Türkiye is a major regional air power and its strategic rationale has continuously focused on aerial deterrence based on the “best defense is offense” principle, considering the country’s location, neighbors, and regional developments.[1] Türkiye’s air force consists mainly of Lockheed Martin F-16s, with over 250 units actively utilized. This makes Türkiye the second largest operator of F-16s in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Türkiye deployed F-16s across several conflicts—most recently in Iraq and Syria—and the aircraft continues to occupy the military calculus in Türkiye. As part of a recent détente between Türkiye and the United States (U.S.), the former administration approved the sale of 40 new F-16 Block-70 Viper units.[2] This has been the largest single acquisition of F-16s from the U.S. with Türkiye expecting delivery of the new aircraft to be complete by 2028.
Discussions on the Turkish Air Force (TAF), however, are not limited to F-16s. Born out of necessity due to increasingly difficult procurement processes, Türkiye angled toward self-sufficiency in the air force.[3] Various indigenous projects include Hürkuş, Hürjet, and the widely anticipated fifth-generation fighter aircraft MMU KAAN. While both Hürkuş and Hürjet are lower altitude models geared toward light combat, training, and close ground support, KAAN represents the apex of Türkiye’s aerial endeavors. The stealth fighter is positioned as a replacement for F-16s to propel aerial capabilities and fill in the gap for F-35 fighters, which Türkiye is currently unable to access due to U.S. sanctions. While KAAN is set to be introduced to the air force from 2028 onward, the project has nevertheless garnered international interest, with Saudi Arabia and the UAE reported as potential buyers.[4]
While Türkiye is at a transitionary stage in the development of its aerial fleet, there are a plethora of questions to be addressed. Another one is the case of the Eurofighter Typhoons. Türkiye has engaged with the Eurofighter consortium over the procurement of several units since 2024.[5] The Minister of Defense, Yaşar Güler, confirmed these reports amidst discussions on Türkiye’s budget, noting that allocations had been made for the purchase of up to 40 units.
This insight explores developments in the TAF’s fighter jet fleet and questions how to move forward with an ambitious agenda to retain its position as a top air power in the region. Türkiye has already achieved major results in military deterrence in the navy and continues to showcase prowess through its homegrown Unmanned Aerial Combat Vehicles (UCAVs) such as Bayraktar TB-2, Akıncı, and Aksungur. Efforts to modernize the air force are concurrent with such developments, which form a unified defense strategy built around domestic production for all critical components pertaining to Türkiye’s defense industry.
Figure 1: KAAN MMU
Source: Turkish Aerospace Industries (TUSAŞ), https://www.tusas.com/urunler/ucak/ozgun-gelistirme/kaan.
The following sections explore the upgrade of the F-16s, the potential acquisition of Eurofighter Typhoons, and the likelihood of Türkiye’s return to the F-35 program. The discussion also delves into how these fighter jet models can be integrated into the air force’s structure. Türkiye’s defense capacity has matured, and decision-making authorities are no longer interested in one-time transactions. Rather, they are concerned with continuity, sustainability, and the possibility to contribute to Türkiye’s military commitments overseas.
Should Türkiye pursue Eurofighters?
Diversification is a pressing issue for Türkiye, particularly as the TAF has almost exclusively relied on the U.S. for equipment since its inception. Eurofighter Typhoons are poised to alter this decades-long trend. This is a strategic move for Türkiye, as it has faced delays and outright embargoes in acquisitions from the U.S. over the past decade. Most recently, Türkiye faced an extended period of negotiations over a bid to acquire F-16s, which were in essence tied to wider geopolitical tensions between Ankara and Washington. The U.S. had imposed Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA) sanctions on Türkiye in 2019 due to its purchase of Russian-made S-400 air defense systems and a de facto embargo following Türkiye’s lackluster position on Sweden and Finland’s bid for membership to NATO. When Ankara dropped its veto on the two Nordic countries, the U.S. gave the green light to set the sale of F-16s in motion. Increasingly, Türkiye’s access to the U.S. defense market has been tied to other policy dossiers, such as the YPG/PKK, Eastern Mediterranean, and relations with Greece, as Türkiye and the U.S. balanced and hedged diverging interests.
The purchase of Eurofighters could be a potential trump card to remedy this adverse trend. Against Türkiye’s precarious relationship with the U.S., the UK has positioned the Eurofighter Typhoon as an alternative option, which is the product of a consortium including Italy, Spain, and Germany that would require three to five years for training, combat-readiness, and logistical maintenance to become operational.[6] Originally, Germany opposed the sale due to Türkiye’s human rights record, military activity in Syria, and ongoing litigation against dual German-Turkish nationals.[7] These concerns now appear to have abated, and Berlin has given a tacit nod for the sale. As Türkiye pursued the UK’s support for a possible contract, a Eurofighter Typhoon aircraft belonging to the Royal Air Force (RAF) landed on its way back from Qatar at a Turkish air base off Ankara for closer inspection by Turkish military officials.[8]
Figure 2: Eurofighter Typhoon
Source: Leonardo Aircraft, https://aircraft.leonardo.com/en/products/eurofighter-typhoon.
The politics of the sale make Eurofighters an asset for Türkiye. Foremost, the engagement would balance Türkiye’s portfolio of acquisitions among its NATO allies. Almost total reliance on the U.S. has increasingly become costly for Türkiye, essentially risking the viability of Türkiye’s deterrence. The Turkish fleet has aged, and the U.S. has not been consistent with its delivery of spare parts or upgrade kits, linking acquisitions to lengthy political discussions. While the Eurofighter is an expensive aircraft (in the range of $US120 million per unit) and bears similar political oversight from European countries, there are fewer issues of contention between Türkiye and members of the consortium—making the likelihood of speedy delivery and persistent supply far more likely.
Also, U.S. President Donald Trump’s isolationist stance against the transatlantic alliance prompted European leaders to reassess their defense strategies, aiming to reduce reliance on U.S. support and address potential security gaps.[9] Türkiye can play a pivotal role in this strategic shift by contributing to Europe’s defense landscape. A key example is the German-led European Sky Shield Initiative (ESSI) in 2024, where Türkiye joined to fill the capability gap in the ground-based air defense domain through the joint development and deployment of assets. Türkiye’s procurement of and even potential joint production of Eurofighter Typhoons with the consortium can utilize its strong military infrastructure to enhance Europe’s coordinated air defense systems. BAE Systems, which supplies avionics for Eurofighters, is a partner of Türkiye’s national aircraft program KAAN and could extend its cooperation to Eurofighters as well. This creates opportunities for technology transfer and the fostering of common European defense mechanisms. All these factors are reasons to support the sale, ultimately with the aim of mutually diversifying the supplier/partner base and fostering stronger defense links between Türkiye and Europe.
The politics of the sale aside, the technical specifications of Eurofighters also make them a desirable choice for Türkiye.[10] Eurofighter Typhoons are time-tested, utilized by several European and global military powers, and could potentially become a bridge for Türkiye in this critical transitionary phase from a fleet dominated by F-16s to a technologically more advanced fleet supplied with domestically produced fighter aircraft in the 2030s. The Eurofighter Typhoon is a 4.5th generation, highly maneuverable aircraft, faster than both F-16s and F-35s—by virtue of design and capacity, it represents a step up from 4th generation F-16s, while not being as advanced as the F-35s. Eurofighters lack the stealth capacity of F-35 fighters but are combat-tested in military missions in Libya, Iraq, Syria, and Yemen.
Türkiye’s most significant short-term gain from acquiring Eurofighters would be the Meteor missile. In recent years, Greece has secured a tactical edge by acquiring 24 Rafale jets armed with Meteor missiles and upgrading its F-16 fleet to Block 70 Vipers. In a potential conflict, Türkiye’s current inventory of 3rd and 4th generation F-16s and F-4s would be at a disadvantage against Greece’s Rafales and F-16 Block 70s, making dogfights obsolete in favor of stand-off engagements with formidable air power from Greece. While Türkiye is developing its indigenous Gökdoğan missile, it remains in the ground testing phase and will take years to be commissioned. Until the 5th generation KAAN enters service in the 2030s, Türkiye requires a strong interim deterrent to restore air superiority over the Aegean Sea. If acquired, the Meteor would be Türkiye’s first ramjet-propelled and most advanced Beyond Visual Range Air-to-Air Missile (BVRAAM). With a range of over 200 km and a 60-km no-escape zone, its ramjet engine provides continuous thrust to target interception, offering significantly greater accuracy and reach than the current AIM-120 AMRAAMs.
Figure 3: F-16 Block 70 Viper
Source: Lockheed Martin, https://www.lockheedmartin.com/en-us/products/f-16.html.
All factors withstanding, Türkiye’s move to acquire Eurofighters, now a real prospect, appears logical in the sequencing of Türkiye’s air force upgrade program. Ankara’s fleet of F-16s is battle-hardened and is manned with great expertise by Turkish pilots. However, the fleet has aged and difficulties around F-16 supply/spare parts present future risks. To mitigate these risks, foster intra-European defense, and acquire an aircraft with superior specifications to the F-16 in the interim, the Eurofighter appears to be an apt choice. This is clearly reflected in Türkiye’s security rationale and budgetary constraints around the Ministry of Defense.[11] Indeed, Türkiye scaled back the original agreement with Lockheed Martin, deciding to forgo the additional package of 79 modernization kits that would come along with the 40 new F-16 fighters. Türkiye instead opted for a comparable indigenous solution based on the Turkish Aerospace Industry’s (TAI) F-16 Özgür-II platform, which means the total package, initially valued at US$23 billion, would now be reduced to an estimated US$6.5-$7 billion.[12] Some of these funds originally earmarked for the upgrade kits can be diverted to the Eurofighter Typhoon acquisition. Given the recent impetus in Türkiye’s ties with Europe, an agreement looks likelier than ever.[13]
Return to the F-35 Program and KAAN
Another topic is Türkiye’s possible return to the F-35 program.[14] Türkiye, a partner country for the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter program since 2002,[15] tasked with producing parts for the advanced aircraft, was removed from its scope in 2019 when the U.S. imposed the CAATSA on Türkiye. The reason for the expulsion was Ankara’s decision to purchase S-400 air defense systems from Russia, which the American authorities deemed a significant transaction and threat to the F-35 program within the scope of the sanctions act. In the ensuing period, Türkiye’s role in the F-35 supply chain was altered, and six F-35 units that were on course to be delivered to Türkiye have been transferred to the U.S. Air Force.
Since 2019, the political tableaux between Türkiye and the U.S. have shifted significantly. Following a period of disengagement and tense relations, Türkiye and the U.S. are once again cooperating on regional and strategic matters,[16] and the U.S. is interested in transferring military equipment to Türkiye, as showcased in the decision of the previous administration to approve the sale of F-16s. Also, with President Trump back in the White House, Türkiye and the U.S. are re-aligning their positions on Gaza, Syria, and Ukraine. Meanwhile, Türkiye’s strategic dependence on Russia has relatively diminished, especially as Moscow’s influence in Syria waned with the Assad regime’s downfall.
This political alignment points to a scenario where Türkiye could be removed from the scope of CAATSA, therefore paving the way forward for a return to the F-35 program. This will require an agreement between Türkiye and the U.S. over the deactivation of the S-400 system or relocation to a third country.[17] The U.S. officials have indicated on several occasions that the S-400s should not coexist with the F-35 due to potential compromise of sensitive technology on F-35s, such as its radar signature, electronic warfare capabilities, and operational tactics—although India, somehow, is a remarkable exception to such a scenario. In fact, India has been named as a potential third country where Türkiye’s S-400 batteries could be deployed.[18] In any case, a potential deal requires Russia’s final approval, as per the terms of the original sale to Türkiye. Given that the Trump administration is more likely to pursue dialogue with Moscow, this prospect could be entertained.
While the political setting appears to favor Türkiye’s return to the F-35 program, the flip side of the question is whether the F-35s continue to serve Türkiye’s strategic interests. There have been troubling rumors on the performance of F-35 units,[19] and that the aircraft is a failure when compared to the program’s objective. Most concerns appear to focus on immense repair costs, faulty targeting systems, and a lack of cybersecurity proofing. Indeed, even Elon Musk, the CEO of Tesla and controversial senior advisor to U.S. President Donald Trump, characterized F-35s as “flop”.[20] There are now reports that the F-35 program will be scrutinized by the controversial Department of Government Efficiency (DOGE) led by Musk.
Figure 4: F-35 JSF
Source: Lockheed Martin, https://www.lockheedmartin.com/en-us/products/f-35.html.
Naturally, adverse comments on the F-35 were widely circulated in the pro-government Turkish media,[21] with some analysts arguing that Türkiye’s national fighter aircraft KAAN and various UCAVs have comparative advantages over the F-35. Indeed, Defense Minister Yaşar Güler even stated that the U.S. had now decided to sell Türkiye F-35s following the success of KAAN’s maiden flight (perhaps to lure Türkiye away from a competing project)—yet this report remains unconfirmed.[22] The fact remains that Türkiye and the U.S. have negotiated over the return to the program,[23] indicating that Türkiye is still interested in F-35s despite adverse reports and ongoing developments in its domestic military aviation.
The F-35 is a formidable aircraft and represents the apex of military aviation development within the scope of the transatlantic alliance. Units have already been integrated into the arsenals of NATO member states, as well as U.S. allies in Türkiye’s region such as Israel—not to mention Greece’s planned acquisition in 2028.[24] Other regional powers, such as the United Arab Emirates (UAE),[25] were also interested in the aircraft—but effectiveness analysis and stringent conditions on the sale have ended those talks for the foreseeable future. Possible Saudi interest in F-35s has also been voiced,[26] yet the future of these talks once again remains uncertain due to conditions attached to the sale of advanced weapons systems to third countries, considered within the scope of longstanding U.S. policy on ensuring Israel’s qualitative military edge in the region.[27]
While Türkiye is in the process of attaining a breakthrough in its domestic military aviation through KAAN, Ankara will continue to pursue F-35s, concurrent with its role in NATO and wider goals over air superiority in the region. As other regional countries, NATO member states, and particularly Greece in this parameter,[28] move to acquire the elite fighters, Türkiye’s interest would also remain alive. The path toward F-35s, however, remains unclear, despite positive political developments that could spur further talks. Türkiye continues to be burdened by CAATSA and is ever unlikely to rejoin the F-35 program as a constituent member of the aircraft’s supply chain. Türkiye’s defense leaders will continue to pursue the advanced aircraft, all the while directing efforts toward the success of the national combat aircraft program KAAN. These ventures look to exist side by side and are unlikely to develop as alternatives.
Conclusion
Türkiye’s evolving military aviation strategy is marked by a nuanced approach to strengthening its domestic capabilities and acquiring advanced aircraft from international allies. The move toward the Eurofighter Typhoon and the potential return to the F-35 program is reflective of Türkiye’s multi-faceted approach to addressing its defense needs while navigating the complexity of ties with the West generally. The acquisition of Eurofighters represents a pragmatic step in addressing the aging fleet of F-16s and F-4s. These aircraft, while having served the TAF with distinction, are nearing the end of their operational life. The Eurofighter offers several advantages, including superior air-to-air capabilities, which align with Türkiye’s strategic defense objectives in crowded skies over the Aegean and the Eastern Mediterranean. Additionally, the integration of Eurofighters into Türkiye’s air force upgrade program is a testament to fostering intra-European defense cooperation, a prospect that has gained importance with President Trump’s return to the White House.
Türkiye’s decision to scale back the agreement with Lockheed Martin and potentially reallocate some of those funds to indigenous projects as well as the Eurofighter program underscores a strategic pivot toward making inroads with the European defense sector. The Eurofighter Typhoon’s advanced avionics, robust airframe, and multi-role capabilities make it a formidable addition to the TAF, ensuring that it remains at the forefront of air combat technology. Concurrently, Türkiye’s potential re-integration into the F-35 program signals a significant shift in bilateral relations between Ankara and Washington. The initial removal of Türkiye from the program due to the acquisition of the S-400 systems from Russia was a setback. However, evolving political dynamics and renewed cooperation on regional and strategic matters have paved the way for potential re-engagement. The U.S. approval of F-16 sales to Türkiye under the Biden administration is indicative of a thaw in relations and an openness to further military cooperation. The F-35, despite mixed reviews and concerns over its performance and cost, remains a pinnacle of modern military aviation. Its stealth features, advanced sensor suite, and interoperability within NATO frameworks make it an asset. Türkiye’s interest in the F-35 is further fueled by its desire to maintain parity with regional adversaries and NATO allies who are also integrating the aircraft into their fleets.
The political and logistical complexities surrounding Türkiye’s re-integration into the F-35 program cannot be understated. The deactivation/relocation of the S-400 systems and the approval of such a move by both the U.S. and Russia are critical hurdles that will require more political will on all sides to overcome. Nevertheless, the current geopolitical climate, characterized by a preference for dialogue and diplomatic solutions, offers a window of opportunity. The Trump administration’s inclination to engage with Moscow adds another layer of optimism to this scenario. Amid these international negotiations, Türkiye’s domestic aviation initiatives, particularly the KAAN aircraft program, continue to make significant strides. The success of KAAN’s maiden flight and ongoing developments in the national UCAV program underscore Türkiye’s commitment to achieving self-reliance in defense technologies. These homegrown efforts are not viewed as replacements for international acquisitions but rather as complementary endeavors that enhance Türkiye’s overall defense posture.
Looking ahead, Türkiye’s dual pursuit of Eurofighters alongside F-16s and F-35s reflects a comprehensive strategy aimed at bolstering national security through diversified means. The Eurofighter Typhoon will provide immediate enhancements to Türkiye’s air power, ensuring the air force remains well-equipped to handle complex threat scenarios into the 2030s. Simultaneously, a successful re-integration into the F-35 program would signify a restoration of Türkiye’s role within the broader NATO alliance, providing access to cutting-edge technology and reinforcing strategic partnerships.
Ultimately, the future of Türkiye’s military aviation landscape appears promising. The acquisition of Eurofighters is a logical and strategic move that addresses current operational needs and fosters European defense collaboration. The potential return to the F-35 program, while complex, is increasingly feasible given the improving political rapport with the U.S. and the pragmatic approach favored by the current administration. Türkiye’s concerted efforts in advancing its domestic aircraft programs, alongside these international acquisitions, exemplify a robust and forward-thinking defense strategy. As Türkiye continues to navigate its geopolitical environment with strategic foresight, upgrades to the TAF will not only enhance Türkiye’s air power but also solidify its position as a key player in regional and international defense arenas.
[1] Senior Turkish Military Official, Interview: Türkiye’s Steel Dome System, January 12, 2024.
[2] Andrew Bernard, “The F-16 deal is as good for NATO as it is for Turkey,” Atlantic Council, June 24, 2024, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/content-series/ac-turkey-defense-journal/f16-deal-as-good-for-nato-as-it-is-for-turkey/.
[3] Sıtkı Egeli, Serhat Güvenç, Çağlar Kurç and Arda Mevlütoğlu, “From Client to Competitor: The Rise of Turkiye’s Defence Industry,” International Institute for Strategic Studies, May 1, 2024, https://www.iiss.org/research-paper/2024/05/from-client-to-competitor-the-rise-of-turkiyes-defence-industry/.
[4] Rojoef Manuel, “Saudi Arabia Eyes Purchase of 100 Turkish KAAN Fighter Jets,” The Defense Post, January 3, 2025, https://thedefensepost.com/2025/01/03/saudi-arabia-kaan-turkey/.
[5] “Germany approves sale of 40 Eurofighter Typhoon jets to Türkiye,” Türkiye Today, November 13, 2024, https://www.turkiyetoday.com/turkiye/germany-approves-sale-of-40-eurofighter-typhoon-jets-to-turkiye-78262/.
[6] S. Süha Çubukçuoğlu, “To Fly or Not to Fly? The Fighter Jet Issue in the U.S.-Turkey Relationship,” TRENDS Research & Advisory, September 7, 2022, https://trendsresearch.org/insight/to-fly-or-not-to-fly-the-fighter-jet-issue-in-the-u-s-turkey-relationship/.
[7] Inder Singh Bisht, “Germany Approves Eurofighter Jet Sale to Turkey After Initial Denial,” The Defense Post, November 15, 2024 https://thedefensepost.com/2024/11/15/germany-eurofighter-jet-turkey/.
[8] Utku Simsek, “UK’s Eurofighter Typhoon jet lands in Ankara for inspection by Türkiye,” Anadolu Agency, December 18, 2024, https://www.aa.com.tr/en/europe/uks-eurofighter-typhoon-jet-lands-in-ankara-for-inspection-by-turkiye-/3427870.
[9] John Vandiver, “Trump Aims to Cut US Force in Europe by 20,000, Compel Subsidies from Allies, Italian Report Says,” Stars and Stripes, January 24, 2025, https://www.stripes.com/theaters/europe/2025-01-24/trump-europe-troop-cuts-16590074.html.
[10] Dora Mengüç, “Türkiye’nin radarındaki Eurofighter’ın F35 ve F16’dan farkı ne?,” Independent Türkçe, November 17, 2024, https://www.indyturk.com/node/675156/türkiyenin-radarındaki-eurofighterın-f35-ve-f16dan-farkı-ne.
[11] “Türkiye awaits price proposal for possible Eurofighter jet purchase,” Daily Sabah, January 30, 2025, https://www.dailysabah.com/business/defense/turkiye-awaits-price-proposal-for-possible-eurofighter-jet-purchase.
[12] Lieven Dewitte, “Turkey Cancels Request to Buy 79 F-16 Block 70 Upgrade Kits from the US,” F-16.Net (blog), November 28, 2024, https://www.f-16.net/f-16-news-article5297.html.
[13] “Türkiye to acquire 40 Eurofighter Typhoon jets in 2 phases, report claims,” Türkiye Today, February 4, 2025, https://www.turkiyetoday.com/turkiye/turkiye-to-acquire-40-eurofighter-typhoon-jets-in-2-phases-report-claims-115033/.
[14] Manolis Kostidis and Vassilis Nedos, “F-35 window opens again for Turkey,” Ekathimerini, February 11, 2025, https://www.ekathimerini.com/politics/foreign-policy/1261246/f-35-window-opens-again-for-turkey/.
[15] “Turkey Joins F-35 JSF Development Effort,” Lockheed Martin, July 11, 2002, https://investors.lockheedmartin.com/news-releases/news-release-details/turkey-joins-f-35-jsf-development-effort.
[16] Mehmet Sah Yilmaz and Serdar Dincel, “Turkish foreign minister discusses Syria, Gaza, Ukraine with US counterpart in Munich,” Anadolu Agency, February 14, 2025, https://www.aa.com.tr/en/americas/turkish-foreign-minister-discusses-syria-gaza-ukraine-with-us-counterpart-in-munich/3482566.
[17] Paul Iddon, “Is the US-Turkey dispute over Russian S-400s about to be resolved?,” The New Arab, October 2, 2024, https://www.newarab.com/analysis/are-us-and-turkey-about-resolve-s-400-dispute.
[18] Paul Iddon, “Why Pakistan Or India Might Want Turkey’s Unused Russian S-400 Missiles,” Forbes, August 9, 2024, https://www.forbes.com/sites/pauliddon/2024/08/09/why-pakistan-or-india-might-want-turkeys-unused-russian-s-400-missiles/.
[19] Mark Finlay, “Below Expectations: A Closer Look At The Declassified Pentagon F-35 Study,” Simple Flying, December 1, 2024, https://simpleflying.com/closer-look-declassified-f-35-study/.
[20] Gabriel Honrada, “Why the F-35 is on DOGE’s chopping block,” Asia Times, February 17, 2025, https://asiatimes.com/2025/02/why-the-f-35-is-on-doges-chopping-block/#.
[21] “Elon Musk’tan gündem olan F-35 paylaşımı! Akıllara Bayraktar Kızılelma’yı getirdi!,” Haber 7, November 26, 2024, https://www.haber7.com/dunya/haber/3481793-elon-musktan-gundem-olan-f-35-paylasimi-akillara-bayraktar-kizilelmayi-getirdi.
[22] “Turkish defense minister says US may sell F-35s,” Duvar English, November 27, 2024, https://www.duvarenglish.com/turkish-defense-minister-says-us-may-sell-f-35s-news-65312.
[23] Murat Yetkin, “US welcomes Türkiye back to F-35 program after S-400 solved,” Yetkin Report, December 6, 2024, https://yetkinreport.com/en/2024/12/06/us-welcomes-turkiye-back-to-f-35-program-after-s-400-solved/.
[24] Zein Halil, “Israel inks $3 billion deal to purchase 25 US F-35 fighter jets,” Anadolu Agency, June 4, 2024, https://www.aa.com.tr/en/middle-east/israel-inks-3-billion-deal-to-purchase-25-us-f-35-fighter-jets/3240256.
[25] “UAE does not plan to re-open F-35 fighter jet talks with US,” Reuters, September 14, 2024, https://www.reuters.com/business/aerospace-defense/uae-does-not-plan-re-open-f-35-fighter-jet-talks-with-us-uae-official-2024-09-14/.
[26] Leonardo Jacopo Maria Mazzucco, “Emirati and Saudi Ambitions for Next-Generation Fighters,” The Arab Gulf States Institute in Washington, February 11, 2025, https://agsiw.org/emirati-and-saudi-ambitions-for-next-generation-fighters/.
[27] Jacob Nagel and Jonathan Schanzer, “How To Maintain Israel’s Qualitative Military Edge,” Newsweek, November 4, 2020, https://www.newsweek.com/how-maintain-israels-qualitative-military-edge-opinion-1544459.
[28] “Greece to receive first 8 F-35 jets by 2030,” Türkiye Today, September 10, 2024, https://www.turkiyetoday.com/region/greece-to-receive-first-8-f-35-jets-by-2030-51096/.
