Türkiye and Saudi Arabia are two established powers in the Middle East with varying degrees of influence across the region. Their bilateral relationship is significant, given that Turkish and Saudi interests have the potential to shape the wider regional agenda. Since 2021, Türkiye and Saudi Arabia have pursued a process of normalization after a thorny period between 2017 and 2020, followed by a rapid expansion of ties. Initially tied to the wider détente in the region and Türkiye’s bid to attract Saudi investment, the relationship has now exponentially grown to accommodate strategic cooperation, particularly at the defense industry level. High-level coordination between Ankara and Riyadh has also vastly improved, with regular contacts between President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman.
Türkiye and Saudi Arabia’s regional policies have also benefited from some alignment. Following the ouster of the incumbent regime in Syria, both Türkiye and Saudi Arabia appear determined to support the new government in Damascus and ensure that Syria returns to normalcy as soon as possible. Indeed, this was apparent in the carefully coordinated visits of Syria’s Interim President Ahmed al-Sharaa to both countries. Türkiye and Saudi Arabia have also aligned in support for the Palestinian cause, with Türkiye routinely voicing support for the Saudi-led Arab League initiative for a two-state solution to the Palestinian Question. Broadly speaking, Türkiye and Saudi Arabia’s regional policy is characterized by their alignment with the U.S. as well.
Despite the overall positive trend in Türkiye-Saudi Arabia ties, an element of competition remains in the bilateral relationship. Türkiye and Saudi Arabia are vying for influence in the same areas, and while regional policy looks loosely aligned, there is the potential that interests will clash given that both countries are vying for regional leadership. Türkiye’s foreign policy has fixated on traditionally Saudi-dominated areas of influence such as Palestine, where Ankara is eyeing a wide-ranging humanitarian and political role. In Syria, there is a more apparent power play in motion, with both Türkiye and Saudi Arabia looking to emerge as the Damascus government’s key strategic partner. Saudi Arabia has the power to facilitate Syria’s return to the Arab fold, while Türkiye is building on extensive ties to Syria’s former rebel networks to cultivate military-strategic links.
This insight offers a survey of recent Türkiye-Saudi ties, first by assessing the burgeoning defense partnership between the two countries. This is the most vivid aspect of the strong bilateral relationship to have emerged since the initial détente in 2021. The research also considers Türkiye and Saudi Arabia’s regional policies, particularly remarking on the cases of Syria and Palestine. Lastly, the study ends with a series of prospects for the year ahead.
Defense Acquisitions
Saudi Arabia has emerged as a major client for Türkiye’s homegrown defense industry. During President Erdoğan’s visit to Saudi Arabia in July 2023, Türkiye’s Baykar Industries, the parent company producing the TB-2 Bayraktar and Akıncı Unmanned Aerial Combat Vehicle (UCAV), announced[1] its largest foreign acquisition bid to date. While the exact amount of the transaction remains undisclosed, sources have put the figure at US$3 billion.[2] The agreement encompasses a co-production clause, with Baykar foreseeing a production line for the Akıncı UCAV in Saudi Arabia. Türkiye is expected to deliver the first units of Akıncı imminently.
Recently, media reports surfaced of Saudi Arabia’s interest in Türkiye’s National Combat Aircraft “KAAN.”[3] The fifth-gen fighter jet being produced by Turkish Aerospace Industries (TAI) and subcontracted by BAE Systems is arguably Türkiye’s most anticipated defense product, set to become the cornerstone of Türkiye’s aerial fleet. Saudi Arabia is reportedly interested in acquiring 100 units of the KAAN aircraft, marking the first instance of foreign interest in Türkiye’s domestic combat aircraft program. While KAAN’s integration into the Turkish aerial fleet and sustained production remain a long-term prospect, early interest from Saudi Arabia is nevertheless a marked indicator that the Kingdom views Türkiye as a long-term partner for defense acquisitions.
Saudi interest in Türkiye’s defense industry is the outcome of several factors. First, the appetite for defense goods in Saudi Arabia is vast. The country boasts a defense budget of over US$78 billion,[4] accounting for over a fifth of all government spending. Furthermore, Türkiye’s exports to Saudi Arabia are not subject to any scrutiny at the legislative or executive levels. The centralization of the defense industry in Türkiye ensures that President Erdoğan’s prerogative on defense exports is final and that no additional approval is sought. This makes Türkiye a desirable country to purchase defense goods from, with Saudi Arabia cultivating ties to senior defense industry executives in Türkiye closely aligned with Erdoğan and within the president’s orbit. Türkiye’s defense products ensure that Saudi Arabia accesses NATO-grade defense products at a reasonable cost and does not suffer the same political scrutiny it would when purchasing from Western countries.
Saudi Arabia’s Vision 2030[5] has the potential to benefit from Türkiye’s defense industry and vice versa. The Kingdom requires sustained defense imports with the addition of technology transfers and co-production agreements. This is in line with Saudi Arabia’s goal of transforming the Kingdom into a center of technological excellence. While Saudi Arabia’s access to high-level Western defense goods remains limited due to far-reaching legislative oversight, particularly in the U.S., Türkiye[6] offers an alternative. Türkiye’s no-strings-attached policy of defense export ensures the delivery of high-grade military equipment without the need for lengthy approval processes. With Saudi Arabia looking to add an advanced fighter aircraft to its arsenal, the KAAN could become a strong alternative to the F-35.[7] This is particularly relevant as Saudi Arabia would likely face an uphill challenge to have such a sale approved by the U.S. Congress, despite President Trump’s strong desire to advance ties with the Kingdom and the Republican-dominated legislature in Washington.
Türkiye continues to benefit from the burgeoning defense partnership with Saudi Arabia. Looked at from the point of political relations, the extensive sale of UCAVs to Saudi Arabia was the catalyst of the normalization between the two countries. The animosity caused by bilateral tensions and spiraling regional competition ended with the prospect of Turkish defense exports to Saudi Arabia, which has in turn shaped the course of relations between these two powers from one of competition to cooperation in strategic sectors. Saudi Arabia’s wealth and the defense sector’s vast resources are an asset for Türkiye, which is gearing up to invest in co-production ventures with the Kingdom. The likelihood that such projects will be realized is high as the Saudi leadership is directing political and financial capital to Vision 2030.
Competition and Cooperation in the Region
While strategic cooperation in the defense sector is ongoing, there are themes of competition in the Türkiye-Saudi Arabia relationship as well. Syria has emerged as the potential nexus[8] of a clash between Türkiye and Saudi Arabia. Both countries look determined to support the government led by Interim President Ahmed al-Sharaa, a goal that has unified years of diverging regional policy. Yet with Türkiye gearing to become Syria’s primary security and military partner, this looks to impact ties with Riyadh. Saudi Arabia is moving to fill the void left by Iran’s departure from Syria to secure critical security and strategic goals and has spearheaded efforts for Syria’s return to the Arab and international communities. This includes a successful endeavor to have Western sanctions on Syria lifted.[9] Washington’s decision to remove sanctions on critical sectors of the Syrian economy appears to have benefited from Saudi lobbying, with the process of more comprehensive sanctions relief ongoing.[10]
Türkiye has spearheaded a similar effort, with Erdoğan calling openly on European allies to end sanctions on Syria.[11] Türkiye also appears to have assumed a mediating role between key NATO allies and the new government in Syria.[12] Both countries are positioning themselves as interlocuters between Damascus and the West. Syrian leaders too are considering the delicate power play between Türkiye and Saudi Arabia. The decision by Ahmed al-Sharaa to first visit Riyadh and then Ankara reflects this rationale. Syria will require both Türkiye and Saudi Arabia’s support in emerging from the devastation caused by over a decade of civil conflict. Hence, neither actor can be disregarded, ensuring that Al-Sharaa’s government is poised to benefit from both countries’ interests in Syria.
Cooperation between Türkiye and Saudi Arabia is likelier than competition in the Syrian case, however. Türkiye’s foreign policy has greatly evolved since the last time Ankara and Riyadh were at odds over regional politics. Türkiye has modified its position on the Gulf and is actively seeking advanced ties with Saudi Arabia. These sentiments are reflected on the Saudi side as well, signified by continued interest in the defense industry. Both countries will actively steer away from open competition due to these factors and will continue to unite over the goal of rehabilitating Syria—aiding the new government in its efforts to rebuild the country.
However, there is potential uneasiness in Riyadh that might stem from Syria becoming a Turkish client state. Saudi Arabia would not allow unchecked Turkish influence in Syria and could rally other Arab and Gulf actors to balance it. Türkiye, on its part, has moved to dispel such rumors. The Turkish Defense Ministry recently announced that it was too soon to comment on potential Turkish military installations in Syria,[13] countering previous reports that Türkiye was moving forward with the construction of military bases. Erdoğan’s government is likely considering the potential fallout that will materialize in ties with Saudi Arabia if the Turkish military moves to Syria on a permanent basis. Türkiye’s military mission to that end looks to remain at the advisory stage in the initial period.
Moreover, Türkiye will require Saudi Arabia’s capital and political support as it moves to wield more influence in Syria. Türkiye alone cannot cover the financial burden of reconstruction and will require assistance from Saudi Arabia and other members of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). This will motivate Türkiye to harmonize policy with Saudi Arabia and the wider GCC, potentially limiting military cooperation, which may be viewed as competing with Saudi influence. Türkiye’s military mission in Syria might instead take a more nuanced route, being limited in scope to security sector reform and training. Türkiye can provide air defense coverage and electronic warfare-early warning-intelligence solutions for Syria either through a partnership or by installing such systems and training the Syrian army to operate them.[14] These efforts are likely to be supported by Saudi Arabia as well, which shares the interest in seeing the central government in Damascus empowered.
Türkiye and Saudi Arabia are also involved in Gaza, with trends of collaboration and competition once again present. Türkiye is actively seeking influence in the Gaza Strip and on the Palestinian Question as a whole. While Türkiye openly supported Saudi-led Arab League initiatives for a two-state solution,[15] Ankara has also promoted its own unique policy priorities. Türkiye has persistently promoted a formula based on guardianship in Gaza,[16] implying that a cohort of regional states could guarantee Palestinian security and well-being in exchange for similar guarantees offered to Israel under the auspices of the United States. Türkiye failed to attract support for the initiative, particularly from Saudi Arabia and other Gulf partners, as it would place Türkiye at the center of developments in Gaza, therefore establishing itself in a central Arab affair. Türkiye has also continued to cultivate a relationship with the radical Islamist group Hamas,[17] again diverging from Saudi Arabia’s policy of preferring to engage with the Palestinian Authority in Ramallah.[18]
Türkiye’s policy priorities notwithstanding, both Ankara and Riyadh continue to be in alignment over the war in Gaza as a whole and the need for a two-state solution to the Palestinian Question. A future political settlement in Gaza could again benefit from the joint interests of Türkiye and Saudi Arabia. Both countries are already primary humanitarian actors in the Palestinian enclave and are poised to contribute to negotiations for a lasting settlement as two key allies of the United States. Again, as in the case of Syria, Ankara and Riyadh are aligned in principle in Gaza, yet with both parties attempting to exert their influence and shape the contours of the post-war settlement in a tacit competition. Türkiye and Saudi Arabia are also attempting to influence American policy concurrently, adding yet another layer to the complex mesh of competition and cooperation that exists.[19]
Prospects in 2025
2024 was one of the most significant years for Türkiye-Saudi ties and 2025 promises even more prospects.[20] This year, Saudi Arabia is set to receive Akıncı UCAVs from Baykar Industries, with the prospect that co-production ventures will also see more concrete developments during this period.[21] This year the limits of Türkiye-Saudi Arabia normalization will also be tested, as both countries move forward with their respective agendas in Syria and Gaza. Türkiye and Saudi Arabia successfully steered an initial process of normalization and subsequent elevation in ties after several years of competition. This time around, conflicting agendas in Syria and Gaza will test whether the trend of strategic cooperation in relations will last. Current indicators point to no immediate fallout or spiraling back into outright competition.
With Türkiye and Saudi Arabia bound by extensive defense ties and the Kingdom potentially becoming a client of Türkiye’s domestic fighter aircraft program, the risk of a fallout is further diminished. Instead, both countries look poised to navigate competing positions and accommodate drives for regional influence. They remain aligned in the broad sense and are both functioning as forces for stability in the region.
Conclusion
The bilateral relationship between Türkiye and Saudi Arabia has the potential to shape developments in the region, owing to the political and economic status of the two countries. Both are centers for power in the Middle East and both exercise influence over the course of the region’s key conflicts. From 2021 onwards, Türkiye successfully pursued a process of détente with Saudi Arabia,[22] resulting in the revival of strategic-military links that have now bound the two countries. While this process was initially linked to the wider realignment in the region, with several concurrent normalization processes ongoing, the Türkiye-Saudi Arabia relationship has also evolved exponentially.
Saudi Arabia is now one of Türkiye’s most significant defense clients and looks to become a future base of operations for the Turkish defense industry. The Kingdom is also reportedly interested in diversifying its defense portfolio with the KAAN fighter jet, marking the first of such international interest in the program. The expanded defense ties between the two nations underscore a newfound level of trust and cooperation that has the potential to redefine regional dynamics. Türkiye’s robust industrial base and strategic location make it an attractive partner for Saudi Arabia, which is undergoing a period of economic diversification under its Vision 2030 initiative. This initiative’s leg emphasizing defense industry capacity could greatly benefit from Türkiye’s own journey in nurturing its defense industry.
The alignment between Türkiye and Saudi Arabia presents a unified front in addressing regional challenges as well. The Syrian conflict has seen both countries engaging in diplomatic efforts to support the newly established government and facilitate reconstruction and rehabilitation. Türkiye and Saudi Arabia’s combined influence is critical in garnering international support and resources necessary for rebuilding war-torn Syria. In Gaza, the collaboration between Türkiye and Saudi Arabia is equally significant. Both countries have been prominent humanitarian actors, providing aid and advocating for a two-state solution to the Palestinian conflict. Despite policy divergences, their shared goal of ensuring a peaceful resolution remains steadfast.
As Türkiye and Saudi Arabia continue to navigate their respective agendas in Syria and Gaza, the prospect of sustained cooperation remains high, albeit with risks of a fallout. The normalization process initiated in 2021 laid a solid foundation for regional collaboration, with both nations recognizing the mutual benefits of strategic ties. The evolving partnership is poised to withstand the tests of conflicting interests, as both Türkiye and Saudi Arabia prioritize regional stability and development.
Türkiye and Saudi Arabia’s relationship exemplifies a complex interplay of cooperation and competition. Their ability to navigate competing positions while accommodating each other’s regional influence showcases their recently acquired diplomatic acumen, building on the lowest point of relations that preceded 2021. As both nations function as forces for stability in the Middle East, their evolving partnership holds the promise of reshaping the regional landscape.
[1] Tolga Yanık, “Turkish drone-maker Baykar’s export deal with Saudi Arabia makes headlines in US media,” Anadolu Agency, August 11, 2023, https://www.aa.com.tr/en/turkiye/turkish-drone-maker-baykars-export-deal-with-saudi-arabia-makes-headlines-in-us-media/2965945.
[2] Jon Lake, “Baykar Tech drone deal dents Chinese dominance,” Times Aerospace, February 7, 2024, https://www.timesaerospace.aero/features/defence/baykar-tech-drone-deal-dents-chinese-dominance#:~:text=On%2018%20July%2C%202023%2C%20Saudi,bn%20agreement%20on%20August%207.
[3] Başak Berber, “Suudi Arabistan’dan 100 adet KAAN hedefi,” Savunma Sanayi ST, December 26, 2024, https://www.savunmasanayist.com/polonyaya-krab-obusu-3-7-milyar-dolar/.
[4] Agnes Helou, “Saudi Arabia increases defense spending to $78B in 2025,” Breaking Defense, February 3, 2025, https://breakingdefense.com/2025/02/saudi-arabia-increases-defense-spending-to-78b-in-2025/.
[5] Eleonora Ardemagni, “Khalid bin Salman’s Rising Influence in Saudi Defense Reforms,” Italian Institute for International Political Studies, November 11, 2024, https://www.ispionline.it/en/publication/khalid-bin-salmans-rising-influence-in-saudi-defense-reforms-190141.
[6] Ali Bakir, “Why Saudi Arabia is so keen on the Turkish KAAN,” Atlantic Council, January 18, 2025, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/menasource/saudi-arabia-turkey-kaan/.
[7] Shimon Arad, “The United States Shouldn’t Sell the F-35 to Saudi Arabia,” War on the Rocks, January 17, 2020, https://warontherocks.com/2020/01/the-united-states-shouldnt-sell-the-f-35-to-saudi-arabia/.
[8] Giorgio Cafiero, “Why Saudi-Turkish collaboration in Syria is more likely than a clash,” Anwaj Media, February 1, 2025, https://amwaj.media/article/why-saudi-turkish-collaboration-in-syria-is-more-likely-than-a-clash.
[9] “Saudi Arabia calls for Syria sanctions relief as Arab, EU diplomats gather in Riyadh,” France24, January 12, 2025, https://www.france24.com/en/live-news/20250112-arab-eu-diplomats-in-saudi-for-talks-on-support-for-syria.
[10] “US pauses select restrictions on Syria, offering hope on Western sanctions,” Al Jazeera, January 7, 2025, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2025/1/7/us-pauses-select-restrictions-on-syria-offering-hope-on-western-sanctions.
[11] “Erdogan urges Italy to lead in efforts for lifting Syria sanctions,” TRT World, January 9, 2025, https://www.trtworld.com/turkiye/erdogan-urges-italy-to-lead-in-efforts-for-lifting-syria-sanctions-18252116.
[12] Aslı Aydıntaşbaş, “Topple, tame, trade: How Turkey is rewriting Syria’s future,” European Council on Foreign Relations, February 6, 2025, https://ecfr.eu/article/topple-tame-trade-how-turkey-is-rewriting-syrias-future/.
[13] “MSB’den Suriye’de “askeri üs kurulacağı” iddialarına yanıt,” Bianet, February 6, 2025, https://bianet.org/haber/msb-den-suriye-de-askeri-us-kurulacagi-iddialarina-yanit-304332.
[14] Agnes Helou and S. Süha Çubukçuoğlu, “From Rebuilding the Armed Forces to Selling Drones, How Turkey Can Enhance Syria’s Defense – Breaking Defense,” Breaking Defense (blog), February 13, 2025, https://breakingdefense.com/2025/02/from-rebuilding-the-armed-forces-to-selling-drones-how-turkey-can-enhance-syrias-defense/.
[15] Rabia İclal Turan, “Gaza Contact Group proposes global alliance to implement 2-state solution,” Anadolu Agency, September 28, 2024, https://www.aa.com.tr/en/middle-east/gaza-contact-group-proposes-global-alliance-to-implement-2-state-solution/3343041.
[16] Tugba Altun, Busranur Koca and Sumeyye Dilara Dincer, “Türkiye proposes guarantor formula for Israeli-Palestinian issue: Turkish foreign minister,” Anadolu Agency, October 17, 2023, https://www.aa.com.tr/en/turkiye/turkiye-proposes-guarantor-formula-for-israeli-palestinian-issue-turkish-foreign-minister/3022412.
[17] Utku Simsek and Seda Sevencan, “Turkish intel helps release of 5 Thai hostages in Gaza via negotiations with Hamas,” Anadolu Agency, January 30, 2025, https://www.aa.com.tr/en/turkiye/turkish-intel-helps-release-of-5-thai-hostages-in-gaza-via-negotiations-with-hamas/3466970.
[18] Haisam Hassanein, “Saudi Official Views of Hamas,” Foundation for the Defense of Democracies, August 23, 2024, https://www.fdd.org/analysis/2024/08/23/saudi-official-views-of-hamas/.
[19] Sümeyye Dilara Dinçer, “Turkish, Saudi foreign ministers discuss Gaza, Syria over phone,” Anadolu Agency, February 2, 2025, https://www.aa.com.tr/en/middle-east/turkish-saudi-foreign-ministers-discuss-gaza-syria-over-phone/3479848.
[20] Sinem Cengiz, “Turkish-Saudi Normalization Grows Under Security Umbrella,” The Arab Gulf States in Washington, July 29, 2024, https://agsiw.org/turkish-saudi-normalization-grows-under-security-umbrella/.
[21] “Saudi SAMI, Turkish firms establish new defense collaborations,” Daily Sabah, July 4, 2024, https://www.dailysabah.com/business/defense/saudi-sami-turkish-firms-establish-new-defense-collaborations.
[22] Hamdullah Baycar, “Saudi-Turkish Normalization: More Complicated than Meets the Eye,” Gulf International Forum, June 24, 2022, https://gulfif.org/saudi-turkish-normalization-more-complicated-than-meets-the-eye/.
