Türkiye is no stranger to East Africa, having been involved in the affairs of the region over the past decade. This engagement has mostly taken place in Somalia, a unique partner for Ankara in the Horn of Africa and Gulf of Aden regions—a geography with ever-growing strategic significance, both for Türkiye and other regional powers. Ankara and Mogadishu have what can be coined a special relationship. For a decade, Türkiye and Somalia have developed a sound security-focused relationship. Türkiye’s largest overseas military base, TURKSOM, is in Somalia’s capital Mogadishu, doubling as both a location for Turkish military deployment abroad and a training center for the Somali military. The base boasts graduates of Somali security forces since 2019 and has become a solid manifestation of the burgeoning defense relationship between the two sides.
Somalia has evolved into a testing ground for Türkiye’s ambitious foreign policy of expanding its influence in Africa. While military relations have added strategic depth to the relationship, Ankara’s engagement with Mogadishu transcends a simple security transaction. Türkiye’s largest diplomatic mission is also in Mogadishu. Scores of Somali military and political elites have been educated in Turkish establishments, thus strengthening institutional ties, while Ankara remains one of Somalia’s key trading partners. Türkiye is exercising both soft and hard power in Somalia. Alongside robust strategic cooperation, Türkiye’s cultural and language institutions have a significant presence in the East African state. Thousands of Somalian students have either graduated from Turkish higher education institutions or are currently enrolled in one.[1]
Ankara has successfully crowned a strategic-level partnership with common social capital, ensuring Türkiye’s position as a prime partner for Somalia into the long term. Indeed, Somalia now serves as a benchmark and a gateway for Türkiye’s engagement across the African continent. After success in the East, Türkiye has set its eyes on the Sahel. Recent diplomatic engagement with Niger indicates a growing Turkish interest in the ECOWAS states, particularly as Ankara looks to capitalize on diminishing Western influence in the region. Ankara’s relationship with Mogadishu is an exemplary model in this regard, with Türkiye now likely seeking to replicate this special relationship across Africa.
This article examines recent developments in the Türkiye-Somalia relationship. First, it looks at the recent enhancement in security cooperation, with Ankara’s outreach in the Horn of Africa now encompassing a significant maritime element.[2] Later, the analysis moves to Türkiye’s position as a mediator in East Africa. Recently, Ankara hosted talks between Ethiopia and Somalia to overcome tensions between the two over Addis Ababa’s recognition of Somaliland in return for maritime access. While talks are yet to achieve results, Ankara is now moving its influence beyond the military realm into the intricate balance of power in the Horn of Africa region. Finally, the article considers the potential future of Türkiye’s presence in this crucial part of Africa and highlights trends for Ankara’s broad engagement with the continent. Türkiye’s proactive Africa policy has its inception in Somalia; however, it looks to expand beyond the Horn and into the wider continent with time.
Forward Engagement in the Horn of Africa
Recently, Türkiye and Somalia moved their security cooperation to a new level. In February, the Somalian government granted exclusive rights to Türkiye to train,[3] equip and modernize its navy, as well as patrol the Somalian Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) in the Indian Ocean. This builds on already excellent military relations and an existing Turkish security infrastructure in Mogadishu. The naval agreement[4] is complemented by an economic one that grants Ankara the right to explore hydrocarbons in Somalia’s EEZ. The economic component of naval cooperation, which was finalized in July by Türkiye’s Energy Minister Alparslan Bayraktar, makes provisions for Türkiye to explore Somali territorial waters in three blocks.[5] Each block corresponds to 5,000 km2 of land as per the minister’s statements, with exploration expected to commence in September. Türkiye’s seismic exploration vessel Oruç Reis is expected to take the helm in these operations, complemented by an escort of support vessels as well. As part of this elaborate network of naval and energy cooperation, Türkiye’s armed forces received a further two-year authorization from the parliament to continue their foreign deployment in Somalia, making explicit reference to naval activities.[6]
Türkiye’s growing presence in the Gulf of Aden proves a considerable diversification of its forward military engagement doctrine. The fact that this is happening in Somalia is no surprise, as Ankara’s most successful model for its Africa opening policy is its ties to Mogadishu. As part of this diversification, Türkiye is branching into the naval sphere of military cooperation and extending its influence on an all-encompassing level in shaping the Somali military. This comes with benefits for both sides of the equation. Türkiye has a venue to showcase its military prowess and training expertise, and Mogadishu benefits from the second-largest army in NATO and a military power closely aligned and integrated into the U.S.-led security infrastructure.
While Ankara’s forward military engagement has not always been well received by its Western allies, the addition of Somalia to Türkiye’s growing security outreach has positive implications for the Western alliance as well. Somalia sits at the nexus of brewing conflict in the wider Gulf of Aden and Red Sea regions. The spiraling insecurity in the region following Hamas’s attack on Israel on 7 October 2023 and Israel’s subsequent invasion of Gaza has flared tensions in areas of proximity to East Africa. Türkiye’s growing naval ties to Somalia can therefore be viewed as a deterrent against further destabilization in the region.
Indeed, as part of the naval accords, Ankara and Mogadishu have agreed to cooperate on issues related to fisheries, piracy, and illicit movements in Somali territorial waters as well. This again signifies Ankara as a force for security in the region, benefiting the wider Transatlantic alliance and the Somali government. Türkiye’s diverse security outreach to the Gulf of Aden comes at a critical stage for the region, where both regional and bilateral tensions could possibly result in the erosion of the security environment. The naval accords between Somalia and Türkiye are therefore timed both strategically from a bilateral point of view and also within the wider context of the region. Türkiye is now positioned to aid Somalia in building its naval capacity and to function as an arbiter of security in the region.
Türkiye as a Mediator
As part of Ankara’s diversification of ties with Somalia, the relationship now includes a novel mediation element in Mogadishu’s tense relationship with Addis Ababa. Early in the year, Ethiopia agreed to recognize the breakaway region of Somaliland in exchange for access to the Red Sea through Somaliland’s Berbera Port. Naturally, the move was contested by Mogadishu, which seeks to block any diplomatic recognition for the breakaway region. Türkiye has become party to the diplomatic impasse between Ethiopia and Somalia, offering to mediate between the two countries.[7] While indeed Somalia is a unique partner for Ankara in Africa, relations with Ethiopia have also been strong. Ethiopia is a customer of Türkiye’s successful TB-2 UAV program, with the Addis Ababa government utilizing Turkish-made UAVs in the country’s civil conflict with Tigray.
With security relations to both Somalia and Ethiopia, Türkiye naturally emerged as a mediator between the two sides. To that respect, talks have been held in Ankara to come to an arrangement that sees Somalian territorial integrity secured, and Ethiopia’s desire to have access to the Red Sea fulfilled. While parties have met under the aegis of Türkiye’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, a conclusive outcome has not yet been attained. Regardless, mediation is expedited to continue, with Türkiye showcasing significant executive interest in that regard. Ankara would like to see Ethiopia’s recognition of Somaliland withdrawn in exchange for an alternative agreement that would allow Addis Ababa access to the Red Sea basin.
Türkiye’s objectives here are multifaceted. Primarily, Ankara is honoring its unique partnership with Mogadishu in prioritizing the country’s territorial integrity. Türkiye’s role as a mediator is indicative of the depth of strategic and military ties to Somalia. Secondly, Türkiye is adopting an agenda of furthering regional calm before the inception of its economic exploration activities in the region. When Türkiye begins exploring hydrocarbons in Somalian maritime zones, a conflict between Somalia and Ethiopia would be highly undesirable. Indeed, Somaliland has already issued a statement denouncing Türkiye’s deployment of naval assets to Somalian territorial waters,[8] arguing that areas of deployment coincide with Somaliland’s sovereign waters. With the potential of conflict between the sides alive, it is natural that Türkiye is seeking some regional cohesion before it begins research with its naval forces.
A successful mediation effort would establish Türkiye not only as a military power in the Horn of Africa but also as a reliable partner for all East African states. Türkiye’s sale of defense goods to the likes of Somalia and Ethiopia has already established Ankara as a key partner. The overcoming of this diplomatic crisis will further Türkiye’s role in the region and will cement Ankara’s strategy of diversifying its proactive foreign policy.
Prospects for Further Engagement
Türkiye’s forward engagement in the Horn of Africa does not come without risks. Türkiye has positioned itself as a mediator of conflicting sides and a dispenser of security in the region. A swift destabilization of the region’s security environment would be consequential for Turkish interests, particularly as Ankara is now moving to invest in the area of hydrocarbons through its agreement with Somalia. The eventual fruition of Türkiye’s goals in the Horn relies on a stable security environment and the reduction of hostilities between the region’s states. Turkish mediation efforts between Somalia and Ethiopia will therefore be of paramount interest moving forward.
These talks could further expand as well. Türkiye already maintains ties to the breakaway Somaliland region. Türkiye is one of the few countries in the world that have diplomatic representation in Somaliland’s de facto capital Hargeisa in the form of a consulate general. Ankara has been pushing for diplomatic ties between Somalia and Somaliland for the past decade. Such talks could see a revived interest in the next months as part of Türkiye’s newfound role as a mediator in the region. This could see more comprehensive developments in overcoming the political fray, and potentially aiding in Ankara’s endeavor of security as economic interests come to the forefront.
Türkiye-Somalia ties are expected to continue exhibiting new venues for cooperation as well. The inclusion of energy exploration and possible drilling activity into the new naval cooperation scheme offers many possibilities for the future of ties.[9] The next phase of energy ties is likely to encompass collaboration on the construction of energy transfer infrastructure and possible linkages to Türkiye. Türkiye’s ambitions of becoming an energy distribution hub remain alive and Somalia could become an integral part of that effort if energy exploration goes as planned. Türkiye could develop into a hub for the transfer of Somalian energy into European markets.
Türkiye is also likely to see more cohesion with its Western allies in East Africa. Türkiye’s growing role as a stabilizing force in Somalian territorial waters can act as a deterrent amidst the ongoing insecurity in the region, potentially aiding U.S. endeavors. Efforts to aid Somalia in overcoming issues of piracy and illicit movement are again aligned with the Transatlantic security agenda. The securitization of Somalia’s territorial waters can reverse adverse trends of migration and terrorism, immensely improving the security environment of a crucial region in Africa with proximity to the Middle East and Europe. The growing Türkiye-Somalia relationship looks to have consequences beyond bilateral ties, impacting regional and global trends because of Türkiye’s wider position in the Middle East as a member of the NATO alliance.
Conclusion
The special relationship between Somalia and Türkiye has come a long way since the inception of a strategic partnership a decade ago. The sides are now bound by an intricate web of ties spanning the military, economic and political domains. Somalia has come to rely on Türkiye as a stalwart partner in securing its regional position and improving its sovereign capability as a power in the Horn of Africa. Türkiye has been allotted the opportunity to test its ambitious foreign policy in Somalia, showcasing all manner of hard and soft power tools at its disposal. Indeed, Somalia has transformed into a model for Türkiye in its bid to expand influence in its near abroad.
The newly enacted naval accord between Türkiye and Somalia deepens an already robust relationship. Türkiye is now gearing up to become a player in East Africa’s energy politics, with Turkish naval assets moving to protect nearby waters and oversee hydrocarbon exploration across the Somalian coast. As Ankara transforms its role in Somalia, it is also tackling the role of a mediator in ensuring that the region’s security environment remains stable and amenable to Turkish interests. This transformative period in Türkiye-Somalia ties comes with opportunities, regional implications and risks. Türkiye’s executive interest is fixated on the Horn of Africa and will likely continue to do so as more Turkish assets move into the region.
Africa provides an apt setting to further test Ankara’s resolve to become a regional power. The model of Somalia will likely serve to guide Türkiye’s outreach to the west of the continent as well. Recent high-level visits by Turkish foreign and security policy officials to the West African state of Niger show that Ankara is eying opportunities to expand its influence.[10] The success of its engagement with Somalia is likely motivating Türkiye to seek broader engagement with the continent, particularly as the West’s position in Africa is being challenged by the emergence of Russia and China as significant actors in the continent. Türkiye is now moving to make its mark on Africa as a long-term power and is poised to have a profound influence on the continent’s shifting geopolitics.
[1] Mohammed Dhaysane, “Somali graduates of Turkish scholarship program give back to their country,” Anadolu Agency, February 11, 2022, https://www.aa.com.tr/en/education/somali-graduates-of-turkish-scholarship-program-give-back-to-their-country/2499620.
[2] “Turkey and Somalia strike an oil and gas cooperation deal for the Horn of Africa nation,” Associated Press, March 7, 2024, https://apnews.com/article/turkey-somalia-sign-oil-gas-agreements-312fcdf58789767f94b6c36a3444faec.
[3] Kiran Baez, “Turkey signed two major deals with Somalia. Will it be able to implement them,” Atlantic Council, June 18, 2024, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/turkeysource/turkey-signed-two-major-deals-with-somalia-will-it-be-able-to-implement-them/.
[4] Utku Şimşek, “Türkiye ile Somali arasında Savunma ve Ekonomik İşbirliği Çerçeve Anlaşması,” Anadolu Ajansı, February 8, 2024, https://www.aa.com.tr/tr/gundem/turkiye-ile-somali-arasinda-savunma-ve-ekonomik-isbirligi-cerceve-anlasmasi-/3131682.
[5] Firdevs Yüksel, Handan Kazancı, “Türkiye, Somali denizlerinde 3 blokta doğal gaz ve petrol arayacak,” Anadolu Ajansı, July 18, 2024, https://www.aa.com.tr/tr/ekonomi/turkiye-somali-denizlerinde-3-blokta-dogal-gaz-ve-petrol-arayacak/3278680.
[6] Aynur Ekiz, Ahmet Buğra Olaç, “TSK’nın Somali’de görevlendirilmesine ilişkin Cumhurbaşkanlığı tezkeresi TBMM’de kabul edildi,” Anadolu Ajansı, July 27, 2024, https://www.aa.com.tr/tr/gundem/tsknin-somalide-gorevlendirilmesine-iliskin-cumhurbaskanligi-tezkeresi-tbmmde-kabul-edildi/3287118.
[7] Nosmot Gbadamosi, “Turkey Tries Diplomacy in Ethiopia-Somalia Dispute,” Foreign Policy, August 21, 2024, https://foreignpolicy.com/2024/08/21/somalia-ethiopia-turkey-port-somaliland/.
[8] Ezgi Akin, “Somaliland warns against Turkey’s naval deployment off Somalia’s coast,” Al-Monitor, July 24, 2024, https://www.al-monitor.com/originals/2024/07/somaliland-warns-against-turkeys-naval-deployment-somalias-coast.
[9] Brendon J. Cannon, “Somalia-Turkey maritime deal is a win for both countries, and not a power play for the Horn of Africa,” The Conversation, March 7, 2024, https://theconversation.com/somalia-turkey-maritime-deal-is-a-win-for-both-countries-and-not-a-power-play-for-the-horn-of-africa-225023.
[10] “Turkey, Niger agree to enhance energy, defence cooperation,” Reuters, July 18, 2024, https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/turkey-niger-agree-enhance-energy-defence-cooperation-2024-07-18/.
