The European Union (EU) is on the brink of an unprecedented energy crisis,[1] especially in terms of the regularity of natural gas supplies and the stability of prices. These prices are continuing to rise in a manner that is alarming some experts and observers concerned with energy affairs. In light of Egypt’s expanded natural gas discoveries, production, and exports of liquefied natural gas (LNG), Egypt is in a position to take advantage of the current crisis.[2] From one perspective, Egypt could shortly become a significant energy exporter to the EU should it be able to significantly ease the European crisis by intensively exporting LNG to the EU. Others believe that Egypt’s being a key exporter of LNG to the EU is a long-term prospect that depends on other factors rather than easing the current crisis. They also believe that Egypt should take a short-term approach by maximizing its profits from LNG exports to Europe, as the EU is currently importing natural gas at higher spot prices.
This paper examines the hypothesis that Egypt can take advantage of the current gas crisis in Europe. The paper’s approach depends on accurately defining the crisis and its reasons, analyzing the status of European needs in parallel with the ability of the Egyptian natural gas market to help ease the crisis and consequently benefit in terms of improving its position in Europe as an LNG exporter looking for higher profit margins. Based on the foregoing factors, the paper forecasts that Egypt’s opportunity to benefit from the crisis in the short and the long terms depends on an objective analysis of the determinants of achieving those benefits.
Defining the crisis
The current crisis was indicated as recently as October 2021 when European countries were importing natural gas at a spot price of $31/MMBtu[3] (million British thermal units), which was nearly 6 times the average global price during the same month ($5.5/MMBtu).[4] In a longer context, the price of natural gas for imports into Europe averaged from 1.5 to 2 times the average global price during the same month of the previous five years. There remain concerns that European governments will be unable to prevent imported natural gas from going even higher, especially given that most European countries suffered substantial economic losses in 2020 and 2021 due to the outbreak of the Coronavirus pandemic.
Causes of the crisis
The natural gas crisis in Europe arose from the accumulation and complexity of less serious or less urgent problems or factors, the most prominent of which are:
A reduction in gas production: In 2020, global production of natural gas declined by 3.6%,[5] due to weaker 2019 energy investment due to low energy prices, coupled with the decline in global demand in 2020 because of precautionary Coronavirus-related lockdowns. The emergency measures taken reduced working hours, transportation needs and industrial energy requirements with consequent impacts on natural gas consumption. The continuing impacts of reduced production were accompanied by the rundown of available stocks, which in turn led to scarcity of supplies after global demand recovered once pandemic restrictions were relaxed. As a consequence, the 2021-2022 winter is deepening the crisis as demand on natural gas in both Europe and China increases as more is required for heating by households.[6]
A hesitant energy sector: Theoretically, it was expected that natural gas suppliers could meet the return of global gas demand to pre-COVID-19 rates through increasing production to previous levels keep pace with rebounding demand. However, the impact of Coronavirus and related precautionary measures has created a complex state of economic anxiety and turmoil. This has been evident in the losses of global stock exchanges seen with each new wave of an outbreak in any country or with the global emergence of a new variant such as Delta[7] and Omicron.[8] Considering the anxiety accompanying new epidemic waves, or the emergence of new mutations, lead to new lockdowns or emergency measures, shareholders, investors, and stock market speculators have reacted negatively and plunged stock markets into losses. The same uncertainty has also led major oil and natural gas companies to hold back production rates, as the risk remains that natural gas demand and prices could collapse as they did in 2020.[9] In 2020, the 11 largest oil and gas giants (Royal Dutch Shell, ExxonMobil, BP, Total, ENI, Baker Hughes, ConocoPhillips, Chevron, Equinor, Halliburton, and Schlumberger) collectively lost about $119.2 billion in revenues.[10] The potential for such losses to recur therefore deters these companies from restoring production to rates commensurate with rising demand.
Purchasing power imbalance between the EU and China: It is worth noting that while global GDP declined by 3.4% in 2020[11] as a result of the economic losses sustained due to the outbreak of COVID-19, some countries relatively less affected by the pandemic, such as China, achieved a slight growth of 2.3%.[12] However, the GDP of the EU declined by 5.9%.[13] Beijing’s containment of the virus enabled China to conclude gas purchasing contracts under futures prices that required percentages of the total contracts volumes as deposits. The EU, on the other hand, has been forced to purchase gas at the spot prices linked with the increasing demand to the extent that European countries are now paying around six times the average global price. In general, it was not self-evident that the supremacy of one country’s purchasing power at the expense of another country or alliance would cause this crisis. However, the reduced production and gas producers’ inability to keep pace with global demand has created an imbalance, with consequent sharp increases in market prices. In sum, China has been able to acquire more of the relatively limited quantities of gas available at the expense of the needs of the EU.
The tense relations between the Russia-Belarus alliance and the EU: Tensions over gas supplies between the EU and Russia do not constitute a new variable as this issue has been a constant feature of relations between the two sides since 2005. Since that year, Russia has occasionally reduced – to the point of completely cutting in some cases – gas supplies routed to Europe through the Ukrainian pipelines that connect Russian fields with European countries[14] such as the “Soyuz-Progress-Brotherhood” network. Russia has justified its actions by claiming that Ukraine had withheld quantities of gas for itself without compensating Russian suppliers or European countries, in breach of international contracts.[15] This was admitted in 2006 by Naftogaz, which operates pipelines on Ukrainian territory.[16] Accordingly, international arbitration in 2010 required the company to return 12.1 billion cubic meters (bcm) of natural gas to RosUkrEnergo, the Swiss-based company that owns the pipelines with Russia’s Gazprom as a 50% shareholder.[17] Despite Russian justifications, Naftogaz’s admissions, and the 2010 arbitration decision, European decision-makers have indicated that recurring crises mean that Russia – which alone accounts for 47% of gas exports to the EU[18] – is no longer a safe source of energy. Over the course of more than a decade, this conclusion has been supported by US officials who have concluded that Russia is politicizing gas crises to attempt to force the EU and European governments to acquiesce to demands that are not related to energy or its prices.[19] Moscow’s priorities in this regard include lifting economic sanctions imposed by the EU on Russia in response to its occupation of Crimea in 2014,[20] pressuring the EU to open new pipelines linking it to Russian gas fields, by-passing Ukraine such as Nord Stream 2,[21] and finally reducing or lifting European sanctions imposed on Belarus after the EU accused the latter of facilitating the flow of illegal African and Middle Eastern migration to Latvia, Lithuania and Poland.[22] The wider gas crisis stemming from the Coronavirus pandemic has coincided with the EU imposing new sanctions on Belarus.[23] In response, the Belarus government threatened in November 2021 to cut off gas supplies that pass through the Yamal pipeline on Belarusian territory.[24] Bloomberg reported in the same month that Yamal supplies had already fallen to a record low.[25] The European gas crisis has intensified at a point when the EU is scheduled to discuss the extension of sanctions against Russia in January 2022.[26]
Alternative suppliers disruptions: In parallel with the worsening relations between the EU on one hand and the Russian-Belarus alliance on the other hand, the production rates of the suppliers that represent alternatives to Russian imports into the EU have declined. Due to factors including maintenance issues, declines in existing field capacity, and slowed exploration, Norway’s production of natural gas has gradually declined since 2017.[27] This, in turn, led to a noticeable reduction in its gas exports that was evident before the outbreak of COVID-19 – a reduction of 7.8% between 2017 and 2020.[28] In comparison to Norway, Algeria’s natural gas exports saw a more dramatic decline of 17% during 2019,[29] a trend exacerbated by domestic protests that ultimately toppled the regime.[30] Internal political turmoil combined with the outbreak of COVID-19, led to a decline in Algeria’s natural gas exports during 2020 by more than 8% compared to 2019.[31]
Estimates of Algerian natural gas exports remain speculative given that the final statistics for the year 2021 have not yet been published. However, political tensions between Algeria and Morocco, which is one of the main transit states for Algerian gas to Europe, suggest that Algerian exports may not reach the level of 2020. Political tensions prompted Algeria to sever its relationship with Morocco in August 2021[32] and terminate contracts to supply natural gas to Europe through the Maghreb–Europe Gas Pipeline that links Algerian gas fields and terminals in Spain through Morocco.[33] As an alternative to the Maghreb-Europe pipeline, Algerian authorities are pursuing an ambitious plan to export gas to Europe through the Medgaz pipeline that connects Algeria with Spain through a pipeline under the Mediterranean.[34] However, it is to be considered here that the difference in the capacity of the two pipelines to pump gas may prevent the realization of these ambitions. The Medgaz pipeline’s capacity would be 8 bcm of natural gas annually,[35] 4.5 bcm less than the existing Maghreb-Europe pipeline’s capacity, which is 12.5 bcm of gas annually.[36] These issues are concerning given that the EU is the main market for Norwegian and Algerian gas exports. Overall, the EU’s imports of Russian natural gas have represented 39% of the EU’s total gas imports compared to Norway’s 30% and Algeria’s 13% respective share of this total.[37] It should be borne in mind that Russia is, at present, providing 47% of the EU’s imports of gas.
European gas needs (volume, usage, origin, and forms)
Due to its huge energy consumption, which amounted to 1,454 million tons of oil equivalents (mtoe) in 2019, the EU is one of the most prominent markets for energy exporters of all kinds.[38] Natural gas contributed 25% of the gross inland energy consumption in 2019, as the EU consumed 404.7 bcm of natural gas,[39] equivalent to 365 mtoe. Overall, natural gas occupies second place on the list of energy sources for the EU after petroleum and its derivatives, which contribute 34.5% of the European countries’ total energy consumption.[40]
From the 2012 statistics – the most recent issued by the EU on the uses of natural gas – gas contributed 37%, 31%, 29%, and 22% of the final energy consumption of European households (for heating, cooking and other activities respectively), services sector (mainly the generation of electricity), industrial sector, and some miscellaneous small sectors (fishing, forestry, and agriculture) respectively.[41]
Despite the importance of natural gas to the EU, especially for critical sectors like households and the industrial and services sectors, about 86.6% of the Union’s natural gas needs are imported from abroad. This means that the EU imports 350.4[42] of the total 404.7 bcm of natural gas it consumes, of which 25.3% (or 89.3 bcm) is Liquified Natural Gas (LNG).[43]
Opportunities for Egypt
Thanks to the new gas discoveries, including the Zohr gas field discovered in 2015,[44] Egypt has been able to achieve a natural gas surplus. Total production of natural gas reached 62.140 bcm in 2020,[45] while consumption reached 5.6 billion cubic feet (bcf) per day,[46] or 2.04 trillion cubic feet (tcf) per year (58 bcm).
The impact of COVID-19 appears to account for the 2020 surplus of 4.140 bcm, given that the surplus in 2019 was more than double this total. In that year, Egypt produced 69 bcm of natural gas[47] and consumed 5.7 bcf per day,[48] or 2.08 tcf during the whole year (59 bcm), with a difference of 10 bcm between production and consumption.
The Egyptian peak surplus represents 2.5% of the total of the EU natural gas requirements and 2.9% of its total gas imports. Egypt’s export strategy for this surplus is based mainly on selling it after its liquefaction in the Idku and Damietta liquefaction complexes. The two complexes were reopened in 2021 with a production capacity of 7.2 million tons of LNG annually for the first complex and 5 million tons for the second complex. This output represents a total of 12.2 million tons per year[49] (16.7 bcm), which is equal to 18.7% of the EU’s total imports of LNG.
The Egyptian authorities announced in June 2021 that Egyptian gas fields and liquefaction complexes had been producing natural gas and LNG at unprecedented rates.[50] Theoretically, Egypt could obtain immediate maximized profits as it is mainly depending on selling its LNG shipments through the spot market at spot prices[51] that remain very high compared to futures and average prices. However, it is unlikely that Egypt could benefit by actively contributing to resolving this crisis to the extent that it encourages the EU to shortly put Egypt on the list of its principal strategic gas exporters. This is due to several reasons:
The global nature of the crisis: The openness of the Egyptian market to large international oil and gas corporates such as BP, Eni, and Rosneft[52] and their partnerships with local companies in the development and production of oil and gas has integrated the Egyptian gas sector into the global market. With the severe global economic contraction in 2020, Egypt’s opportunities to extensively contribute to resolving the European crisis have been constrained. Firstly, Egypt does not expect to sacrifice LNG exports at spot prices as compensation for 2020 losses even though the EU is seeking gas imports at lower prices. Secondly, Egypt is unlikely to urgently increase the production of its gas fields to meet the current European demand, even if this were technically and logistically possible. These expectations are driven by the fact that most markets and oil and gas giants are very cautious about increasing their production rates given the imperative of avoiding losses that could occur as a result of a sudden drop in demand as happened in 2020. Demand contraction is still expected if countries return to lockdown as a precautionary measure against new outbreaks of COVID-19 or its more deadly variants. Thirdly, Egypt’s integration into the global gas market exposes its gas sector to global competition that is imbalanced in favor of China against the EU due to the superiority of Chinese purchasing power. Indeed, Egypt has been exporting shipments of LNG to China[53] as well as to the EU.[54] In other words, it can be said that the current Egyptian gas surplus – no matter how large it is – cannot be monopolized by the EU to resolve its own energy crisis because it is most likely that some Egyptian gas would be sold to China whether by spot or futures contracts.
The balance of Egyptian diplomacy: Theoretically, the import of natural gas by the EU during October 2021 at 6 times the average global prices may urge some exporters to delay or cancel the fulfillment of their obligations towards other importers, especially China, due to profit differences – which more than compensate for the penalties incurred by delaying or canceling existing obligations. But for Egypt, the balance of its diplomacy towards global powers such as the US and the EU on one hand, and Russia and China on the other hand, mitigates against Egypt violating its obligations towards any country or alliance in favor of another. The balance of the Egyptian gas market itself in receiving foreign investments in which European, American, and Russian companies are prominent reinforces the need for Egypt to continue practicing its balanced diplomacy. Also, Cairo’s foreign policy is currently based to a large extent on fulfilling Egypt’s commitments to its Arab and African neighbors as well as the requirements of the global powers. Therefore, it is expected that part of the surplus of Egyptian gas will be exported to Lebanon at the beginning of 2022 to the extent of 60 million cubic feet (mcf) of gas per day[55] or about 22 bcf per year (613 million cubic meters (mcm)).
The nature of European infrastructure: Since Egypt is not connected to the EU by gas pipelines, its exports can only be in the form of LNG, which some European countries may not be able to process at present due to lack of infrastructure. These countries, including Germany, Netherlands, Italy, and Belgium, are heavily dependent on piped natural gas (PNG) imports that are pipelined to them.[56] Such heavy dependence on PNG imports calls into question whether these countries lack the necessary infrastructure to switch to LNG for use in home heating, operating factories, generating electricity, fueling cars, and other sectors.
Egyptian gas surplus ability to contribute to resolving the crisis: The extent of Europe’s needs compared to the Egyptian surplus of natural gas, which represents a potential 2.9% of total EU imports, will likely push European governments to turn to more intensive natural gas producers and exporters such as Qatar and Oman, whose surplus and huge export potential could urgently solve Europe’s supply needs. In addition, dependence on the less intensive producers and exporters of natural gas, such as Egypt, requires negotiations with a larger number of governments and corporates, which is impractical given the urgency of European needs during the colder months.
Indirect advantages
Regardless of the uncertainty over the potential short-term benefits for Egypt, the European gas crisis could offer long-term strategic benefits for Egypt. The current shortages could, to some extent, reduce European reliance on PNG supplies that may be disrupted.
In fact, the EU has already adopted a strategy to expand its reliance on LNG at the expense of PNG for several reasons.[57] Among the most prominent of these reasons are: 1) the ability to store a strategic stockpile of LNG in contrast to the difficulty of doing the same with PNG; and 2) facilitating the openness of the EU to new natural gas markets without being linked to those markets through pipelines, which would help the EU to diversify its natural gas imports sources and reduce its dependence on piped Russian gas supplies.
However, some European countries are adopting policies that appear, to some extent, to undermine the increased focus on obtaining LNG. The German authorities are expanding projects such as the Nord Stream 2 pipeline to expand capacity to receive Russian PNG exports.[58] With regard to LNG, the German and Dutch authorities have not taken serious steps to transform their infrastructure to handle increased supplies. Accordingly, the current crisis is considered a favorable opportunity and a suitable climate for some EU countries to reconsider their policy towards LNG in a way that increases its share of European energy consumption.
Reconsidering the expansion of reliance on LNG at the expense of PNG may totally negate the feasibility of some projects that are interpreted as a competitor to Egypt’s exports of gas to the EU. One is the EastMed pipeline,[59] which is projected to link the Israeli and Cypriot offshore gas fields with Greece through the Mediterranean, enabling distribution to the EU through its 2 major pipelines, the IGB pipeline connecting Greece with Bulgaria and the Poseidon pipeline connecting Greece with Italy.
Determinants of long-term benefits for Egypt
The expansion of LNG imports at the expense of PNG or greater European willingness to import LNG are not the only factors that will determine the extent to which Egypt will benefit from increased gas exports. Egypt faces competition for the export of LNG from Qatar and Oman, as well as from Russia, Norway, and Algeria – the traditional exporters of natural gas to the EU. Therefore, the extent to which Egypt will benefit depends on several determinants, namely:
Increasing production: Expanding gas discoveries and increasing productivity from the currently proven reserves, as the maximum total Egyptian production of natural gas (69 bcm) represents about 3.2% of the total proven Egyptian gas reserves of 77 tcf[60] (2.186 trillion cubic meters (tcm). This contrasts with current production levels ranging from 5.7% to 9% of proven gas reserves in countries with similar levels of reserves to Egypt. These countries include Norway (72.358 tcf / 2.049 tcm)[61] and Canada (71.794 tcf / 2.033 tcm),[62] where the rate of the annual production in the former is 116.2 bcm[63] and in the latter 183 bcm.[64] Egypt also needs to maximize the efficiency of its liquefaction complexes so that they better process additional Egyptian gas or surplus gas from Egypt’s regional partners such as Israel and Cyprus. These two countries have agreed to liquefy their surplus gas in Egypt for export abroad, including the EU.[65] Signing similar agreements with other countries may offer a quicker means to increase the volumes of natural gas refined at Egypt’s liquefaction complexes. It is possible that Iraq and Greece, which currently lack significant capabilities to liquefy gas, could be potential new partners with which Egypt might conclude such agreements.
Expanding futures agreements: The volatility of PNG prices in Europe in recent months is indicated by import contracts valued between $1150-2000/thousand cubic meters of gas[66] ($32.5-56.6/MMBtu) signed in October 2021 between Russia and the Netherlands. Gazprom, the Russian natural gas giant company, is currently negotiating with EU governments to solve the crisis by maintaining the price of gas exported from Russia to Europe in the range of $200-400/thousand cubic meters ($5.7-11.32/MMBtu),[67] which was the usual rate of Russian gas export prices to the EU from 2004 to 2020. If prices were to fall to that level, LNG prices may concern some European governments, as LNG prices usually outperform PNG prices, with recent LNG spot prices ranging from $31-34/MMBtu.[68] Of course, this price discrepancy requires exporters of LNG to expand futures contracts with the EU, in which LNG is priced based on a well-established level of 11%-12% of Brent crude oil prices[69] to maintain costs for importers at an acceptable level. Based on this equation, the price of LNG would range between $8.4-9.13/MMBtu according to the current price of Brent crude oil, which is estimated at $76.08.[70] That price seems competitive compared to the maximum price of $11.32/MMBtu at which Russia seeks to export gas to the EU. But if the price were to fall to $5.7/MMBtu, this may require LNG exporters to reconsider their price in relation to Brent crude. Some gas-exporting countries have already started to take this approach, such as Qatar, which concluded its recent futures contracts with Pakistan and China in March 2021, based on a price set at 10.2% of Brent crude oil.[71]
Creating more attractive alternatives: Anticipating future trends in the energy market, the Egyptian authorities have begun to pay special attention to the electrical interconnection between Egypt, Africa, Europe, and Asia. This ambitious project represents a creative alternative for Egypt to avoid the fierce competition for LNG exports to the EU and manage fluctuating natural gas prices. This seems prescient given that 21% of the total electric power generated by EU countries (2,556 tWh annually)[72] comes from gas-operated power plants.[73] In other words, the EU’s import of electricity directly from Egypt as an alternative may obviate the union from importing part of its gas needs, whether liquefied or compressed. Theoretically, the Egyptian gas surplus is sufficient to produce about 105 tWh of electric power, which represents 4.1% of the total electricity needs of the EU and 19.6% of the total electric power produced by the EU from natural gas, which is estimated at 537 tWh. Expanding Egyptian electricity exports to Europe would require substantial investments to establish power plants and electricity networks. Egypt has already spent 6 billion euros[74] ($6.77 billion) on power plants that can meet the needs of 40 million Egyptians[75] at a yearly consumption rate of 1,683 kWh per capita,[76] amounting to 67.32 tWh in total. However, electricity export revenues could rapidly compensate the costs of investments as 1 MMBtu of gas can produce about 293 kWh of electricity. Taking into account that the average price of electricity for European households is 0.22 euros per kWh[77] ($0.25), this means that electrical production from 1 MMBtu of natural gas could be sold to Europe at $73.25 – eight times the maximum expected price of exporting LNG to the EU ($9.13/MMBtu).
Conclusion:
In sum, it can be concluded that Egypt can achieve unprecedented profits from exporting LNG to the EU at spot prices. However, Egypt cannot benefit from the European gas crisis in the short term by competing with established strategic suppliers of natural gas due to the complexity of the global energy crisis, the interconnectedness of the Egyptian gas sector with the global market, the relatively modest Egyptian gas surplus compared to the Europe’s requirements, and the current deficiencies in European infrastructure to process and distribute LNG at this time. However, in the long term, the crisis may lead to a significant shift in EU gas imports from PNG to LNG, allowing Egypt to be one of the top exporters to the continent. This depends on the Egyptian authorities being able to increase production, conclude more futures contracts, and adopt more creative, competitive and innovative projects for maximizing the benefits of its gas surplus, including exporting surplus electrical power generation to the EU.
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Note: The study excludes the United Kingdom gas consumption of 7.479 billion cubic feet (bcf) / day, 2,730 bcf/year (77.3 bcm), from the total gas consumption of the EU.
Source: https://www.ceicdata.com/en/indicator/united-kingdom/natural-gas-consumption
[40] Eurostat, ‘Energy statistics – an overview’. Source: https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php?title=Energy_statistics_-_an_overview#:~:text=As%20for%20the%20structure%20of,crude%20oil%20and%20natural%20gas.
[41] European Environment Agency (2015), ‘Final energy consumption by sector and fuel’. Source: https://www.eea.europa.eu/data-and-maps/indicators/final-energy-consumption-by-sector-8/assessment-2
[42] European Commission (2020), ‘Quarterly Report Energy on European Gas Markets with focus on the impact of global LNG markets on EU gas imports, Market Observatory for Energy, DG Energy, Volume 12, (issue 4, fourth quarter of 2019)’, Page 3. Source: https://ec.europa.eu/energy/sites/ener/files/quarterly_report_on_european_gas_markets_q4_2019_final.pdf
Note: The study excludes the United Kingdom gas imports, of 47.620 bcm/year, from the EU total gas imports.
Source: https://www.ceicdata.com/en/indicator/united-kingdom/natural-gas-imports
[43] Ibid.
Note: The study excludes the United Kingdom LNG imports of 18.7 bcm/year from the EU total LNG imports.
[44] Michal Addady (2015), ‘This energy company just found the ‘largest-ever’ gas field in the Mediterranean Sea’, Fortune. Source: https://fortune.com/2015/08/31/natural-gas-egypt-eni-zohr/
[45] CEIC Data, ‘Egypt Natural Gas Production: OPEC: Marketed Production’. Source: https://www.ceicdata.com/en/indicator/egypt/natural-gas-production-opec-marketed-production
[46] CEIC Data, ‘Egypt Natural Gas: Consumption’. Source: https://www.ceicdata.com/en/indicator/egypt/natural-gas-consumption
[47] CEIC Data, ‘Egypt Natural Gas Production: OPEC: Marketed Production’. Source: https://www.ceicdata.com/en/indicator/egypt/natural-gas-production-opec-marketed-production
[48] CEIC Data, ‘Egypt Natural Gas: Consumption’. Source: https://www.ceicdata.com/en/indicator/egypt/natural-gas-consumption
[49] Mona Sukkarieh (2021), ‘The East Mediterranean Gas Forum: Regional cooperation amid conflicting interests’, Natural Resource Governance Institute. Source: https://resourcegovernance.org/sites/default/files/documents/the_east_mediterranean_gas_forum_regional_cooperation_amid_conflicting_interests_0.pdf
[50] Sayed al-Abnoudy (2021), ‘Petroleum Ministry: Egypt’s production of natural gas has risen to unprecedented levels’, Al-Dostor. Source: https://www.dostor.org/3469218
[51] Yasmin Saleem (2021), ‘An energy crisis hits Europe, will Egypt’s natural gas exports benefit?’, Masrawy. Source: https://bit.ly/31U4faa
[52] Daily News Egypt (2019), ‘Zohr’s gas production hits 11.3bn cm mark in 1H19: Rosneft’. Source: https://dailynewsegypt.com/2019/08/15/zohrs-gas-production-hits-11-3bn-cm-mark-in-1h19-rosneft/
[53] Youssef Jaber (2021), ‘Egypt exports 7 shipments of LNG in 2021, China tops the list of importers’, Al-Ahram Gate. Source: https://gate.ahram.org.eg/News/2567139.aspx
[54] Yasmin Saleem (2021), ‘Egypt exports the first shipment of LNG from the Damietta complex to Europe after an 8-year hiatus’, Masrawy. Source: https://bit.ly/32085yd
[55] Marina Raouf (2021), ‘Petroleum Ministry reveals the details of exporting natural gas to Lebanon: 60 million cubic feet per day’, Elwatan News. Source: https://www.elwatannews.com/news/details/5825209
[56] Statista, ‘Natural gas imports by type in Europe in 2020, by country’. Source: https://www.statista.com/statistics/332218/gas-trade-imports-in-selected-countries-in-europe/
[57] Council of European Union (2016), ‘Liquefied Natural Gas and gas storage will boost EU’s energy security’. Source: https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/hu/MEMO_16_310
[58] Deutsche Welle (2021), ‘Germany insists Nord Stream 2 will not threaten EU gas supply’. Source: https://www.dw.com/en/germany-insists-nord-stream-2-will-not-threaten-eu-gas-supply/a-59633894
[59] Anadolu Agency (2020), ‘EastMed threatens Egypt’s dreams of becoming a regional energy hub’. Source: https://bit.ly/3s35MFN
[60] World Meter, ‘Natural Gas Reserves by Country’. Source: https://www.worldometers.info/gas/gas-reserves-by-country/
[61] Ibid.
[62] Ibid.
[63] CEIC Data, ‘Norway Natural Gas Production: OPEC: Marketed Production’. Source: https://www.ceicdata.com/en/indicator/norway/natural-gas-production-opec-marketed-production
[64] CEIC Data, ‘Canada Natural Gas Production: OPEC: Marketed Production’. Source: https://www.ceicdata.com/en/indicator/canada/natural-gas-production-opec-marketed-production
[65] Energy Egypt (2020), ‘Egypt and Cyprus are in extensive discussion on planned gas pipeline’. Source: https://energyegypt.net/egypt-cyprus-are-in-extensive-discussions-on-planned-natural-gas-pipeline/
[66] Olga Tanas and Dina Khrennikova (2021), ‘Russia Wants Gas Price 60% Lower to Keep Energy Grip on Europe’, Bloomberg. Source: https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2021-10-26/russia-wants-gas-price-60-lower-to-keep-energy-grip-on-europe
[67] Ibid.
[68] Marwa Rashad (2021), ‘Analysis: LNG markets eye record prices in race to replenish stocks’, Reuters. Source: https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/lng-markets-eye-record-prices-race-replenish-stocks-2021-11-17/
[69] Marwa al-Ghoul (2021), ‘OAPEC: LNG prices rise in futures agreements in the second quarter of 2021’, Youm7. Source: http://www.youm7.com/5430555
[70] Shruti Wilson (2021), ‘What happened in the prices of petrol and diesel, know today’s prices here’, News Track Live. Source: https://english.newstracklive.com/news/what-happened-in-the-prices-of-petrol-and-diesel-know-todays-prices-here-ta303-1198163-1.html
[71] Khalid Mustafa (2021), ‘Cheaper LNG deal signed with Qatar’, The News International. Source: https://www.thenews.com.pk/print/796105-cheaper-lng-deal-inked-with-qatar
[72] Eurostat, ‘Electricity production, consumption and market overview’. Source: https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php?title=Electricity_production,_consumption_and_market_overview
Note: The study excludes UK electricity generation of 18.675 tWh/month, 224 tWh/year.
Source: https://www.ceicdata.com/en/united-kingdom/electricity-overview/electricity-total-generation
[73] Statista, ‘Share of natural gas in electricity and heat generation and overall energy consumption in the European Union in 2019’. Source: https://www.statista.com/statistics/1270873/natural-gas-share-in-eu-energy-use/
[74] Reuters (2018), ‘Egypt inks $352 mln deal with Siemens to manage power stations’. Source: https://www.reuters.com/article/egypt-power/egypt-inks-352-mln-deal-with-siemens-to-manage-power-stations-idUKL8N1W63Q3
[75] Seimens Energy, ‘Egypt Megaproject’. Source: https://www.siemens-energy.com/mea/siemens-energy-in-middle-east/company/megaprojects/egypt-megaproject.html
[76] World Bank, ‘Electric power consumption (kWh per capita) – Egypt, Arab Rep.’. Source: https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/EG.USE.ELEC.KH.PC?locations=EG
[77] Eurostat, ‘Electricity price statistics’. Source: https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php?title=Electricity_price_statistics
