Over the past decade, U.S.-Türkiye relations have been on the same tumultuous rollercoaster track as the spiraling U.S.-led international order. Amid major shifts from the U.S.-led unipolar system to a more multipolar world, Ankara has embraced a policy of strategic autonomy, seeking to balance its interests with all sides of the international arena—most notably between its NATO ally, the United States and its Black Sea neighbor, Russia. Over this period, Ankara has—incorrectly—seen Washington as a less than consequential actor in a world that it has calculated to be continually post-Western.[1] Today, however, despite this decade-long strategic divide, the United States has reemerged as a central consideration of Ankara’s foreign policy during U.S. President Donald Trump’s second term in the White House.

Two recent developments have put the United States back at the center of Ankara’s foreign policy considerations: first, U.S. President Donald Trump’s increased interest in the ongoing war in Ukraine and Türkiye’s role in mediating the conflict; second, the fall of the Bashar al-Assad regime in Syria and the United States’ and Türkiye’s shared support for the new government. Despite expectations that Trump’s second rendition of “America First” would involve a high level of delegating foreign policy to allies, including Ankara, the administration has taken great interest in both the war in Ukraine and the development of a new Syrian state. This foremost includes President Trump’s personal interest in mediation as a manifestation of his “art of the deal,” as well as his appointment of close personal friends to consequential diplomatic positions such as U.S. Special Envoy for the Middle East and Special Envoy for Peace Missions Steve Witkoff and U.S. Ambassador to Türkiye and Special Envoy for Syria Tom Barrack.

For Ankara, which is deeply interconnected with both countries as they are not only geographically close but have also long relied on Ankara as an intermediary power, Washington’s involvement has been celebrated as a cause for increased U.S.-Türkiye cooperation, which is much needed after a decade of fallouts and disagreements. However, as U.S. foreign policy has been extremely volatile throughout the first nine months of the Trump administration amid cuts to U.S. government agencies[2] as well as the administration’s ever-changing views on Ukraine, it is also unclear in what direction cooperation will continue to move in these theaters. Furthermore, while Trump and Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan have close personal ties that are compatible with both actors’ preference for leader-to-leader relations, several points of strategic misalignment between the United States and Türkiye remain—not least tensions related to U.S. support for Israel and Turkish support for Hamas.[3] Therefore, as Washington’s and Ankara’s roles in these conflicts continue to develop, how will further U.S. and Turkish involvement in these areas, as well as other factors shaping relations, affect ties between Ankara and Washington moving forward? Can Trump and Erdoğan’s personal diplomacy supersede any potential fault lines?

To answer these questions, this article will first look at points of conflict and convergence in U.S.-Türkiye relations since the first Trump administration. Then, it will examine how developments in, first, Ukraine and then Syria, have shaped relations in more recent years. It will also examine how close Trump-Erdoğan relations, among other factors, may shape bilateral foreign policy. Finally, it will outline recommendations for how to promote bilateral cooperation and improve U.S.-Türkiye relations moving forward.

From the first Trump administration to the war in Ukraine: few opportunities for cooperation despite leader-to-leader relations

During Trump’s first election to office in 2016, Ankara strongly embraced the Trump White House, encouraged by his promise to radically alter American foreign policy to “Make America Great Again” and reject the U.S.-led international order. While bilateral relations had begun to face tensions due to the Obama administration’s criticism of government crackdowns following the Gezi Park protests in 2013, the Trump administration’s disinterest in considering the rule of law and democratic standards in foreign policy was welcome news to Ankara, which was already facing intense criticism from Brussels over its “democratic backsliding.”[4] However, while rhetorical overtures made for friendly meetings between Trump and Erdoğan, real strategic dissonance between the United States and Türkiye could not be overcome, as the bilateral relationship was plagued by many insuperable institutional and ideological issues.

First, as the civil war in Syria turned into a global battle against the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS), in 2015 the United States began training and arming the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), a coalition of militias most notably comprised of the People’s Protection Units (YPG), the Syrian offshoot of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK)—the terrorist organization waging a four-decade-long insurgency against Türkiye. While Ankara was initially convinced that it might pry the Trump administration away from the SDF, especially as Trump campaigned on pulling out American troops from Syria,[5] it was unable to convince U.S. officials to abandon its partners against ISIS. As many key national security personnel managing the Syria portfolio remained close to the White House from the outgoing administration, Turkish analysts even tried to rebrand these officials as “Obama leftovers” to separate the Trump administration from any perceptively anti-Türkiye policy.[6]

Second, as Türkiye suffered a bloody coup attempt on 15 July 2016, carried out by the followers of cult leader Fethullah Gülen—known as FETÖ and officially designated as a terrorist organization in Türkiye—his status as a permanent resident of the United States stirred accusations of U.S. support for the coup and a years-long dispute over Gülen’s extradition to stand trial in Türkiye. While the issue was raised by Türkiye in nearly every bilateral communique for years following 2016, and several meetings between the U.S. Department of Justice and Türkiye’s Ministry of Justice were held on the issue,[7] the Trump administration’s continued failure to extradite Gülen soured relations with officials in Ankara as well as public sentiment against the United States. Although matters of extradition are outside the purview of the U.S. executive as they are delegated to the judiciary, the legality of the issue was irrelevant to the Turkish side, especially in the court of public opinion.[8]

Amid this clear crisis of confidence between the United States and Türkiye, issue after issue began to surface between the allies despite Trump’s seat in the White House. Both the administration and Congress became increasingly vocal of their mistrust of Ankara following several major bilateral issues, including the arrest of several local staff members of the U.S. Mission in Türkiye,[9] Turkish security forces’ assault on pro-Kurdish protestors outside the Turkish embassy in Washington, DC,[10] and the arrest of a U.S. pastor in Izmir on espionage charges.[11] Bipartisan criticism of Türkiye’s human rights record became the norm. The arrest of Pastor Andrew Brunson even drew personal ire from President Trump, whose party is comprised of a strong Evangelical Christian base. Following Brunson’s arrest, Ankara was slapped with devastating sanctions on steel imports, sinking the Turkish lira’s value against the dollar. In the same announcement via Trump’s Twitter account, the president declared for all to see that “Our relations with Turkey are not good at this time!”[12]

As U.S.-Türkiye relations remained dicey, analysts began to debate Türkiye’s relations with the West in light of its increasingly close relations with Moscow—arguing whether its strategic balancing act was a symptom of Türkiye’s system of “flexible alliances”[13] or a betrayal of its position as a member of the Western alliance. As many in Ankara and a large portion of Turkish society blamed Washington for the attempted coup, general trust in the West plummeted, with the majority of Turks echoing this opinion.[14] Türkiye’s desire to move away from the West and build new partnerships to balance it drove Ankara to its Black Sea neighbor, with whom it was already in regular contact regarding deconfliction in Syria, e.g., the Astana format, despite backing opposing sides. Emboldened by its desire for strategic autonomy as well as the memory of being attacked by its own army with interoperable NATO weapons on the night of the coup, Ankara agreed to purchase the Russian-made S-400 surface-to-air missile system in 2017. Despite immediate warnings from Congress to halt its purchase,[15] Ankara moved forward with acquiring the system, triggering U.S. sanctions on Türkiye under the Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA). Consequently, Ankara’s purchase also led Congress to block Türkiye from the F-35 fighter jet program, of which it had been a key manufacturer of parts for decades, causing it to lose not only billions of dollars in investments but also access to strategic military hardware. As the CAATSA sanctions only came into effect in December 2020, they punctuated the end of the Trump administration’s tumultuous relations with Türkiye.

With the COVID-19 pandemic in full swing as Joe Biden came to office in January 2021, the more imminent threat of global health left bilateral relations simmering in the background, lacking new sources of tension to boil over. The Biden administration’s policy of ignoring Türkiye, avoiding both bilateral meetings with President Erdoğan and leaving out Türkiye from Washington’s Democracy Summit,[16] left relations where they had descended during the first Trump term. Working relations continued through multilateral fora such as NATO, with little momentum toward making bilateral amends. With the Biden administration maintaining the Trump administration’s focus on China as well as the general U.S. neo-isolationist zeitgeist, U.S. involvement in Türkiye and its backyard remained, comparatively, a non-issue. During a September 2021 trip to the UN General Assembly in New York, President Erdoğan commented that “the current trajectory [of relations between the United States and Türkiye] does not bode well.”[17] Thus, amid such apathy, it took a major shift in international politics to provide any momentum toward cooperation.

Mediating the war in Ukraine: where does Türkiye stand vis-à-vis Trump’s negotiations?

After nearly a decade of animosity and distance between the United States and Türkiye, the war in Ukraine brought about increased cooperation between the two NATO allies. More broadly, the war launched a wave of transatlantic unity, with NATO allies unanimously voting to condemn the aggression/invasion, and historically neutral countries Finland and Sweden writing up accession documents to join the alliance. In Washington, the Biden administration approved hundreds of millions of dollars in aid for Kyiv, while European powers such as Germany proclaimed that they were undergoing a transformation (zeitenwende) toward rearming the European continent. Ankara was one of the first countries to send weapons and supplies to Kyiv—most notably its Bayraktar TB2 drones.[18]

However, while Ankara has joined its NATO allies in all declarations condemning Moscow from the start of the war until today and has also been both a vocal supporter of Ukraine’s territorial integrity and an important arms supplier since Russia’s 2014 annexation of Crimea,[19] Türkiye’s position between its two Black Sea neighbors has remained, to some degree, in the middle. Despite its support for Kyiv, Türkiye has remained the only NATO member not to impose sanctions on Russia. In line with its decades-long balancing act between the West and Russia as well as balancing economic troubles at home, Ankara has been reluctant to forsake its energy and economic relationship with Moscow. While Ankara has received much criticism for its posture in the West, its unique position has also allowed it to become a key mediator between Kyiv and Moscow, acting as no other allied country could. Therefore, despite years of tensions with Washington and Brussels, Ankara’s position on both sides became an asset within the Western orb and created space for strategic realignment with the United States.

Early in the war, Ankara demonstrated its commitment to protecting the Straits, strictly upholding the Montreux Convention (1936) to prevent the passage of Russian war vessels, which received praise from its NATO allies. By July 2022, it concluded UN-backed negotiations between Kyiv and Moscow to ensure the safe passage of grain and foodstuffs from the Black Sea to the rest of the world, which became known as the Black Sea Grain Initiative. Though the deal only lasted one year, Türkiye’s mediation efforts were applauded by the Biden administration and became a turning point for cooperation between Washington and Ankara.[20]

Although Ankara’s mediation role in the war was far from restoring the trust lost between the United States and Türkiye over the last decade, the Biden administration welcomed Ankara’s willingness to take up this role, which also kept Washington—reluctant to get deeply involved in Ukraine amid isolationist pressure at home—further away from the conflict. To this end, the Biden administration’s stated desire to move back toward a norms-based foreign policy framework and global democracy promotion was quickly forgotten amid Ankara’s utility in the war in Ukraine, engendering a new transactional approach to Türkiye. This became obvious following Sweden’s accession to NATO, in which Ankara withheld its approval for over one year, first, due to its legitimate concerns about the PKK and counterterrorism laws in Sweden and then, to extract commitments from the Biden administration regarding the sale of F-16 fighter jets.[21] Although Türkiye’s position created friction with its European allies, any cooperation and concessions that it would get from Washington far outweighed this concern.

Following Trump’s victory in the 2024 U.S. presidential election, the dynamics surrounding the war in Ukraine, the negotiation table around the conflict, and Türkiye’s seat at that table have been uncertain. As Trump’s promise to end the war within 24 hours in office did not come to fruition, the Trump administration’s array of diplomatic strategies over the last nine months have varied from cozying up to the Russian side—even greenlighting a high-level meeting with a Russian delegation in Istanbul on the anniversary of Moscow’s annexation of Crimea[22]—to hurling insults at Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky after inviting him to visit the Oval Office in February[23] to most recently orchestrating a face-to-face summit in Alaska with Russian President Vladimir Putin on August 15.[24] While Trump’s personal involvement in mediation efforts has resulted in near-constant whiplash, with the confusion and instability over the U.S. position in the war breeding chaos across Europe, it has also resulted in Ankara’s inability to conduct more effective negotiations toward peace between the sides. Although Türkiye has hosted three high-level trilateral meetings at Istanbul’s Çırağan Palace since May 2025, where the three sides have agreed to prisoner swaps and the exchange of soldiers’ remains, the latest meeting on 23 July could not move beyond these agreements as Russia was waiting for Putin’s face-to-face meeting with President Trump.[25]

The uncertainty around Ankara’s position grew when, following the Alaska meeting, members of the European Coalition of the Willing, of which Ankara is also a part, convened at the White House to address the points raised by Putin during the prior meeting. While leaders from seven different European nations as well as the heads of the EU and NATO were photographed sitting around a large table with Trump, Türkiye was noticeably absent.[26] Although U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio placed at least two phone calls to Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs Hakan Fidan in the weeks following the coalition meeting,[27] Türkiye’s role in any future negotiations is still unclear.[28] While Türkiye has offered to send peacekeeping troops to Ukraine only in the case of a ceasefire, this offer seems irrelevant as Moscow continues to bombard Ukrainian cities as well as both U.S. and Turkish companies inside Ukraine, leaving even more question marks around how effective any negotiations with Putin can be. Following his trip to the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) Summit in China on 1 September, where he spoke directly with Putin and later by phone with Zelensky, President Erdoğan returned, saying that the two leaders are “not yet ready” for negotiations.[29] Still, as Trump has also threatened several times to walk away from negotiations should Putin not seem to be working toward them, Türkiye stands ready to help negotiate peace.[30] Although the war in Ukraine has set U.S.-Türkiye relations on course toward increased cooperation over the last few years, it is currently unclear how much longer this point of strategic realignment with Washington will continue to be a source of increased cooperation due to Trump’s willingness to give up on settling the conflict as well as Putin’s continued aggression.

A new Syrian government breeds new opportunities for U.S.-Türkiye cooperation

Over the last year, the conflict in Syria has become an unexpected point of cooperation between the United States and Türkiye. The sudden fall of the Bashar al-Assad regime on 8 December 2024 became a day of victory not only for the Syrian people but also—initially at least—for Türkiye, which for the last decade had been supporting anti-Assad factions in Syria, including Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) and its leader Ahmed al-Sharaa. After a decade of diverging Syria policies with the United States, Türkiye’s support of these certain factions of the opposition, which the United States had long spurned due to their past affiliation with Al-Qaeda, had paid off. For a brief moment, Türkiye “held the keys” to Syria’s future, as voiced by then President-elect Trump.[31] While the United States initially remained at arm’s length from Al-Shaara, the fate of its long-time partner in Northern Syria, the SDF, was also called into question vis-à-vis Damascus’ visions for a united Syria. However, after the inauguration of President Trump, this dynamic began to shift as the new administration became increasingly invested in supporting the new Syrian government more directly.

In April 2025, Congress confirmed Lebanese American real estate investor Tom Barrack, a close friend of Trump who was tapped early on for the role, as the Ambassador of the United States to Türkiye. Just one week after assuming his role in Ankara, Barrack was also appointed as the United States Special Envoy for Syria. Given Ankara’s close relations with the new Syrian government as well as the fact that the State Department had been operating its Syria Regional Platform partially from Istanbul since the outbreak of the war, the appointment comes as little surprise. However, Ambassador Barrack’s intense involvement in Syria—not to mention the wider Levant—has been a bit more unexpected. Since his appointment, Barrack has not only raised the American flag in Damascus for the first time in over a decade but also successfully lobbied Congress to remove sanctions on Syria and expressed an unwavering commitment to the new Syrian government, which he has met with countless times.

Rather than leave the rebuilding of the Syrian state solely to Türkiye and the Gulf states, the Trump administration has shown that it wants to work together with these actors to ensure a stable, united Syria. At the behest of Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman as well as President Erdoğan, Trump met with Al-Sharaa in Riyadh in May, with Mohammed bin Salman and Erdoğan (virtually) also in attendance.[32] Following the meeting, Ankara and Washington established a high-level comprehensive working group on Syria, including the participation of both countries’ ambassadors.[33]

However, amid the excitement that the U.S. and Türkiye are finally on the same page in Syria after a decade of tensions, several factors on the ground threaten to challenge the future of this alignment. Continued talks of a federated Syria, ethnic clashes between several groups, including government forces (with the most notable being with the Druze in Suwayda), and subsequent Israeli interventions in Syria threaten to break apart the fragile condition of the new Syrian state. With two of these challenges, the SDF and Israel, being both U.S. partners and Türkiye’s rivals (at least currently in the case of poor Israel-Türkiye relations), a conflict involving either party may complicate Trump’s other alliances in Syria despite the shared will toward U.S.-Türkiye cooperation.

Most important for Ankara is Damascus’ fragile 10 March agreement with the SDF, which is currently stalling further negotiations with the state as it seeks further autonomy. As Ankara’s second attempt at a peace process with the PKK is currently unfolding in parallel, the future of the SDF inside Syria is also inextricably linked to the future of the peace process in Türkiye, potentially adding a new layer of trouble. While Ambassador Barrack has maintained that there is “no Plan B” inside Syria[34]—signaling that Washington would support Al-Sharaa and thus Türkiye over its long-time Kurdish partners if push comes to shove—such a scenario would still likely compound Barrack’s “three Tylenol headache” as the U.S. may attempt to negotiate a settlement.

Additionally, Israel’s encroachments into Syria pose a major threat to both the new government and Erdoğan as well as the regional order. While analysts have pointed out that a clash between the two regional powers may be inevitable, President Trump has even preemptively offered to mediate between Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and President Erdoğan in the face of further Israeli aggression.[35] However, while any Trump mediation between Erdoğan and Netanyahu would certainly entail a very unpopular photo-op between the Turkish and Israeli leaders back home, in the meantime, negotiations are likely to continue to proceed through Azerbaijan as long as deconfliction is a manageable option. Should tensions escalate beyond this, Trump will certainly be waiting to welcome his friends for negotiations, which would ideally restore a fragile peace as well as the shared U.S.-Türkiye vision for Syria.[36]

Can Trump and Erdoğan bridge the gap the second time around?

Although close personal relations were not enough to weather the storm of international politics during Trump’s first term in office, a renewed sense of optimism has existed between the two sides since the beginning of Trump’s second presidency. While Ankara has been more reserved in its praise for the Trump administration during the first term, Washington has been quite positive about the prospect of relations with Türkiye. In March, Steve Witkoff told conservative personality Tucker Carlson that “[…] the president has a relationship with Erdoğan, and that’s going to be important.”[37] Since the beginning of his term, Trump has referred to Erdoğan as a “good leader,”[38] among an array of other compliments. The two have held several calls over the last nine months and even met on the sidelines of the NATO Summit in the Hague in June. Finally, on September 25, Erdoğan got his highly anticipated invitation to visit Trump at the White House, where the two made “meaningful progress” on trade and defense deals, including a discussion of Türkiye’s acquisition of F-35s and F-16s, among other issues.[39] Once again, the mutual admiration between the two leaders was on full display.

Furthermore, amid Trump’s reordering of the global economy and the imposition of a mercurial U.S. tariff regime, Türkiye has remained relatively unscathed.[40] It is currently subject to the lowest level of U.S. tariffs, a 15% rate (excluding steel products, which globally face a higher tariff rate). Given Türkiye’s lower tariff rates than many other major manufacturing countries around the world, especially China, analysts have even argued that Türkiye may even benefit from the tariffs as manufacturers could relocate to Türkiye to avoid higher fees.[41] In a similar vein, unlike countries such as India, which is currently facing 50% tariffs due to its significant purchase of Russian oil, Ankara has so far escaped any additional tariffs and sanctions despite also being a major importer of Russian oil.[42] As tariffs have been unilaterally imposed by Trump and his administration in a frequently ad-hoc manner, one may infer that close leader-to-leader ties play some factor in this decision, especially as many other countries’ tariffs have been renegotiated with the administration. While Türkiye’s purchase of Russian oil was mentioned by Trump at their recent White House meeting, Ankara’s decision prior to the leaders’ meeting to lift tariffs on U.S. steel and aluminum, which Ankara had reciprocally imposed on Washington in 2018, seemed to keep Trump pleased for now.[43]

While the second Trump administration has generally prioritized leader-to-leader relations in foreign policy much more than in the first administration, it is important to note that the “fading of old irritants”[44] undermining bilateral cooperation, especially in Syria, has been a major factor propelling cooperation forward. The elimination of factors such as the death of Fetullah Gülen and, therefore, the controversy over his extradition; major Türkiye critics such as former Chair of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee Bob Menendez, who is currently serving time in federal prison on corruption charges and conspiracy to act as a foreign agent for the government of Egypt; and Trump’s influence over a Republican-controlled Congress have certainly helped advance relations. As Ankara is seeking to remove the CAATSA sanctions on Türkiye, which would require Congressional approval, the administration’s stranglehold over the Republican party would certainly tilt any vote on this matter in Türkiye’s favor—although Türkiye would likely first need to develop a solution to the safe and monitored storage of S-400 missiles.[45] Overall, Trump’s massive expansion of executive power has made both Congress and the Supreme Court more amenable to his agenda, though this has largely played out in the realms of immigration and the shrinking of the federal government rather than in foreign policy matters. However, it is not hard to believe that Trump could persuade Congress to act in favor of his friends in Türkiye, too. During the press conference before his meeting with Erdoğan, Trump claimed regarding the CAATSA sanctions that “if we have a good meeting, [we can lift sanctions] almost immediately.”[46]

As future divergences in either Ankara’s or Washington’s policies in Ukraine and Syria may pose the largest risks to undermining improving bilateral relations, there are, however, a few potential obstacles to cooperation. First and foremost, as previously mentioned, there is still the elephant in the room: U.S. support for Israel and Türkiye’s support for Hamas in Gaza. While at their recent meeting, Trump claimed that he does “not know his [Erdoğan’s] stance”[47] on the issue, Erdoğan has since claimed that Trump asked him to get Hamas to the negotiation table with Israel. However, as it is still unclear how this peace plan will materialize, it is equally unclear if this issue will affect bilateral relations in the future. Second, as Türkiye-Israel relations have reached new lows, the United States launched the 3+1 regional format in May with not only Israel but also Türkiye’s regional rivals, Greece and the Republic of Cyprus. While Türkiye-Greece relations are currently relatively amicable, the possibility of Trump meeting the leaders of these three nations together under such a format carries the possibility that they may at some point try to sway him away from his good friend Erdoğan.

Policy Recommendations

Improving the state of U.S.-Türkiye relations is no easy task amid a constantly shifting geopolitical landscape. While the past few years have created an opening for increased cooperation, there is still little bilateral trust outside the relationship between the two executives. Therefore, while preserving leader-to-leader trust, the two sides should work on shared areas of cooperation in the international arena to build back trust on the institutional level. Developing additional working areas in Ukraine and Syria would be a good start. To this end, the United States and Türkiye might consider the following:

• The United States should invite Türkiye into its smaller meetings of the Coalition of the Willing. As Erdoğan is one of the few Western leaders with whom both President Zelensky and President Putin have deep working relations, Türkiye’s seat at the table is crucial to opening more lines of communication between Kyiv and Moscow that can also include the United States.
• As Ankara has recently signed a formal security cooperation agreement with Damascus, the U.S.-Türkiye Syria Working Group should establish a separate or additional working group dedicated specifically to defense and military matters. The involvement of Defense Department and Ministry of Defense officials on each respective side would improve communication and coordination between the sides on Syria-related intel and counterterrorism operations that are important to both Ankara and Washington.
• While Ankara and Washington should first work to resolve the S-400 issue and then restore Türkiye’s place in the F-35 program, the two allies should also look toward expanding defense industry cooperation, especially amid NATO members’ pledge to commit 5% of GDP to defense. The United States should also support the integration of Türkiye’s defense sector within the European security architecture amid the continent’s need to bolster its own defenses without U.S. aid.

[1] Megan Gisclon and Fuat Keyman, “Turkey and Germany in the Interregnum: New Foreign Policy Strategies for a Multipolar World,” German Politics (2025), doi: 10.1080/09644008.2025.2497526.

[2] Most notably to USAID.

[3] “Turkey’s Erdogan says Trump’s Gaza plan is ‘major threat’ to world peace,” Reuters, February 13, 2025, https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/turkeys-erdogan-says-trumps-gaza-plan-is-major-threat-world-peace-2025-02-13/.

[4] European Commission, “Turkey 2018 Report,” Commission Staff Working Document, Strasbourg 17.4.2018. SWD (2018) 153 final, https://neighbourhood-enlargement.ec.europa.eu/document/download/446c8261.

[5] Phillip Rucker and Missy Ryan, “Trump Orders Pentagon to Draft Isis Strategy, Restructuring of Security Council” The Washington Post, January 28, 2017, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/powerpost/wp/2017/01/28/trump-to-order-joint-chiefs-to-draft-isis-strategy-restructure-security-council/?utm_term=.781361b34df1.

[6] Burhanettin Duran, “How the US could sell Turkey on its Syria plan,” SETA, January 19, 2025, https://www.setav.org/en/how-the-us-could-sell-turkey-on-its-syria-plan.

[7] “US to Send Delegation to Turkey for Gülen Probe: Official,” Reuters, August 20, 2016, http://www.reuters.com/article/us-turkey-security-usa-idUSKCN10V0GB; “Justice Minister in US over Gülen’s Extradition Demand,” Hurriyet Daily News, May 6, 2017, http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/justice-minister-in-us-over-Gülens-extradition-demand.aspx?pageID=238&nID=112795&NewsCatID=510.

[8] Michael Werz and Max Hoffman, “The Process Behind Turkey’s Proposed Extradition of Fethullah Gülen,” Center for American Progress, September 7, 2016, https://www.americanprogress.org/article/the-process-behind-turkeys-proposed-extradition-of-fethullah-gulen/.

[9] Nick Ching, “US: Turkey’s Arrest of US Consulate Staffers ‘Deeply Disturbing’,” VOA, October 11, 2017, https://www.voanews.com/a/united-states-says-turkey-arrest-consulate-staffers-deeply-disturbing/4065237.html.

[10] Amberin Zaman, “Second indictment for Erdogan guards over DC beatdown in May,” Al Monitor, August 31, 2017, https://www.al-monitor.com/originals/2017/08/us-indicts-turkish-security-may-beat-down-dc.html.

[11] United States Commission on International Religious Freedom, “Pastor Andrew Brunson,” accessed September 8, 2025, https://www.uscirf.gov/religious-prisoners-conscience/released-rpocs/pastor-andrew-brunson.

[12] Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), “I have just authorized a doubling of Tariffs on Steel and Aluminum with respect to Turkey as their currency, the Turkish Lira, slides rapidly downward against our very strong Dollar! Aluminum will now be 20% and Steel 50%. Our relations with Turkey are not good at this time!” Twitter (now X), August 10, 2018, https://x.com/realDonaldTrump/status/1027899286586109955.

[13] Fuat Keyman and Megan Gisclon, “Turkey’s Strategic Choice: Flexible Alliances with an Enduring Transatlantic Anchor,” On Turkey, German Marshall Fund of the United States, December 1, 2017, https://www.gmfus.org/news/turkeys-strategic-choice-flexible-alliances-enduring-transatlantic-anchor.

[14] Mustafa Aydın, et al., “Research on Public Perceptions on Turkish Foreign Policy,” Center for Turkish Studies – Kadir Has University, July 4, 2019, https://www.mustafaaydin.gen.tr/source/TDP-2019-EN.PDF.

[15] Andrew Hanna, “Cardin: Turkey’s Purchase of Russian Missile System Say Trigger Sanctions,” Politico, September 14, 2017, https://www.politico.com/story/2017/09/14/turkey-russia-purchase-may-trigger-sanctions-242725.

[16] Kemal Kirisci, “Biden’s Exclusion of Erdoğan from the Democracy Summit May Be a Blessing in Disguise for Turkey,” Just Security, December 8, 2021, https://www.justsecurity.org/79477/bidens-exclusion-of-erdogan-from-the-democracy-summit-may-be-a-blessing-in-disguise-for-turkey/.

[17] “Erdogan says Turkish relations with US not ‘healthy’,” Al Monitor, September 23, 2021, https://www.al-monitor.com/originals/2021/09/erdogan-says-turkish-relations-us-not-healthy.

[18] Stephen Witt, “The Turkish Drone that Changed the Nature of Warfare,” The New Yorker, May 9, 2022, https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2022/05/16/the-turkish-drone-that-changed-the-nature-of-warfare.

[19] Rich Outzen, “Part 3. Defense Cooperation: Turkey’s Triangular Balancing in the Black Sea Region,” in A Sea of Opportunities: Exploring Cooperation Between Turkey and the West in the Black Sea (Istanbul: Atlantic Council in Turkey, 2024), https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/report/part-3-defense-

cooperation-turkeys-triangular-balancing-in-the-black-sea-region/.

[20] Jeff Flake, “Ambassador Jeff Flake: America ‘Needs Friendships,’ and so do Our Allies,” interview by Samuel Benson, Deseret News, May 23, 2024, https://www.deseret.com/politics/2024/05/23/ambassador-jeff-flake-turkey-ukraine-gaza-israel/.

[21] Megan Gisclon and E. Fuat Keyman, “The Three Dimensions of NATO Enlargement in 2023: From the Arctic to the Black Sea and Beyond,” Transatlantic Policy Quarterly 22, no.1 (2023): 63–71.

[22] Sertac Aktan, “US and Russian diplomats meet in Istanbul for second round of talks,” Euronews, February 27, 2025, https://www.euronews.com/my-europe/2025/02/27/us-and-russian-diplomats-meet-in-istanbul-for-second-round-of-talks.

[23] Kevin Liptak, Jeff Zeleny, Kaitlan Collins, and Kit Maher, “Trump and Vance erupt at Zelensky in tense Oval Office meeting,” CNN, February 28, 2025, https://edition.cnn.com/2025/02/28/politics/trump-zelensky-vance-oval-office.

[24] Laura Gozzi, “‘Next time in Moscow?’: Five takeaways after Trump and Putin’s Alaska summit,” BBC, August 15, 2025, https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c4gj9er0x0zo.

[25] “Russia and Ukraine discuss more prisoner exchanges at Istanbul talks,” Al Jazeera, July 23, 2025, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2025/7/23/russia-set-for-ukraine-talks-in-turkiye-says-progress-will-be-difficult.

[26] “Turkey eyes Ukraine peacekeeping role but mistrust clouds Western ties,” Radio France Internationale (rFi), August 25, 2025, https://www.rfi.fr/en/podcasts/international-report/20250825-turkey-eyes-ukraine-peacekeeping-role-but-mistrust-clouds-western-ties.

[27]  Office of the Spokesperson, “Secretary Rubio’s Call with Foreign Minister Fidan,” U.S. Department of State, Readout, August 19, 2025, https://www.state.gov/releases/office-of-the-spokesperson/2025/08/secretary-rubios-call-with-foreign-minister-fidan/; Office of the Spokesperson, “Secretary Rubio’s Call with Foreign Minister Fidan,” U.S. Department of State, Readout, August 28, 2025, https://www.state.gov/releases/office-of-the-spokesperson/2025/08/secretary-rubios-call-with-foreign-minister-fidan-2/.

[28] “Ukrayna’ya sağlanacak güvenlik garantilerinde Türkiye nasıl bir rol oynayacak?” BBC Türkçe, August 21, 2025, https://www.bbc.com/turkce/articles/c0r7jr404nwo.

[29] “Erdogan says Putin, Zelenskiy ‘not yet ready’ for face-to-face meet on war,” Reuters, September 2, 2025, https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/erdogan-says-putin-zelenskiy-not-yet-ready-face-to-face-meet-war-2025-09-02/.

[30] “Türkiye offers to host Ukraine peace summit, citing trust and mediation record: Report,” Türkiye Today, September 8, 2025, https://www.turkiyetoday.com/nation/turkiye-offers-to-host-ukraine-peace-summit-citing-trust-and-mediation-record-report-3206399.

[31] Jeff Mason, “Trump says Turkey holds the key to Syria’s future,” Reuters, December 17, 2025, https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/trump-says-turkey-holds-key-syrias-future-2024-12-16/.

[32] “President Erdoğan holds online meeting with leaders of the U.S., Saudi Arabia and Syria,” Presidency of the Republic of Türkiye Directorate of Communications, May 14, 2025, https://www.iletisim.gov.tr/english/haberler/detay/president-erdogan-holds-online-meeting-with-leaders-of-the-u.s-saudi-arabia-and-syria.

[33] U.S. Department of State, “Joint Statement on the U.S.-Türkiye Syria Working Group,” Media Note, Office of the Spokesperson, May 20, 2025, https://www.state.gov/releases/office-of-the-spokesperson/2025/05/joint-statement-on-the-u-s-turkiye-syria-working-group.

[34] Ambassador Tom Barrack, “EXCLUSIVE INTERVIEW: U.S. ENVOY REVEALS SECRET PEACE TALKS BETWEEN HEZBOLLAH, ISRAEL, SYRIA & LEBANON,” interview with Mario Newfal, X, 24:49, August 25, 2025, https://x.com/MarioNawfal/status/1961083854116294990.

[35] “Trump: “I have great relations with a man named Erdogan’,” @trtworld, YouTube, https://www.youtube.com/shorts/QwI6MI0OrH0.

[36] Rachel Bradenburg, “Could Trump be ‘mediator-in-chief’ for Turkey and Israel in Syria?” Atlantic Council, May 19, 2025, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/menasource/could-trump-be-mediator-in-chief-for-turkey-and-israel-in-syria/.

[37] Steve Witkoff, “Steve Witkoff’s Critical Role in Negotiating Global Peace, and the Warmongers Trying to Stop Him,” interviewed by Tucker Carlson, premiered March 22, 2025, The Tucker Carlson Show, YouTube, 54:24, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=acvu2LBumGo.

[38] “Trump hails Erdoğan, Türkiye as ‘good leader, good country’,” Daily Sabah, March 26, 2025, https://www.dailysabah.com/politics/trump-hails-erdogan-turkiye-as-good-leader-good-country/news.

[39] “Erdogan hails ‘meaningful progress’ in his talks with Trump,” Reuters, September 26, 2025, https://www.reuters.com/business/aerospace-defense/turkeys-erdogan-says-meaningful-progress-made-trump-talks-2025-09-26/.

[40] Mucahithan Avcioglu, “Türkiye emerged ‘positively’ in light of new US tariffs: Trade Ministry,” Anadolu Agency, August 1, 2025, https://www.aa.com.tr/en/economy/turkiye-emerged-positively-in-light-of-new-us-tariffs-trade-ministry/3648373.

[41] Jens Bastian, “What risks and opportunities does the US–EU conflict pose for Turkey’s trade and supply chain policies?” Centre for Applied Turkish Studies, CATS Network Perspectives, July 15, 2025, https://www.cats-network.eu/publication/what-risks-and-opportunities-does-the-us-eu-conflict-pose-for-turkeys-trade-and-supply-chain-policies.

[42] Ahmad Ghaddar and Robert Harvey, “Exclusive: Top Turkish refiner Tupras resumes buying Russian Ural crude, sources say,” Reuters, April 16, 2025, https://www.reuters.com/markets/commodities/top-turkish-refiner-tupras-resumes-buying-russian-urals-crude-sources-say-2025-04-16/.

[43] Daren Butler, “Turkey ends some tariffs on US imports ahead of Erdogan-Trump meeting,” Reuters, September 22, 2025, https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/turkey-says-it-is-ending-additional-tariffs-some-us-imports-2025-09-22/.

[44] Adam Weinstein and Steven Simon, “The Fading of Old Irritants: U.S.–Türkiye Relations in a Post–Assad Landscape,” Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft, Quincy Brief #82, August 12, 2025, https://quincyinst.org/research/the-fading-of-old-irritants-u-s-turkiye-relations-in-a-post-assad-landscape/#

[45] Aaron Stein, “The Time is Right to Sell F-35 to Turkey,” Behind the Front Substack, April 12, 2025, https://behindthefront.substack.com/p/the-time-is-right-to-sell-f-35-to.

[46] “LIVE: Trump meets with Turkey’s Erdogan at the White House,” Associated Press, streamed live on September 25, 2025, 10:09, YouTube, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=KYu0LsLl7ns.

[47] Ibid., 10:09.