TRENDS study traces the roots of the crisis to the organization’s success in building influence within state institutions beginning in the 1950s. A recent study released by TRENDS Research & Advisory argues that the ongoing war in Sudan is not merely a temporary military struggle over power. Instead, it represents a revealing climax of the collapse of the Sudanese state model and its structural disintegration, the result of a long process of ideologization and the militarization of state institutions pursued by the Muslim Brotherhood over three decades.

Structural Roots and the Hijacking of Institutions The study — The War in Sudan: Repercussions of the Outcomes of Brotherhood Islamism — was undertaken by Badriya Al-Reyami, Senior Researcher at the Political Islam Department at TRENDS. It traces the roots of the crisis to the organization’s success in building a deep base of influence within state institutions beginning in the 1950s and culminating in the 1989 coup. Al-Reyami notes that the empowerment policies were not intended to build a state based on institutions. Instead, they sought to reengineer the armed forces, transforming them from a neutral professional body into an ideologized political actor serving the long-term sustainability of the organization’s project. Failure to Dismantle The study stresses that the fall of the regime’s leadership in 2019 was not followed by a genuine dismantling of the deep state, as the Brotherhood’s security and economic networks retained their ability to influence events and operate from behind the scenes. These conditions undermined prospects of a civilian democratic transition and turned the transitional period into a conflict arena between revolutionary forces and remnants of the former regime. From ‘Empowerment’ to ‘Survival Economy’ In the study, the researcher identifies a dangerous shift in the Muslim Brotherhood’s strategy following the outbreak of war. They moved from an “economy of empowerment” to an “economy of war and survival.” As a result, networks of interest emerged, marked by the rise of intermediaries and traders who profit from the continuation of chaos through the sale of information and the forgery of permits. Violence was instrumentalized, becoming both an economic resource and an alternative mode of governance that ensures the survival of Brotherhood networks amid the collapse of the Sudanese state. The study also documents the Brotherhood’s reluctance to engage with peace initiatives, noting that ending the war would threaten their political survival and expose their unofficial sources of funding. Outcomes and Implications The study concludes that the Sudanese case represents a “historical laboratory” demonstrating the disastrous consequences of subordinating the state to a closed ideological logic. The ongoing war has eroded the state’s sovereign functions, leaving it unable to monopolize the use of force or protect vital facilities. It has also triggered tribal regression, with tribes reemerging as parallel authorities filling the vacuum left by collapsing institutions. At the same time, the social fabric has fragmented, and primary affiliations have become the primary means of survival and political representation. The study ends with a warning that any genuine path out of Sudan’s crisis depends on ending the structural dualism (between the military and Islamist actors) and on laying the foundations for an inclusive civilian state that restores institutional neutrality and draws a clear, decisive line between the political and military spheres.