In the 21st century, control over data and finance increasingly depends on who owns and operates the underlying infrastructure. While much attention is given to artificial intelligence, mobile networks, and social platforms, the most consequential battleground may lie on the ocean floor and within cryptographic ledgers. China has quietly but decisively expanded its influence over global information flows by building vast undersea cable networks and pioneering state-led blockchain systems. These projects, which other nations might dismiss as technical upgrades, are in fact central to Beijing’s broader strategy to achieve technological and financial sovereignty. As Western countries and their allies across the Middle East and Asia struggle to respond, a fragmented digital order, which is shaped by innovation and geopolitical design, is starting to emerge. China’s strategy of building submarine cables and blockchain networks aims not just to advance Beijing’s technological infrastructure but also to redefine who controls the global flow of money and information. By designing both the physical and digital infrastructure of the future, China aims to dominate the foundations of the next global economy.
Digital Infrastructure as a Financial Strategy
China’s digital infrastructure development is not a scattered effort, but a coordinated strategy designed to assert financial independence and technological sovereignty. At the core of this effort is Beijing’s understanding that control over connectivity infrastructure would ensure economic leverage and strategic protection. While Western nations typically treat digital systems as private-sector ventures, China integrates state planning with physical and digital deployments. This approach is evident in the Digital Silk Road (DSR), which is a global initiative geared toward shaping international flows of information through Chinese-led standards and platforms.[1] The DSR’s prioritization of infrastructure ownership reflects a vision of digital globalization that is governed not by openness, but by managed interdependence. In this framework, submarine cables and blockchain protocols are not separate technologies but two interlocking components of a broader financial strategy.
China’s expansion of domestic cable infrastructure reflects its determination to build a resilient, self-contained digital economy. By investing heavily in this internal submarine cable network, China aims to control its data routing to avoid reliance on foreign systems that could be subject to geopolitical pressure. Between 2001 and 2020, China significantly increased its number of cable landing stations, especially in economically strategic coastal provinces like Guangdong and Shanghai.[2] This continued expansion enhances internal bandwidth and security but also serves the strategic purpose of minimizing exposure to foreign surveillance or disruption. Additionally, the regional concentration of landing points aligns with economic development zones, integrating digital resilience into China’s broader financial infrastructure.
On the digital front, blockchain has become a central pillar of China’s financial sovereignty strategy. Unlike the decentralized blockchain systems promoted in the West, China has prioritized permissioned networks that allow for centralized oversight while maintaining transactional integrity. Through the state-supported Blockchain-based Service Network (BSN), China provides a scalable infrastructure for smart contracts, supply chain verification, and international financial transactions.[3] These systems offer the benefits of traceability and automation while retaining government control, making them ideal tools for secure, frictionless commerce that aligns with national policy goals. The blockchain infrastructure complements the physical cable network by enabling secure data processing across Chinese-controlled digital corridors.[4] Thus, blockchain serves as the software layer of China’s infrastructure-led financial strategy, bridging its control of physical networks with its ambitions for digital dominance.
The strategic convergence of cables and blockchain reflects China’s long-term goal of insulating its financial system from external shocks while simultaneously exporting its digital standards abroad. As geopolitical tensions mount, Beijing is preparing for a future where access to Western technology or financial systems could be restricted. The development of Chinese-controlled settlement platforms and cable routes bypassing U.S.-aligned territories, for instance, those facilitated by China Unicom and Huawei Marine, supports this strategy.[5] This approach reduces dependence on SWIFT and other Western-dominated infrastructures while offering partner states an alternative model of connectivity. It also gives China considerable leverage in shaping the rules of the digital economy, positioning it as a provider of both infrastructure and governance. As the next section will demonstrate, these ambitions are increasingly visible in China’s international cable ventures, particularly in politically sensitive regions such as the Middle East and Africa.
China’s Undersea Cable Ambitions
China’s global undersea cable strategy extends its domestic sovereignty goals into international waters, embedding state influence into the arteries of global connectivity. While domestic cable expansion secures internal data flow, international cable projects offer China both economic reach and strategic leverage. These projects enable China to bypass U.S.-aligned chokepoints and establish alternative digital routes aligned with its political interests. A key example is the Pakistan and East Africa Connecting Europe (PEACE) cable, which links China to Africa and Europe via Pakistan, Djibouti, and Egypt. This cable is partially constructed by HMN Tech (formerly Huawei Marine) and is strategically routed to avoid Western jurisdictions.[6] Similarly, China Unicom has spearheaded numerous intercontinental projects, reinforcing its presence in the global telecom market.[7] In addition to improving bandwidth, these initiatives also serve the objective of projecting influence. By controlling infrastructure that carries sensitive data, China gains access to privileged routes and the potential for network surveillance, censorship, or selective throttling. Through cable diplomacy, China is exporting not only fiber optic lines but also a vision of sovereign, state-mediated digital globalization.[8]
Companies like HMN Tech and China Unicom operate as both commercial entities and instruments of state strategy, blurring the boundary between enterprise and geopolitics. Unlike Western firms that are largely beholden to market incentives, Chinese telecoms often operate under government directives and must align with national priorities such as the Digital Silk Road and the Belt and Road Initiative. HMN Tech’s involvement in over 90 international submarine cable projects, including the South Atlantic Inter Link and PEACE, highlights its pivotal role in expanding China’s global digital reach.[9] Additionally, China Unicom, as one of China’s “big three” state-owned telecom firms, has participated in multinational consortia, building landing points across Asia, Africa, and the Middle East.[10] This corporate-state fusion facilitates highly coordinated infrastructure rollouts that serve diplomatic, military, and economic ends simultaneously. It also creates strategic dependencies in recipient countries, many of which are unable to build such systems independently. In this way, China’s corporate actors function as geopolitical tools, securing alignment through fiber-optic entanglements.
China’s control over routing and landing rights carries significant geopolitical implications, particularly in contested regions. Cable landing points are not just technical decisions; they are strategic nodes that determine jurisdiction over data, maintenance, and legal access. China’s international submarine cable expansion is increasingly focused on routes through the South China Sea, where territorial disputes create opportunities for leverage.[11] Notably, these expansion projects have been avoiding traditional hubs like Hong Kong, previously a global telecom gateway, due to fears of Western scrutiny, opting instead for mainland-controlled cities such as Hainan and Guangzhou. By shifting landing points inland or to friendly partners, China reduces its exposure to legal challenges from liberal democracies and deepens its grip on regional digital flows. This strategy is not only about efficiency or speed but also about ensuring that data flows through jurisdictions favorable to Chinese political and regulatory control. These ambitions reveal that China’s submarine cable ventures are as much about reshaping geopolitical realities as they are about connecting continents.
Blockchain as the Software Layer for a New Financial System
Blockchain technology forms the digital backbone of China’s financial infrastructure strategy, complementing its physical network of undersea cables. While submarine cables control how data physically moves, blockchain governs how that data, particularly financial transactions, is validated and recorded. In China’s model, this dual control offers both technical efficiency and strategic visibility. Rather than embracing decentralized blockchain networks like Bitcoin or Ethereum, China has developed permissioned systems that are centrally governed but maintain distributed architecture. The Blockchain-based Service Network (BSN), backed by state-owned firms like China Mobile and China UnionPay, provides infrastructure for smart contracts and payment systems.[12] This model retains many blockchain advantages, including immutability, automation, and auditability, while allowing for government control over who participates and what data is visible. China’s blockchain architecture is thus not a rejection of decentralization but a reinvention of it with a sovereign framework.
The permissioned structure of China’s blockchain networks reflects its broader political and economic philosophy, which is state control over critical infrastructure. In open blockchain networks, anyone can validate transactions and access data. In China’s model, only trusted entities participate, reducing the risks of foreign interference or regulatory conflict. Unlike the public blockchains used in the West, BSN nodes are permissioned and monitored, offering a traceable yet tightly governed system. This allows for more predictable governance, especially in applications like trade finance and logistics, where transparency is valued but regulatory compliance is essential. It also aligns with China’s domestic priorities of surveillance, financial control, and data security. The BSN is not simply a technological platform; it is a governance model for a Chinese-led digital economy.
China’s blockchain systems also serve a strategic role in reducing friction in international trade and finance. Traditional cross-border transactions rely on intermediaries and compliance systems, many of which are Western-controlled and slow. The BSN and its affiliated digital currency infrastructure offer the potential to settle international transactions directly between central banks or authorized entities, bypassing SWIFT and Western sanctions regimes.[13] Some BSN projects also explore integration with Belt and Road economies, providing technical infrastructure for trade settlements and logistics tracking. This not only improves speed and reduces cost but also insulates partner countries from Western-dominated financial architecture. Blockchain here becomes a tool of diplomatic alignment, offering a smoother on-ramp to a Chinese-dominated financial ecosystem. As China’s blockchain infrastructure matures, its global financial implications will grow clearer, particularly in how it challenges the established order dominated by U.S. and European institutions.
Implications for Global Finance and Geopolitics
China’s combined control over physical and digital infrastructure poses a fundamental challenge to the existing global financial order. For decades, the West has operated through systems like SWIFT and World Bank-backed connectivity projects, which prioritize openness, multilateralism, market-based governance, and liberal transparency. China’s model introduces a parallel infrastructure rooted in technological self-reliance, surveillance, strategic control, and state-centric regulation. The Digital Silk Road is not just a connectivity initiative but also a bid to create a new digital and financial order that reflects China’s governance norms.[14] The integration of the Blockchain-based Service Network (BSN) and undersea cables allows China to offer partner countries not just services but also rules and standards. This parallel system increases fragmentation in global finance, as states are increasingly faced with a binary choice: operate within a U.S.-aligned ecosystem governed by liberal norms, or join China’s tightly managed alternative. In this bifurcated world, infrastructure choice becomes geopolitical alignment.
One of the most significant geopolitical risks of China’s infrastructure strategy is the potential for surveillance and censorship. Control over data routing and financial settlement systems grants unprecedented access to sensitive information formation and the ability to monitor or suppress dissent. Kumar (2023) notes that China’s cable infrastructure, including systems like the PEACE cable, can support dual-use capabilities, including military and cyber-intelligence applications. Similarly, Burdette (2021) highlights U.S. concerns that Chinese-managed cables and digital platforms could be used for large-scale data collection or strategic sabotage. These concerns are not hypothetical. The U.S. has already blocked projects like the Pacific Light Cable Network due to security risks. In this context, even seemingly commercial infrastructure becomes a potential national security threat. As more nations become reliant on Chinese digital pathways, the risk of asymmetric control over data and communications will continue to grow.
Western governments are increasingly aware of the stakes and are developing countermeasures to China’s expanding digital footprint. The U.S., E.U., and allied partners have begun investing in alternative infrastructure and governance models to counterbalance China’s growing influence. Initiatives such as the Blue Dot Network aim to promote transparent and high-standard infrastructure financing, while the Important Projects of Common European Interests (IPCEI) in microelectronics and digital innovation seek to secure technological sovereignty.[15] In parallel, the U.S. has explored the concept of a digital dollar and invested in domestic blockchain research to hedge against China’s digital yuan.[16] These projects indicate that the global competition is no longer limited to military or economic power, but now includes the contest to set the standards and rails of the future digital economy. The outcome of this infrastructure race will, in addition to determining efficiency, dictate who governs the platforms that define global finance and control of data flows.
Conclusion
While China’s global digital strategy creates faster cables and more efficient blockchain, it is also rewriting the architecture of the global economy. By integrating physical infrastructure with sovereign digital systems, China is embedding influence at the structural level of how information and capital flow. This convergence of undersea cables and permissioned blockchain platforms allows China to bypass traditional chokepoints, enforce its governance standards, and create dependencies among partner states. As global competition shifts from control over resources to control over networks, infrastructure becomes ideology, expressed in fiber optics and algorithms. The United States and its allies are beginning to respond, but the contest is no longer over speed or innovation alone. It is over who gets to define the rules. In this context, China is no longer just participating in the global system but also laying the foundation for a system of its own.
[1] Richard Ghiasy and Rajeshwari Krishnamurthy, China’s Digital Silk Road: Strategic implications for the EU and India, Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies, Leiden Asia Centre, (2020).
[2] Yongshun Xie, Chengjin Wang, and Jie Huang, “Structure and evolution of the submarine cable network of Chinese mainland,” Journal of Geographical Sciences 32 (2022): 932-956, https://doi.org/10.1007/s11442-022-1979-4
[3] Gary Sigley and Powell Warwick, “Governing the digital economy: An exploration of blockchains with Chinese characteristics,” Journal of Contemporary Asia 53, no. 4 (2023): 648-667, https://doi.org/10.1080/00472336.2022.2093774
[4] Ibid.
[5] Yongshun Xie, Chengjin Wang, and Jie Huang, “Structure and evolution of the submarine cable network of Chinese mainland.”
[6] Raghvendra Kumar, “Securing the digital seabed: Countering China’s underwater ambitions,” Journal of Indo-Pacific Affairs 6, no. 8 (2023): 74-90.
[7] Jun Rong Ng, The role of underwater cables in global geopolitics SSRN, 2025, https://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.5169546.
[8] Ibid
[9] Richard Ghiasy and Rajeshwari Krishnamurthy, China’s Digital Silk Road: Strategic implications for the EU and India.
[10] Jun Rong Ng, The role of underwater cables in global geopolitics.
[11] Yongshun Xie, Chengjin Wang, and Huang, “Structure and evolution of the submarine cable network of Chinese mainland.”
[12] Gary Sigley and Powell Warwick, “Governing the digital economy: An exploration of blockchains with Chinese characteristics.”
[13] Ibid.
[14] Richard Ghiasy and Rajeshwar Krishnamurthy, China’s Digital Silk Road: Strategic implications for the EU and India.
[15] Ibid.
[16] Gary Sigley and Powell Warwick, “Governing the digital economy: An exploration of blockchains with Chinese characteristics.”
