policies for strategic autonomy. While Türkiye’s finding in the Beylikova field is unlikely to bring short-term gains due to technical hurdles and infrastructural shortcomings, Türkiye might find an important role as a supplier to Western industries in the mid-term.[2] Rare earth elements (REE), referring to 17 specific metals, are considered vital components of modern industrial use such as mobile phones, electric vehicles, civil aviation, defense industries, and clean-energy machinery. Multiple authoritative assessments project continued growth in REE demand to 2040 as electrification and clean-energy deployment accelerate.[3]
President Erdoğan announced Türkiye’s ambitions to become among the five largest producers of REE. Türkiye launched site operations in Eskişehir province in 2011, and the drilling operations have continued since then to evaluate the scope of the reserve. In 2022, initial analyses revealed that Türkiye has one of the world’s largest REE sites with approximately 694 million tons, often compared to China’s Bayan Obo mining district with over 800 million tons of ore. Turkish media report initial reserve findings in Sivas, Malatya, and Burdur provinces, despite no official confirmation on the scope of those reserves. The country established the Research Institute for Rare Earth Elements (NATEN) under the Turkish Energy, Nuclear and Mining Research Institute (TENMAK), an entity operating under Türkiye’s energy ministry as a research body on energy technologies, nuclear energy, and raw materials to increase scientific know-how on REEs. The newly highlighted site contains 10 of the 17 known REE—materials critical to defense industries, renewable energy systems, electric vehicles, communications, and space technology.
The announcement of the discovery came at a time when China’s control over REE supplies had become a central issue in U.S.-China rivalry. As a potential newcomer to REE markets, Türkiye does not yet have the full suite of technologies to process the elements, which makes it reliant on foreign technology transfer from a partner. Talks with the Chinese side ended in deadlock, as Beijing has historically resisted sharing core separation and refining know-how, a position that Ankara regards as a non-starter. President Erdoğan has emphasized that Türkiye will not relinquish control of strategic assets to foreign entities.[4] China’s strict rules on technology transfer for REE reach a level where China-based companies are constrained from consulting third parties without state approval.[5]
Türkiye adamantly needs technology transfer, as this is a crucial factor for its autonomous foreign-policy goals. This issue is also poised to reverberate in domestic politics. Supporters frame the discovery as a strategic breakthrough; critics warn against inflated expectations without a clear technological and financial roadmap.[6]
Türkiye’s flirting with Chinese and U.S. companies
In September 2024, Türkiye signed a memorandum of understanding with a Chinese state company to attempt a partnership for processing REE from the newly publicized deposit. However, Bloomberg reported that the Chinese side insisted on processing the materials in China rather than Türkiye and resisted sufficient technology transfer.[7] Because Türkiye wants refining and value-added capacity to remain within the country, the Chinese deal faltered. Owing to the stalemate with China, Türkiye opened discussions with the United States to develop the deposit with a Western partner, signaling a shift.[8] A deal with a U.S. company would likely improve Türkiye-U.S. economic ties; however, Türkiye’s REE strategy is designed to extend beyond presidential terms. As the importance of REE rises in global energy and industrial markets, Türkiye’s plans to become a newcomer that diversifies REE supplies—reducing dependence on China—may play a lasting positive role in Türkiye-U.S. relations over the coming decades.
Türkiye is one of the countries that suffers from China’s economic dominance and trade policies that are often viewed as aggressive by Turkish private-sector representatives. Türkiye’s trade deficit with China is substantial; China is the top source of Türkiye’s imports by country, and policymakers have publicly pursued measures to narrow the gap.[9] Official statistics in mid-2024 showed China as the leading source of Türkiye’s imports and indicated a cumulative foreign-trade deficit of around US$43 billion in the first half of the year.[10] The great imbalance in trade with China and dependence on Chinese intermediate products would likely worsen if China processed Türkiye’s REE under terms that limited domestic value-added. Recent Chinese investments in Türkiye are not yet sufficient to rebalance trade.
Türkiye imports high-value manufactured and technological goods from China—such as electronics and machinery—while exporting mostly lower-value raw materials, agricultural products, and intermediate goods. This imbalance limits Türkiye’s economic gains. Additionally, logistical challenges, limited access to China’s domestic market, and non-tariff barriers make it harder for Turkish exporters to compete. The dominance of Chinese products in Türkiye’s market also pressures local industries. Combined with currency fluctuations and weak diversification, these factors create an uneven trade relationship that heavily favors China.[9]
Türkiye is likely to turn REE into a geopolitical advantage
As a country with geopolitical aspirations in the region and beyond, Türkiye is likely to turn its large REE reserve into an advantage. A country with historically limited gas and oil reserves—despite recent discoveries in the Black Sea and southeastern Türkiye—Ankara understands the importance of energy geopolitics. The energy crisis in Europe that intensified after the Russia-Ukraine war in 2022 heightened Türkiye’s role in energy politics due to its crucial geographic position. Recent increases in the Gabar oil field’s production (approximately 80,000 barrels per day) and new discoveries in neighboring districts have boosted Türkiye’s energy independence plans.[11]
Since 2022, Türkiye has become an increasingly important actor in Europe’s energy security, especially following the disruption of Russian natural-gas supplies. As the European Union (EU) sought to diversify its energy sources and routes, Türkiye’s strategic geographic position—as a bridge between the Caspian and the Middle East and European markets—gained new importance. Türkiye’s LNG infrastructure and aspirations to become a regional gas hub add weight to its significance for Europe’s energy security.
Türkiye serves as a vital transit hub for Caspian energy, particularly through the Southern Gas Corridor, which carries Azerbaijani gas from the Shah Deniz field via the South Caucasus Pipeline, the Trans-Anatolian Natural Gas Pipeline (TANAP), and the Trans-Adriatic Pipeline (TAP) into southern Europe. This corridor has become a cornerstone of the EU’s diversification strategy, reducing dependence on Russian gas.[12] Türkiye has also positioned itself as an emerging regional energy hub by investing in LNG terminals, interconnectors, and storage capacity, allowing greater flexibility in supply.
Since the Russia-Ukraine war began in 2022, Europe has faced severe natural-gas challenges, including price spikes, supply shortages, and the urgent need to replace Russian pipeline gas, which once accounted for around 40% of EU imports. Additional shocks to pipeline infrastructure and supply cuts intensified these problems. In response, European countries increased LNG imports (especially from the United States and Qatar), accelerated renewable-energy investments, and strengthened cooperation with Türkiye and Caspian suppliers. Thus, Türkiye’s energy corridors and infrastructure have become essential to Europe’s long-term energy resilience and diversification strategy.
Why does the REE reserve discovery offer a window of opportunity for Türkiye?
Despite the name, these minerals are not particularly rare—but their extraction and refinement are technologically challenging and environmentally taxing.[13] This complexity has enabled China to dominate the global market, accounting for roughly 70% of current production and close to 90% of refining capacity.[14]
In 2024, the EU imported a total of 12,900 tons of REE—a sharp 29.3% decline compared with 2023, mainly due to slowing growth in certain industries.[15] China continued to dominate the EU’s REE imports in 2024, with China, Russia, and Malaysia collectively accounting for the overwhelming majority.[16] The same year, the United States imported rare-earth compounds and metals valued at about US$170 million (down from US$86 million in 2023), remaining highly dependent on foreign suppliers—most notably China.[17] This dependence underscores a persistent strategic vulnerability in sectors vital to defense, clean energy, and advanced manufacturing.
Ankara’s rare-earth strategy represents a critical window of opportunity—one that can both advance the nation’s pursuit of strategic autonomy and position it as a pivotal link in a restructured global supply chain, using this leverage to strengthen its alliances within the Western bloc while reducing collective dependence on China. Beijing’s evolving export controls and regulatory measures have highlighted the geopolitical risks of concentrated supply chains and underscored the strategic value of alternative producers.[18] [19] Besides a potential strategic advantage as a key supplier to Europe and other Western economies, Türkiye’s rapidly growing defense industry could significantly benefit from local production.
Western nations view overwhelming dependence on China as a major vulnerability in global competition and are taking coordinated steps to diversify supply chains. Efforts focus on developing alternative mining sources in countries like the United States (Mountain Pass), Australia (Lynas), and Canada, as well as in Africa. Because refining is China’s strongest advantage, Western governments are investing in new processing and separation facilities in the United States and Europe. The Minerals Security Partnership (MSP), launched by the United States and allies, promotes cooperation to secure sustainable, transparent supply chains.[20] [21] [22] Simultaneously, the West is expanding REE recycling from electronic waste and researching substitute materials to reduce dependency. Overall, the strategy aims to build a resilient and diversified REE ecosystem that limits China’s dominance and safeguards critical industries, especially as global demand for renewable-energy technologies and electric vehicles continues to rise.
Realistic timeline for Türkiye’s entry to global markets
If exploration, permitting, and pilot testing proceed without significant obstacles—and provided that Ankara secures the necessary foreign technology and financing—Türkiye could initiate limited industrial-scale production of rare-earth oxides within approximately three to five years. However, the timeline for achieving large-scale output of separated, high-purity REE suitable for integration into international high-technology and defense supply chains remains uncertain and depends on many factors. The key uncertainties are the independent verification of the deposit and the successful scaling of separation and refining technologies.[22]
Currently, the Beylikova Pilot Plant serves as the focal point of Türkiye’s REE development efforts. The facility is designed to process around 1,200 tons of ore annually at pilot scale, with plans to upgrade it into an industrial-scale operation capable of handling approximately 570,000 tons per year. Once fully operational, this expansion is projected by officials to generate significant export and fiscal revenues for Türkiye. Public statements by Türk authorities indicate that the government intends to lay the foundation of the industrial facility and bring it online within a two-year horizon from groundbreaking.[23]
According to Sait Uysal, founder of the Turkish Critical Minerals Initiative, Türkiye’s ability to meet its REE ambitions will depend heavily on international collaboration and technology sharing. Partnerships that include the transfer of know-how could enable Türkiye not merely to supply raw materials but to develop value-added processing and potentially downstream manufacturing capacity.[24] Türkiye’s Energy and Natural Resources Minister, Alparslan Bayraktar, has emphasized the objective of establishing an industrial plant capable of processing roughly 570,000 tons of ore annually, underscoring Ankara’s intent to anchor value-added steps domestically.[25]
How will this affect Türkiye’s domestic politics?
Environmental concerns are emerging as an increasingly potent, if indirect, force in Türkiye’s domestic politics. Unlike in continental Europe, where Green parties hold measurable electoral influence and institutional representation, Türkiye’s environmental movement remains fragmented, issue-based, and largely outside formal party politics. Yet this limited organizational power belies a deeper political resonance. Environmentalists in Türkiye, through activism and appeals to public interest, have repeatedly demonstrated their ability to energize the main opposition—the Republican People’s Party (CHP)—and to shape national narratives. The discovery in the Beylikova deposit in Eskişehir illustrates how environmental and nationalist concerns can fuse into a politically salient theme. When large-scale mining operations begin, the issue is expected to gain greater salience on the national agenda.
The extraction and processing of REE are environmentally intensive, producing large volumes of toxic waste and posing long-term ecological risks. This contradiction—between industrial ambition and environmental fragility—has become a focal point for domestic political contention. Environmentalists have raised concerns about transparency, environmental impact assessments, and community rights. Over the past decade, Türkiye has witnessed repeated waves of environmental protests, from opposition to hydroelectric dams in the Black Sea region to mining projects in Kazdağları (a mountain range located in northwestern Türkiye). These local movements often align with broader objections to centralized decision-making. While such mobilization may not decisively alter national voting behavior, it shapes public discourse and local governance dynamics.
Opposition figures have questioned the strategic value of REE production for Türkiye, given the current gap in domestic processing capacity. Some commentators argue that selling raw ore would constitute a premature depletion of non-renewable national assets, absent a clear plan to integrate into high-value industrial chains. In their view, deferring extraction until higher-value production is feasible may be a more prudent strategic choice. Government officials counter that moving ahead in phases—pilot, industrial processing, and then advanced separation—remains essential if Türkiye is to build an indigenous ecosystem.
The government maintains control over policy implementation, regulatory oversight, and media framing, while the opposition must rely on symbolic politics—mobilizing perception rather than legislation. Environmental controversies like Beylikova serve precisely this function: they provide emotionally resonant narratives that interrogate the alignment between nationalist rhetoric and developmental practice. Each new environmental dispute becomes a microcosm of Türkiye’s larger struggle between modernization and conservation, and between centralized power and participatory governance.
Looking ahead, the domestic political significance of environmental issues is likely to deepen. As Türkiye expands its mining and energy sectors to support industrial and green-transition goals, tensions over land use, pollution, and local consent will intensify. Even if environmentalists remain politically fragmented, their influence—and the opposition’s readiness to adopt their concerns—ensures that ecology will remain a recurring site of political confrontation. The interplay of environmental anxiety, national pride, and geopolitical calculation suggests that Türkiye’s path to resource independence will be as politically contested as it is economically ambitious.
The likely effect on Turkish society in the next election cycle
Türkiye has long faced the challenge of limited natural resources, relying heavily on imports for energy, minerals, and industrial raw materials. This dependence has often been seen as a weakness, contributing to trade deficits and economic vulnerability. At the same time, recent developments—such as increased oil production in the Gabar field and the localization of certain high-technology and defense platforms—have bolstered perceptions of national capability.
Against this backdrop, the discovery of REE deposits has sparked renewed optimism among constituencies that prioritize strategic autonomy. If Türkiye can successfully explore, extract, and process these elements—anchoring value-added steps domestically—it could strengthen technological and economic independence, reduce import dependence, and even become a strategic supplier for Europe. Beyond economic potential, such a discovery carries strong symbolic value—offering a sense of pride that Türkiye may possess a resource with global importance and transformative potential. Public sensitivity regarding foreign involvement remains high; disinformation about “selling” the Beylikova project abroad has already prompted official rebuttals.[26] Survey evidence also suggests that narratives about external constraints on Türkiye’s resource development resonate with portions of the electorate.[27]
Conclusion
Türkiye’s discovery of substantial rare earth element reserves in Eskişehir may mark a turning point in its strategic autonomy goals. Should the new discovery be managed effectively, this development could help reposition Türkiye within global supply chains for critical materials. The REE reserves provide an opportunity not only to reduce trade imbalances but also to align Türkiye’s industrial ambitions with its geopolitical aspirations. However, the discovery alone does not guarantee transformation. Without international partnerships that include genuine technology transfer, it is unlikely that Türkiye will become an integrated producer or supplier of high-value components.
From a geopolitical perspective, Türkiye’s emerging role as a potential alternative to China in the next decade in REE supply chains could strengthen its standing within Western alliances. By leveraging its geographic position between Europe and Asia, Türkiye could contribute to global efforts aimed at diversifying critical mineral supply chains—a strategic priority shared by the EU and the United States. In domestic politics, the issue may become part of the day-to-day debate due to environmental side effects. As mining and refining operations expand, public scrutiny and ecological concerns will intensify, shaping the political narrative—especially ahead of the next presidential elections, if held in 2028.
Türkiye’s rare earth initiative encapsulates a broader national project—bringing industrial modernization, geopolitical ambition, and environmental responsibility together. Whether the Eskişehir discovery becomes a catalyst for sustainable development or a case study in missed potential will depend on Ankara’s ability to reconcile these competing imperatives. Success would enable Türkiye to emerge as a credible regional actor in global supply chains for REEs—resources often described as the “oil of the future.”
End Notes
[1] “How Türkiye’s bid for rare earth independence carries global overtones,” Türkiye Today, October 6, 2025.
[2] “China’s crackdown on rare earths causes alarm for the automotive industry,” ING Research, June 10, 2025.
[3] “Nadir toprak elementlerinde ilk 5 hedefi için uluslararası işbirlikleri kilit rol oynayacak,” Anadolu Agency (Energy Terminal), October 17, 2025.
[4] Republic of Türkiye – Directorate of Communications, “Eskişehir’deki NTE sahasının ABD’ye devredileceği iddialarına ilişkin açıklama,” October 8, 2025.
[5] “What to know about China’s new regulations on rare earths,” Associated Press, September 2025.
[6] “Beylikova’daki NTE rezervine dair bilinenler ve bilinmeyenler,” Bianet, October 9, 2025.
[7] “Turkey Seeks Chinese Partnership on Rare Earth Elements for EVs,” Bloomberg, September 3, 2024.
[8] “Turkey Eyes US Rare Earths Deal After China, Russia Talks Slow,” Bloomberg, October 6, 2025.
[9] “Turkey told Beijing it wants to boost agricultural and food exports to China,” Reuters, June 5, 2024.
[10] Foreign Trade Statistics – June 2024 (tables showing China as top import source and a first-half deficit of around USD 43 billion), TurkStat (TÜİK).
[11] “Gabar Mountain oil production reaches 81,000 barrels daily, meeting 8% of Türkiye’s needs,” Türkiye Today, May 19, 2025.
[12] European Commission, “International trade in critical raw materials — Statistics Explained.”
[13] International Energy Agency (IEA), “China’s share in rare-earth magnet production, 2024,” updated October 6, 2025.
[14] Goldman Sachs via Reuters round-up and broader industry analyses indicating China ~69–70% mining and ~90% refining.
[15] “Imports of rare earth elements saw 30% drop in 2024,” Eurostat News, April 9, 2025.
[16] “International trade in critical raw materials — Statistics Explained,” Eurostat, 2025 update.
[17] USGS, Mineral Commodity Summaries 2025 — Rare Earths, March 2025.
[18] “What to know about China’s new regulations on rare earths,” Associated Press, 2025.
[19] “Rare earths: China’s magnet war threatens global industry,” Le Monde (English edition), June 7, 2025.
[20] U.S. Department of State, “Minerals Security Partnership (MSP),” official page.
[21] European Commission, “Commission hosts the Minerals Security Partnership to advance critical raw materials projects,” December 12, 2024.
[22] “G7 Cooperation to De-Risk Minerals Investments in the Global South,” CSIS, May 7, 2025.
[23] Republic of Türkiye – Ministry of Energy and Natural Resources, press item on Beylikova: the industrial facility foundation and two-year commissioning goal (October 29, 2025).
[24] “Rare earth element reserves in Turkey: What is known and what remains unknown,” Bianet, October 11, 2025.
[25] Anadolu Agency/Energy Terminal and ministerial statements summarizing the plan to process ~570,000 t/y at industrial scale.
[26] Republic of Türkiye – Directorate of Communications, “Statement on claims that the Eskişehir NTE field would be transferred to the US,” October 8, 2025.
[27] 2018 survey on public perceptions of the Treaty of Lausanne’s “secret clauses,” KONDA Research.
