As global conflicts grow more complex, exacerbating humanitarian crises and unfolding within a post-war, rules-based international order that is becoming increasingly fragile, the Women, Peace and Security (WPS) agenda remains a strategic pillar for inclusive and durable peace. Nearly 25 years after the adoption of UN Security Council Resolution 1325, NATO’s renewed WPS Policy, anchored in its 2022 Strategic Concept, reaffirms the importance of gender-responsive leadership, participation, prevention, and protection across all its core tasks. But NATO cannot advance this agenda in isolation.

This insight will examine how deeper NATO-EU coordination, particularly with the EU’s Gender Action Plan III and its civilian crisis response capabilities, can elevate WPS from policy to practice. With NATO’s defense posture and the EU’s diplomatic and development tools, both institutions are uniquely positioned to mainstream gender into conflict prevention, peacebuilding, and institutional leadership. In an era of mounting geopolitical risk, sidelining gender in favor of “hard” security not only undermines long-term stability but also fails to recognize the strategic value of gender inclusion.

This insight argues that WPS must be seen not as a parallel agenda but as a shared strategic asset central to both NATO and the EU’s missions. Such a relationship cannot come at a more critical time considering the United States Department of Defense’s recent pullback of the WPS agenda throughout the agency. It is worth recalling that the United States became the first country to pass comprehensive legislation on the Women, Peace and Security agenda when President Donald Trump signed the WPS Act into law in 2017, during his first term, with then-Senator, now Secretary of State, Marco Rubio as one of its co-sponsors. The Act underscores the importance of ensuring women’s equal and meaningful participation in peacebuilding, security, and decision-making processes.[1]

UNSCR 1325

The structure of Resolution 1325 rests on four interrelated pillars, each aimed at embedding gender perspectives into global peace and security efforts. The first pillar emphasizes the prevention of conflict, including efforts to address the root causes of violence and to strengthen early warning mechanisms. The second calls for the participation of women at all levels of decision-making, particularly within peace and security processes. The third highlights the need for the protection of women and girls during armed conflict, especially from sexual and gender-based violence. Finally, the fourth pillar underscores the importance of women’s involvement in peacebuilding and post-conflict recovery, recognizing their indispensable role in achieving lasting peace and stability.

Resolution 1325, adopted unanimously by the UN Security Council in October 2000, represented a turning point in global recognition of gendered experiences in war. Over the following two decades, it was reinforced by nine additional resolutions that collectively form the Women, Peace and Security (WPS) agenda. This growing body of international law acknowledged that traditional security frameworks had long overlooked the specific impacts of conflict on women and failed to harness their potential as peacebuilders.

The rationale behind the resolution was shaped by the changing nature of warfare and its devastating toll on civilians. As conflicts increasingly target population centers and employ advanced weaponry, women and children have become disproportionately affected. In addition to greater risks of gender-based and sexual violence, women also experience the secondary impacts of conflict, such as the loss of spouses to conscription, economic hardship, and increased caregiving responsibilities. In the aftermath of war, their exclusion from peace processes further undermines sustainable recovery and long-term stability.

The consequences extend beyond physical harm. Women are often left as sole heads of households due to conscription or the death of spouses and children, forcing them into unfamiliar roles as primary breadwinners, an especially daunting transition for those who were previously homemakers or caregivers. Despite these realities, women remain underrepresented in post-conflict recovery. As of 2022, only one in three peace agreements references gender, and those that exclude women are 50% more likely to fail.

UNSCR 1325 emerged as a landmark resolution to acknowledge these gaps by formally recognizing the critical role women play in conflict prevention, resolution, and peacebuilding, and by calling for their full and equal participation in all efforts to maintain and promote peace and security. To guarantee that peace negotiated today becomes a mandated, accountable status quo in the future, a whole-of-government strategy that involves both legislatures and civil society is still essential to lasting success outcomes.

Given today’s volatile global security landscape, marked by the humanitarian catastrophe in Gaza, the protracted war in Ukraine, the Taliban’s resurgence in Afghanistan pushing the healthcare system to the brink, and decades of ongoing violence in eastern DRC where sexual violence remains a weapon of war, women and children are disproportionately bearing the brunt of armed conflict. Across regions and crises, their suffering is both acute and preventable. Now more than ever, the WPS agenda must be prioritized and fully implemented.

Since the adoption of UN Security Council Resolution 1325 over two decades ago, a growing body of evidence has shown that the inclusion of women in peace processes leads to more durable and equitable outcomes. When women participate in peace processes, peace agreements are 20% more likely to last at least two years and 35% more likely to last for 15 years.  Moreover, countries with higher levels of gender equality are statistically less prone to conflict, corruption, and instability.[2]

At a time when the U.S. Department of Defense has regrettably reversed its commitment to WPS, despite having championed it in the past, the responsibility to lead must now fall to its transatlantic allies. The EU and NATO are uniquely positioned to advance this agenda. They must act decisively to close the gap, reinforce institutional accountability, and ensure that women are not only present in peace and security processes but that their influence shapes the outcomes.

The 2022 NATO Strategic Concept and the New WPS Policy

During the 2019 Women Political Leaders Summit, former NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg emphasized that prioritizing gender equality is both a moral imperative and a strategic necessity. He argued that greater diversity and gender balance contribute directly to NATO’s effectiveness in defending its values and populations.[3]

In line with the principles of UNSCR 1325 and its own global mandate, NATO recognizes the disproportionate impact of conflict on women and children. It also acknowledges the vital role women play in identifying early warning signs of radicalization within their families and communities, underscoring the importance of including women in counterterrorism efforts and conflict resolution processes. Women experience the consequences of insecurity firsthand, particularly in regions like Eastern Europe, where conflict has led to an erosion of rights and personal freedoms. NATO affirms that when women have a voice and presence, whether in government, politics, military command, or at the negotiating table, results are more inclusive, equitable, and long-lasting.

First integrated into NATO’s operational strategy in 2007 through collaboration with the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC), the adoption of the inaugural NATO/EAPC Policy on Women, Peace and Security marked a foundational step in embedding gender equality as a core value of the Alliance and one that is tied to sustainable peace and stability.

To ensure these pledges are put into practice, NATO has introduced a series of Action Plans, starting with the first plan endorsed at the 2010 Lisbon Summit. This plan focused on incorporating gender perspectives into operational settings, which also coincided with the 10th anniversary of UN Security Council Resolution 1325. Building on this foundation, NATO officially adopted the 2021-2025 Action Plan on Women, Peace and Security, reinforcing its commitment to mainstreaming gender perspectives across all dimensions of its work.

The Secretary General’s Special Representative (SGSR) for Women, Peace and Security, became a permanent role within the alliance in 2014 following the appointment of Ambassador Mari Skåre, the first Special Representative for WPS, in 2012.  The current SGSR, Irene Fellin, leads the alliance’s efforts to integrate gender perspectives across its core missions: defense, crisis management, and cooperative security. Fellin advises senior leadership, coordinates with internal and external stakeholders, and promotes inclusive peace and security policies in line with NATO’s WPS agenda and UNSCR 1325.

NATO’s 2022 Strategic Concept, drafted to serve as a blueprint for the next decade, outlines the WPS agenda within the fifth element of its Purpose and Principles section:

Here’s the challenge: While it is encouraging that the WPS agenda is explicitly mentioned in NATO’s Strategic Concept, its inclusion alongside other broad issues such as climate change and human security risks positioning it as a secondary concern. The above-mentioned are all critical global issues, with each warranting distinct strategic attention. However, the WPS agenda should be more than a symbolic gesture or ‘litmus test;’ it must be integrated as a core component of NATO’s operational and strategic planning, reflective of its fundamental relevance to peacebuilding, conflict prevention, and long-term security.

To further underscore this point, in 2024 NATO, the heads of state and government of the allied members endorsed the latest NATO Policy on Women, Peace and Security, which further elaborates how the WPS agenda aims to be implemented across NATO’s three core tasks (deterrence and defense, crisis prevention and management, and cooperative security), prioritizing four strategic objectives inspired by the global WPS Agenda: gender-responsive leadership and accountability, participation, prevention and protection.[5]

Implementation of the NATO Policy on Women, Peace and Security Strategic Objectives:

The Role of Civil Society

Just as addressing climate change requires strong partnerships with the private sector, advancing the WPS agenda depends on sustained engagement with civil society. As part of this commitment, NATO is prioritizing collaboration with local women’s groups and civil society organizations in crisis prevention and management, recognizing their essential role in strengthening analysis, informing military planning, and supporting more effective, gender-responsive solutions. This priority was reaffirmed during the first meeting of the Civil Society Advisory Panel (CSAP), held in Brussels on 18–19 January 2024.[13]

Under the leadership of NATO Secretary General’s Special Representative for WPS Irene Fellin, CSAP is composed of 24 civil society experts and institutions from nation member states, including those working directly in conflict zones like Ukraine. The panel provides expertise from those on the ground working directly on peace negotiations, community security, training, research, and the development and monitoring of National Action Plans on WPS. The establishment of CSAP ensures NATO receives regular feedback and recommendations on implementing the WPS agenda. It also helps build local-level dialogue with civil society, especially women’s rights groups and community leaders, so that grassroots perspectives inform NATO’s actions, particularly in areas where the alliance is active on the ground.[14]

By institutionalizing ongoing dialogue with civil society and women’s organizations, NATO is transforming the WPS agenda from a policy intention into concrete, operational action that reflects and responds to the lived realities of those most affected by conflict.

Establishing a Standard: Implications from the U.S. Department of Defense Rescinding WPS from Its Operational Agenda

The strength of NATO’s WPS agenda ultimately depends on the commitment and implementation of individual member states. As outlined in NATO’s Policy on Women, Peace and Security, “resilience is a national responsibility,” expressed through collective commitment. However, in 2025, U.S. Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth announced the termination of the WPS program within the Department of Defense (DoD), a program originally enacted into law in 2017 during President Trump’s first term. In a statement on the social media platform X, Hegseth dismissed the initiative as “woke” and “divisive,” arguing that it distracted the military from its core mission: “WAR-FIGHTING.”[15]

This decision was widely criticized, especially considering that women make up half the global population and play a critical role in building and sustaining peaceful communities.  Moreover, evidence consistently shows that states with gender inequality increase the likelihood of higher levels of internal conflict.[16] Female participation in defense and security should be recognized as a force multiplier rather than undermining military effectiveness. Responding to Hegseth’s decision, retired Lieutenant General Mark Hertling, former commander of U.S. Army Europe and leader of the 1st Armored Division in Iraq, warned that getting rid of WPS “won’t make the U.S. more lethal, but it might make it half blind.”[17]

The decision was part of a broader effort by the newly seated administration to dismantle diversity, equity, and inclusion (DEI) initiatives across the U.S. government, an effort justified by President Trump as realigning federal priorities with his “America First” agenda, rather than continuing what he views as the ideological legacy of his predecessors.[18] Yet, when the United States, long regarded as a global leader and advocate for human rights, rolls back gender equality programs, it raises serious questions about the example it sets for the rest of the world.

Beyond the optics, the decision to downgrade the WPS agenda from the Department of Defense weakens U.S. military readiness and undermines broader national security objectives. In light of Secretary Hegseth’s decision, it is more important than ever for academics, policymakers, and military professionals to keep the WPS agenda at the forefront of strategic dialogue. As Ambassador Melanne Verveer, co-founder of the Georgetown Institute for Women, Peace and Security with Secretary Hillary Clinton, emphasizes, it is vital to continue demonstrating how the WPS agenda strengthens defense operations, particularly through the perspectives of those directly engaged in governmental and intergovernmental efforts, and to document its contribution to overall military effectiveness.[19]

While Secretary Hegseth stated that the Pentagon would comply with the minimum requirements of the WPS agenda as mandated by federal statute, he signaled his intent to defund the program during the next defense budget reconciliation process. Ambassador Verveer further emphasized the importance of accountability in monitoring the Department of Defense’s obligation to keep the WPS agenda in the public eye. Notably, the Secretary of Defense had consulted the Joint Staff on whether the WPS initiative should continue. Although the Joint Staff affirmed the WPS agenda’s value, Hegseth ultimately disregarded their recommendation.[20]

Lessons learned in Afghanistan

After NATO’s combat mission formally ended in 2014, the alliance launched the Resolute Support Mission (2015–2021) to train, advise, and assist Afghan forces. This included integrating gender perspectives through the WPS agenda. NATO-led gender advisors remained in-country with the aim of equipping Afghan women with military training and operational skills.

Despite a U.S. commitment of $160 million between 2016 and 2018 to support the recruitment and training of women in the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces (ANDSF), the program consistently fell short of its targets. Sociocultural norms and entrenched gender hierarchies posed major obstacles;[21] many women remained under the strict control of male family members, limiting their ability to participate fully. Beyond societal barriers, the military’s male-dominated structure offered limited pathways for advancement and lacked mechanisms to report sexual harassment or assault. Numerous reports emerged of women being coerced into exchanging sexual favors for promotions or salary increases, highlighting systemic issues within the institution.[22]

Moreover, the policy was perceived by many Afghans as being culturally intrusive and externally imposed, rooted more in Western ideals than in an understanding of the local context. As a result, implementation suffered from the outset. Despite its well-meaning objectives, the initiative ultimately failed to produce sustainable change. Unconditional and overly optimistic funding in such environments not only risks wasting resources but can also exacerbate existing inequalities and foster false hope among those yearning for meaningful progress.

The Role of the EU: Complementing and Reinforcing NATO Efforts

Aligned with NATO’s strategic objectives, the EU prioritizes gender equality and human rights across its policies, an approach recently reaffirmed through the adoption of the 2025 Roadmap for Women’s Rights by the European Commission. This long-term strategy aims to advance gender equality while also addressing emerging challenges such as technology-facilitated bias, discrimination, and violence.[23] Gender equality is not only a fundamental EU value and human right but also recognized as a driver of prosperous societies, good governance, and sustainable peace and security. As such, it remains a strategic political objective at the heart of the EU’s external action and global engagement.[24]

In line with the WPS agenda, the EU also recognizes that the meaningful participation of women in conflict prevention, resolution, and peacebuilding leads to more resilient and inclusive outcomes. Female involvement not only strengthens peace processes but also helps build more gender-equal societies post-conflict. Consistent with NATO’s approach, the EU prioritizes women’s roles in peace operations, crisis management, and all aspects of defense and security, acknowledging the unique perspectives women bring to the table.[25] This reflects the EU’s belief that sustainable peace is only achievable when women are fully and equally engaged in shaping outcomes.

Formally adopted by the Council of the European Union, specifically by the Foreign Affairs Council, in July 2019, the EU Action Plan on Women, Peace and Security (WPS) 2019-2024[26] covers six interdependent and collectively reinforcing objectives:

EU’s new Action Plan on Gender Equality and Women’s Empowerment in External Action 2021–2025 (GAP III) 

Launched in 2020, the EU’s Gender Equality Action Plan III (GAP III) 2021–2025[28] serves as the European Union’s strategic framework for promoting gender equality and women’s empowerment across all areas of its external action, including its global partnerships, bilateral relations, and foreign policy initiatives, ensuring everyone has the opportunity to thrive. In line with the United Nations Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) #5,[29] the plan acknowledges that, despite meaningful progress over recent decades, gender equality remains uneven and incomplete worldwide. GAP III aims to accelerate progress by building on the momentum of previous global commitments, particularly the Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action, a landmark 1995 framework that identified 12 critical areas for action to advance gender equality and outlined practical steps for governments to bring about systemic change.

While the EU Action Plan on Women, Peace and Security is specifically designed to implement the United Nations WPS agenda within EU external action through concrete indicators and targets related to women’s participation in peace processes and the prevention of gender-based violence, particularly in CSDP missions and external programs, GAP III represents a broader strategic framework to embed gender equality and women’s empowerment across all areas of EU foreign and development policy.

To support the creation of a more gender-equal world, the EU works with partner countries to address systemic gender discrimination. GAP III provides a clear political and operational roadmap for engaging with stakeholders at the national, regional, and multilateral levels; steps up action in key thematic areas; calls on EU institutions to lead by example; and ensures transparency and accountability through measurable results. Implemented through a gender-transformative and intersectional approach, GAP III is applied across geographic regions and thematic sectors, with gender mainstreaming integrated throughout the EU’s external action.

GAP III guides the EU’s external engagement through a policy framework structured around five central pillars:[30]

1. Mainstreaming Gender Equality Across Policies The EU aims to make gender equality a cross-cutting priority in all areas of its external action. By 2025, 85% of all new external initiatives are expected to contribute to gender equality, using a gender-transformative, rights-based, and intersectional approach.
2. Strengthening Partnerships and Coordination The EU works with member states, partner governments, civil society, and the private sector to implement GAP III at the country, regional, and multilateral levels. This approach emphasizes collaboration, transparency, and shared responsibility.

• Focusing on Six Strategic Areas GAP III targets key issues including ending gender-based violence, advancing sexual and reproductive health and rights, promoting economic empowerment, increasing women’s participation and leadership, supporting the WPS agenda, and addressing gender dimensions in green and digital transitions.

1. Leading by Example The EU aims to commit to gender-responsive and gender-balanced leadership at political and management levels. This includes investing in expertise, resources, and coordinated action across institutions.
2. Monitoring Progress and Accountability GAP III establishes a robust system for monitoring and reporting progress, using both quantitative and qualitative methods. The goal is to ensure accountability, improve transparency, and communicate the real-world impact of EU efforts on gender equality globally.

As measuring results and reporting are key to ensuring successful implementation, in 2023—three years after its implementation—the European Commission and the European External Action Service published the Joint mid-term report on the implementation of the EU Gender Action Plan (GAP III) to serve as a mid-term report card to evaluate the progress of how GAP III has elevated gender equality as a strategic priority in EU external actions.[31]

Key findings included:

• GAP III adopts a policy-driven, context-specific approach, supported by gender country profiles, which has led to the development of 131 Country-Level Implementation Plans (CLIPs) that guide gender-responsive programming across partner countries.
• The EU significantly increased its financial commitments to preventing and responding to gender-based violence. Annual funding rose from an average of EUR 91 million (2014–2020) to EUR 60 million in 2021, followed by a major increase to EUR 282 million in 2022. In addition, the EU allocated EUR 33.1 million in 2021 and EUR 41.3 million in 2022 specifically for addressing gender-based violence in humanitarian settings.
• GAP III has provided the EU with a strategic platform to address some of the most pressing global challenges facing women and girls. At the multilateral level, the EU has actively collaborated with the United Nations—particularly through the UN Commission on the Status of Women—to advance efforts to combat violence against women and ensure that women’s perspectives are meaningfully included in climate and digital forums and policy-making.
• There has been a clear increase in both initiatives and financial support aimed at promoting gender equality and empowering women and girls. In the context of growing geopolitical competition, GAP III has also helped the EU position itself as a more visible and impactful global actor by ensuring that gender equality is systematically integrated into major external strategies.[32] This includes the Global Gateway strategy, the EU’s global investment framework, and Team Europe Initiatives (TEIs), which are joint efforts by the EU and its member states to support partner countries facing development challenges.

Moving forward, recommended goals to support the second half of GAP III include:

• Further intensify efforts to promote gender equality and empower women and girls by strengthening gender mainstreaming, increasing resources, and applying gender-transformative approaches in international partnerships.
• To address structural and political gaps in the implementation of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), engagement must be broadened to more effectively integrate gender mainstreaming and promote gender-responsive leadership. This can be advanced through targeted outreach and coordination with WROs and civil society organizations (CSOs), with special attention to the inclusion of marginalized groups.
• Recognizing the need for gender-responsive leadership and strengthened internal processes, the EU extended the implementation of GAP III through 2027. This extension will support the delivery of newly launched initiatives and align the plan’s timeline with the 2021–2027 Multiannual Financial Framework, the EU’s long-term budget plan.

Challenges with NATO-EU alignment on WPS

NATO and the EU have long shared foundational values and strategic priorities with the United States, whose leadership has historically played a central role in shaping a stable global security environment. More recently, however, U.S. global leadership has waned as domestic concerns, such as border security and trade policy, have taken precedence over multilateral engagement and broader international security responsibilities. In this context, the deepening relationship between NATO and the EU is increasingly anchored in their mutual commitment to democracy, the rule of law, a rules-based international order, and the protection of fundamental human rights, including gender equality and inclusion. These shared principles continue to drive closer alignment, particularly through their growing collaboration on the WPS agenda, which both partners view as a reflection of shared values and one of strategic importance.

The 2018 EU-NATO Joint Declaration notably included a commitment to strengthening cooperation on the WPS agenda. [33] While its inclusion in the official text is a positive step, the context in which WPS appears is telling. The WPS agenda is grouped alongside security issues such as military mobility, counter-terrorism, and resilience to chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) threats—issues with fundamentally different scopes and objectives. This positioning risks marginalizing the WPS agenda by treating it as a secondary concern rather than a cross-cutting priority. By embedding WPS within a list of hard security challenges, its strategic value and broader relevance to peacebuilding and conflict prevention are inadvertently diminished.

While formal collaboration between the EU and NATO on the WPS agenda remains limited, efforts since the 2018 Joint Declaration have demonstrated pockets of progress. In March 2019, a summit on WPS in the Western Balkans was held in Bosnia and Herzegovina, co-organized by the UK.[34] Earlier that year, the EU, NATO, and the United Nations participated in a UK-hosted workshop in London focused on preventing sexual exploitation and abuse, an essential component of the WPS agenda.[35]

Importantly, the WPS agenda continues to be a strategic priority within the European Union’s Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), its framework for defense and crisis management. Through the CSDP, the EU deploys civilian and military missions abroad to promote peace and security, often in cooperation with international partners, including NATO. However, despite these individual efforts, the development of integrated, joint operational frameworks remains limited. With the United States stepping back from global leadership on WPS under the “America First” doctrine, deepening EU-NATO convergence is not only timely, it is essential to sustaining momentum and ensuring the agenda’s meaningful implementation in fragile and conflict-affected regions.

Both NATO and the EU emphasize that the successful implementation of the WPS agenda hinges on sustained collaboration with external partners, including women’s rights organizations, civil society, and international institutions. To turn this commitment into concrete results, a critical next step is to harmonize their respective WPS frameworks. Standardizing policies and practices, much like NATO’s push for military interoperability, would enhance coordination, minimize fragmentation, and ensure consistent application across joint operations. However, a significant challenge lies ahead: within NATO alone, there are 32 member states, each with its own cultural context, political will, and interpretation of WPS priorities.[36] Overcoming these divergent perspectives to create a unified approach will require both political resolve and sustained institutional engagement.

As Europe grapples with its first large-scale land war since World War II, the urgency of advancing the WPS agenda has never been greater. In Ukraine, women and children are bearing the brunt of the conflict, facing deteriorating access to healthcare, disruptions in education, loss of livelihoods, and the burden of becoming sole providers as men are conscripted or volunteer for military service.[37] This reality demands deeper EU-NATO alignment on WPS implementation, not only to respond to the gendered impact of war but also to uphold shared values of human rights and resilience. The need is further underscored by the rollback of WPS and Diversity, Equity, and Inclusion (DEI) initiatives under the Trump Administration’s “America First” policy, which signals reduced global leadership in gender-responsive security policy and inclusive governance.

Conclusion

Today’s world is faced with a convergence of rapidly evolving and interlinked challenges: the largest land war in Europe since World War II, the rise of disruptive technologies, the United States retreating from its traditional leadership role, a deteriorating security landscape across the MENA region, and intensifying great power competition. Together, these dynamics threaten to sideline the WPS agenda, as policymakers shift their focus toward hard security and geopolitical rivalry. Without intentional and sustained efforts, the WPS framework risks being deprioritized at a time when its principles are more essential than ever.

Institutional change takes time, especially when it involves integrating a feminist perspective into traditionally male-dominated and hierarchical institutions like the military. At the same time, the reverse concern is also valid: when feminist values are implemented within a military framework, there is potential for objectives to become diluted, co-opted, or reshaped to fit operational goals. The optics of such efforts risk “legitimizing the war system;”[38] ultimately undermining the transformative intent of the WPS agenda altogether.

Calls to elevate the WPS agenda are both commendable and urgently needed. However, these conversations must move beyond symbolic gestures and remain active across all levels of governance, including national governments, intergovernmental institutions, NGOs, civil society, academia, and think tanks. To ensure realistic and effective implementation, WPS practices must be more refined, standardized, and operationalized across these sectors. At the same time, as seen in frameworks like the Paris Climate Accords, a one-size-fits-all approach is neither practical nor equitable. Cultural, political, and institutional contexts vary widely, and tailored pathways may be necessary to enable different actors to meet shared WPS goals without compromising core principles. Achieving meaningful progress requires both unified standards and flexible mechanisms for adaptation.

While acknowledging the disproportionate impact of conflict on women and children remains a central pillar of the WPS agenda, the focus must evolve. It is no longer enough to simply celebrate women’s inclusion; it must be institutionalized as a standard practice in peacebuilding, defense, and security sectors. Women make up half the global population, and demographic shifts show that many are intentionally reshaping their roles in society, delaying marriage and childbirth to pursue higher education, professional careers, and financial independence. These evolving aspirations underscore the need to design security structures that reflect the realities and ambitions of modern women.

Integrating women meaningfully into the security ecosystem is not just a matter of equality or values; it is a strategic and operational imperative. To meet today’s complex global challenges, WPS must move beyond rhetoric. Commitments must translate into enforceable legislation and accountability mechanisms. The empowerment of women is essential to national security, economic resilience, and the sustainability of peace. It is not optional; it is foundational to global stability.

[1] “Press statement on Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth’s announcement on Women, Peace and Security,” Georgetown Institute for Women, Peace and Security (n.d.), https://giwps.georgetown.edu/press-statement-on-secretary-of-defense-pete-hegseths-announcement-on-women-peace-and-security/.

[2] “Women’s participation and a better understanding of the political,” UN Women (n.d.), A Global Study on the implementation of UN Security Council resolution 1325, https://wps.unwomen.org/participation/.

[3] NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg, ”Gender equality is the smart thing to do,” North Atlantic Treaty Organization, June 23, 2021, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/opinions_185443.htm.

[4] NATO, “NATO 2022 Strategic Concept,” June 29, 2022, https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/2022/6/pdf/290622-strategic-concept.pdf.

[5] NATO, “Women, Peace and Security Policy 2024,” July 11, 2024, https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/2024/7/pdf/240711-WPS-Policy-2024_en.pdf.

[6] Balázs Gyimesi, Isabella Vogel, and Jessica White, The Women, Peace and Security Agenda in NATO and beyond: The way forward (Conference report), Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies, February 2025, https://static.rusi.org/women-and-nato-conference-report-feb-2025.pdf.

[7] North Atlantic Treaty Organization, “Rose Gottemoeller takes office as NATO Deputy Secretary General,” June 27, 2016, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_135938.htm.

[8] Mark Patton, “First female NATO JFC commander takes lead in Naples,” DVIDS, June 8, 2016, https://www.dvidshub.net/news/200342/first-female-nato-jfc-commander-takes-lead-naples.

[9] NATO,  Annual Report 2022: Diversity and Inclusion, 2023, https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/2023/8/pdf/2022-annual-diversity_inclusion-report.pdf.

[10] North Atlantic Treaty Organization, “Action Plan for the Implementation of the NATO/EAPC Policy on Women, Peace and Security 2021–2025,” [Official text]. October 21, 2021, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_187485.htm.

[11] NATO, Gender Advisor (GENAD) Factsheet, December 2021, https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/2021/12/pdf/2112-factsheet-genad.pdf.

[12] NATO, “Military Committee guidance to prevent and respond to conflict-related sexual and gender‑based violence (MCM‑0009‑2015),” 2015, https://www.nato.int/issues/women_nato/2015/MCM-0009-2015_ENG_PDP.pdf.

[13] NATO, “NATO starts talks with civil society on Women, Peace and Security,” January 18-19, 2024,  https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_221854.htm.

[14] NATO, “Civil Society Advisory Panel on Women, Peace and Security,” AP WPS Annual Meeting Report, 2016, https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/pdf_2016_10/20170309_161018-apwps-annual-mtg-rep.pdf.

[15] Hegseth, P. [@PeteHegseth], “This morning, I proudly ENDED the “Women, Peace & Security” (WPS) program inside the @DeptofDefense. WPS is yet another woke divisive/social justice/Biden initiative that overburdens our commanders and troops — distracting from our core task: WAR‑FIGHTING [Tweet]. X, April 29, 2024, https://x.com/PeteHegseth/status/1917203362396639518.

[16] Siân Herbert, “Links between gender-based violence and outbreaks of violent conflict,” GSDRC Helpdesk Research Report No. 1169, April 24, 2014, https://gsdrc.org/docs/open/hdq1169.pdf.

[17] Mark Hertling, “A commander’s case for Women, Peace, and Security,” The Bulwark, May 1, 2025, https://www.thebulwark.com/p/a-commanders-case-for-women-peace-security-hegseth-military-woke-iraq-qaeda-terrorists.

[18] The White House, “Fact sheet: President Donald J. Trump removes DEI from the Foreign Service,” March 18, 2025, https://www.whitehouse.gov/fact-sheets/2025/03/fact-sheet-president-donald-j-trump-removes-dei-from-the-foreign-service/.

[19] Melanne Verveer, email message to the author, June 22, 2025.

[20] Ibid.

[21] John F. Sopko, “Support for Gender Equality: Lessons from the U.S. Experience in Afghanistan (Executive Summary),” Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction, February 2021, https://www.sigar.mil/Portals/147/Files/Reports/Lessons-Learned/SIGAR-21-18-LL-Executive-Summary.pdf

[22] S. Jones, “As Afghan women join the fight, their men worry they’ll lose their dignity,” The New York Times Magazine, October 5, 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/05/magazine/afghanistan-women-security-forces.html

[23] European Commission, “A Union of Equality: Gender Equality Strategy 2020–2025,” March 5, 2020, https://commission.europa.eu/strategy-and-policy/policies/justice-and-fundamental-rights/gender-equality/gender-equality-strategy_en.

[24] European Commission & High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, “Together Towards A Gender Equal World: EU Gender Action Plan III – An ambitious agenda for gender equality and women’s empowerment in EU external action,” November 25, 2020. Retrieved June 19, 2025, from https://international-partnerships.ec.europa.eu/system/files/2021-01/join-2020-17-final_en.pdf.

[25] European Union External Action, “Implementing the Women, Peace and Security agenda,” European Union (n.d.), https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/implementing-women-peace-and-security-agenda_en.

[26] Council of the European Union, “EU Action Plan on Women, Peace and Security (WPS) 2019–2024,” July 4, 2029, https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-11031-2019-INIT/en/pdf.

[27] European Commission & High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, “Together Towards A Gender Equal World: EU Gender Action Plan III – An ambitious agenda for gender equality and women’s empowerment in EU external action,” op. cit.

[28] In 2023, the EU extended the implementation period of GAP III through the end of 2027 to align it with the 2021–2027 Multiannual Financial Framework.

[29] SDG #5, one of 17 Sustainable Development Goals established by the United Nations in 2015, focuses on achieving gender equality and empowering all women and girls.

[30] European Commission & High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, “Together Towards A Gender Equal World: EU Gender Action Plan (GAP) III – An ambitious agenda for gender equality and women’s empowerment in EU external action,” op. cit.

[31] European Commission, “Joint mid‑term report on the implementation of the EU Gender Action Plan (GAP III),” November 20, 2023, https://international‑partnerships.ec.europa.eu/document/download/7bd3f0b5‑1a87‑43a4‑9c10‑faede23cf644_en?filename=Joint%20mid‑term%20report%20on%20the%20implementation%20of%20the%20EU%20Gender%20Action%20Plan%20%28GAP%20III%29.pdf.

[32] Alexie Jones and Katja Sergejeff, “Half‑time analysis: How is Team Europe doing?,” European Centre for Development Policy Management, September 19, 2022, https://ecdpm.org/work/half-time-analysis-how-team-europe-doing.

[33] North Atlantic Treaty Organization, “Joint Declaration on EU‑NATO Cooperation by the President of the European Council, the President of the European Commission, and the Secretary General of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization,” January 10, 2023, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_156626.htm.

[34] Gustav Lindström and Thierry Tardy, (Eds.), The EU and NATO: The essential partners (EPC Discussion Paper). Publications Office of the European Union, 2019, https://publications.europa.eu/resource/cellar/08e9e07b-cd30-11e9-992f-01aa75ed71a1.0001.01/DOC_1.

[35] Ibid.

[36] Balázs Gyimesi, Isabella Vogel, and Jessica White, The women, peace and security agenda in NATO and beyond: The way forward, op. cit.

[37] Gina Bou Serhal and Rahaf Al Khazraji, “Shattered lives: The impact of the Ukraine Conflict on Women and Girls’ Displacement, Healthcare, and Economic Security,” TRENDS Research & Advisory, May 31, 2024, https://trendsresearch.org/insight/shattered-lives-the-impact-of-the-ukraine-conflict-on-women-and-girls-displacement-healthcare-and-economic-security/.

[38] War Prevention Initiative, “Gender Advisors in NATO Militaries,” Peace Science Digest, May 21, 2025, .https://warpreventioninitiative.org/peace-science-digest/gender-advisors-in-nato-militaries/.