This contribution analyzes the paradigm of human fraternity as an alternative to the instrumentalization of religious discourse in legitimizing geopolitical dominance. Through a comparative analysis of the Russian-Orthodox and American-Evangelical models, the study identifies functional convergences in the sanctification of the political-economic order, in the construction of otherness as an ontological threat, and in the production of domestic consensus through eschatological narratives. The Document on Human Fraternity (Abu Dhabi, 2019), also known as the Abu Dhabi Declaration, offers instead an alternative framework grounded in shared dignity, pluralism as a positive value, and common responsibility. The article proposes pathways to operationalize the declaration in the context of international relations. Particular attention is given to the role of Mediterranean and Gulf actors as mediators in constructing counter-narratives to the instrumentalization of the sacred.
1. Introduction
In the contemporary geopolitical landscape, the religious dimension has regained a centrality that analyses inspired by the secularist paradigm had prematurely set aside. This is not a matter of the sacred returning to the public sphere, but rather of the emergence of sophisticated strategies for instrumentalizing religious discourse to legitimize power and project international influence. This dynamic is particularly evident in two contexts that appear distant yet converge functionally: the narrative of the Russkiy mir promoted by the Moscow Patriarchate in symbiosis with the Kremlin, and the ideological complex of American exceptionalism fueled by evangelical currents and the prosperity gospel.
The present analysis seeks to examine these phenomena not through the lens of traditional religious studies but by adopting the analytical perspective of geopolitics and international relations. Systems of belief are treated here as observable socio-political variables, as symbolic resources mobilized by state and non-state actors in the competition for regional and global hegemony. Such an epistemological approach makes it possible to identify the deeper structures that link models that appear antithetical yet converge in their function of legitimizing the existing order.
The research question underpinning this analysis is: what are the structural characteristics of religious instrumentalization in the legitimization of geopolitical dominance, and to what extent can the paradigm of human fraternity—as articulated in the 2019 Abu Dhabi Declaration—constitute a credible alternative for the governance of international relations?
The contribution is organized into five sections. After outlining the conceptual framework of reference, the comparative analysis examines both the Russian-Orthodox and the American-Evangelical hegemonic models, identifying their functional convergences.
The following section presents the paradigm of human fraternity as an alternative proposal, while the fifth explores possible pathways to make it operational within contemporary international relations.
2. Conceptual Framework
Understanding the religious legitimation of geopolitical power requires the adoption of an appropriate conceptual apparatus, one capable of grasping the specific mechanisms through which religious discourse is mobilized within international competition. The notion of symbolic power, developed by Pierre Bourdieu, constitutes the first pillar of this framework.[1]
Bourdieu defines symbolic power as a form of power that operates with the complicity of those who are subjected to it, insofar as they do not recognize it as such. In the religious field, Méconnaissance—the misrecognition of the underlying power relations—constitutes the very condition of effectiveness of religious symbolic power.[2]
The second theoretical element is represented by the concept of religious soft power, developed on the basis of Joseph Nye’s theory of attractiveness as a resource of power.[3] Peter Mandaville and his collaborators have systematized the study of the use of religion in states’ foreign policy, highlighting the ways in which religious symbolic resources are mobilized to build and sustain geopolitically significant relationships.[4] For their part, Yang and Li have proposed a typology that distinguishes three dimensions of religious soft power: performative, discursive, and relational.[5]
The performative dimension concerns the ritual and ceremonial practices through which the alliance between political power and religious authority is manifested. The discursive dimension relates to the production of narratives that legitimize the existing political order and demonize otherness. The relational dimension pertains to the transnational networks of confessional solidarity that can be mobilized for geopolitical purposes.[6]
The third element of the framework is provided by securitization theory as applied to the religious domain.[7] This approach enables the analysis of the processes through which issues of religious identity are transformed into matters of existential security. The discursive construction of ontological threat represents a crucial mechanism in the religious legitimation of geopolitical dominance.[8]
The operational definition of “religious legitimation of geopolitical power” that emerges from this framework may be formulated as follows: the set of discursive and performative processes through which state actors and religious institutions collaborate in producing narratives that sanctify specific configurations of power, construct otherness as an existential threat, and mobilize religious symbolic resources for the projection of international influence.
3. Comparative Analysis of Hegemonic Models
3.1 The Russian-Orthodox Model
The relationship between the Russian Orthodox religious institution and the State represents a paradigmatic case of what the Eastern tradition describes as symphonia, the harmonious cooperation between spiritual and temporal power.[9] This symbiotic relationship, rooted in the adoption of Christianity in Kievan Rus’ in 988, has undergone significant intensification since Kirill’s election as Patriarch of Moscow in 2009 and the conservative turn in President Putin’s leadership after 2012.[10]
The concept of Russkiy mir (Russian World) constitutes the central axis of the geopolitical narrative developed within this symbiosis. Originally referring to the sphere of Russian cultural and linguistic influence, the term has undergone a progressive symbolic legitimation, eventually designating a quasi-mystical entity that transcends state borders to encompass all territories historically associated with Russian influence.[11] This narrative presents Russia as the guardian of traditional Christian values against the moral corruption of the liberal West, thereby conferring a metaphysical dimension upon geopolitical competition.[12]
The militarization of Orthodox ecclesiastical law, documented in Fedor Arkhipov’s analyses, represents a particularly serious phenomenon. Pacifism has been declared incompatible with Orthodox teaching—a position that has prompted condemnation from hundreds of religious-studies scholars worldwide, who have denounced the ideology of Russkiy mir as heretical, insofar as it instrumentalizes religious concepts to legitimize political agendas.[13] The break in communion with the Patriarchate of Constantinople in 2018, following the recognition of the autocephaly of the Orthodox Church of Ukraine, further radicalized anti-ecumenical and isolationist tendencies.[14]
3.2 The American-Evangelical Model
American exceptionalism, in its religious articulation, constitutes an ideological complex that presents the United States as a chosen nation, entrusted with a providential mission in world history. Empirical studies have shown that Evangelical and Mormon components of American society are significantly more inclined to embrace exceptionalist visions than other confessional groups.[15] Under these doctrines, religious traditionalism and the intensity of confessional belonging correlate positively with support for interventionist foreign-policy orientations, framed within a binary struggle between good and evil in which the United States is cast as the instrument of divine will.[16]
The prosperity gospel—the doctrine according to which adequate faith guarantees health and material wealth—represents the neoliberal variation of American Pentecostalism.[17] As documented by Mary Wrenn, this current constitutes the spiritual articulation of neoliberalism: individual responsibility for economic success, faith in meritocracy, and hostility towards redistributive policies all find transcendent legitimation in the linkage between material prosperity and divine favor.[18]
The consecration of capitalism effected by the prosperity gospel produces significant effects both domestically and internationally. Domestically, the symbolic legitimation of individual economic success delegitimizes critiques of structural inequalities, presenting poverty as the consequence of a spiritual deficit rather than systemic conditions. Internationally, this vision supports economic policies that promote the interests of American capitalism as the expression of a providentially established order.[19]
3.3 Functional Convergences
Despite profound doctrinal differences and their belonging to antagonistic geopolitical spheres, the Russian-Orthodox and American-Evangelical models display significant functional convergences that warrant explicit articulation. The first convergence concerns the symbolic legitimation of the existing political-economic order. In both cases, religious discourse is mobilized to confer transcendent legitimacy upon specific configurations of power—the Russian model of centralized governance on the one hand, neoliberal capitalism on the other—presenting them as aligned with a divine design rather than as historically contingent constructions.
The second convergence concerns the construction of difference as an ontological threat. Russkiy mir depicts the liberal West as a bearer of moral corruption and the dissolution of traditional values; American exceptionalism casts the enemies of the United States as embodiments of cosmic evil. In both cases, political conflict is elevated to a metaphysical confrontation between forces of good and evil, making any compromise impossible.[20]
The third convergence concerns the production of domestic consensus through eschatological narratives—that is, narratives invoking ultimate destinies and final confrontations between good and evil. The mobilization of ultimate horizons—the defense of Holy Rus’, America’s providential mission—enables the subordination of particular interests to a higher good, neutralizing potential internal opposition through appeals to unity in the face of existential threat.[21] Finally, in both models, religious institutions operate as multipliers of state soft power, projecting influence through transnational networks of confessional solidarity.[22]
4. The Paradigm of Human Fraternity
The Document on Human Fraternity for World Peace and Living Together, signed in Abu Dhabi on 4 February 2019 by Pope Francis and the Grand Imam of Al-Azhar, Ahmad Al-Tayyeb, represents an attempt to articulate an alternative paradigm to the instrumentalization of religious discourse in geopolitical competition.[23] The international recognition of the importance of this initiative is evidenced by the decision of the United Nations General Assembly to proclaim 4 February as the International Day of Human Fraternity.[24]
The founding principle of the Abu Dhabi Declaration is the affirmation of the shared dignity of every human being, irrespective of religious, ethnic, or national belonging. This affirmation, seemingly self-evident, acquires a subversive meaning when contrasted with the hegemonic models analyzed above, which construct hierarchies of value among human groups—Orthodox believers of the Russkiy mir over the morally corrupt West; citizens of the chosen nation over America’s enemies. It should be noted, however, that these hierarchical constructions reflect the perspectives of specific, albeit highly influential, religious movements and do not represent the prevailing religious or political views in the United States.
The second fundamental principle is the recognition of pluralism as a positive value. The declaration states that the diversity of religions, sexes, races, and languages is an expression of divine wisdom—a position that stands in direct opposition to the claims of exclusive possession of truth that characterize hegemonic models. This conception of pluralism does not imply relativism; rather, it acknowledges that the understanding of the transcendent manifests through multiple traditions.
The third principle is that of shared responsibility for peace and global justice. The Document calls upon religious leaders to become active promoters of a culture of dialogue, cooperation, and mutual understanding, explicitly rejecting any use of religion to justify violence, hatred, or exclusion. The Higher Committee of Human Fraternity, established to promote the implementation of the Document, testifies to the intention to translate these principles into concrete initiatives.[25]
The structural differences between the paradigm of human fraternity and hegemonic models are profound. Whereas the latter operate through the symbolic legitimation of exclusion and the demonization of otherness, the paradigm of fraternity grounds its legitimacy in the symbolic legitimation of inclusion and the value of mutual recognition. While hegemonic models instrumentalize religious discourse to project power, the paradigm of fraternity proposes religious discourse as a resource for the construction of peace. Whereas the former construct antagonistic identities, the latter promotes relational identities founded on the shared belonging to the human family.[26]
5. Implementation of Human Fraternity
Translating the paradigm of human fraternity into operational tools for international relations requires a multi-layered reflection.
The first level concerns integration into international mediation frameworks. The principles of the Abu Dhabi Declaration may be incorporated into the mediation protocols of international organizations—the United Nations, the European Union, the African Union, the Arab League—as normative reference points for reconciliation processes involving religious dimensions. This implies recognizing that the management of conflicts with religious-identity components requires specific approaches capable of distinguishing between the legitimate expression of religious identities and their instrumentalization for political purposes.
The second level concerns the training of diplomatic elites with critical religious literacy. The persistent secularization of political science and international relations has produced generations of diplomats and international officials lacking the analytical tools needed to understand the religious dimension of contemporary conflicts. Dedicated training programs combining expertise in religious studies with geopolitical competence are necessary to build a leadership class capable of distinguishing between genuine religious motivations and political instrumentalization of the sacred.
The third level concerns the construction of counter-narratives to the instrumentalization of the sacred. The hegemonic narratives analyzed above operate effectively because they respond to deep needs for meaning and belonging. The paradigm of human fraternity can constitute a credible alternative only if it is capable of articulating narratives that are equally powerful at the symbolic level, offering inclusive horizons of meaning without sacrificing the depth of religious traditions. This requires significant investment in cultural production—literature, art, cinema, digital media—that gives concrete form to the values of fraternity.
The fourth level pertains to the role of Mediterranean and Gulf actors as credible mediators. The genesis of the Abu Dhabi Declaration in the context of Islamic-Christian dialogue grants actors in this region particular legitimacy in promoting the paradigm of fraternity. Through the Higher Committee of Human Fraternity, the United Arab Emirates has taken on a leading role that combines religious moderation with significant diplomatic influence.[27]
A fifth level involves establishing monitoring and evaluation mechanisms. The effective implementation of the human fraternity paradigm requires the systematic assessment of its impact on conflict resolution and interfaith cooperation. Measurable benchmarks for assessing progress could be provided by institutional indicators such as the number of mediation processes incorporating interfaith dialogue components, the frequency of joint religious–political statements on peace and coexistence, and the integration of fraternity-based study programs within diplomatic academies. It is worth noting in this respect that recent international policy documents have begun to acknowledge the operational relevance of interfaith dialogue. For example, recent peace plans have introduced provisions for establishing interfaith dialogue processes based on tolerance and peaceful coexistence, indicating a growing political recognition of the principles set out in the Abu Dhabi Declaration. A specific example is paragraph 18 of the Gaza Peace Plan, published by the White House on 29 September 2025, which calls for the launch of “an interfaith dialogue process based on the values of tolerance and peaceful coexistence, aimed at reshaping the mindsets and narratives of Palestinians and Israelis, while highlighting the benefits of peace”.
Operationalizing the paradigm of human fraternity also requires a critical reflection on its intrinsic limits. The risk of a rhetoric of harmony that obscures real conflicts of interest, the difficulty of translating abstract principles into binding norms, and the possible instrumentalization of the discourse of fraternity by actors with opaque agendas are challenges that must be addressed with analytical clarity. The paradigm does not present itself as a miraculous solution, but as an alternative normative and practical framework that opens spaces of possibility otherwise foreclosed by dominant hegemonic logics.
6. Conclusions
The analysis has shown how the instrumentalization of religious discourse in legitimizing geopolitical narratives operates through structurally convergent mechanisms, despite the profound doctrinal and contextual differences between the Russian-Orthodox and American-Evangelical models. Three shared features characterize these forms of religious soft power: the symbolic legitimation of the existing political-economic order, the construction of otherness as an existential threat, and the mobilization of eschatological narratives to build domestic consensus. The paradigm of human fraternity, as articulated in the Abu Dhabi Document, offers an alternative framework grounded in structurally antithetical principles: shared dignity, pluralism as a resource, and common responsibility for peace.
The future evolution of religious instrumentalization and of the alternative paradigm of human fraternity will be shaped by the interaction of multiple drivers. At the technological level, generative artificial intelligence and digital platforms amplify the capacity to produce and disseminate instrumentalized religious narratives, while simultaneously offering tools for constructing inclusive counter-narratives. At the economic level, intensifying global inequalities and tensions surrounding the energy transition fuel the demand for symbolic legitimations of existing power configurations. At the political-regulatory level, the fragmentation of the multilateral order and the emergence of antagonistic geopolitical blocs favor the securitization of religious identities. At the social level, migratory dynamics and accelerated urbanization generate new configurations of religious pluralism that may evolve towards conflict or coexistence. At the ethical level, growing awareness of existential risks—climatic, nuclear, pandemic—may reinforce both competitive eschatological narratives and appeals to shared responsibility. The technological driver demands particular scrutiny. The deployment of generative AI by extremist actors—from deepfake audio of religious leaders reciting scripture to radicalizing chatbots capable of personalized recruitment and the automated translation of jihadist propaganda into dozens of languages—represents a qualitative leap in the instrumentalization of the sacred. The cognitive tendency to attribute empathy and moral authority to artificial interlocutors amplifies the risk of individual radicalization, particularly among isolated subjects. Concurrently, the absence of specific provisions on algorithmic manipulation of confessional narratives—in both the European Digital Services Act and U.S. regulatory frameworks—constitutes a strategic lacuna that state and non-state actors will exploit with increasing sophistication.
Three plausible scenarios emerge from the analysis. In the first scenario (hegemonic consolidation), models of religious instrumentalization strengthen and spread: new state actors adopt analogous strategies, while the paradigm of human fraternity remains confined to symbolic declarations without operational impact. In this scenario, conflicts with religious dimensions intensify, and polarization within plural societies deepens. In the second scenario (competitive equilibrium), hegemonic models persist but encounter growing resistance: transnational religious movements promote alternatives to confessional nationalism, international institutions partially integrate the principles of human fraternity into mediation frameworks, and some regional conflicts are de-escalated through the involvement of mediators with religious credibility. In the third scenario (paradigmatic transformation), a systemic crisis—a limited nuclear conflict, accelerated climate collapse, or a more lethal pandemic—produces a turning point in global consciousness, delegitimizing competitive eschatological narratives and strengthening the demand for cooperative paradigms. In this scenario, the framework of human fraternity is progressively institutionalized within international organizations and incorporated into the training curricula of diplomatic elites.
The scenarios outlined rest on several critical assumptions requiring continuous monitoring. The first assumption is that state actors will maintain the capacity to influence religious institutions. The second assumption is that digital platforms will continue to operate according to engagement-maximization logics that favor polarization: significant regulatory interventions could modify this parameter. The third assumption is that the international order will not undergo radical discontinuities: a major conflict between great powers or the collapse of key multilateral institutions would render all proposed scenarios obsolete. The main uncertainties concern the speed of technological transition, the evolution of demographic dynamics, and the resilience of democratic institutions in the West under populist pressure. Early indicators for monitoring evolution towards the different scenarios include: the trajectory of institutional endorsements of the Abu Dhabi Declaration; the frequency and intensity of references to religious instrumentalization in political leaders’ speeches; the inclusion of modules on the religious dimension of conflicts in diplomatic training programs; and the emergence of cross-tradition alliances among religious leaders on specific issues (climate, disarmament, migration).
The implications for policymakers and international institutions are significant. Integrating the principles of human fraternity into mediation frameworks requires, first, the development of dedicated protocols that systematically include interfaith dialogue components in peace negotiations involving religious-identity dimensions (see, for example, the above-mentioned Gaza Peace Plan, point 18). Second, training diplomats with specific expertise in religious literacy and peacekeeping demands the creation of specialized curricula within diplomatic academies and schools of international affairs, combining competence in religious studies, comparative law, and conflict resolution. Third, constructing counter-narratives to the instrumentalization of the sacred calls for coordinated investment in cultural and media production—including digital platforms, academic exchanges, and interreligious education programs—capable of offering inclusive symbolic alternatives to exclusivist narratives. Fourth, enhancing the role of Mediterranean and Gulf actors as mediators entails strengthening the institutional capacity of bodies such as the Higher Committee of Human Fraternity and fostering partnerships between regional organizations and global multilateral institutions. Finally, the development of evaluation frameworks to measure the concrete impact of fraternity-inspired initiatives on conflict de-escalation and social cohesion would contribute to evidence-based policymaking in this domain. The operational translation of these recommendations confronts a structural asymmetry between the declarative reach of fraternity-inspired diplomacy and the absence of binding institutional mechanisms. The Higher Committee of Human Fraternity has demonstrated significant convening power—as evidenced by the progressive consolidation of the UN International Day of Human Fraternity—but its normative incisiveness remains limited. The transition from symbolic endorsement to verifiable compliance protocols, anchored in measurable parameters of confessional de-escalation in active crisis theaters, constitutes the decisive challenge of the coming decade. However, without dedicated financial architectures, the fraternity paradigm risks functioning primarily as a resource of legitimation rather than as an instrument of transformation.
The limitations of the present contribution open up directions for future research. The analysis could be extended to other models of religious instrumentalization in order to test the applicability of the proposed theoretical framework. Empirical studies on the effectiveness of initiatives inspired by the paradigm of human fraternity would be necessary to assess their concrete impact. Finally, a more in-depth analysis of the forms of resistance encountered by this paradigm—both from actors who benefit from hegemonic logics and from those who fear that the discourse of fraternity may obscure real conflicts of interest—would contribute to strengthening its transformative potential.[28]
[1] Pierre Bourdieu, “Sur le pouvoir symbolique,” Annales. Économies, Sociétés, Civilisations 32, no. 3 (1977): 405-411, https://doi.org/10.3406/ahess.1977.293828.
[2] David Swartz, Symbolic Power, Politics, and Intellectuals: The Political Sociology of Pierre Bourdieu (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2013), ISBN: 978-0-226-92546-7, https://press.uchicago.edu/ucp/books/book/chicago/S/bo14365337.html.
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[4] Peter Mandaville, The Geopolitics of Religious Soft Power: How States Use Religion in Foreign Policy (New York, 2023; online edn, Oxford Academic, August 24, 2023), https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780197605806.001.0001.
[5] Zikun Yang and Li Li, “Positioning Religion in International Relations: The Performative, Discursive, and Relational Dimension of Religious Soft Power,” Religions 12, no. 11 (2021): 940, https://doi.org/10.3390/rel12110940.
[6] Peter Mandaville, The Geopolitics of Religious Soft Power: How States Use Religion in Foreign Policy.
[7] Barry Buzan, Ole Wæver, and Jaap de Wilde, Security: A New Framework for Analysis (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1998). ISBN: 978-1-55587-784-2,, https://www.rienner.com/title/Security_A_New_Framework_for_Analysis.
[8] Frank Gadinger, “Fields, Trajectories, and Symbolic Power: Studying Practices of Polycentric Governing with Bourdieu,” in Frank Gadinger and Jan Aart Scholte, eds., Polycentrism: How Governing Works Today (Oxford, 2023; online edn, Oxford Academic, June 22, 2023), https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780192866837.003.0010.
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[10] Stefano Caprio, Lo zar di vetro. La Russia di Putin (Milano: Jaca Book, 2020), ISBN: 978-88-16416-44-4, https://librerie.unicatt.it/scheda-libro/stefano-caprio/lo-zar-di-vetro-la-russia-di-putin-9788816416444-714326.html.
[11] Natalia Zhdanova, “From Pulpit to Propaganda Machine: Tracing the Russian Orthodox Church’s Role in Putin’s War,” February 6, 2024, https://reutersinstitute.politics.ox.ac.uk/pulpit-propaganda-machine-tracing-russian-orthodox-churchs-role-putins-war.
[12] Zacarias Negron, “To Whom Much is Given: The Russian Orthodox Church’s Role in the Russo-Ukrainian War,” Journal of Church and State 67, no. 1 (2025): 1-15, https://doi.org/10.1093/jcs/csae046.
[13] Fedor Arkhipov, “War and peace of Russian Orthodoxy: the militarization of ecclesiastical law of the Russian Orthodox Church after the outbreak of the war in Ukraine,” DPCE Online 69, no. 1 (2025): 1-22, https://doi.org/10.57660/dpceonline.2025.2436; A Declaration on the “Russian World” (Russkii Mir) Teaching, Public Orthodoxy, March 13, 2022, https://publicorthodoxy.org/2022/03/13/a-declaration-on-the-russian-world-russkii-mir-teaching.
[14] Ioannis Kaminis, “The Russian World: A Version of Aggressive Ethnophyletism,” Occasional Papers on Religion in Eastern Europe 44, no. 5 (2024): Article 2, 1-17, https://doi.org/10.55221/2693-2229.2525.
[15] James Guth, “The Religious Roots of Foreign Policy Exceptionalism,” The Review of Faith & International Affairs 10, no. 2 (2012): 77-85, https://doi.org/10.1080/15570274.2012.682497.
[16] Eugene Wittkopf, Faces of Internationalism: Public Opinion and American Foreign Policy (Durham: Duke University Press, 1990), ISBN: 978-0-8223-1034-7, https://www.dukeupress.edu/faces-of-internationalism.
[17] Kate Bowler, Blessed: A History of the American Prosperity Gospel (New York, 2013; online edn, Oxford Academic, September 1, 2013), https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199827695.001.0001.
[18] Mary Wrenn, “Selling salvation, selling success: neoliberalism and the US Prosperity Gospel,” Cambridge Journal of Economics 45, no. 2 (2021): 295-311, https://doi.org/10.1093/cje/beaa048.
[19] Mary Wrenn, “Consecrating Capitalism: The United States Prosperity Gospel and Neoliberalism,” Journal of Economic Issues 53, no. 2 (2019): 425-432, https://doi.org/10.1080/00213624.2019.1594528.
[20] Kateryna Odarchenko, “How the Russian Orthodox Church Became a Weapon of Political Warfare,” Foreign Policy Research Institute, October 27, 2025, https://www.fpri.org/article/2025/10/how-the-russian-orthodox-church-became-a-weapon-of-political-warfare/.
[21] Boris Knorre and Alexandra Zasyad’ko, “Православный антиэкуменизм 2.0:мобилизационная модель,секьюритизация и реваншизм”, Государство, религия, церковь в России и за рубежом 39, no. 2 (2021): 277-317, https://doi.org/10.22394/2073-7203-2021-39-2-277-317.
[22] Peter Mandaville and Jon Hoffman, “Thinking about Religion and Religious Soft Power in International Relations and Foreign Policy Analysis,” in Peter Mandaville (ed.), The Geopolitics of Religious Soft Power: How States Use Religion in Foreign Policy (New York, 2023; online edn, Oxford Academic, August 24, 2023), 1-18, https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780197605806.003.0001.
[23] A Document on Human Fraternity for World Peace and Living Together, Abu Dhabi, February 4, 2019, https://www.vatican.va/content/francesco/en/travels/2019/outside/documents/papa-francesco_20190204_documento-fratellanza-umana.html.
[24] United Nations General Assembly, “Resolution adopted by the General Assembly on 21 December 2020 – International Day of Human Fraternity (A/RES/75/200),” United Nations, New York, https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N20/436/01/PDF/N2043601.pdf.
[25] Higher Committee of Human Fraternity, https://www.forhumanfraternity.org.
[26] Nadia Urbinati, “Democracy and Populism,” Constellations 5, no. 1 (1998): 110-124, https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-8675.00080.
[27] Sophia R.C. Johnson, “Consequences for the Orthodox Who Reject the Russkii Mir,” Centre for Geopolitics, University of Cambridge, April 5, 2022, https://www.cfg.cam.ac.uk/news/consequences-russkii-mir/.
[28] Loïc Wacquant, “Symbolic power and group-making: On Pierre Bourdieu’s reframing of class,” Journal of Classical Sociology 13, no. 2 (2013): 274-291, https://doi.org/10.1177/1468795X12468737.
